APPENDIX

27TH CONG....3D SESS.

[We commence the Congressional Globe and Appendix for this session of Congress (the 3d and last of the 27th) with the executive proceedings of the Senate, at the last session, on the British treaty made between Mr. WEBSTER and Lord ASHBURTON.

Ratifications of the treaty were not exchanged in time for us to publish the proceedings, correspondence, and speeches thereon, in the Congressional Globe and Appendix for the last session, to which they properly belong.

The Journal of the Senate in secret session, the correspondence in relation to the treaty, and the treaty itself, are -contained in the first two numbers of the Congressional Globe for this ses

sion.

All the speeches made in secret session on the treaty, which have been, or may be, written out by the Senators, will be published in the Appendix, and ; will probably fill four or five numbers. This number is occupied entirely by MY. BENTON's against the treaty, which is not concluded. It is expected that his speech will nearly fill the next number of the Appendix.

We shall print between four and five thousand surplus copies of the Congressional Globe and Appendix, for the purpose of furnishing complete copies. to all persons who may subscribe for those works before the 1st of January, 1843.

This number of the Appendix will be sent to some of our friends, with the hope that they will obtain some subscribers for us. The Congressional Globe and Appendix are $1 each for a session. The extra matter, which we intend to print in them this session, is worth the money.-EDITORS CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE AND APPENDIX.]

The British Treaty-Mr. Benton.

BRITISH TREATY.
[SECRET SESSION.]

SPEECH OF MR. BENTON,
OF MISSOURI,

In Senate, Thursday, August 18, 1842-In opposi
sition to the treaty.

Mr. BENTON said: I speak against this treaty not so much for the Senate as for the country. I mean to publish my speech, and that with the full illustrations and quotations which it is unneces sary to make here, where the documents are in every Senator's hand, but which will be necessary to the understanding of the subject by those who have not access to the documents. I am opposed to the treaty on many grounds; and first, because it is not a settlement of all the questions in dispute between the two countries. We were led to believe, on the arrival of the special minister, that he came as a messenger of peace, and clothed with full powers to settle everything; and believing this, his arrival was hailed with universal joy. But here is a disappointment-a great disappointment. On receiving the treaty and the papers which accompany it, we find that all the subjects in dispute have not been settled; that, in fact, only three out of seven are settled; and that the minister has returned to his country, leaving four of the contested subjects unadjusted. This is a disappointment; and the greater, because the papers communicated confirm the report that the minister came with full powers to settle everything. The very first note of the American negotiator-and that in its very first sentence, confirms this belief, and leaves us to wonder how a mission that promised so much, has performed so little. Mr. Webster's first note runs thus: "Lord Ashburton having been charged by the Queen's Government with full powers to negotiate and settle all matters in discussion between the United States and England, and having on his arrival at Washington announced," &c., &c. Here is a declaration of full power 10 Settle everything; and yet, after this, only part is settled, and the minister has returned home. This is unexpected, and inconsistent. It contradicts the character of the mission, balks our hopes, and frustrates our policy. As a confederacy of States, our policy is to settle everything, or nothing; and having received the minister for that purpose, this .complete and universal settlement, or nothing, should have been the sine qua non of the American negotiator.

From the message of the President which accompanies the treaty, we learn that the questions in discussion between the two countries were: 1. The Northern boundary. 2. The right of search | in the African seas, and the suppression of the African slave-trade. 3. The surrender of fugitives from justice. 4. The title to the Columbia river. 5. Impressment. 6. The attack on the Caroline. 7. The case of the Creole, and of other American vessels which had shared the same fate. These are the subjects (seven in number) which the President enumerates, and which he informs us occupied the attention of the negotiators. He does not say whether these were all the subjects which occupied their attention. He does not tell us whether they discussed any others. He does not say whether the British negotiator opened the question of the State debts, and their assumption or guaranty by the Federal Government! or whether the American negotiator mentioned the point of the Canadian asylum for fugitive slaves (of which twelve thousand have already gone there) seduced by the honors and rewards which they receive, and by the protection which is extended to them. The mes. sage is silent upon these further subjects of difference, if not of discussion, between the two countries; and, following the lead of the President, and

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confining ourselves (for the present) to the seven subjects of dispute named by him, and we find three of them provided for in the treaty-four of them not: and this constitutes a great objection to! the treaty-an objection which is aggravated by the nature of the subjects settled, or not settled. For it so happens that, of the subjects in discussion, some were general, and affected the whole Union; others were local, and affected sections. Of these general subjects, those which Great Britain had most at heart are provided for; those which most concerned the United States are omitted: and of 'the three sections of the Union which had each its peculiar grievance, one section is quieted, and two are left as they were. This gives Great Britain an advantage over us as a nation: it gives one section of the Union an advantage over the two others, sectionally. This is all wrong, unjust, unwise, and impolitic. It is wrong to give a foreign power an advantage over us: it is wrong to give one section of the Union an advantage over the others. In their differences with foreign powers, the States should be kept united: their peculiar grievances should not be separately settled, so as to disunite their several complaints. This is a view of the objection which commends itself most gravely to the Senate. We are a confederacy of States, and a confederacy in which States classify themselves sectionally, and in which each section has its local feelings and its peculiar interests. We are classed in three sections; and each of these sections had a peculiar grievance against Great Britain; and here is a treaty to adjust the grievances of one, and but one, of these three sections. To all intents and purposes, we have a separate treaty-a treaty between the Northern States and Great Britain; for it is a treaty in which the North is provided for, and the South and West left out. Virtually, it is a separate treaty with a part of the States; and this forms a grave objection to it in my eyes.

Of the nine Northern States whose territories are coterminous with the dominions of her Britannic Majesty, six of them had questions of boundary, or of territory, to adjust: and all these are adjusted.

The twelve Southern slaveholding States had a question in which they were all interested-that of the protection and liberation of fugitive or criminal slaves in Canada and the West Indies: this great question finds no place in the treaty, and is put off with phrases in an arranged correspondence. The whole great West takes a deep interest in the fate of the Columbia river, and demands the withdrawal of the British from it: this large subject finds no place in the treaty, nor even in the correspondence which took place between the negotiators. The South and the West must go to London with their complaints: the North has been accommodated here. The mission of peace has found its benevolence circumscribed by the metes and boundaries of the sectional divisions in the Union. The peace-treaty is for one section: for the other two sections there is no peace. The nonslaveholding States coterminous with the British dominions are pacified and satisfied: the slaveholding and the Western States, remote from the British dominions, are to suffer and complain as heretofore. As a friend to the Unicn-a friend to justice and as an inhabitant of the section which is both slaveholding and Western, I object to the treaty which makes this injurious distinction amongst the States.

This objection, great in itself, receives emphasis from a cotemporaneous act of British legislation. While diplomacy on this side the Atlantic was giving a separate treaty to the Northern States, legislation on the other side of that sea was giving them a separate trade. This results from the new corn law just passed by the British Parliament, and the great difference which is made in the rate of duties on foreign and colonial products, and the admission of

27TH CONG....... 3D SESS.

American grain and provisions as colonial productions when they pass through Canada. Of course, this partial legislation, like the title of the one-sided treaty, is in general terms; it speaks generally, and professes nothing of what it effects. But, in admitting American grain and provisions as Canadian when they pass through Canada, it, of course, admits none but of the States coterminous with Canada; for from none of the rest can it go. In admitting this wheat at a fraction of the duty it would pay, if it went from an American port, a discrimination is made between the neighboring States and those distant from Canada. This is the fact now. The rate of duty on wheat exported from an American or Canadian port sets out with a difference of four to one in favor of the Canadian, rises as high as fifteen to one, and averages ten or twelve to one. This is effected by the discrimination between foreign and colonial wheat, and the sliding scale, which makes the duties fall as the price of the wheat rises, and which fixes the foreign duty at twenty shillings the quarter (eight bushels) when the colonial is at five shillings; at fifteen when the colonial is at one; and whien fixes one shilling as the ordinary and common duty on the colonial wheat; while the foreign is only admitted at that rate when the price of the wheat reaches the maximum price of seventy-three One shilling duty on the shillings a quarter. quarter, is only a penny halfpenny (or three cents) on the bushel-a mere nominal duty on what is selling at from seven to nine shillings (150 to 200 cents) the bushel. At this rate, our Northern citizens can send their wheat to England; so that, virtually, they have a free trade, as well as a separate trade, with Great Britain in this great staple; while to the rest of the Union her ports are nearly closed against the same article, by the heaviness of the duty. As it is with wheat, so it is with flour, and with all other grains and their manufactures, and with beef and pork. I have merely taken wheat for the illustration which a single article affords. It is the same with all the rest. Barley, rye, oats, Indian corn, beans, peas, corn-meal, buckwheat, buckwheat flour, rice, and salted provisions--all have their place in the same sliding scale, and with the same proportionate difference of duty between the foreign and the colonial. Thus a separate trade, and virually a free trade, in the great staples of grains, flour, and provisions, is granted to our Northern citizens by British legislation in London, at the same time that British diplomacy in Washington gives them a separate treaty!

I do not mention these things because I repine at the advantages of our Northern brethren: on the contrary, I wish them all possible prosperity. But I mention them because they are facts; because they are strange coincidences; because they are novelties in cur Union; and because of the effect which they should have in our judgment upon this treaty. The Senate is a body representing all the States. They have the harmony and the unity of the confederacy to preserve; and it may be their duty to correct the error into which a sectional negotiator may have fallen.

The failure to settle all the matters in dispute between the two countries, aggravated as that failure is by the sectional and invidious distinction which it makes among the States, is a circumstance badly calculated to recommend the treaty to the indulgence or to the partiality of the Senate. What it does contain must be good indeed to overbalance so great an objection; but if, instead of being good, its contents are bad-if the sins of commission are to be added to those of omission, then there is no redeeming quali y about it, and unqualified condemnation should be its fate. This I hold to be the case. I look upon the treaty to be about equally bad for what it contains, and, for what it omits; and, under these two aspects I shall proceed to give it the close and careful examination which the magnitude of the subject requires.

The treaty comes to us recommended by a message from the President of the United States, in which, among other advantages gained for us, he presents an acquisition of four millions of valuable mineral land on the western shore of Lake Superior. I begin with this part of the message, because it involves a fallacy which it is necessary to detect, in order to appreciate the recommendations which are made in favor of the treaty. The fact is, not an acre of these four millions has either been acquired or secured by this treaty; the line between the Lake Superior and the Lake of the Woods is changed for the worse, not for the bet

The British Treaty-Mr. Benton.

ter, by this treaty; and our Secretary negotiator, who drew up the message of the President, has led him to sign a recommendation which has no foundation in fact. The message is in these words:

"From the imperfect knowledge of this remote country at the date of the treaty of peace, some of the descriptions in that treaty do not harmonize with its natural features, as now ascertained. "Long Lake" is nowhere to be found under that name. There is reason for supposing, however, that the sheet of water intended by that name is the estuary at the mouth of Pigeon river. The present treaty, therefore, adopts that estuary and river, and afterward pursues the usual route, across the height of land by the various portages and small lakes, till the line reaches Rainy Lake; from which the com. missioners agreed on the extension of it to its termination, in the northwest angle of the Lake of the Woods. The region of country on and near the shore of the lake, between Pigeon river on the north, and Fond du Lac and the river St. Louis on the south and west, considered valuable as a mineral region, is thus included within the United States. It embraces a ter. ritory of four millions of acres northward of the claim set up by the British commissioner under the treaty of Ghent."

The message, in this passage, faintly sketches a dispute where no grounds for one existed, and celebrates an acquisition where nothing had been gained. The line from the Lake Superior to the Lake of the Woods never was susceptible of a dispute. That from the Lake of the Woods to the head of the Mississippi was disputable, and long disputed; and it will not do to confound these two lines, so different in themselves, and in their political history. The line from Lake Superior was fixed by landmarks as permanent and notorious as the great features of nature herself-the Isle Royale, in the northwest of Lake Superior, and the chain of small lakes and rivers which led from the north of that isle to the Lake of the Woods. Such were the precise calls of the treaty of 1783, and no room for dispute existed about it. The Isle Royale was a landmark in the calls of the treaty; and a great and distinguished one it was-a large rocky island in Lake Superior, far to the northwest, a hundred miles from the southern shore; uninhabitable, and almost inaccessible to the Indians in their canoes; and for that reason believed by them to be the residence of the Great Spirit, and called, in their language, Menong. This isle was as notorious as the lake itself, and was made a landmark in the treaty of 1783, and the boundary line directed to goto the north of it, and then to follow the chain of small lakes and rivers called "Long Lake," which constituted the line of water communication between Lake Superior and the Lake of the Woods; a communication which the Indians had followed beyond the reach of tradition, which was the highway of nations, and which all travellers and traders have followed since its existence became known to our first discoverers. A line through the Lake Superior, from its eastern outlet to the northward of the Isle Royale, leads direct to this communication; and the line described was evidently so described for the purpose of going to that precise communication. The terms of the call are peculiar. Through every lake and every watercourse, from Lake Ontario to the Lake Huron, the language of the treaty is the same: the line is to follow the middle of the lake. Through every river it is the same: the middle of the main channel is to be followed. On entering Lake Superior, this language changes. It is no longer the middle of the lake that is to constitute the boundary, but a line through the lake to the "northward" of Isle Royalea boundary which, so far from dividing the lake equally, leaves almost two-thirds of it on the American side. The words of the treaty are these:

"Thence through Lake Superior, northward of the isles Royale and Philippeaux, to the Long Lake; thence through the middle of said Long Lake, and the water communication betwen it and the Lake of the Woode, to the Lake of the Woods," &.

These are the words of the call; and this variation of language, and this different mode of dividing the lake, were for the obvious purpose of taking the shortest course to the Long Lakes, or Pigeon river, which led to the Lake of the Woods. The communication through these little lakes and rivers was evidently the object aimed at; and the call to the north of Isle Royale was for the purpose of getting to that object. The island itself was nothing, except as a landmark. Though large, (for it is near one hundred miles in circumference,) it has no value, neither for agriculture, commerce, nor war. It is sterile, inaccessible, remote from shore, and fit for nothing but the use to which the Indians consigned it--the fabulous residence of a fabulous deity. Nobody wants itneither Indians nor white people. It was assigned to the United States in the treaty of 1783, not as a possession, but as a landmark, and because the

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shortest line through the lake, to the well-known route which led to the Lake of the Woods, passed to the north of that isle. All this is evident from the maps, and all the maps are here the same; for these features of nature are so well defined that there has never been the least dispute about them. The commissioners under the Ghent treaty, (Gen. Porter for the United States, and Mr. Barclay for Great Britain,) though disagreeing about several things, had no disagreement about Isle Royale, and the passage of the line to the north of that isle. In their separate reports, they agreed upon this; and this settled the whole question. After going to the north of Isle Royale, to get out of the lake at a known place, it would be absurd to turn two hun. dred miles south, to get out of it at an unknown place. The agreement upon Isle Royale settled the line to the Lake of the Woods, as it was, and as it is: but it so happened that, in the year 1790, the English traveller and fur-trader, Mr. (afterwards Sir Alexander) McKenzie, in his voyage to the Northwest, travelled up this line of water communication, saw the advantages of its exclusive possession by the British, and proposed in his "Histo tory of the Fur Trade," to obtain it by turning the line down from Isle Royale, near two hundred miles, to St. Louis river in the southwest corner of the lake. The Earl of Selkirk, at the head of the Hudson's Bay Company, repeated the suggestion; and the British Government, forever attentive to the interests of its subjects, set up a claim, through the Ghent commissioner, to the St. Louis river as the boundary. Mr. Barclay made the question, but too faintly to obtain even a reference to the ar bitrator; and Lord Ashburton had too much candor and honor to revive it. He set up no pretension to the St. Louis river, as claimed by the Ghent commissioner: he presented the Pigeon river as the "long lake" of the treaty of 1783, and only asked for a point six miles south of that river; and he obtained all he asked. His letter of the 17th of July is explicit on this point. He says:

"In considering the second point, it really appears of little importance to either party how the line be determined through the wild country between Lake Superior and the Lake of the Woods, but it is important that some line should be fixed and known.

"I would propose that the line be taken from a point about six miles south of Pigeon river, where the Grand Portage com. mences on the lake, and continued along the line of the said portage, alternately by land and water, to Lac la Pluie-the existing route by land and by water remaining common by both parties. This line has the advantage of being known, and attended with no doubt or uncertainty in running it."

These are his Lordship's words: Pigeon river, instead of St. Louis river! making no pretension to the four millions of acres of fine mineral land supposed to have been saved between these two rivers; and not even alluding to the absurd pretension of the Ghent commissioner! After this, what are we to think of the candor and veracity of an official paper, which would make a merit of having saved four millions of acres of fine mineral land, "northward of the claim set up by the British commissioner under the Ghent treaty?" What must we think of the candor of a paper which boasts of having "included this within the United States," when it was never out of the United States? If there is any merit in the case, it is in Lord Ashburton-in his not having claimed the 200 miles between Pigeon river and St. Louis river. What he claimed, he got; and that was the southern lice, commencing six miles south of Pigeon river, and running south of the true line to Rainy lake. He got this; making a difference of some hundreds of thousands of acres, and giving to the British the exclusive possession of the best route, and a joint possession of the one which is made the boundary. To understand the value of this concession, it must be known that there are two lines of communica tion from the Lake Superior to the Lake of the Woods, both beginning at or near the mouth of Pigeon river; that these lines are the channels of trade and travelling, both for Indians and the furtraders; that they are water communications, and that it was a great point with the British, in their trade and intercourse with the Indians, to have the exclusive dominion of the best communication, and a joint possession with us of the other. This is what Lord Ashburton claimed-what the treaty gave him-and what our Secretary negotiator be came his agent and solicitor to obtain for him. I quote the Secretary's letter of the 25th of July to Mr. James Ferguson, and the answers of Mr. Ferguson of the same date, and also the letter of Mr. Joseph Delafield, of the 20th of July, for the truth of what I say. From these letters, it will be seen that our Secretary put himself to the trouble to hunj

27TH CONG.... 3D SESS.

testimony to justify his surrender of the northern route to the British; that he put leading questions to his witnesses, to get the information which he wanted; and that he sought to cover the sacrifice, by depreciating the agricultural value of the land, and treating the difference between the lines as a thing of no importance. Here is the letter. I read an extract from it:

"What is the general nature of the country between the mouth of Pigeon river and the Rainy lake? Of what formation is it, and how is its surface? and will any considerable part of its area be fit for cultivation? Are is waters active and running streams, as in other parts of the United States? Or are they dead lakes, swamps, and morasses? If the latter be their general character, at what point, as you proceed westward, do the waters receive a more decided character as running streams?

"There are said to be two lines of communication, each partly by water and partly by portages, from the neighborhood of Pigeon river to the Rainy lake: one by way of Fowl lake, the Saganaga lake, and the Cypress lake; the other by way of Arrow river and lake; then by way of Saganaga lake, and through the river Maligne, meeting the other route at Lake la Croix, and through the river Namekan to the Rainy lake. Do you know any reason for attaching great preference to either of these two lines? Or do you consider it of no importance, in any point of view, which may be agreed to? Please be full and particular on these several points."

Here are leading questions, such as the rules of evidence forbid to be put to any witness, and the answers to which would be suppressed by the order of any court in England or America. They are called "leading," because they lead the witness to the answer which the lawyer wants; and thereby tend to the perversion of justice. The witnesses are here led to two points: first, that the country between the two routes or lines is worth nothing for agriculture; secondly, that it is of no importance to the United States which of the two lines is established for the boundary. Thus led to the desired points, the witnesses answer. Mr. Ferguson says:

"As an agricultural district, this region will always be valueless. The pine timber is of high growth, equal for spars, perhaps, to the Norway pine, and may, perhaps, in time, find a market; but there are no alluvions, no arable lands, and the whole country may be described as one waste of rock and

water.

"You have desired me also to express an opinion as to any preference which1 may know to exist between the several lines claimed as boundaries through this country, between the United States and Great Britain.

"Considering that Great Britain abandons her claim by the Fond du Lac and the St. Louis river; cedes also Sugar island, (otherwise called St. George's island,) in the St. Marie river; and, agrees, generally, to a boundary following the old commercial route, commencing at the Pigeon river, I do not think that any reasonable ground exists to prevent a final determination of this part of the boundary."

And Mr. Delafield adds:

"As an agricultural district, it has no value or interest, even prospectively, in my opinion. If the climate were suitable, (which it is not,) I can only say that I never saw, in my explo rations there, tillable land enough to sustain any permanent pop. ulation sufficiently numerous to justify other settlements than those of the fur-tradeis; and, I might add, fishermen. The fur traders there occupied nearly all those places; and the opin ion now expressed is the only one I ever heard entertained by those most experienced in these Northwestern regions.

"There is, nevertheless, much interest felt by the fur traders on this subject of boundary. To them, it is of much importance, as they conceive; and it is, in fact, of national importance. Had the British commissioner consented to proceed by the Pigeon river, (which is the Long Lake of Mitchell's map,) it is proba ble there would have been an agreement. There were several reasons for his pertinacity, and for this disagreement; which belong, however, to the private history of the commission, and can be stated when required. The Pigeon river is a con tinuous watercourse. The St. George's island, in the St. Marie river, is a valuable island, and worth as much, perhaps, as most of the country between the Pigeon river and Dog river route, claimed for the United States, in an agricultural sense."

These are the answers; and while they are conclusive upon the agricultural character of the country between the two routes, and present it as of no value; yet, on the relative importance of the routes as boundaries, they refuse to follow the lead which the question held out to them, and show that, as commercial routes, and, consequently, as commanding the Indians and their trade, a question of national importance is involved. Mr. Delafield says the fur-traders feel much interest in this boundary: to them, it is of much importance; and it is, in fact, of national importance. These are the words of Mr. Delafield; and they show the reason why Lord Ashburton was so tenacious of this change in the boundary. He wanted it for the benefit of the furtrade, and for the consequent command which it would give the British over the Indians in time of war. All this is apparent; yet our Secretary would only look at it as a corn and potato region! And finding it not good for that purpose, he surrenders it to the British! Both the witnesses look upon it as a sacrifice on the part of the United States, and suppose some equivalent in other parts of the boundary was received for it. There was no such

The British Treaty-Mr. Benton.

equivalent: and thus this surrender becomes a gratuitous sacrifice on the part of the United States, aggravated by the condescension of the American Secretary to act as the attorney of the British minister, and seeking testimony by unfair and illegal questions, and then disregarding the part of the answers which made against his design.

Sir, I have dwelt long upon this point, because it was necessary to detect the fallacy which the President has been made to sign, and to expose the subserviency of our Secretary to the interests of Great Britain. He has sacrificed an important boundary-important for war and commerce; and, while making this sacrifice, and surrendering all the country between the two routes, he makes the President sign a statement which leads the country to believe that he has made an acquisition of four millions of acres of fine mineral land. The detection of this fallacy, and the exposure of this subserviency, are not only necessary to save us from gross error about these four millions of acres; but also to show us the spirit in which the treaty was made, and the faith with which the papers submitted to us have been drawn. Other occasions will occur for similar detections and exposures. And here I wish to say, once for all, that I consider this message, which the President has signed, as being the work of his Secretary; and that his fault consists in not having verified its statements before he signed it.

I have stated one general objection to the treaty-that of not settling all the questions in dispute. I pass over other general objections at present, for the purpose of getting at once to the consideration of its details. These other general objections are numerous and weighty; but I pass them over at present with a mere enumeration, to be attended to hereafter. I name them now, without stopping to dwell upon them. They are: That such a negotiation should have been committed to a sole negotiator, and one not subjected to the approval of the Senate, nor furnished with presidential instructions to limit and guide him, and the citizen of an interested State;--the assumption of this negotiator to treat the question of national boundaries, not as a question of rights under the treaty of independence, but as a matter of bargain and sale, or of grants and equivalents, in the hands of the negotiators;the omission of the American negotiator to keep minutes, or protocols, of his conferences and propositions; the obscurity and mystery which rest upon the origin and progress of the different propositions; the assumption of the American negotiator to act for the British negotiator, in presenting › the British proposition for the Maine boundary as the American proposition; and the unjustifiable and unfounded arguments with which he pressed that proposition upon the commissioners of the State of! Maine, until he succeeded in victimizing that deserted and doomed State;-the mixing up of incongruous subjects in the same treaty;-the irregular manner in which the ratification of the treaty has been forestalled by private consultations and conferences with Senators before it was submitted to the Senate;--the solemn and mysterious humbuggery by which Dr. Franklin has been made to play a part in ravishing this ratification from our alarms, and screening the negotiator from responsibility. for his gratuitous sacrifices;--the awful apparition of the disinterred map discovered by Mr. Jared Sparks in Paris, with the red marks upon it, and which was showed about to Senators to alarm them into prompt action;-the impressive invocation to secrecy and despatch, lest the British should get wind of the aforesaid map and letter, and thereupon renounce the treaty; when it was perfectly clear, from Lord Ashburton's letter of the 11th of July, that the sagacious old gentleman had already scented out these secret papers, and was ready to claim the benefit of them if new negotiations commenced;-the war-cry which is raised if the treaty is not ratified-a cry which addresses itself to our fears, and not to our judgment, and which would make merchandise of national honor and national rights. I pass over all these additional general objections to the treaty for the present, intending to revert to them in good time, and proceed at once to the consideration of the treaty itself.

The northern boundary is the first subject in the treaty; and on this question, (abandoning all claims of right and title under the treaty of independence-with what propriety will hereafter be seen,) the negotiators proceeded to adjust this boundary upon : the principle of compromise and accommodation, ceding and conceding, granting and compensat

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ing, until they brought it to the condition in which we find it in the treaty. Waiving, for the present, all remarks upon this assumption of power over our national boundaries, and this demolition of the work of our ancestors, who established these boundaries at the expense of so much blood and treasure, and for the wise purpose of covering their country by a proper frontier: waiving, for the present, all remarks upon this point, I proceed to state the grants and equivalents which were made on each side, and shall consider the value and importance of each. These are, on the side of the British-1. Sugar or St. George's island, in the State of Michigan, between the lakes Huron and Superior. 2. Rouse's Point, and a strip of territory in the State of New York. 3. A strip of territory in the State of Vermont. 4. A hundred thousand acres of land in the State of New Hampshire. 5. The qualified navigation of the St. John river, within the British dominions. 6. The amount of money received by the British for timber cut and sold on the disputed territory. These are the grants and compensations on the part of the British. On the part of the United States, they are: 1. The impor-' tant national boundary between the Lake Superior, and the Lake of the Woods, so necessary to the furtrade and to the control of the Indians. 2. The four thousand one hundred and nineteen square miles of territory in the State of Maine, being the same and the whole that was awarded to Great Britain by the King of the Netherlands. 3. Eight hundred and ninety-three square miles in Maine, being so much over and above the award of the King of the Netherlands. 4. The establishment of the new boundary, on this side of the awarded line, from lake Pohenagamook to Metjarmette pass, one hundred and ten miles in length, and wholly within the ancient and natural boundaries of Maine. 5. The surrender of the mountain boundary which covered the State of Maine and commanded the road to Quebec, from the heat of the St. Francis to the Meijarmette pass-say 150 miles in length-and being so much over and above the award of the King of the Netherlands. 6. The navigation of the St. John river within the State of Maine. 7. A right of way over the territory of Maine, to reach the river. 8. The sum of $300,000 to be paid to the States of Maine and Massachusetts for their loss of territory. 9. The sum of about $200,000 to be paid to the same States, to reimburse their expenses in protecting the disputed territory against Great Britain. 10. A naval alliance and co-operation with Great Britain for the suppression of the African slave-trade. 11. A diplomatic alliance with the same power, for remonstrating with nations against the slave-trade, and for closing the markets of the world against the traffic in slaves. 12. The delivery of fugitive criminals.

This is the list of the grants and equivalentsthese the concessions on each side; the value of which I now proceed to examine, beginning with those on the part of Great Britain.

1. The first of these concessions, as they are called, is the island in St. Mary's river, between the lakes Huron and Superior; called by us Sugar island, by the British St. George's. This island has been in our possession, and under our jurisdiction, since the treaty of peace of 1783; our people make sugar upon it; our Indians inhabit it; and for upwards of a quarter of a century we have exercised proprietory rights over it. It was ours by the treaty of 1783, and by fifty years' possession; but the British commissioner under the Ghent treaty (Mr. Barclay) set up a claim to it which Lord Ashbur ton was too candid to enforce. He readily threw it up to us. In his letter of the 16th of July, he

says:

"The other things connected with this boundary being satisfactorily arranged, a line shall be drawn to as to throw this island within the United States."

This was prompt and handsome. His Lordship knew very well what he was about, and how insignificant was a rich island compared to a commanding boundary. Sugar island had no military importance. It was good for sugar and grain, but not for cannon. Its 26,000 acres of fertile soil was a great object in the eyes of an agricultural people, but nothing in the eyes of a domineering monarchy. The cession enured to the benefit of Michigan, and sweetened the treaty to the palate of that young State. It was a large object in the eyes of a young State; the little island of 200 acres in the mouth of the Detroit river was a much larger one in the eyes of the British! The little island of

27TH CONG....3D SESS.

Bois Blanc, opposite Malden, and commanding the ver Detroit and its entrance into the Lake Erie, was worth many sugar islands to them; and this they took good care to save.* In June 1822, Mr. Barclay, the British commissioner under the 6th article of the Ghent treaty, wrote thus to General Porter, the American commissioner:

"The undersigned, therefore, is ready to cede Sugar, Fox, and Stony is'ands to the United States, provided the commissioner of the United States agrees to appropriate the island of Bois Blanc to his Majesty, and to establish the line in the water passage between Bois Blanc and the three beforementioned islands."

The little island was accordingly so appropri ated; the offer of three others for it being reinforced by a threat to refer the question of right to the King of the Netherlands, if it was not given up. It was given up in 1822; and I mention the circumstance to show how the British do these things. A large island, excellent for raising cabbages and potatoes, and making sugar and sirup, is readily thrown up to us: a small one, on which cannon could be planted, was pertinaciously retained by them! The taste of both countries was accommodated-ours for agriculture, theirs for dominion! Like a sagacious negotiator, who knew where to concede, Lord Ashburton surrendered Sugar island to Michigan; conciliated that State in favor of his treaty, and marched straight on to the grand object of his mission.

2. Rouse's Point, in the State of New York, and the narrow slip of land which includes it. This point is now hailed as an invaluable acquisition, sufficient of itself to pass the treaty. I remember very well when it was assigned to us by the King of the Netherlands, and when it stood for nothing in favor of the award. That award was rejected, not by the will of President Jackson, but under the action of the Senate and the two interested States, although it gave us this now prized point, cost us no money, took so much less from the State of Maine, and left us the long and lofty line of mountain frontier opposite to Quebec. Rouse's Point gained us not a vote in this body in favor of that award: it now becomes a gigantic consideration in favor of a treaty so much worse than the award. Be it so. The author of the present treaty was the enemy of the award, and will doubtless see the propriety of explaining the reason for the strange contradiction which his conduct presents. Historical recollections attach some interest to this point, which is now more imaginary than real. It has been the scene of some military operations, which the growth of the country will carry to a more distant theatre in future wars. By the peace of 1783, this point fell within our limits, and that by the British ascertainment of the 45th parallel of latitude before the Revolution. That parallel was the boundary, in that quarter, between the United States and Canada: its rectification, under the treaty of Ghent, left out Rouse's Point, and the little fort which had been commenced upon it, to command the entrance into Lake Champlain. The same rectification of the line showed an error of half a mile wide in the northern boundary of the States of New Hampshire and Vermont, giving that much off of each to Great Britain. But it was an acquisition which Great Britain did not want; which she has refused to touch, though entitled to it since the treaty of Ghent; which has remained in our possession ever since, and would doubtless so remain forever. Great Britain wanted none of our republican population added to her Canadian possessions. This she has shown by near thirty years' refusal to receive them; and her minister was the correct interpreter of her policy when he readily threw up this point, and the strip along with it; taking care to make the easy concession an item in the accomplishment of his great design on Maine. All this the British negotiator admits, with a readiness and good feeling which does him much credit. He says:

The question here at issue between the two countries, was as to the correct determination of the parallel of latitude, and the true source of the Connecticut river. Upon both these points decisions were pronounced in favor of Great Britain; and I might add that the case of America, as matter of right, was but

"It is, in my opinion, of very great importance that the right of passage be secured for American vessels, between the island of Bois Blanc, in the river Detroit, (opposite Fort Malden,) and the British shore; the channel is only 200 to 300 yards wide, and is entirely commanded both by the island and Fort Malden. At present, there is no other passage for our larger class of vessels, steamboats, &c., and it will require much time and expense to render the old passage south of Gros Isle available. In short, the right of using the British channel is, in my opinion, absolutely necessary."-Mr. Robert Steuart's letter to Mr. Webster, July 27.

The British Treaty-Mr. Benton.

feebly and doubtingly supported by her own authorities. Iam, nevertheless, disposed to surrender the whole of this case, if we should succeed in settling, as proposed, the boundary of Maine.

"This concession, considered with reference to the value of the land ceded, which is generally reported to be fertile, and contains a position at Ronse's Point much coveted in the course of the controversy, would, under ordinary circumstances, he considered of considerable importance. The concession will, however, be made by Great Britain without reluctance, not only to mark the liberal and conciliatory spirit by which it is desired to distinguish these negotiations, but because the case is, in some respects, analogous to that of the Madawaska settlement, before considered. It is believed that the settlers on the narrow strip (which would be transferred to Great Britain by rectifying the 45th parallel of latitude, which was formerly incorrectly laid down, are principally from the United States; and that their opinions and habits incline them to give a preference 10 that form of government under which, be ore the discovery of the error in question, they supposed themselves to be living. It cannot be desired by her Majesty to acquire any addition of territory under. such circumstances, whatever may be the weight of her rights; but it will be observed that the same argument applies almost exactly to the Madawaska settlement, and justifies the reservation I am there obliged to make. In these days, the convenience and happiness of the people to be gov. erned will ever be the chief guide in transactions of this descrip tion, between such Governments as those of Great Britain and the United States."

In this paragraph his Lordship shows a considerate regard for the compromised inhabitants, citizens of the United States, living on this strip of land. He is willing to give them up for a consideration, though he declares it could not be desirable to her Majesty to acquire them. His benevolence is still subordinate to his policy; and he is willing to leave these Republicans in the United States, provided the main object is accomplished on the frontiers of Maine. It is clear the British would never accept these inhabitants; yet, to sign a treaty denationalizing them, would have been revolting to the public feeling. To quiet them where they were, was to gain friends for the treaty. The strip was narrow, and of no great length-half a mile at one end, a point at the other, and some fifty miles in length. An area of twelve or fifteen square miles, (some eight or ten thousand acres,) and a few thousand inhabitants, constituted its totality of popula tion and territory. Except the people, it was no great object; but to sign a treaty leaving them out of the United States, would have been unjust and unpopular.

Rouse's Point is the prominent object in this concession; and to this object, historical recollections attach some degree of military importance. It is a point for cominanding the entrance into Lake Champlain-the best, but not the only point for that purpose. Further within our line, two batteries from opposite shores will do the work of one battery at this point. It is the best for commanding the entrance, because the outlet is there the narrowest; but its only advantage is in the difference between two batteries and one. The British could not take it, except as part of the strip in New York and Vermont, which would bring her the people she did not want. That she attached no military importance to it, either for her own. defence or our annoyance, is evident from her total refusal to touch it for so long a time, when indisputably hers; from her readiness to give it up, under the award, without compensation, while endeavoring to ravish from us the real military positions which were indisputably ours-namely, the islands of Bois Blanc, Cainpo Bello, and Grand Menan, and the mountain frontier of Maine. To us, it can be of nuo moment in any future wars with Great Britain. We can hardly repeat the folly of border warfare; of summer operations; of isolated invasions; and of petty detachments hung upon a line of a thousand miles. Instead of that, a large movement will probably be organized. A hundred thousand men concentrated upon the heart, instead of diffused upon the extremities of Canada-marching upon the ice, as Pichegru marched upon Holland-going to Quebec instead of going to the little posts which line the lakes; in such a movement, neither forts nor ships would be wanting. Rivers and lakes, instead of obstacles, would become bridges to the invader; and Rouse's Point would cease to have a place in any man's mind. Still, old ideas give it some value. Its name is connected with the battle of Plattsburg, and with McDonough's victory on Lake Champlain. It is considered the key to the lake which washes two States; and it is not to be dissembled that its recovery gratifies the public feeling, propitiates two States in favor of the treaty, and facilitates the grand object of the British mission. The British negotiator conducted skilfully in conceding for a price what he had no wish to retain-what had been given up without price in the awardwhat had an illusive value in our eyes, and no

Senate.

value at all in his; and the concession of which was smoothing his way to Maine. The only thing worthy of observation in this acquisition, is the importance attached to it now, when it costs $500,000 in money, and an additional slice off of Maine, by those who rejected it when obtained under Jack son's administration for nothing.

3. The cession of territory in Vermont. This is a narrow strip, ninety miles in length, three-quarters of a mile wide at one end, half a mile at the other; giving an area of some fifty square miles, or about 30,000 acres. It is a slip made by the same rectification of the line on the 45th parallel, which cut off Rouse's Point and the strip in New York; and is subject to all the remarks which were applied to it. This strip in Vermont was given up by the British negotiator, for the same reason he had given up the other: it could have no national consideration, except for the people upon it. His Government did not want these people, and would not have them; still it would be wrong to disquiet them by signing a treaty which should leave them on the British side. The concession which quiets them, strongly recommends the treaty to the State of Vermont; and, taken in conjunction with Rouse's Point, which is at the outlet of their lake, assures its favorable reception in that border State. Two votes more for the treaty!

4. The 100,000 acres assured to New Hampshire between Hall's creek and Perry's creek. This cannot be called a cession, or a concession. The State of New Hampshire has always possessed it, and always exercised jurisdiction over it. She was in no danger of ever losing that possession, or that jurisdiction, whether the Ghent commissioners were right or wrong in retiring the boundary from Hall's creek to Perry's creek. The British never availed themselves of the unacceptable acquisition, and never would. They no more wanted New Hampshire Republicans, than New York or Vermont Republicans, within their dominions. The 100,000 acres, and the population upon it, have been just as much the territory and population of New Hampshire since the Ghent treaty as before it. The concession of the British minister changes nothing; but, while changing nothing, it prevents an objection, and conciliates support for the treaty in the State of New Hampshire.

5. The qualified privilege to a part of the inhabitants of Maine to navigate a part of the river St. John. This is the last of the British concessions, and one much boasted of by the advocates of the treaty. The analysis of the article which grants this vaunted privilege will show it to be restricted to a very narrow benefit, and counterbalanced by rights of navigation granted to the people of New Brunswick to the same river within the State of Maine, with the important addition of a right of way to it. The river St. John, politically considered, is divided into three parts: the lower part wholly in the British province of New Brunswick; the middle part, by the new treaty, a boundary between Maine and New Brunswick; the upper part wholly within the State of Maine. The rights of navigation in this river are thus conferred: so far as it is a common boundary, both parties living upon the waters of the river possess it: so far as it is within the limits of New Brunswick, the people of Maine, living on the waters of the river, may use it for the transportation of the products of the forest, and such of the products of agriculture as are not manufactured, subject to the regulations of the British authorities to establish the origin and character of the articles: so far as it is within the limits of Maine, the neighboring inhabitants of New Brunswick have the same privilege of navigation, with the addition of a territorial right of way to reach the river--a privilege not granted to the people of Maine on the lower part of the river. This is the analysis of this privilege: and what does it amount to? Not as much as the law of nations would give Maine without the treaty. For the law of nations gives to the people on the upper waters of navigable streams the right of passing through foreign dominions to reach the ocean--the highway of nations. This is what we asserted against Spain, in the case of the Mississippi: it is what the American negotiator of this treaty now admits in relation to the Red river, the Sabine, and the Mississippi, in favor of Texas. Reduced and restricted as the privilege is,it is but a small matter for Maine to receive; nothing for Great Britain to grant; and is counterbalanced by privileges of navigation and of way granted to her. But a question arises here. The privilege of navigation granted is limited to the inhabitants of the coun