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law has ever been more misrepresented or misunderstood than the bankrupt law passed at the extra session. Provisions not contained in the law have been ascribed to it; while those it does contain have been so perverted and misrepresented as to make a false and delusive impression on the public mind. In its enactments, in its general provisions, and in its details, in its spirit and meaning, in its tendencies, and in its practical influences upon the morals and general welfare of society, it has everywhere been misrepresented, and almost everywhere misunderstood. Its plain provisions, calculated and designed to protect the rights and advance the best interests of both debtor and creditor, saving the former from oppression and the latter from fraud, have been represented as adverse to all the best interests of the community. A thousand popular prejudices have been most unjustly waked up, having no just foundation in the provisions of the law itself, but springing from a desire of politicians to operate on pending popular elections. This is to be regretted-deeply regretted-as calculated to mislead the popular mind, and prevent a fair and calm decision of the people.

Before the late presidential election, both political parties professed themselves in favor of a bankrupt law, and stood committed before the country for its passage. The proof of this is clear and positive, and is to be found in the recorded votes, the debates, and general history of the times. General Harrison and Mr. Van Buren, the candidates of the respective parties for the Presidency, while in the Senate of the United States, had declared, by their votes and speeches, that they were in favor of the passage of a bankrupt law, with only this `difference: Mr. Van Buren thought it should embrace merchants and traders only; while General Harrison contended that it ought equally and without distinction, to extend its benefits to all classes of society. Which of these plans is preferable, is not my purpose now to examine; certainly, however, it may be safely assumed that the plan advocated by General Harrison was then, and is now, most conformable to popular sentiment. It is my sole purpose, at present, to show that both General Harrison and Mr. Van Buren were the open and avowed advocates of a bankrupt law. Mr. Van Buren was a member of the committee that reported the bill of 1826; and, in his remarks in the Senate on that bill, avowed himself strongly in favor of a bankrupt law, and declared he was in its favor, (to use his own language,) "not only because he was satisfied that a great proportion of his immediate constituents desired it, but because he believed their claim upon Congress, for the exercise of its constitutional powers in this respect, could be sustained on the ground of policy as well as justice." Mr. Van Buren, on the first vote taken, voted against the bill-not on account of the general principle, but on account of a feature contained in it which he objected to; but, on the other friends of the bill agreeing to remove this objection, he voted for the reconsideration, and he and General Harrison, side by side, voted for the bill on the question of engrossment for its final passage.

Mr. Tyler and Col. R. M. Johnson, the candi dates for the Vice Presidency, were also in favor of a bankrupt law, and have since reiterated their opinions the former in a message to Congress, the latter in a published letter. With these candidates for the Presidency and Vice Presidency, all avowedly and openly in favor of the passage of a bankrupt law, did the respective political parties enter the contest which resulted in the Whig victory of 1840. If the question was not fully discussed before the people, it was because, both parties being in favor of the measure, it was not made a matter of controversy. Politicians, then, of all parties, saw wisdom, beauty, good policy, and humanity, in a bankrupt law. It was inscribed on every banner; and the unfortunate, and the friends of the unfortunate, (who were, and I hope now are, far more numerous than the unfortunate themselves,) were told that, no difference where victory might perch, the passage of this measure, at least, was safe.

But the proof that both parties in that contest were for a bankrupt law, and stood pledged for its passage, does not stop here. There is still behind clearer and more unanswerable evidence, not only that both parties were the avowed advocates of the measure, but showing, also, what were the principles and proposed provisions of that measure. For this I refer to the Congressional Globe and Appendix of 1840. Two bills, each providing for a uni

The Bankrupt Law-Mr. M. Brown.

form system of bankruptcy, were reported to the Senate, emanating from the two political parties. Mr. Benton, speaking of these two bills, (see Appendix to Congressional Globe, page 502,) said:

"Three members of the Judiciary Committee have reported one bill; two members have reported another; and these two bills emanate from the two political parties which, under whatsoever names, have existed in this country for fifty years."

These two bills were reported, one by Mr. Clayton, (Whig,) the other by Mr. Wall, a leader of the Van Buren party. After giving his objections to Mr. Clayton's bill-objecting to it on the ground that it was, as he alleged, partial and unequal, not extending its benefits alike to all, and limited to two years' duration-Mr. Benton then turned to Mr. Wall's bill, and said:

"The other (that is, Mr. Wall's bill) is a general bill, looking to the rights of creditors as well as to the relief of debtors-intended for the future as well as for the present and past--applicable to corporations as well as to persons-embracing the compulsory as well as the voluntary feature--and making provision for those who are not, as well as those who are, technically merchants and traders."

Another prominent objection urged by Mr. Benton against Mr. Clayton's Whig bill, and reason why he preferred Mr. Wall's Democratic bill, may be seen by the following extract of his speech:

"There is to be (said Mr. Benton, referring to his objections to Mr. Clayton's bill) a line of division between the debtors--a horizontal line; those above the line are to have relief-those below it are denied it. This results from the amount which the debtor must owe in order to entitle himself to the benefits of its provisions. The bill provides for an amount, and leaves the sum in blank. Will the reporter of the bill, said Mr. B., (addressing himself to Mr. Clayton of Delaware,) name the amount which it is proposed to insert?

"Mr. Clayton said he had not been instructed to move a particular sum, but five hundred dollars had been mentioned in the committee.

"Mr. B. continued. Five hundred dollars. That was the sum mentioned in the committee, and no other sum is mentioned here. Five hundred dollars must be considered, then, as the amount necessary to be owed, to entitle a person to the relief of this act. Now, this is arbitrary and unequal; it cuts off the small dealers, the persons of little property, the laborers; it cuts them off from the benefit of the act, and operates as an encouragement to people to go largely in debt, as the large debtors are to be relieved, and the small ones not. It makes the act exclusively for large dealers; and this, contrary to the principle of equality which is professed in the bill, and without any foundation in reason and justice. The weight of debt is relative, not absolute. It depends on the amount of the debtor's property, and not upon the amount of the debt. To one man, a debt of one hundred dollars is as much as a hundred thousand or a million is to another. To one man five hundred dollars is as much as five hundred thousand is to another; and, beyond question, the most numerous class of debtors in the Únited States are those who owe less than the minimum proposed in this bill. But these small debtors, numerous as they are, are disregarded and overlooked by the bill. They are to work out their debts in sorrow and in misery, carrying their endless load to the grave; while the dashers, the large debtors, clear out theirs by a declaration and surrender."

Again: Mr. Benton said, speaking with reference to the coming presidential election:

"I do not think the present session the propitious one for beneficial action on this subject. Five hundred thousand voters, demanding the passage of a law on the eve of an election, must have an influence on the hopes and fears of the lawgiver, as well as on his judgment and conscience. Since they have waited so long, I should have preferred a delay of a few months more. Still, the subject is before us, and we are here; and I am willing to act, and to do what I believe to be my duty. I am ready to assist in framing an act which shall be general in its provisions, and just in its application; which shall do justice to the creditor as well as the debtor; which shall apply to trading and moneydealing corporations as well as to trading and money-dealing individuals; which shall be compulsory with regard to traders and dealers, whether natural or artificial; which shall be optional with respect

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to other classes of the community, and which shall distinguish between misfortune and misconduct."

Again, in another place, he adds: "The bill of the minority (Mr. Wall's bill) furnishes the true basis for the enactment of a bankrupt system."

He says:

Now, Mr. Speaker, here is the direct testimony of Mr. Benton on two points: First, that Mr. Wall's bill originated with, and emanated from, the Van Buren party, to which he and Mr. Wall belonged; and, second, that it furnished the true basis for the enactment of a bankrupt system. "These two bills emanate from the two political parties, which, under whatsoever names, have existed in this country for fifty years." He also says that Mr. Wall's bill, emanating from, and put forth to the country by the Van Buren party, furnished "the true basis for the enactment of a bankrupt sys

lem."

Now, sir, it is material, in tracing the standing of parties on this question, to know what were the Democratic features of this Democratic bill report ed by Mr. Wall, and held forth to the anxious hopes of a suffering country by the Van Buren party, during the pendency of the presidential election. What were its features? Did it embrace the past as well as the future? Did it discharge contracts made before the passage of the law? Did it, in a word, contain any or all the provisions that have been urged as objections to the law of the extra session? The original bill is now before me. Its provisions may be seen, and I invite investigation. It was reported in April preceding the presidential election, by Mr. Wall, as the organ of the minority of the Committee on the Judiciary, and is Senate bill No. 324. What does Mr. Wall himself say of this bill, which, according to the then opinions of that party, was the true basis for the enactment of a bankrupt law? Mr. Wall says: (Appendix Globe, 462:)

"It is intended to act both retrospectively and prospectively. It looks upon the past, not to condemn, but to relieve. The whole land is strewed with the wrecks of bankruptcy, and we cannot look in any direction without perceiving the jetsam et flotsam of trade cast upon the shores. All must admit the fact, however much they may disagree as to the causes, that the state of things has resulted from the contractions and expansions of the currency; and that the fluctuations growing out of it have impaired all business depending on prices, the hazards and vicissitudes incident to commerce and trade. The best energies of the country have been paralyzed; the brightest visions of gain have disappeared; and the wisest and most prudent schemes, uniting public improvement with individual interest, have perished, as if by magic, in the universal revulsion that has desolated the country. This bill proposes to cast the mantle of oblivion over the past conduct of the debtor, over his acts which may have been compelled, or the preferences which may have been extorted, in his vain struggles to prolong his existence in the marts of trade. All that it demands from the debtor who seeks its benefits, is, that he should honestly surrender what is left, however small, for the general benefit of his creditors."

Now, Mr. Speaker, with the lights thrown upon this subject by Mr. Benton and Mr. Wall, and with the bill itself before us, let us compare its features with the one passed at the extra session, against which so much prejudice has been excited; and, to effect this the more clearly, let us trace the leading objections raised to the bill passed at the extra ses sion, and which have been seized upon to render it unpopular.

The first and chief objection to that law has been its retrospective operation-that is, its operation on contracts entered into prior to the passage of the law. Did Mr. Wall's bill contain this feature? Mr. Benton and Mr. Wall settle this in the affirmative. Mr. Benton says "it was intended for the future, as well as the present and past." Mr. Wall says "it was intended to act both retrospectively and prospectively;" that it looked to "the past, not to condemn, but to relieve;" that it proposed "to cast the mantle of oblivion over the past conduct of the debtor;" and that all it demanded from the debtor was, "that he should honestly surrender what is left, however small, for the general benefit of his creditors."

It is certain, therefore, that this plan of a bank. rupt law, emanating from the Van Buren party, and promised to a suffering country, in the event of the continuance of that party in power, did embrace

27TH CONG......3D SESS.

past transactions; it was designed to wipe out debts contracted before the passage of the law.

It is true that Mr. Benton was a little afraid that so many voters, who were unfortunately ruined, and now demanding relief, might, on the eve of an election, have an undue influence on the "hopes and fears," as well as the "judgment and conscience" of the lawgiver; and he preferred, that as they had waited so long, and suffered so long, they would wait on, and suffer on, until after they had given their votes at the then approaching presidential election. But after they had given their votes, and the election was over, and the danger of the "judgment and conscience" of the lawgiver being improperly influenced by the "hopes and fears" growing out of that election had passed, then these unfortunate men were to have relief. Yes, relief! And that, too, at the hands of the Van Buren party. Not relief from debts that might be contracted after the passage of the law; not from future debts-for in this, these unfortunate men had no more concern than others; but from present and past contracts-from debts contracted before the passage of the law. And this promise to the unfortunate was not allowed to hang on general and vague declarations; but the bill itself, Democratic in all its features, and emanating from the hands of the Van Buren party, was held up to the hope of those whose fortunes had been wasted by the sad reverses of the times, and who had nothing left but their good names, and their votes and influence at the ballot-box. Mr. Benton even then declared his readiness to act, and to act promptly; and others declared the same; but it so happened that nothing was done. The subject was left open, both parties professing to be for the measure, and standing pledged for its passage. Did we then hear of the demoralizing consequences of a bankrupt law? Did we then hear anything of this effort now making all over the country to degrade and dishonor those who ask relief? Nothing of all this was heard. It was then regarded by all as right, virtuous, and honorable, for the unfortunate to ask relief; and a constitutional, virtuous, and patriotic duty in Congress to grant it. Seeing this, Mr. Webster rose and congratulated the Senate and the country that this subject "did not connect itself with any of the party contests of the day;" and spoke of it "as a green spot in the midst of the fiery deserts of party strife."

This, sir, is the manner in which this subject was treated by all parties before the presidential election.

And here let me pause, and ask a question obviously suggested by these facts. I invite a response from the candid and honest of all parties. Seeing that both parties, during the presidential canvass, had promised relief to the unfortunate, and given assurances of the passage of a bankrupt law; seeing that all the candidates for the Presidency and Vice Presidency had inscribed this promise on their banners, and none objected to it; seeing that two plans, emanating from the two political parties, both retrospective in their operation, had been held out as rivals for popular favor,-was not the extra session of Congress bound to conclude that these facts had given undoubted evidence of public opinion on the subject? Add to this, that a flood of petitions rolled in from every quarter of the Union, signed by men of all parties-by those who were insolvent and by those who were rich-and presented here on this floor by members of all parties, with scarcely a petition or other evidence of popular opinion on the other side-was it not reasonable to arrive at the conclusion, that the public judgment was in favor of a bankrupt law? Sir, this was the impression made on my mind; and I doubt not was made on a majority of the House at the time. Sir, it cannot be concealed that the reason why many, very many, of the opposition on this floor voted against the law, was not because of their convictions against it; but because of a determination, founded in party policy, to throw the responsibility of all measures on the Whigs. But

to return.

Another objection to the law of the extra session is, that it embraces not only the compulsory, but the voluntary feature also. Mr. Wall's bill did the same; for which we also have the direct testimony of Mr. Benton. He says it embraced "the compulsory as well as the voluntary feature."

Another objection to the law of the extra session is, that it includes those who are not, as well as those who are, merchants and traders. Mr. Wall's bill did the same, It included all classes--none

The Bankrupt Law-Mr. M. Brown.

were left out of its provisions. Mr. Benton said it made provisions "for those who are not, as well as those who are, technically merchants and traders."

Another objection to the bill of the extra session is, that it extends down to sums too small. Mr. Wall's bill extended to all sums, and Mr. Benton lauded this as a most Democratic feature; it was, indeed and emphatically, the poor man's bankrupt law-not for your large debtors and "dashers" merely, but for small debtors also. Yes, sir; and I venture to say, that if the law of the extra session had failed to include small debtors, and had been confined to large ones, it would have been pronounced a most odious discrimination, designed to favor large and reckless speculators.

Another objection to the law of the extra session is, that it discharges the debtor without the consent of the creditor. Mr. Wall's bill did the same. The debtor's discharge depended not on the consent of a part or of all his creditors, but on the decision of a court and jury.

Again: it has been objected that the provision under this law of the extra session, allowing the bankrupt an amount, at the discretion of the court, not in any case to exceed $300, was too liberal. Mr. Wall's bill went much beyond this. It allowed the bankrupt his clothes, &c., his tools of trade, household and kitchen furniture, two cows, &c., and also all that was allowed by the insolvent laws of the respective States. Not only this; but he was to be allowed one dollar a day for attendance before the court, and also not exceeding three dollars per week for each member of his family, for their support for a time not exceeding two months. And if, on final discharge of an appeal, the bankrupt's estate paid fifty cents in the dollar, he was to be allowed five per cent. of his estate, provided the per cent. did not amount to over $500. Mr. Wall's bill was, therefore, far the most liberal in its allowance. If the bill of the extra session in this respect was wrong, Mr. Wall's bill was still worse.

Another objection urged to the law of the extra session is, that it discharges the obligation existing between security and principal. Mr. Wall's bill did the same. Besides, this law is far better guarded against fraud, than_that_proposed by Mr. Wall and his political friends. This law excepts out of its benefits defaulters to the Government-that did not. This law excepts out of its benefits delinquent executors, administrators, guardians, trustees, &c.-that did not.

I might trace the parallel between these two bills further; but it is useless. My purpose has been to show--what is the fact--that every feature in the law of the extra session which has been deemed exceptionable, and has been seized upon and perverted for the purpose of making it unpopular, for political effect, is to be found in the bill reported by Mr. Wall, and held forth by the Van Buren party, before the late presidential election, as the bow of promise to a country deluged by revolutions and disasters. I might do more. I could, by pursuing the parallel between these bills, show that, while that of the extra session contains no feature deemed objectionable which is not to be found in that of Mr. Wall, it is far better guarded against frauds. But this I leave for those who may be curious to pursue the subject; repeating, however, that I invite investigation.

The chief, if not the only, distinction in principle, between these bills, is, that Mr. Wall's included banks and other corporations; and that of the extra session does not. But all will agree, that the law of the extra session, if unpopular, does not owe its unpopularity to this. Besides, it will be seen that the provision in Mr. Wall's bill on this subject would have been entirely inoperative. It provided that any State might release its banks and other corporations from the operations of the law. This rendered its provisions unequal and not uniform, and therefore unconstitutional. It made it inoperative and useless, because the States would generally, if not always, grant the exemption, and render the law of Congress powerless.

Having tried to explain, with as much clearness and fairness as I could, the standing of all parties on this question, and shown that all, in some form or other, have declared in favor of a uniform system of bankruptcy, I come to the direct questionought this law now to be repealed?

The power to pass the law is engrafted into the Constitution, and comes to us by the sanction of the wisdom of our fathers. This power was conferred on the Federal Government by a

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vote of all the States but one. The opinions of Washington, of Madison, of Marshall, and a host of others, constituting a large majority of our greatest and best men, living and dead, stand recorded in favor of the wisdom and policy of a bankrupt law. We have the example, in some form or other, of every commercial nation on earth. Should we not then pause before we hastily, and under an excitement raised by misrepresentations and misunderstandings of its spirit and object, erase this law from the statute-book, leaving behind it prejudices deep and lasting against all laws on the subject, that will, perhaps, in all future time, cause this wise provision of the Constitution to remain a dead letter? If the law is defective, ought we not to amend, rather than destroy it?

The leading, if not the only popular, objections to this law, have been drawn from its retrospective action-its operation on past contracts. Nearly all have declared in favor of a law to operate on future contracts. This bill for repeal, in the form it is likely to pass, retains the retrospective, and only repeals the prospective feature-that is, it retains the part supposed to be unpopular, and repeals that which is a favorite with all!

The first operation of the law is its retrospective feature, which is favorable to debtors: its second operation is its prospective feature, which is favorable to creditors. Why allow it to operate in part, and then repeal it? The law was designed as a system looking to the future, as well as the present and the past-looking to the rights of creditors, as well as debtors. Why allow it to operate in favor of one class, and then, by repeal, prevent its operation in favor of the other? This law, by this repeal bill, is in danger of mutilation-in danger of being rendered useless, if not injurious, by cutting asunder parts essential to the value and vitality of each other.

It is not designed to repeal the bankrupt law as a whole, but to repeal one-half of it only; and the part proposed to be repealed is that which is objected to by no one. This is a strange state of the question. An excitement has been gotten up, and, for political effect, this law has been misrepresented, and distorted, and denounced, all over the country, as partial in its operation, and discharging debtors without any corresponding benefit to creditors. Creditors, looking only at the first operations of the law, have been induced erroneously to suppose it injurious to their interests; and now, before that part which is unquestionably beneficial to them can be brought fairly into exercise, and fully understood by the country, it is to be repealed, and the law is to be prevented from vindicating its own wisdom by time and experience.

Sir, in these times, so sadly out of joint, when a temporary triumph in a popular election is more looked to than the permanent good of the country, and when patriotism in the breasts of many is extinguished by motives of party and personal elevation, it is not remarkable that this law should have been misrepresented. Though blessed with but little foresight, I foresaw and foretold this in the remarks I made on the bill before its passage at the extra session. I hope I shall be pardoned for reading from my printed speech what I then said. After giving my general views on the subject, I said:

"I know that it takes time to develop the operation of any system. The people have to learn and become accustomed to it, in order properly to appreciate its value. I know this system will go out like a stranger, who must not expect to gain full confidence before he has formed his acquaintance in the community. I know, sir, that a thousand prejudices will be raised against it. But if the people will sustain it until it has passed its day of tria), as I believe they will, the consequences will be happy and glorious. The silent but potent influence of this system in regulating society, and in improving the morals of the country, may not at once be seen; but in the end it will be developed, and its powerful influence will be universally acknowledged.

"Every important change in our social condition must meet with opposition. It breaks in on previously-formed opinions and long-established habits of thinking, and must therefore be for a while viewed with distrust, and regarded by some as a troublesome intruder. It is this that gives me the only uneasiness I feel about this measure, in the event of its passage."

Sir, after listening, with the most anxious desire for the truth, to all that has been said against this law, I have an unchanged opinion, that, if sustained by the people, and allowed to remain unrepealed

27TH CONG....3D SESS.

until it shall have been tested by time and experience, it will do much permanent good.

This law, in its prospective operation, is calcu lated to prevent fraud, by cutting off fraudulent conveyances and dishonest preferences. It aims a deadly blow at all conveyances designed to defraud creditors. It subjects the debtor who makes them to its compulsory process, and gives to the honest creditor a most efficient and effective remedy against fraud and concealment.

Again: it not only furnishes the most powerful weapons against dishonesty, but it holds out the strongest inducements for honesty. In this it will improve the morals of the country, and save many a cheek from the blush of guilt. The man who has been in affluence, but finds himself scathed by a stroke of misfortune, too often finds an excuse to his own conscience for concealing, in the hands of his friends, something to give bread to those who are helpless and dependent on him. This is wrong; but many will do it as long as the law allows no final relief or discharge. If the creditor gives up all, still he is in bondage. The little he may earn by the sweat of his brow, to supply the wants of those dependent on him, is subject to be taken. In this condition, he yields to the temptation, and conceals his property. This, I repeat, is wrong. But, Iask, is not the law wrong that leads him into this temptation? Is it not better to say to him, Give up honestly and fully all you have, and you shall go free? Will he not give up all? Will he not be saved from temptation? And will not his integrity be preserved? And, I will add, will not creditors, under the operation of this motive, acting on debtors, get more than they otherwise would?

This law provides for equality in the distribution of the debtor's property, and forbids unfair and unjust preferences given to favorite and confidential creditors. This cuts up by the roots the largest and most fruitful source of fraud and injustice. Go into your courts of chancery and of law, and inquire what opens the most extensive harvest in the field of litigation; and you will find that it is the permission which the law has heretofore given to debtors to divide out their property among a portion of their creditors, to the total exclusion of all others. A man, for example, doing an extensive business, finds himself in sinking circumstances, and immediately determines to save his friends-and that, perhaps, with the secret understanding that they shall save him from the danger of wanting sufficient means to play the gentleman upon. An assignment, a mortgage, or a deed of trust, is executed, by which all his property is at once transferred to those confidential creditors and friends, appointing some one in the confidence and under the control of the debtor as trustee. And it is very common for the trustee and creditors to commence operations by appointing the debtor himself their agent to conduct the business and wind up its concerns. Other creditors, seeing this, and feeling the injustice done them, go to law for what they conceive to be their rights; but, in the end, they are generally turned out of court, having learned, to their cost, that the law tolerated these mortgages, assignments, and deeds of trust; and that it was within the sovereign pleasure of the debtor to give his property to either of his creditors, though it might be a father, a brother, or a son.

Take another example of frequent occurrence. A man-a merchant, for example-in casting up his accounts, makes the unwelcome discovery that his debts exceed his credits-that he is unable to meet his engagements. He is willing to give up all at once, it that would discharge him; but the State laws do not allow this. Though nine-tenths of his creditors should agree to his discharge, the others may hold him in bondage to the day of his death. Having, therefore, nothing to gain, and much to lose, by bringing his business to a close and making a full surrender to his creditors, he becomes desperate, and resolves to go on and put every thing to the hazard of a bold enterprise, and risk his fortune and future hopes on a single adventure. In the language of a distinguished orator and statesman of South Carolina, "If he should succeed, he is saved; and if he fails, he can only perish; which, as ruin already stares him in the face, will not render his condition much worse than it is. Being driven by the force of circumstances to this determination, the means of executing it are at hand. He has friends; the banks are open to them; loans are obtained by means of endorsements of men in good credit, under a solemn pledge that, come what may, there shall be no departure from

The Exchequer-Mr. Barnard.

the modern code of honor, which makes it the most sacred of duties to secure the friendly endorser, no matter at whose expense, or at what sacrifice of feeling or principle. With a fictitious credit, thus created and thus supported, the debtor engages boldly in a species of commercial gambling. The luck is against him, and his doom is sealed. But though he must perish, he resolves to fall with honor. He goes into the market, and, on the strength of the credit obtained by the countenance of his friends, possesses himself of the goods of others; then fails, and assigns his whole estate, including the goods thus obtained, to these very friends, and leaves all others to their fate."

This picture every one of observation will recognise as true to the life. This power of preferring confidential creditors is the author of a thousand gambling speculations, gotten up by persons in sinking and desperate circumstances, and sustained by fictitious credit. It is the source of the splendid failures which dazzle and astonish the commercial world with the magnificence of the bubbles that have bursted, and which exhibit such a vast disproportion between debtors' property and the amounts of their indebtedness. Not only this; but it opens the widest door for all manner of fraud and imposition on the honest and unsuspecting, who are but little acquainted with the games of deception that can be played off by the dishonest and fraudulent gambler in commercial adventures.

This law, in its prospective operation, is calculated, in a great degree, to check this growing and swelling tide of evil, which is pouring its bitter waters over the land. It provides for equality in the distribution of the debtor's property, forbids unfair preferences, and protects the mass of honest and unsuspecting creditors from the cunning and devices of the few who usually engross all the debtor's property. How often has it been seen that a large estate, by the magic concealment of mortgages, deeds of trust, and secret conveyances, has been swept into the hands of confidential friends, (perhaps the near relations of the bankrupt,) or into the grasp of banks and other moneyed corporations, to save endorsers, while the mass of creditors get nothing? Debts contracted to raise the means of wild speculation are paid; while those contracted for the produce of the "sweat of the brow" of the farmer and mechanic go neglected. Not only this; but it often happens that the cotton, the tobacco, the corn, and the wheat, obtained on a credit from the planter and farmer, go to save endorsers or confi. dential friends, while those who raised the produce from the soil go unrewarded-and that, too, in many instances, where these very endorsers and confidential friends had given to the bankrupt a fictitious credit, and enabled him to purchase the property of the unsuspecting, under the cover of this deception. Is this not wrong? This law is designed to put an end to this, and place confidence and credit on surer and juster foundations. That the speculator and money-dealer should oppose this, is not so remarkable; but that the mass of the people should, when they rightly understand it, is impossible. They may for a while be deceived-and that, too, by those who, on other occasions, and when no political capital was to be made, have eulogized the law; but they cannot long remain deceived. Truth, crushed for a while, will re-establish itself; and the good sense of the people, when they understand the matter rightly, will discover their own best interests.

It will, in its prospective operation, restrain that system of suretyship which, while it seldom does good, or benefits any one, has been the destruction of thousands. Cut off the flattering promise of mortgages and deeds of trust and other preferences, in the event of the debtor's failure, and you give to the surety or endorser a good reason for keeping his name off his friend's paper; or, if he puts it there, it will be upon the confidence that his friend can meet all his engagements. It will operate as a restraint upon debtors, and hold them within the circle of that legitimate credit which is the soul and life-blood of commerce and trade, by first taking from them the means of building up false_credit; and, secondly, by giving to the creditors, through the compulsory process of the law, a timely check on their wild extravagance, fraud, or folly.

Again: this law, in its prospective operation, will restrain excessive credit. Mortgages and deeds of trust are the very pillars on which false credit

rests.

The only legitimate credit which is safe, and should be encouraged, is that which rests on a confidence in the ability of the debtor to pay all

his debts.

H. of Reps.

That is false and delusive which rests

on mortgages or deeds of trust, or the promise of them, giving a preference to part, thereby impliedly acknowledging an inability to pay all. The secret promises and expectations of trusts and other preferences in favor of confidential creditors, are most powerful elements in the production of excessive credit, and, combined with other causes, its unhappy fruits may be seen in the desolation that now overspreads the land. This law, much abused as it is, affords the best remedy for this dis ease, and will do more good than all the nostrums with which the country is flooded. The evils of excessive credit furnish a theme for every politician's tongue; and yet the remedies they offer, both for prevention and cure, generally strike at the branches, and not at the root of the evil. Let the causes of excessive credit, to which I have adverted, be checked and controlled by wise legislation; and then let a curb be placed on the irregularities and fluctuations of the currency; and you will do much to prevent a recurrence of the revulsions and dis asters in commerce and trade, which have distinguished the last ten years as a most unfortunate and remarkable epoch in our history.

I might refer to other arguments connected with the prospective operation of this law; but, having spoken on the subject once before, my cbject now is brevity. I voted for this law on its passage, because I thought it right, and because I believed, from all the lights I had, that my constituents were for it. On a former effort to repeal it, not having heard anything from my constituents to the contrary, I voted against the repeal; and now that it has gone into operation, and had its effect only in part, I feel bound, for still stronger reasons, to vote against its repeal. A repeal in the manner in which it is likely to pass, as I have already said, would only operate on that part of it which I have nowhere heard objected to. If the law is defective, let us amend it. I will go heart and hand with those who desire that. If it does not in all things conform to the opinions of the people, let us change it until it does; but, for Heaven's sake, let us not tear a law from the statute-book, and repudiate principles which we have all, without distinction of party, in some form or other, in times past, warmly advocated.

SPEECH OF MR. BARNARD,

OF NEW YORK.

In the House of Representatives, January 26, 1843-On the Executive plan for a board of exchequer.

The report of the Committee of Ways and Means, with a resolution adverse to the President's plan of an exchequer, being under considerationMr. BARNARD, spoke nearly as follows:

Mr. SPEAKER: If I supposed that the action of this House on the subject of the currency was to end with its vote on the resolution now before us, I should not feel desirous of submitting any remarks whatever to the House at the present time. I should be content to record my vote, and refer, as I should do with pride, to the general reasoning of the able report, presented by my friend and colleague, [Mr. FILLMORE,] and which concludes with this resolution, for my justification; though, at the same time, it is proper, perhaps, I should say, while making this reference to the valuable report of the Commit tee of Ways and Means, that, if the direct question before us were now upon the report instead of the resolution, I should find it necessary to dissent from some of its positions and arguments.

But, sir, I trust we are not to stop when we have disposed of the exchequer plan of the Executive by the adoption of this resolution. It is right and proper that we should do that; but then we should do something more if we can. And I believe we can, and ought, to agree upon a plan of relief for the Government and country. The rejection of the Executive plan by the adoption of this resolution will dispose effectually, not only of the plan in the particular form given to it by the bill submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury, but of the plan in the form into which it has been moulded by the manifes tations of the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. CUSHING,] and in every other form in which the substance of the original conception might be im bodied. Such, at least, will be the meaning of the vie

27TH CONG.... 3D SESS.

which I shall give; and such, I have no doubt, will be the meaning of the vote of the House, nearly unanimous as it will be. This done, I hope the House will proceed promptly to consider the subject in Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, taking up for that purpose the bill introduced by the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. CUSHING,] not certainly with any idea that the House would even entertain that particular bill, except as affording a convenient mode of coming to the consideration of some one or other of the plans which have already been submitted and proposed as substitutes for it. The plan thus submitted by myself a few days ago, I shall feel it to be my duty to urge upon the notice of the House; and, for this purpose, if the gentleman from Massachusetts does not move to go into committee on the subject, I shall, and that at the earliest practicable moment.

This Congress has twice presented to the Presidenta measure of their own, on the subject of finance and currency; and twice has the President rejected their measure. The President, in turn, has presented to us his plan; it received the silent veto of Congress at the last session, and now we propose to give it our true constitutional veto. And one advantage, at least, will follow from this proceeding; and that is, that the President and his friends in this House will learn by it, (what they do not seem to have yet dreamed of,) that if the President is a "fixed constitu-. tional fact," as the gentleman from Massachusetts has said, Congress is a "fixed constitutional fact" also. This much being done on the one side and on the other, the decks will then be clear; and we can all look about us, to see how we shall steer and sail the ship for the residue of this present voyage. We know every intelligent man knows-that noth*ing can be done between Congress and the President on the general subject before us, upon the basis either of our plan, which is a bank, or of his plan, which is a board of exchequer. The sooner, therefore, we get clear of both, for the present Presidential term, the better. We may then proceed to consider some plan different from either, to serve our common objects for the time being, if one has been, or shall, or can be offered worthy of our consideration; and adopt or reject it, as it may seem to deserve. It will be the object and tendency, I hope, of the observations I now propose to submit on the exchequer scheme, to prepare the way for a favorable consideration by the House, of a plan for relieving the treasury, and at the same time supplying to the country a national currency, to which I have already referred, and which has lately been laid on the tables of members at my instance. The first step is to dis pose effectually of the exchequer; and I proceed to submit some observations upon it.

When we had a bank of the United States in existence and operation, it was found to perform certain important functions for the Government and the country. It was a capital fiscal agent for the Government. It was a safe and convenient depository for the public moneys; it kept them, transferred them from point to point as required, and disbursed them as directed. It was our commissioner of loans, and our pension agent. And then, in the course of its own appropriate business as a corporation dealing in money for profit, it furnished the country with a sound and uniform national currency, and with cheap exchanges; checking, at the same time, by an easy and natural operation, the State banks, and keeping them in a healthy condition and movement. We (the majority in this Congress) thought that another bank of the United States, better guarded than the last, and rendered perfectly safe, might have been established, with all the advantages which the country had experienced from the last. The "fixed constitutional fact" of the President's conscience stood in the way; and we have been obliged to yield. What, then, was to be done? The employment of State banks as fiscal agents, and as the means of supplying national currency and exchanges, in the manner once adopted and tried by General Jackson, had been discarded and abandoned; and Mr. Tyler had no idea that there was any other mode, or terms, in which they could be advantageously employed. But he was of opinion, after discarding both a bank of the United States and the State banks, that there was

The Exchequer-Mr. Burnard.

still another kind of agency by which all the benefits and services of a bank of the United States could be attained; free, at the same time, from all constitutional and other difficulties and objections. And he undertook to devise such an agency. It was not to be a corporation-least of all a bank; yet it was to be an agency, with some sort of independent existence; it was not, at any rate, to be the Government itself, but a creature of the Government, made to serve the Government and the country just as a corporation or bank would.

Well, sir, the President has offered us what he calls a board of exchequer, with its agencies; and it is just what every man of sagacity knew, beforehand, it must be. It is no independent agency at all, though carefully named and described as if it was. It is simply a plan by which the Executive Government itself undertakes to perform all the functions of a bank of the United States. The Executive Government is to keep, transfer, and disburse the public revenues, to receive the money of individuals on deposite, to supply paper for currency and commercial exchanges, and to regulate the State bank currency.

For, what is this board of exchequer and agencies? Why, an Executive department, or a bureau or branch of an Executive department, composed of, and conducted by, officers of Executive appointment, according to the constitutional mode of appointment. It is to be established "in the Treasury Department." It may be considered a part of that department, or independent of it: this is immaterial. It is either a new Executive department, or it is a branch of a department already existing; and it is, in its relations to the Government, just what the Post Office is, or the General Land Office, or the War or Navy Department. And, considering some of the functions which it is to perform, it certainly offers to our consideration something quite new, not only in this Government, but in any other that I have ever heard of. I have before heard of Governinents dealing with individuals, in money and other things, on Government account; but this is the first time, I think, it was ever proposed that a Government should formally enter into the business of dealing with individuals, in money and commercial exchanges, on individual account; only for the convenience and benefit of individuals in the trading and commercial community, and for a profit to the Government! I shall have occasion to advert again, before I conclude, to the question of the competency of this Government to enter upon any such enterprise. In the mean time, I wish the House to understand precisely what this board of exchequer and agencies is, and what it is to do.

The board of exchequer, with its agencies, then, is an executive department of this Government; and it is contrived to act in two very distinct capacities, which it is important to note.

In one capacity, it is an executive treasury with sub-treasuries. This is for the transaction of Government business-of business on Government ac

count.

In the other capacity, it is an executive commercial bank of deposite and exchange. And this is for the transaction of business wholly and exclusively on individual account, and for the accommodation of the trading public.

Let us pass by the bank for a few moments, while we look at this executive treasury-for an executive treasury is a very different thing from that "treasury of the United States" which was established under the law of 1789. Under that law, a treasurer was charged with the duty of providing for the safekeeping of the public money-not with the keeping of the money in his own personal custody. Such a construction of his duty was never dreamed of in the pure days of the Republic, and no corrupt practice of that sort was ever attempted. But this is the precise object of this executive treasury scheme. Executive officers-officers appointed by the Executive, and indebted to him for their places-are to be the personal holders of the public treasure. Instead of one treasurer keeping the public funds, by a safe system of deposite in banks, there is to be a legion of treasurers, with commissions from the Executive, holding the money in their own hands.

H. of Reps.

And this is the main purpose of the exchequer, so far as it is designed for the transaction of business on Government account.

Let us look a little at the history of this question of the mode of keeping the public money.

In the first session of the first Congress under the Constitution, (1789,) the Treasurer of the United States was charged with keeping the public moneys, under the general superintendence of the Secretary of the Treasury, as the head of that department. How or where the money should be kept, was not then prescribed by law; nor efterwards, till 1816. The Treasurer was left to choose his own mode of keeping it, on his own responsibility, subject only to such control of the Secretary as was due to his office, to which belonged the general administration of the finances.

The Treasurer at once adopted the mode of keeping all moneys in State banks, of which some three or four were then in existence. Neither he, nor anybody else, at that day, dreamed of any other way; it was a matter of course, and must have been so understood when the law was passed.

In the next session of the same Congress, the first Bank of the United States was established, and that bank and its offices were immediately employed as depositories, though not to the entire exclusion of State banks. The Treasurer was not required by law thus to employ this bank; it was a matter of course that he should do so.

In 1794, a committee was appointed by the House of Representatives to examine into the condition of the treasury, and the mode of keeping the public moneys adopted by the Treasurer. The committee, by Mr. Baldwin, its chairman, made an elaborate report, showing that the whole subject, in all its bearings and aspects, had been thoroughly investigated; setting forth, in minute detail, the whole plan of keeping and managing the public revenues, and fully approving of it. I will read a brief extract from that report:

"The Treasurer, pursuant to general directions from the Secretary of the Treasury, keeps the public moneys under his control in the several banks. Formerly, the banks of North America, New York, Massachusetts, and Maryland, were places of deposite. At present, the public moneys are kept in the Bank of the United States, and its several offices of discount and deposite at Boston, New York, Baltimore, and Charleston, and in the Bank of Providence. The Treasurer has never any public money in his possession or custody, which is not, in fact, deposited in bank, from the moment his possession or custody commences, till it ceases, by the disbursement of it, for public purposes; except in the case of bank bills, orders upon individuals, &c., heretofore enumerated, or remittances from the supervisors of the revenue and collectors of the customs, to the Treasurer; and those, also, immediately after the receipt of them, constitute deposites in bank, to the credit of the Treasurer. The Secretary of the Treasury, or any other officer of the department besides the Treasurer, never has the possession or custody of any of the public money, &c. And the possession or custody of the Treasurer is, as already stated, exercised through the banks."

Sir, when the charter of the Bank of the United States expired in 1811, the Treasurer did not change the mode of keeping the money, except that State banks were employed, as they had been before that bank was created. He had now nearly one hundred banks to select from; and before another Bank of the United States was created, he had about two hundred and fifty to select from. This embraced the period of the war; and during this period all the State banks south of New England suspended specie payments. And yet all this while these very suspended banks, in common with others, were made the depositories of the Treasurer; for those thus used by him were known to be just as solvent after their suspension as before; and all this while no new legislation took place on the subject. Congress and the country well knew, and were well satisfied to know, that he still employed banks as depositories, as he had done from the beginning.

On the incorporation of the Bank of the United States in 1816, it was one of the privileges conferred on that institution that it should have the public deposites; of which it could only be deprived by an order of the Secretary of the Treasury, and for reasons which should be promptly submitted to Congress. This was the first act ever passed by Congress which designated any particular place for the public moneys; and yet it will be perceived that the mode of keeping was still unchanged. was no part of the policy of this law to interfere with the duty of the Treasurer as to the mode of keeping.

It

27TH CUNG....3D SESS.

This was a contract with the bank, in consideration of the services required of it, and the heavy bonus which had been exacted of it; and the Treasurer executed this contract by making the bank his principal depository.

In this situation things remained till 1833, when, by the direct interposition or order of the Executive, the public moneys were removed from the vaults of this bank, and were placed again in the State banks. Here, still, so far as the law was allowed to operate, the moneys were still in the charge of the Treasurer, and kept on deposite. Certain it is, nobody else was appointed by law, or allowed, to keep the moneys, but the Treasurer. The removal, however, took place under strange and alarming circumstances; and it was deemed necessary, in order to reduce the possession of the moneys once more to the certain custody of the law, and reclaim them from the violent seizure of the Executive, to prescribe the terms and conditions on which State bunks should be selected and employed as depositories. This was done in 1836. There was then a very large surplus in the treasury, which was eagerly sought after by the banks, to be used in their business; and it became a source of immense political influence and corruption in the hands of the Executive. By this act, it was designed to hold the Secretary of the Treasury directly responsible, not to the Executive, but to Congress and the country, for the proper selection of depositories which he was to make, under the restrictions imposed by the law; whilst all deposites were still to be made, as before, to the credit of the Treasurer, who was still, by the act of 1789, the sole official keeper of the public money.

In 1837, át a session of Congress specially called to take care of the Government in the emergency which had then arisen-for there was again a general suspension of specie payments-Mr. Van Buren proposed to change entirely, in principle and in fact, the mode of keeping the public money which had prevailed, without an hour's exception, from the origin of the Government. He proposed to place the public moneys in the personal custody of officers appointed by the Executive. This recommendation finally prevailed in the last year of Mr. Van Buren's administration, and his plan was established by law. Upon this measure he was defeated as a candidate for re-election to the Presidency, and a complete political revolution was effected. The law establishing the sub-treasury was then repealed-having been in existence about one year from the 4th of July, 1840. The act of 1836 was also repealed; and the custody of the public money again stood upon the act of 1789, where it stands to this day. The Treasurer is still charged with this important duty, and banks are now employed as depositories, according to the ancient and approved practice of the Government. A report made by the Secretary of the Treasury at the last session, at my instance, names the banks in which the moneys are now kept, (or were at that date,) and the terms on which they are employed. As always heretofore, the public funds are deposited in the banks to the credit of the Treasurer, from which they can be drawn only by warrant of law. The banks perform, if required, the duties of commissioners of loans and pension agents, and they transfer the funds wherever they may be required, and all without charge to the treasury.

This recital, sir, shows what the system of keeping the public money now is, and that it is just what it has been from the beginning of the Government, with the single exception of one year in Mr. Van Buren's time. Why should Congress be asked to change the mode now, when it had prevailed for fifty-two out of the fifty-three years that the Government has existed? Above all, why should we be asked to give up this mode, for that which was adopted under the late administration, and which was so signally and promptly condemned and rebuked by the people?

Mr. Speaker, if we were now at the beginning of this Government, and if the question were put to us now for the first time, How shall the public money be kept? The answer of every man of sense would be, Let the Government keep its money just as any prudent and discreet individual in private life would

The Exchequer-Mr. Barnard.

keep his money. It is prudent and safe for the Government to do in this matter, just what it would be prudent and safe for any such individual, or for any well-conducted public or private body or corporation, to do under the like circumstances.

Now, sir, there is in this country a practice on this subject of almost unbroken uniformity, which goes far to settle at once what is wise and what is unwise in regard to it. It is impossible, on a question of this nature, appealing so directly to the highest pecuniary interests of those who have to act in the premises, and in a manner to rouse all their faculties to the utmost vigilance and caution-it is impossible that there should be, throughout this whole country, and in all departments of business, public and private, a particular practice, settled by common and universal consent, though with nothing like actual concert, without establishing in every rightthinking mind the conviction that that practice is founded in true wisdom.

Sir, such a practice may be said to have, in some sort, the sanction which belongs to the settled maxims of the common law-the sanction of general assent founded on general experience. It has, in truth, a still higher sanction, not altogether unlike that which belongs to the principle of morality itself; for though it have not a common sentiment and feeling in its favor, like that which determines the right from the wrong in a moral question, it is confirmed by a kind of instinct, which is scarcely less shrewd and discriminating where a question of pecuniary interest is concerned. No intelligent and well-informed man in this country, even now, with the general distrust of banks which prevails, intrusts the keeping of his surplus cash to individual handsunless it be to some individual banker of high repute and of established wealth-when he can find a convenient bank of tolerable credit to receive it. And the same is true of private and public bodies and associations.

I have stated already what the practice of this Government has been from its organization. I will not speak positively as to all the States, though I do not believe there is one where the practice is not substantially the same as under this Government. If there be an exception, gentlemen can name it. As a general rule, the treasurers of States, of counties, of cities, and towns, of societies and associations, literary, charitable, and political, the treasurers and cashiers of corporate bodies other than moneyed corporations are never intrusted, from choice, with the personal custody of the surplus moneys under their charge. As to individuals and firms in business, or retired capitalists, it is a thing quite unknown for them to keep any considerable sums of surplus and unemployed money on hand, or in the personal custody of their agents, when they can find a convenient bank of fair repute to receive it for safekeeping. The same practice prevails with all our judicial bodies, in relation to money paid or brought

into court.

And what earthly reason is there why this universal practice, this rule of good sense and sound discretion, should be departed from in the case of this Government? Are the officers and agents of this Government likely to be better selected, and more honest and trustworthy men, than the treasurers and other money agents selected by States, societies, corporations, and individuals? All fact and all experience are against such a supposition.

To say the least, this Government has had its full proportion of unfaithful and dishonest men employed in its service. There is not a State in the Union which would suffer in the comparison with it in this respect; nor scarcely a company or corporation, much as is said about dishonesty, fraud, and embezzlement among such. I doubt if the late Pennsylvania Bank of the United States itself was worse served, in the article of faithful and honest agency, than this Government has been for the last twelve or fourteen years. Corruption, peculation, and fraud, have crept in everywhere. Sir, it is not the best description of men who apply for office, nor the best of those who apply who receive office; it is not uncommonly the worst of all the candidates for a particular place that succeeds. It is the brazen, the obsequious, the unprincipled, the broken in fortune and

H. of Reps.

reputation, these are the sort of men to be the suc cessful candidates for Government favor and patronage. And they are successful oftentimes without any particular fault on the part of the appointing power, which—in modern times, at least is apt to surround itself, or to be surrounded, with selfish and fawning flatterers and false friends, who practise towards it every species, of systematic deception and cajolery. There is in this country a growing, restless, morbid anxiety to get into public office. As sure as a man shows himself unfit to manage his own affairs, or to get a living by his profession or his trade, so sure is he to become an applicant for office. And I doubt if there be a worse school of morals than is found in public office under this Government, this side the penitentiaries of the country. Many an honest man is matriculated in office, who is graduated a rogue; and if a rogue takes office, he is ten times a rogue before he leaves it. Scarcely any man's morals are improved by his experience in the administrative places of the Government; though some, no doubt, retain their integrity in spite of all temptations. It is not an uncommon feeling among those who seek and obtain these offices, that the public and the Government are fit subjects of plunder, and that he is a fool who, once within the pale, does not enrich himself and escape with all the valuables he can lay his hands on.

No; the Government of the United States should be the last to intrust its money for keeping to the hands of individual agents selected and appointed by itself. Others may make good selections; Gov. ernment in these times cannot. The very qualities which it requires to win its favor-the qualities which have made or may make the candidate useful to the administration-are not such as are apt to constitute, or to consist with high character. Government officers ought not, on every principle, to be intrusted with public money for one farthing beyond what is absolutely unavoidable. And this is precisely the rule of wisdom, which, under the lead of the wise and pure men of the Revolution, has prevailed uniformly under the Government, with the exception of the single condemned experiment to which I have before adverted.

Besides, sir, it is a safe rule to intrust the keeping of large sums of money to no individual hands, where it can be avoided. There is something in the very touch which seems to contaminate. Say what we will of human virtue, men are not to be trusted with the personal custody of large amounts of other men's money; it is a cruel experiment, let it be tried when and where it will. Suretyship cannot make it safe, with all the cruel vicarious suffering which that system inflicts on the innocent. Nor can penal enactments make it safe-though that is the best security, perhaps, the case admits of-any more than the sight of the penitentiary and the gibbet can deter from other crimes.

No; the best and safest system of keeping money which the wit of man has devised, is that of deposite in banks. This involves a system of suretyship, which, without any personal responsibility of stock holders beyond their respective shares, is as complete as it is possible to make it, without being unjust to anybody. A corporation is a person that cannot run away; its officers and agents may embezzle and fly, but the corporation remains, and its whole capital stands pledged to answer for the faith and integrity of all in its employ. And it is certainly true, that even this whole capital may be exhausted by fraud and peculation, and the corporation itself may fail. But it is equally true, as shown by a public document from the Treasury Department, that of the hundreds upon hundreds of millions of public money deposited in banks from 1789 to 1837, only half a million was ever lost by the insolvency of the banks; while in the same period, of the collectors and others, officers of the Government, receiving and disbursing public money, 2,760 became defaulters, and about five millions were thereby lost to the treasury.

Mr. Speaker, this executive treasury is just the old condemned sub-treasury over again; and this plan of placing the public funds in the hands of Government officers for personal keeping, is the substance and main feature of both. But this now proposed is vastly the most objectionable of the two,