27TH CONG....3D SESS.

do not say, sir, that such ought to be the decision. I do not say that it would be a fair and honest interpretation of the article. But I do say, there is enough in it to cavil about-enough to afford the English Government a plausible pretext for doing that which they are now doing without a pretext.*

The following account, given by the notorious Tappan, of a conference which took place between Lord Ashburton and a committee of the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, shortly after the ratification of the treaty, appeared in the New York Courier and Enquirer of the 12th September last. If we can credit this statement (I admit of doubtful authenticity) we have already a commentary on this article of the treaty by the minister who negotiated it, declaring, not only that it does not apply to cases like the Creole, but that, in framing the treaty, great care had been taken to prevent any such application. I refer to this publication here, not only as furnishing some indication of his Lordship's views on this subject, but especi ally as an evidence of the connexion which exists between the Abolitionists of this country and the Government of Great Britain. How diseased must be the state of public opinion in a community which can tolerate, within its bosom, foreign societies formed for the avowed purpose of war. ring against the fundamental institutions of the country, and does not cover with universal opprobrium American citizens who publicly apply to the ambassador of a foreign nation to protect them against the acts of their own Government.

"ABOLITION MORALITY.-We find in the Journal of Commerce the following gross attack upon the honor and honesty of Lord Ashburton:

"We have heretofore alluded to the fact, that the Abolitionists have openly recommended slaves to steal from their masters whenever it would aid them in effecting their escape; and now Lewis Tappan would have the world believe that Lord Ashburton approves of such advice!

In law, the receiver of stolen goods is as criminal as the thief; and in morals, all must agree that the person who can de liberately advise a human being to set at naught the laws of God and man, and justify-nay, urge-his stealing, would him. self be guilty of theft when an opportunity offered. Thou shall not steal' is one of God's commandments; and he who advises his fellow-being to violate it, would undoubtedly violate it himself if secure from punishment.

"And yet, because Mr. Lewis Tappan and some of his asso. ciates are willing to advise others to steal, these honest and PIOUS gentlemen infer that Lord Ashburton would give similar advice! In other words, they in fact publish his Lordship

as a THIEF.

"Let the reader peruse the following, and form his fown opinion of Mr. Tappan and his honest and religious associ alea."-Ed. Cour, and Eng.

From the Journal of Commerce.

He very

INTERVIEW WITH LORD ASHBURTON. The Executive Committee of the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, apprehending that the tenth article of the treaty lately concluded between the British minister and our Government, might be used to the injury of fugitive slaves escaping into Canada, appointed a deputation to solicit an interview with Lord Ashburton just before his departure for England, to lay before him facts in relation to the subject, which might be communicated to his Government. readily complied with the request, and appointed 10 o'clock a. m. September 3d, for the mterview, at his lodgings at the Astor House. The committee consisted of Messrs. S. S. Joce. lyn, Leonard Gibbs, Le Roy Sunderland, and Lewis Tappan. Mr. Gerrit Smith being present, was invited to accompany the delegation. The delegation was courteously received by Mr. Mildmay, secretary of the special mission of her Britannic Majesty, and by him presented to Lord Ashburton, who invited them to be seated, expressed much satisfaction at seeing them, and entered into a frank and full conversation on the subject for which the interview was requested. The delegation, alter congratulating the British envoy on the successful termination of his mission, informed him of the particulars of the case of Nelson Hackett, a slave who fled from Arkansas to Canada, where his pursuers overtook him, had him arrested on a charge of stealing a coat, gold-watch, and horse of his master. Hackett was imprisoned, and meantime a grand jury in Arkansas in. dicted him. A demand was forwarded from the Governor of Arkansas to the Governor General of Canada, for his surren der. Sir Charles Bigot complied, and Hackett was taken back to Arkansas. The delegation stated to Lord Ashburton their apprehensions that such a course occurring without any treaty stipulation, there was great cause of apprehension that, under the tenth article of the treaty, which provides for the mutual surrender of all persons charged with certain specified crimes, no fugitive slave would be safe in Canada, when it is notorious that slaveholders allege crimes against fugitive slaves as one expedient for their reclamation.

Lord Ashburton went into an explanation of the 10.h article, and mentioned several particulars of the discussion that took place, both on that topic and others relating to slaves. He said that it was very desirable to have an article in the treaty to meet cases similar to that of Holmes, who ed from Canada into Vermont, and the cases that would frequently arise, considering the extent of the bordering lines, and the temptation for criminals to flee across the lines in hope of securing themselves from arrest and punishment. The Governor of Canada was anxious that deserters should be included; but as Lord A. learned that a claim would be put in for the delivering up of fugitive slaves, he abandoned the question of deserters from her Britan nic Majesty's possessions. He was also very desirous to secure the delivery of mutineers; but did not press it, lest it should involve, on the part of his Government, the delivery of slaves situated as were those on board the Creole. With regard to the case of the slave Hackett, he did not know all the facts. Sir Charles Bagot was known to him, and he did not believe he But he had just enwould do anything intentionally wrong. tered upon his duties, and was probably desirous, at that junc ture, of promoting good feeling with his great neighbor. The fact that the slave had taken his master's watch. was a circumrance that probably went against him. "Had he only taken the horse," said Lord A., (looking at Gerrit Smith, significantly, though he could not be supposed ever to have read the advice of that gentleman to fugitive slaves,) "he would not probably have been surrendered; for you know the horse was necessary for his escape." Lord A. said that, in framing the 10th article,

The British Treaty-Mr. Rives.

Some gentlemen, I know, although, like myself, they do not entirely approve this treaty, are yet willing to vote for it as the price of peace. However anxious I may be to preserve peace, I am not willing to purchase it. I differ from them, moreover. I do not believe any peace will be permanent, as long as this agitating subject remains unsettled. England has told you that the door of negotiation on this subject is closed. It will never be re-opened, except at the point of the bayonet. If you were to go to war now, it would be the war of the whole country. From the banks of the Penobscot to the Mississippi, we would present an unbroken front. But, once separate these questions; let the North settle those in which she is more immediately interested, and leave the South alone with its wrongs unredressed; and you increase the chances of war, while you diminish those of its successful prosecution. Your forbearance now will only increase the insolence of Great Britain, and encourage the repetition of outrages like those of the Hermosa and the Creole. She will unfurl the banner of abolition still more conspicuously before the eyes of your slaves. She will accustom them to consider her as their bencfactress, the champion of their rights, the avenger of their wrongs; and when war does come-as come it will-she may then hope to realize her threat of being welcomed by them as a deliverer, and her flag, wherever it appears, becoming the signal of servile insurrection.

great care had been taken that inferior magistrates in Canada should have no authority to surrender fugitives, as had been urged by the other party; and that only the Governor himself could perform an act of so great importance. Great care would be taken, he had no doubt, to protect the innocent; and that the taking of any article necessary to effect an escape would not be considered felonious. If, said he, the operation of the 10th article prove injurious, he had no doubt the British Government would put an end to it, agrecably to another provision of the treaty, viz: "The 10th article shall continue in force until one or the other party shall signify its wish to terminate it, and no longer."

Lord Ashburton said that, when the delegation came to read his correspondence with Mr. Webster, they would see that he had taken all possible care to prevent any injury being done to the people of color; that, if he had even been willing to intro. duce an article including cases similar to that of the Creole, his Government would never have ratified it, as they will adhere to the great principles they have so long avowed and main. tained; and that the friends of the slave in England would be very watchful to see that no wrong practice took place under the tenth article.

The delegation now rose, and, after thanking Lord Ashburton for the candid and satisfactory manner in which he had received their communications, and answered their inquiries-wishing the divine blessing for the part he had taken in perpetuating peace between the respective countries, and protecting the rights of the oppressed, and a safe and speedy return to his na. tive land-took their leave, highly gratified with the courtesy, frankness, intelligence, and philanthropy of this distinguished nobleman. Believing the above statement will be interesting to your readers, especially to those who labor and pray for the slave-for the poor fugitive, particularly-that it will tend to quiet the fears of the twelve thousand colored inhabitants of Canada, most of whom have fled from Southern slavery, and their numerous friends on both sides of the line; and that there will be found an additional occasion for the thankfulness to God, that he has, through the instrumentality of the American and British ministers, brought about a peace that will, it is hoped, be lasting. I remain, very respectfully, yours, LEWIS TAPPAN.

BRITISH TREATY.

SECRET SESSION.

SPEECH OF MR. RIVES,

OF VIRGINIA.

Senate.

the national question, to inquire by whom the treaty had been negotiated, or whose name stood subscribed to it. They have looked to the treaty in itself, isolated from every invidious reference to persons or parties; and have pronounced upon its acceptance or rejection as, in their best judgment, the interests and honor of the nation demand.

The stipulations of the treaty embrace three distinct objects: an exact and permanent definition of the boundaries, where they had been the subject of doubt or dispute, between the territories of the United States and the adjacent provinces of Great Britain; a plan of co-operation for the more effectual suppression of the African slave-trade; and an agreement for the mutual surrender, in certain cases, of criminals fugitive from justice. The first of these objects, from its intimate connexion with the tranquillity of the frontier, and the peace of the two countries-on several recent occasions exposed to imminent hazard of interruption, from intrusions on the disputed territory, and the conflicting jurisdictions exercised over it--naturally occupies the foreground of the treaty.

The merits of the controversy respecting our Northeastern boundary, and the respective claims and arguments of the two parties in regard to it, are too well known to the Senate, (said Mr. R.,) to require any recapitulation of them at my hands. A brief retrospect of the history of the controversy, however, may be necessary to enable the Senate to comprehend the position of the question at the moment when the negotiations which terminated in this treaty were entered upon.

The second article of the definitive treaty of peace of 1783, describes the Northeastern boundary of the United States as follows: "Beginning at the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, to wit: that angle which is formed by a line drawn due north from the source of the St. Croix river to the highlands; along the said highlands, which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic ocean, to the northwesternmost head of Connecticut river;" and then, pursuing the description of the boundaries of the United States around their whole territory, on the north, the west, and the south, it returns to the eastern boundary of Maine in the following words: "East by a line to be drawn along the middle of the river St. Croix, from its mouth, in the Bay of Fundy, to its source; and from its source, directly north to the aforesaid highlands, which divide the rivers that fall into the Atlantic ocean from those which fall into the river St. Lawrence."

Nothing could afford a more striking evidence of the extremely defective knowledge of the geography of the country in question, which existed at the time of the signature of the treaty of peace, than the fact, that, in the very first year succeeding the conclusion of the treaty, a serious controversy arose between the high contracting parties as to which was this river St. Croix, here called for as a natural boundary between their adjacent possessions. There were three rivers emptying themselves into Passamaquoddy bay, a part of the Bay of Fundy, (as it was subsequently formally declared to be,*) each one of which, it seemed, had, some time or other, passed under the name of the St. Croix. This territorial comedy of errors, like all other questions of disputed boundary, was, on several occasions, near producing tragical results, by embroiling the authorities and population adjacent to the con roverted limits. The most eastern river was claimed by the United States as the true St. Croix-the western by Great Britain. Finally, after lowering over the peace of the frontiers for ten years, this controversy was put in a train of amicable adjustment by the treaty of 1794, (commonly called Jay's treaty,) which provided for the appointment of joint commissioners to determine which was the river truly intended under the name of the St. Croix, in the treaty of peace. The commissioners met, and in 1798 closed their deliberations, by declaring an intermediate river, called the Scoodiac, to be the true St. Croix of the treaty; which has been, accordingly, ever since recognised and observed as the actual boundary of the Uni ed States in that quarter, and to that extent.

In a very short time after this portion of the Northeastern boundary was ascertained and established, new difficulties and uncertainties arose in following it out, according to the terms of the treaty of peace. The decision of the commissioners, under the treaty of 1794, in identifying the true river St. "By the fourth article of the treaty of Ghent,

27TH CONG.......3D SESS.

Croix, and in fixing its source, had established the terminus a quo, from which the boundary in question was to be run. But the terminus ad quem, to which it was to be continued-to wit: the highlands dividing the tributary waters of the St. Lawrence and the Atlautic, which lay due north from the source of the St. Croix-remained to be ascertained; and when they were ascertained, the northwestern. most head of the Connecticut river, (another terminus to which the boundary along the said highlands was to be continued,) was also to be identified and established. Both of these termini were supposed to be involved in doubt by the actual geography and physical conformation of the country. The high. lands described in the treaty were said to have no definite existence in nature; and the various sources of the Connecticut river, and their relative position, produced confusion in determining which was the true northwesternmost source referred to by the treaty of peace. For the "adjustment of these uncertainties," by the agency of a joint commission formed on the model of that of Jay's treaty in regard to the St. Croix river, a convention was concluded by Mr. Rufus King with Lord Hawkesbury, in May, 1803, under the instructions of Mr. Madison, then Secretary of State. This convention received the unanimous advice and consent of the Senate to its ratification, with the exception of its fifth article, relating to the northwestern boundary between the Lake of the Woods and the Mississippi river, which, it was apprehended, might conflict with the territorial claims of the United States under the treaty for the purchase of Louisiana from France; which had been concluded twelve days previous to the convention with Lord Hawkesbury, but which fact was not known to either of the negotiators at the signature of the latter. The change thus made by the Senate not being acceded to by the British Government, the convention failed to take effect.

Thus stood the question in regard to the Northeastern boundary, without any new arrangement to obviate or adjust the uncertainties which had arisen, until the treaty of Ghent. By the fifth article of that treaty, it was agreed that two commissioners should be appointed-one by each party-to ascertain and determine where is the point of intersection, or angle called the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, formed by a line drawn due north from the source of the St. Croix to the highlands, as described in the treaty of peace; and also the northwesternmost head of Connecticut river; and to cause the entire boundary, from the source of the St. Croix to the river St. Lawrence, to be surveyed and marked, according to the provisions of the said treaty of peace; and if these commissioners should differ in opinion on the matters referred to them, then their differences were to be referred to some friendly sovereign or State, to be named for the purpose, whose decision should be final and conclusive on all the matters so referred. The commissioners appointed under the treaty of Ghent having radically differed in their views of the true boundary, a convention was entered into between the two Governments, in September, 1827, for carrying into effect the stipulated reference to some friendly sovereign; agreeing to proceed, in concert, to the choice of such friendly sovereign, and regulating various details connected with the arbitration. The King of the Netherlands was, by the concurrent act of the two Governments, subsequently chosen as the arbiter; and, in January, 1831, he pronounced his award-declaring, in effect, that neither the line claimed by the United States, to the north of the river St. John, nor that claimed by Great Britain, to the south of that river, fulfilled the description of the boundary contained in the treaty of peace; that the stipulations of the treaty were too vague and indeterminate to admit of satisfactory execution, when applied to the actual topography of the country; and that, therefore, "it will be suitable (il conviendra) to adopt as the boundary of the two States" a line which drawn from the source of the St. Croix till it intersect the river St. John, shall continue along that river to the mouth of the St. Francis; thence along the St. Francis, to its south westernmost head; and thence, by a due-west course, to the line claimed by the United States.

This award of the King of the Netherlands, in proposing the adoption of a new boundary, was considered as a departure from the question submitted for his decision by the terms of the reference, and was held, therefore, not to be obligatory on the parties. The Senate of the United States,

The British Treaty-Mr. Rives.

before whom the award was laid by the President for their advice on the subject, expressed an opinion unfavorable to its acceptance; and from that time down to the special mission of Lord Ashburton, a series of halting and abortive negotiations has been going on between the two Governments, terminating in nothing, and leaving this disturbing controversy as far as ever from settlement; the peace of the two countries, in the mean time, exposed to perpetual danger of interruption, by collis ions on the debatable frontier.

Mr. R. said he had thus briefly retraced the history of this controversy, and exhibited the mutual proceedings of the two Governments in regard to it-not with any purpose of weakening or impugn. ing the just title of the United States to the territory claimed by them as being within the limits established by the treaty of peace; on the contrary, he felt in his own mind a clear conviction of the justice and validity of the American claim as resting on the terms of the treaty. He believed that the boundary claimed by the United States fulfilled the literal description contained in the treaty, and that it was the only boundary which did fulfil that description. He had, therefore, heartily concurred in the resolution unanimously passed in this body, four years ago, affirming our conviction of the right of the United States under the treaty of peace; and such, he was authorized to say, was still the opinion entertained by every member of the committee. But, while this was the opinion of the committee and of the Senate, and, without doubt, of a large majority of the citizens of the United States who have investigated the subject, it is impossible for us, looking at the public and solemn acts of the nation through its recognised organs, now to stand uncompromisingly on the ground of right. We have admitted, over and over again, that the question is one open to doubt and controversy; and, as such, we have agreed to make it a subject of arbitration; and the opinion of the arbiter, however wanting in legal obligation, has yet been pronounced before the world against our claim.

The Senate has seen, from the review just presented, that, not only by the treaty of Ghent, and the subsequent convention of 1827, had we abandoned the ground of clear and incontestable right; but that, at a long antecedent period, by the convention of 1803 between Mr. King and Lord Hawkesbury, (an arrangement unanimously confirmed by the Senate, so far as the Northeastern boundary was concerned,) we had agreed to bring our claims into litigation before a mixed tribunal of arbitrament, to be specially constituted for the purpose. The President of the United States, [Mr. Jefferson,] in communicating the conclusion of that arrangement to Congress, accompanied it with the following pregnant remarks:

"A further knowledge of the ground in the northeastern and northwestern angles of the United States has evinced that the boundaries established by the treaty of Paris, between the British territories and ours in those parts, were too imperfectly described to be susceptible of execution. It has, therefore, been thought worthy of attention, for preserving and cherishing the harmony and useful intercourse subsisting between the two na. tions, to remove, by timely arrangements, what unfavorable incidents might otherwise render a ground of future misunderstanding. A convention has, therefore, been entered into, which provides for a practicable demarcation of those limits, to the satisfaction of both parties."

Mr. Madison, in the instructions given by him to Mr. King for the negotiation of the convention, used language of similar, and not less significant import:

"In fixing," said he, "the point at which the line is to terminate, and which is referred to as the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, the difficulty arises from a reference of the treaty of 1783 to the high'ands,' which it is now found have no defi nite existence. To remove this difficulty, no better expedient occurs than to provide for the appointment of a third commis sioner, as in article five of the treaty of 1794; and to authorize the three to determine on a point to be substituted for the description in the second article of the treaty of 1783, having due regard to the general idea that the line ought to terminate on the elevated ground dividing the rivers falling into the Atlantic, from those emptying themselves into the St. Lawrence. The commissioners may also be authorized to substitute for the description of the boundary between the point so fixed and the northwesternmost head of the Connecticut river-uamely, a line 'along the said highlands;"-such a reference to intermedia'e sources of rivers, or other ascertained or ascertainable points, to be connected by straight lines, as will admit of easy and accurate execution hereafier, and as will best comport with the apparent intention of the treaty of 1783"

Here we have an instruction from one of the most cautious, as well as able and enlightened statesmen, that ever presided over the department of our foreign relations, expressly authorizing the minister of the United States, on the ground of the impracticability of finding the limits described in the

Senate.

treaty of 1783, to enter into an arrangement to substitute-not, as has been said, a point only, but-a continuous and long line of boundary between that point and another, for the lines and angles described in the treaty.

After these various and repeated acts of the nad tional authorities, acknowledging, in one form another, the doubts and difficulties which stood in the way of the actual demarcation of the boundary in question, according to the provisions of the treaty of 1783, it seems to the committee too late in the day, consistently with a proper regard for the peace of nations and the opinion of the world, to plant ourselves now sternly and inflexibly on the ground of a clear, manifest, and incontrovertible right to the precise line of boundary we claim. If the honor of the country, as is now asserted, demanded that the summum jus of our claims, in regard to the disputed boundary, should have been rigorously insisted on in the late negotiation, then that honor has been long since irretrievably prostrated in the dust. It was sacrificed by the treaty of 1794, by the convention of 1803, by the Ghent negotiations in 1814, by the arbitration arrangement of 1827; it was betrayed by Washington, Jefferson, and Madison; and trampled under foot by every successive administration that has been charged with the foreign relations of the country, from the peace of 1783 to the present day. How would even our hero Presi dent, the venerable Jackson-at whose lofty tone in the foreign intercourse of the nation the world stood surprised-how would even he stand, it tried by this new standard of diplomatic chivalry? During the period of his administration, repeated enries were made on the disputed territory by agents of the neighboring British provincial authorities, who arrested our citizens, seized their property, and transported both one and the other into a foreign jurisdiction. Did he summon the nation to arms for this hostile invasion of our territory?—as it assuredly was, if the principle now so cheaply put forward, of the incontrovertible justice and va lidity of our title to the boundary we claimed, be correct. No, sir; he knew that, however strong might be our conviction of the justice of our claim, there were two sides to the question-the adversary claim resting on grounds which we had, by the most solemn national acts, recognised to be fair topics of discussion; and that we could not justify ourselves to the moral sense of mankind, in rashly taking the decision of the question into our own hands.

The truth is, that no administration has ever shown a greater disposition to settle this question with Great Britain, on principles of compromise and concession, than did that of General Jackson. It is well known that his opinions and inclinations were decidedly in favor of the acceptance of the award of the King of the Netherlands; and that the objec tions of the State of Maine, and the action of the Senate on the subject, alone prevented his acceding to the new conventional line proposed by that award. When, from these causes, the adjustment under the mediation of the King of the Netherlands failed, President Jackson immediately sought, by a provisional arrangement with the State of Maine, for an indemnity to be paid her by the United States in other lands, to arm himself with the necessary sanction of her assent, to agree with Great Britain upon a new boundary line, in place of that of the treaty of 1783. An arrangement to that effect was actually entered into by three distin guished public functionaries duly authorized by the President, with three other gentlemen as agents of the State of Maine; but not being ratified by the Legislature of the State, when submitted to them, the negotiation, upon that basis, was necessarily abandoned. Being thus forced back upon new ef forts to settle and ascertain the boundary as it exist ed under the treaty of peace, General Jackson authorized a proposition of extreme liberality to be submitted to the British minister. Hitherto, in all the discussions upon thes ubject, as well as in the explorations and surveys made to determine the boundary, one thing had been assumed as certain and fixed-to wit: that, from the source of the St. Croix, the boundary, in the express language of the treaty, should be run directly north to the highlands, &c.; and this had been invariably considered a main pillar of the argument in support of the American claim. General Jackson, in his earnest desire to bring this long-pending controversy to an amicable termination, and with an accommodating and liberal spirit which was emphatically acknowl edged by the British Government, now proposed,

27TH CONG.... 3D SKSS.

through Mr. Livingston and Mr. McLane, successively Secretaries of State, that the commissioners should be no longer restricted by the due-north line in determining the true boundary; but, discarding that line, if they thought proper, they should be at liberty to seek the highlands described in the treaty, to the west of the meridian of the source of the St. Croix, and in any part of the disputed territory north or south of the river St. John. What seemed mainly to produce the hesitation of the British Government in acceding to this proposition, was, the doubt entertained by it whether the assent of the State of Maine (which had not, and probably could not, be obtained) would not be as necessary to give effect to an ar rangement on this basis, as on that of an avowed conventional line.

It appears to the committee, therefore, in looking back to the public and solemn acts of the Government, and of its successive administrations, that the time has passed, if it ever existed, when we could be justified in making the precise line of boundary claimed by us the subject of a sine qua non of negotiation, or of the ultima ratio of an assertion by force. Did a second arbitration, then, afford the prospect of a more satisfactory result? This expedient seemed to be equally rejected by all parties-by the United States, by Great Britain, and by the State of Maine. If such an alternative should be contemplated by any one as preferable to the arrangement which has been made, it is fit to bear in mind the risk and uncertainty, as well as the inevitable delay and expense, incident to that mode of decision. We have already seen, in the instance of the arbitration by the King of the Netherlands, how much weight a tribunal of that sort is inclined to give to the argument of convenience, and a supposed intention on the part of the negotiators of the treaty of 1783, against the literal and positive terms employed by the instrument in its description of limits. Is there no danger, in the event of another a bitration, that a farther research into the public archives of Europe might bring to light some embarrassing (even though apocryphal) document, to throw a new shade of plausible doubt on the clearness of our title, in the view of a soveign arbiter? Such a document has already been communicated to the committee; and I feel it (said Mr. R.) to be my duty to lay it before the Senatę, that they may fully appreciate its bearings, and determine for themselves the weight and importance which belong to it. It is due to the learned and distinguished gentleman, (Mr. Jared Sparks of Boston,) by whom the document referred to was discovered in the archives of France, while pursuing his laborious and intelligent researches connected with the history of our own country, that the account of it should be given in his own words, as contained in a communication addressed by him to the Department of State. I proceed, therefore, to read from that communication:

"While pursuing my researches among the voluminous pa pers relating to the American Revolution in the Archives des Affaires Etrangeres in Paris, I found in one of the bound volumes an original letter from Dr. Franklin to Count de Ver. gennes, of which the following is an exact transcript:

"PASSY, December 6, 1782. "SIR: I have the honor of returning herewith the map your Excellency sent me yesterday. I have marked with a strong red line, according to your desire, the limits of the United States, ay settled in the preliminaries between the British and American plenipotentiaries.

"With great respect, I am, &c.,

"B. FRANKLIN."

"This letter was written six days after the preliminaries were signed; and if we could procure the identical map mentioned by Franklin, it would seem to afford conclusive evidence as to the meaning affixed by the commissioners to the language of the treaty on the subject of the boundaries. You may well sup. pose that I lost no time in making inquiry for the map, not doubting that it would confirm all my previous opinions re. specting the validity of our claim. In the geographical department of the Archives are sixty thousand maps and charts; but so well arranged with catalogues and indexes, that any one of them may be easily found. After a little research in the American division, with the aid of the keeper, I came upon a map of North America, by D'Anville, dated 1746, in size about eighteen inches square, on which was drawn a strong red line throughout the entire boundary of the United States, answering precisely to Franklin's description. The line is bold and distinct in every part, unade with red ink, and apparent. ly drawn with a hair-pencil, or a pen with a blunt point. There is no other coloring on any part of the map.

"Imagine my surprise on discovering that this line runs whol ly south of the St. John's, and between the head waters of that river and those of the Penobscot and Kennebec. In short, it is exactly the line now contended for by Great Britain, except that it concedes more than is claimed. The north line, after departing from the source of the St. Croix, instead of proceeding to Mars Hill, stops far short of that point, and turns off to the west, so as to leave on the British side all the streams which How into the St. John's, between the source of the St. Croix and Mars Hil. It is evident that the line, from the St. Croix (0 the Canadian highlands, is intended to exclude all the waters running into the St. John's.

The British Treaty-Mr. Rives.

"There is no positive proof that this map is actually the one marked by Franklin; yet, upon any other supposition, it would be difficult to explain the circumstances of its agreeing so perfectly with his description, and of its being preserved in the place where it would naturally be deposited by Count de Ver gennes. I also found another map in the Archives, on which the same boundary was traced in a dotted red line with a pen, apparently copied from the other.

"I enclose herewith a map of Maine, on which I have drawn a strong black line, corresponding with the red one above mentioned."

I am far from intimating (said Mr. Rives) that the documents discovered by Mr. Sparks, curious and well worthy of consideration as they undoubtedly are, are of weight sufficient to shake the title of the United States, founded on the positive language of the treaty of peace. But they could not fail, in the event of another reference, to give incrcased confidence and emphasis to the pretensions of Great Britain, and to exert a corresponding influence upon the mind of the arbiter. It is worth while, in this connexion, to turn to what Lord Ashburton has said, in one of his communications to Mr. Webster, when explaining his views of the position of the highlands described in the treaty:

"My inspection of the maps, and my examination of the docu ments," says his Lordship, lead me to a very strong conviction that the highlands contemplated by the negotiators of the treaty were the only highlands then known to them-at the head of the Penobscot, Kennebec, and the rivers west of the St. Croix; and that they did not precisely know how the north line from the St. Croix would strike them; and if it were not my wish to shorten this discussion, I believe a very good argument might be drawn from the words of the treaty in proof of this. In the ne gotiations with Mr. Livingston, and afterwards with Mr. McLane, this view seemed to prevail; and, as you are aware, there were proposals to search for these highlands to the west, where alone, I believe, they will be found to answer perfectly the description of the treaty." If this question should unfortu nately go to a further reference, I should by no means despair of finding some confirmation of this view of the

cuse."

It is for the Senate to consider (added Mr. RIVES) whether there would not be much risk of introducing new complications and embarrassments in this controversy, by leaving it open for another litigated reference; and if the British Gov. ernment-strongly prepossessed, as its minister tells us it is, with the justice of its claims--would not find what it would naturally consider a persuasive "confirmation of its view of the case" in documents, such as those encountered by Mr. Sparks in his historical researches in the archives of France.

A map has been vauntingly paraded here, from Mr. Jefferson's collection, in the zeal of opposition, (without taking time to see what it was,) to confront and invalidate the map found by Mr. Sparks in the Foreign Office at Pari; but, the moment it is examined, it is found to sustain, by the most precise and remarkable correspondence in every feature, the map communicated by Mr. Sparks. The Senator who produced it, could see nothing but the microscopic dotted line running off in a northeasterly direction; but the moment other eyes were applied to it, there was found. in bold relief, a strong red line, indicating the limits of the United States according to the treaty of peace, and conciding, minutely and exactly, with the boundary traced on the map of Mr. Sparks. That this red line, and not the hardly visible dotted line, was intended to represent the limits of the United States according to the treaty of peace, is conclusively shown by the circumstance, that the red line is drawn on the map all around the exterior boundary of the United States;-through the middle of the Northern Lakes, thence through the Long Lake and the Rainy Lake to the Lake of the Woods; and from the western extremity of the Lake of the Woods to the river Mississippi; and along that river, to the point where the boundary of the United States, according to the treaty of peace, leaves it; and thence, by its easterly course, to the mouth of the St. Mary's, on the Atlantic,

Here, then, is a most remarkable and unforeseen confirmation of the map of Mr. Sparks, and by another map of a most imposing character, and bearing every mark of high authenticity. It was printed and published in Paris in 1784, (the year after the conclusion of the peace,) by Lattré, graveur du Roi, (engraver of maps, &c to the King.) It is formally enti tled, on its face, a "map of the United States of America, according to the treaty of peace of 1783.-(Carte des Etats Unis de l'Amérique, suivant le traité de paix de 1783.) It is "dedicated and presented" (dediée et presentée) "to his Excellency Benjamin Franklin, Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America, near the court of France," and while Dr. Franklin yet remained in Paris; for he did not return to the United States till the spring of the year 1785. Is there not, then, the most plausible

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ground to argue that this map, professing to be one constructed "according to the treaty of peace of 1783," and being "dedicated and presented" to Dr. Franklin, the leading negotiator who concluded that treaty, and who yet remained in Paris while the map was published, was made out with his knowledge, and by his directions; and that, corresponding as it does identically with the map found by Mr. Sparks in the Archives of the Foreign Affairs in Paris, they both partake of the same presumptions in favor of their authenticity.

Mr. R. said he did not design to dwell farther on these matters. That the knowledge possessed of the country bordering on the northern, and northeastern, and northwestern frontiers of the United States, was exceedingly imperfect at the time the attempt was made to define these boundaries in the treaty of peace of 1783, is admitted by our whole diplomatic history. Exclusive of the early controversies respecting the true river St. Croix, and the extension of our boundary from the northwestern point of the Lake of the Woods to the river Mississippi, (both of which arose from the imperfect or erroneous notions of the geography of the country existing at the conclusion of the treaty of peace,) the remarkable fact, that as many as four boards of commissioners were constituted by the treaty of Ghent, more than thirty years after the definitive treaty of peace, to settle and determine an equal number of disputed boundary lines on the northern frontier of the United States, from Passamaquoddy Bay to the Lake of the Woods, is in itself pregnant evidence of the necessarily imperfect description of limits contained in the treaty of peace. From the want of known and recognised landmarks, or familiar natural monuments, in a country then unpeopled and unexplored, the negotiators of the treaty of peace were compelled to act very much in the dark, and to substitute, for a plain reference to known and familiar objects, a general description of limits, which has given rise to doubts and arguments, more or less plausible, as to the boundaries really intended, or most nearly described under the terms employed in the treaty. So long as the discussion shall continue to be conducted on its original grounds, the same doubts and difficulties which, for now sixty years since the achievement of our national independence, have prevented the definitive adjustment of our limits, will continue to embarrass and defeat a settlement of the question. Some new mode of solving the controversy, therefore, has become imperiously necessary.

A question of disputed boundary between adjacent territories, now rapidly filling up with a hardy and enterprising population, is one attended with constant danger to the peace of the two nations. The acts of ill-advised individuals, of small detachments of troops, of subordinate local authorities, may, at any moment, bring on a conflict, in which the two countries would be committed to the stern issues of war, against their own deliberate policy and will. How near this catastrophe was being brought about three years ago, on the occasion of what was called the Aroostook war, I need not remind the Senate. For terminating this thorny and long-protracted controversy, so fraught with mischiefs and dangers to both countries, the failures of the past prove that the only expedient now left is the conventional establishment of a new and welldefined boundary line. All attempts to effect an arrangement of this kind hitherto have been rendered unavailing, by the impossibility of obtaining the assent of the States of Maine and Massachusetts-one of them claiming the rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction, as well as soil; the other an original and undivested interest in the soil of the disputed territory. Under the principles of our federative system, the national authority has been held incompetent, by means of a convention with a foreign power or otherwise, to change the boundaries, and, in effect, alienate a portion of the territory of one of the members of the Union, without its formal and stipulated assent. This fundamental obstacle, which, through so long a series of abortive negotiations, has continued to keep open an ancient and dangerous controversy with a foreign power, has at length, by a fortunate combination of circumstances, and happy reconciliation of jarring interests, been overcome. Both Maine and Massachusetts, through their several commissioners furnished with full powers for the purpose, have given their final assent to the new boundary line, separating their territory from that of the adjacent British provinces, which is proposed to be established by the treaty before us.

27TH CONG....3D SESS.

The Committee on Foreign Relations (said Mr. RIVES) is clear in the opinion that an arrangement so sanctioned, after the numberless perplexities and impediments which have heretofore and so long obstructed a satisfactory adjustment of the question, ought not to be lightly disturbed by the action of this body. On looking into the arrangement itself, they see nothing in it incompatible with the character of a fair, just, and reasonable compromise, under all the circumstances of difficulty and embarrassment which surrounded the subject. The new boundary agreed on pursues the line recommended by the King of Netherlands, till it reaches a point on the St. Francis not very distant from its source; and thence, turning off at right angles, in a southwesterly direction, it terminates at a point in the highlands where the respective boundaries heretofore claimed by Great Britain and the United States meet-throwing on the British side of the new line a narrow strip of barren land, along the eastern base of the highlands formerly claimed by the United States, of about one hundred and ten miles in length. In consideration of this narrow strip of land conceded to Great Britain, beyond what was allotted to her by the award of the King of the Netherlands, she grants in perpetuity to the inhabitants of Maine the free navigation of the St. John, from the point where it enters her territory, to the seaport at its mouth--guarantying, in favor of the agricultural produce and lumber of Maine, the same treatment, in all respects, as if they were the productions of her own provinces. She also relinquishes and gives up forever the one hundred thousand acres of valuable land at the sources of the Connecticut, lying within the actual limits of New Hampshire; as well as the strip of land on the northern frontier of Vermont and New York-both of which were determined, by the award of the King of the Netherlands, to belong to Great Britain. And the all-important military position at Rouse's Point, commanding the outlet of Lake Champlain--which, by a special exception in the award of the King of the Netherlands, was reserved to the United States--is also, by this arrangement, forever secured to them. At the same time, in the adjustment of certain disputed boundary lines farther to the west, on which the British and American commissioners under the seventh article of the treaty of Ghent differed, it is agreed that the limits shall be so established as to throw a very large and valu. ble island in the water communication between Lakes Huron and Superior, called St. George's or Sugar island, (which was claimed by the British commissioner,) on the side of the United States; and also to yield to the United States an extensive district of about four millions of acres, lying on the western side of Lake Superior-of but little intrinsic value, probably, but which was, nevertheless, warmly contended for by the British commissioner under the aforesaid article of the treaty of Ghent. Many of these concessions on the part of Great Britain, enuring to the benefit of the United States in their national capacity, and being principally induced by the assent of the States of Maine and Massachusetts to the establishment of the new boundary line on the Northeastern frontier, the United States finally stipulate to pay to those two States, in equal moieties, the sum of three hundred thousand dollars, on account of their assent to the said line; and to refund the expenses incurred by them, respectively, in protecting and surveying the disputed territory.

In analyzing the details of this arrangement, it appears that seven-twelfths in quantity of the disputed territory have fallen to the share of Mainein value, a far larger proportion. The lands allotted to Great Britain are, for the most part, barren and unproductive; deriving their chief (if not sole) importance from the more direct and convenient communication they afford between her provinces, and the greater breadth of border they give her on the St. Lawrence. These, indeed, are the essential objects she professed to have in view. On the other hand, the lands reserved to the State of Maine are, many of them, of great fertility, and all of them abound in fine timber. But their actual commercial value must depend, after all, on the facilities of a cheap transportation to convey their agricultural produce, and especially their heavy lumber, to market. Hence the free navigation of the St. John to the ocean is of vital importance to the upper parts of the State of Maine; and the stipulation to receive and treat their productions on a footing of equal favor with the produce of the colonies, enhances still farther the value of this

The British Treaty-Mr. Rives.

grant. The free navigation of the St. John formed no part of the award of the King of the Netherlands; and in every practical view, therefore, the arrangement now proposed possesses marked advantages for the State of Maine over that of the award, which it is now attempted to exalt' so much in the comparison. On this point, we have the highest possible evidence-the decision of the party most deeply interested-of Maine herself. It is apparent, from the correspondence before us, that Lord Ashburton was, at all times, ready to enter into an arrangement on the naked basis of the award of the King of the Netherlands, and that the commissioners of Maine were as steady and unwavering in their repugnance to it; and I am authorized explicitly to state the fact, that the three-fold option was distinctly presented to the commissioners-of the award, the arbitration, and the arrangement now before us. They deliberately elected the last; and most wisely and sagaciously, in my opinion, did they decide.

Looking at the arrangement as a national question, and as the interests of the Union at large are concerned, its advantages, in a sober and candid view of things, appear to the committee equally ob. vious. Will any gentleman hesitate to say that the important territorial concessions, and the quieting of contested boundaries all along the Northern frontier of the United States, from the head of Connecticut river to the western extremity of Lake Superior, including the surrender of the unquestionable British title to the ownership of by far the most important military position upon our whole frontier, (Rouse's Point,) are not cheaply purchased by the paltry sum to be paid to Maine and Massachusetts for their assent to the new boundary? Have honorable gentlemen, who find so much fault with this arrangement, forgotten that General Jackson was willing, and actually entered into an agreement, to pay to Maine and Massachusetts--not the pittance of three hundred thousand dollars-but an indemnity equivalent to a million and a quarter of dollars, if they would acquiesce in the award of the King of the Netherlands.

But it is said that the arrangement in question, by giving to Great Britain the narrow strip of wild and desolate land on the eastern side of the highlands from the head waters of the St. Francis river to the Metjarmette portage, surrenders a line of military positions, which, at the same time, command Quebec and cover the State of Maine! But for this unlucky treaty, Mr. President, these important discoveries in military topography, I venture to say, would never have been made. We have had able and scientific reports, from time to time, on the deences of our inland frontier, from boards of officers, consisting of the first professional men in America, who are well acquainted with the country in question, and all its military attributes and relations. And yet, in not one of these reports have we had the remotest hint of these commanding military positions-facing, as they do, the St. Lawrence at points below Quebec, where nothing would be gained if you were to reach it, and on the other side looking down on a sterile region and boundless forests, where armies could neither be moved nor subsisted, and would, therefore, never attempt to penetrate! I have two of these reports now before me-one made in 1838, and the other in 1840-and they both concur in the emphatic declaration, that north of the old route leading to Quebec along the Kennebec and the Chaudière-a line which the southern termination of the new boundary conceded to Great Britain does not approach nearer than within some thirty or forty miles-there is no military position along the highlands of any importance either for defence or invasion. One of these reports disposes of the whole question, by briefly declaring that "no general, who understood his profession, would invade Maine by a route destitute of forage, provisions, and the means of transportation;" and the other pithily remarks, that "isolated forts along the frontier, if you had them, would command nothing beyond the range of their own guns." And yet the Quixotic imagination of gentlemen, by these highland windmills, would command Quebec at the distance of some fifty miles!

No, sir: Great Britain obtains nothing by the new boundary agreed upon, but a more direct and convenient communication between her upper and

'See the report on the defence of the frontier of Maine, communicated to Congress by the Secretary of War, on the 21st December, 1838; and, also, the report of a board of officers, on a system of national defences, communicated the 15th May,

1840.

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lower provinces, and a strip of alternate rock and morass, which simply serves to eke out, by added space, her border along the St. Lawrence. And are these such boons that national honor or safety for bids they should be granted, for fair equivalents, to a neighboring power, in the compromise and adjustment of a disputed boundary, which has been the subject of controversy for half a century? We have always admitted that the boundary claimed by us was a most inconvenient one for Great Britain, by interrupting the communication between her provinces; and we have never been so churlish a neighbor as to insist on holding this advantage, against every proposition of compromise and mutual accommodation. I cannot divest myself of the consciousness that we are the stronger power on this continent, and I am not afraid to do what the spirit of good neighborhood and manly intercourse requires, when appealed to by corresponding dispositions; and it does seem to me that, while Great Britain is freely surrendering to us an inval. uable military position-her title to which, if she chose to insist on it, is above all question-(I mean Rouse's Point)-a position which is pronounced, by the first military officers in our service, (in com. munications now before me,) to be the great strategic point on our Northern frontier-the key, in our hands, to the Canadas; in theirs, to the heart of our own country; and, therefore, "above all price," either for attack or defence;-it would be ungracious, indeed, and unworthy alike of our honor and our strength, if we were doggedly to refuse the slightest relaxation from the rigor of our claims, even for an obvious mutual convenience.

But the Roman god Terminus, Mr. President, is invoked to animate us to stand uncompromising ly by our limits as they are, however inconvenient to others or to ourselves. The honorable gentlemen who make this invocation will pardon me for saying that they have not been very consistent worshippers of the Roman deity. Where was their holy reverence for the rites of this revived worship, three years ago, when my honorable friend, one of the Senators from Maine [Mr. WILLIAMS] introduced a bill simply to provide for a peaceable and innocent survey of our boundaries by skilful and scientific men, according to the description of limits in the treaty of peace? They then arrayed themselves in stern opposition even to this peaceable attempt to ascertain our limits, lest it might give umbrage to our neighbor. I beg leave to remind my learned and classical friends who now hold up to us the example of the Romans in the worship of the god Terminus, that the same hardy and restless people worshipped another pagan deity-Janus, the god of war-whose temple, always open in time of war, was shut, we are told, but three times during a period of more than seven hundred years. Do the patriotic gentlemen, who call upon us now to imitate the example of the Romans in worshipping the litigious and impracti cable divinity that presided over limits, mean to invite us also to follow them in their warlike and bloody career? and do they propose to celebrate the American Terminalia, not by libations of milk and wine, but by the effusion of blood?

To the worship of these pagan deities, Mr. Pres ident, has succeeded a purer and better religion, which teaches "peace on earth, and good will to men;" and while, for one, I would never shrink from the maintenance of the rights and honor of my country, at every hazard, when the occasion demanded, I should, from the bottom of my soul, deprecate an appeal to the arbitrament of arms, upon a mere question of disputed boundary. We live in an age when the moral sense of inankind de mands that every honorable expedient for the adjustment of national disputes should be honestly tried, before the ultimate appeal is ventured upon; and 1 feel a strong confidence that the body of our fellow-citizens-the friends of civilization and humanity everywhere-the rest of the nations of the earth all of whom have so deep a stake in the preser vation of general peace-will rejoice that, in this instance, they have not been tried in vain.

We come now (said Mr. Rives) to that portion of the treaty which relates to the suppression of the African slave-trade. There is no nation under the sun which has shown, through her whole history, more anxiety for the extinction of this odious and revolting traffic than the United States; and none have, therefore, a deeper interest, historical and political, in the consummation of the great work in which they led the way. Not to speak of the various and repeated acts of the Legislatures of

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the several States, while they were yet colonies of Great Britain, to arrest and put an end to this cruel traffic-acts rendered inoperative by what my own State (Virginia) denounced at the time to be "an inhuman use of the royal negative," and which she specially set forth among the wrongs and grievances which impelled her to the establishment of an independent Government;--not to speak of acts of this sort, with which our ante-revolutionary history abounds,-it is sufficient to say that the Government of the Union, from the moment of its establishment under the existing Constitution, has steadily devoted itself to the accomplishment of the same great object. While the Christian States of Europe still tolerated, and some of them even encouraged, this revolting commerce, the United States, first among the nations of the earth, pronounced its formal condemnation by law; and, following up this condemnation, as occasion required, with new penal sanctions, combined with active measures of surveillance and repression, they finally gave to the world the striking example of a crowning act of legislative energy, by which they affixed the brand of piracy to the slave-trade, declaring that any citizen of the United States found engaged in it, whether on board an American or a foreign vessel, or any foreigner on board an American vessel, so employed, "should be adjudged a pirate, and suffer death as such."

While the United States thus set the example of their own early and energetic legislation for the repression of this crime against humanity, it was felt that a general co operation of the powers of Christendom, and especially of all the maritime powers, would be necessary to ensure its final and complete extirpation. In pursuance of this policy, the United States and Great Britain, in concluding the treaty of peace at Ghent, entered into the following stipulation with each other:

"Whereas the traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice; and whereas, both his Majesty and the United States are desirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire abolition; it is hereby agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavors to accom. plish so desirable an object."

A practical interpretation of the spirit of this engagement, and a striking proof of the cordial sympathy of the representatives of the people in the general object of it, was afterwards afforded in a resolution, passed by the House of Representatives, on the 10th day of February, 1823, by the nearly unanimous vote of 131 yeas to 9 nays. It was expressed in the following words:

"Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to enter upon and prosecute from time to time such negotiations with the maritime powers of Europe and America as he may deem expedient, for the effectual abolition of the African slave trade, and its ultimate denunciation as piracy under the law of nations, by consent of the civilized world."

Both of these solemn acts--the resolution of the House of Representatives in 1823, as well as the stipulation of the treaty of Ghent-clearly recog nised the propriety and necessity of some system of combined action among the maritime powers of the world, to put an end effectually to the slavetrade. Great Britain early embraced, and has till now perseveringly adhered to the opinion, that the mutual concession of a right of search, to be exercised by the armed cruisers of each party over the merchant vessels of the others, is the only effectual means of putting an end to this infamous traffic. The United States, on the other hand, unable to forget the serious wrongs they had so recently experienced from the abusive exercise of the right of search; jealous, above ali things, of the immunity of their flag, and of the general freedom ofthe seasthe commonand equal inheritance of all nations--have been unwilling to compromise these great interests, by entering into an arrangement involving so vital an innovation upon the established maritime code; especially as they believed other means were to be found no less effectual for the accomplishment of the common object of the suppression of the slave-trade. Great Britain, in the mean time, succeeded in making treaties with Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands, for the mutaal right of search. And other European States having, from time to time, come into the same arrangement, the United States are now the only considerable maritime power that has continued to refuse its accession to a system which they could not but regard as compromising, in a high degree, the general freedom of the seas. It has thus, doubtless, happened that the American flag has been, in many instances, fraudulently used to cover vessels really belonging to States who are parties

The British Treaty-Mr. Rives.

to the mutual grant of the right of search, from the exercise of that right; and, to prevent this evasion, the Government of Great Britain recently put forth a pretension of alarming extent, and which we have resisted, and must ever resist, as wholly unsustainable upon any just principle of public law; to wit, that her cruisers have the right to board and detain vessels sailing under the American flag, when they shall judge it proper to do so, to ascertain, by an examination of their papers, whether they are truly and bona fide American or not.

This was the state of things existing at the commencement of the present session of Congress, when the President laid before us the correspondence which had taken place on the subject of this new pretension between our Minister at London and Lord Palmerston and Lord Aberdeen, successively her Majesty's Secre aries of State for Foreign Af fairs. The message of the President, referring to the same pretension, held the following emphatic and unequivocal language:

"However desircus the United States may be for the suppression of the slave trade, they cannot consent to interpolations into the maritime code, at the mere will and pleasure of other Governments. We deny the right of any such interpolation to any one or all the nations of the earth, without our consent. We claim to have a voice in all amendments or alterations of that code; and when we are given to understand, as in this instance, by a foreign Government, that its treaties with other na tions cannot be executed without the establishment and enforcement of new principles of maritime police, to be applied without our consent, we must employ a language neither of equivocal import, nor susceptible of misconstruction. American citi. zens, prosecuting a lawful commerce in the African seas, under the flag of their country, are not responsible for the abuse or unlawful use of that flag by others; nor can they rightfully, on account of any such alleged abuses, be interrupted, molested, or detained, while on the ocean."

Here, then, is the answer of the American Government, in the highest and most authoritative form known to its official intercourse, to the pretension advanced on the part of Great Britain, in the discussion with our late Minister at London. It is an unequivocal negation of that pretension, in principle and in practice; and leaves nothing to be done which could announce in more emphatic terms our determined resistance to it.

The vital question of the independence of our flag being thus disposed of, by the prompt, unequivocal, and final answer of the American Government to this new pretension, other considerations of an important character present themselves to view. It is shown, by the correspondence just referred to, and other incontestable proofs that the American flag has been extensively abused to cover this iniquitous traffic-sometimes by American citizens, notwithstanding the severity of our penal enactments; but more frequently by the subjects of other powers-by Spanish, Portuguese, or Brazilian slave-dealers, who assume the American colors to protect them from the right of search, to which they would be subject under their own national flags. The fact of this abuse is admitted by our Government. Mr. Stevenson, in his letter to Lord Aberdeen, says: "That the flag of the United States has been grossly abused, there is too much reason to believe and deplore.' The same declaration is repeated by the President, in his message to Congress at the commencement of the present session; and in the correspondence between Lord Palmerston and Mr. Stevenson, which accompanied that message, the mortifying fact is disclosed that, of the four vessels sailing under the American flag, which had been visited and detained by British cruisers on the coast of Africa, (and which it became the duty of our minister to make the subject of representation and complaint to the British Government, on account of the violation of the flag,) every one of them turned out, upon inquiry and investigation, to be slavers, furnished with American captains and American papers; but, in reality, as there is reason to believe, Spanish property.

Seeing, then, that our flag has been shamelessly abused to cover an infamous traffic, which our laws were the first to denounce and pursue with adequate penalties-that it has been made a shelter to screen from the punishment due to their crimes the most profligate of the human race,-does not the national honor demand that we should give to the world an assurance of our determination to cleanse and preserve it from this horrible pollution? We have, upon considerations of the highest state policy, and from a jealous solicitude to maintain the freedom of the seas, refused to concede that mutual right of search which other nations have consented to yield, as an instrument for the suppression of the slave-trade. We have, with still stronger determination, and upon impregnable grounds of public

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law, declared our resistance to the new pretension of subjecting our flag to visitation and detention, for the alleged purpose of carrying into execution the agreements of other powers, to which we have refused to become a party. Under these circumstances, is it not due to the character of the American people, pledged by all their past history to the great cause of the final suppression of the African slave-trade, that, while rejecting the plans proposed by other Governments for this object, we should come forward with one of our own, which will afford a complete guaranty against the prostitution to which we have seen our flag so vilely exposed, and which will, at the same time, bring the most efficient means to the general extirpation of this odious traffic, without intrenching on the liberty of the seas and the established principles of maritime law?

Considerations and sentiments such as these, doubtless suggested the arrangement contained in the treaty. By that arrangement, it is stipulated that the two powers shall each maintain a squadron of not less than eighty guns on the coast of Africa, to enforce, separately and respectively, the laws and obligations of each country for the suppression of the slave-trade: the two squadrons to be perfectly independent of each other; but, at the same time, to act in concert and co-operation for the attainment of the common object, under such orders as shall, from time to time, be given by their respective Governments. And it is farther stipulated, that the two parties will unite in all becoming representations and remonstrances to any power within whose dominions markets for the purchase of African slaves may be still allowed to exist, to close such markets at once and forever. In virtue of this arrangement, (which is limited to five years, if either party shall wish then to terminate it,) each power will, separately and independently, exercise the necessary supervision and police over all vessels sailing under its own flag; neither being permitted to visit or search the vessels of the other; but the presence of the two squadrons, always on the alert, and acting in friendly concert, will afford, by their vigilant oversight, complete security against the use of the flag of either power to cover the prohibited traffic, and will, at the same time, give protection to the merchant vessels of each, when necessary, from all unlawful interruption or molestation.*

This arrangement is adapted to meet every exigency of the case, and reconciles the most vigorous measures for the suppression of the slave-trade with a sacred regard for the independence and immunity of the national flag. It vindicates from all suspicion the sincerity of the United States; which their persevering and solitary opposition, for a long time, to the mutual concession of the right of search, for the more effective pursuit and detection of the traffic, exposed to injurious doubts and misconstruction. At the same time, it has the merit of a strict fidelity to American principles. It is, indeed, the identical plan which, when Lord Castlereagh was so earnestly insisting on a mutual right of search as the only effectual means for the suppression of the slave-trade, President Monroe caused to be presented, as the American contre-projet-which, however, did not prevent his Lordship from recurring to, and urgently pressing, again and again, his favorite right of search. The proposition referred to was developed in a letter from the Secretary of State

In the speech of Mr. Benton on the British treaty, recently published, he claims great credit to Mr. Van Buren's adminis tration for having rejected, as contrary to the principles and policy of this Government, an agreement of co-operation for the suppression of the slave-trade, which, he says, was similar to that contained in the treaty. Mr. Benton's allusion, it seems, is to a letter of Mr. Paulding, Secretary of the Navy, to Licur. Paine, commanding the United States schooner Grampus; in which the Secretary disapproved an arrangement entered into by that officer with the commander of a British cruiser on the coast of Africa, by which "Lieut. Paine delegated to the British commander the right to seize and detain, under certain circumstances, vessels sailing under American col org." Now, it was this "delegation of power to seize and de tain vessels under American colors," which Mr. Paulding declared was "unauthorized by instructions, and contrary to the established and well-known principles and policy of the American Government." But Mr. Benton surely will not say that the arrangement made in the treaty delegates to British cruisers the right to seize and detain vessels sailing under American colors It is precisely the contrary; for the treaty expressly declares that the two squadrons are to enforce, separately and respectively, the laws of each country for the suppression of the slave-trade, and that they are to be independent of each other. The same letter of Mr. Paulding, however, enjoins "a friendly co operation with the British cruisers in the suppression of the slave-trade;" and expressly authorizes Lieut. Paine "to cruise in company and co operation with any British vessel of war employed on the slave coast"— which is precisely what is done (neither less nor more) by the treaty arrangement so much denounced by Mr. Benton!