27TH CONG....3D SESS.

at the last session, against the increase of the navy, and in favor of its reduction, the Secretary passes all unheeded, and moves on in his bold career of folly and extravagance, without abiding for a moment any will but his own. Nothing more can be hoped for, so long as the navy has such a host of backers, urging its increase and extravagancefrom motives of personal interest too often. The axe should be laid at once to the root of the evil: cut down the pay, and it will not then be sought after so much as a convenient resort for idlers, who seek the offices for the pay, expecting and intending that but litle service shall be rendered in return, because but very little is needed. The salaries are far beyond any compensation paid to any other officer of Government, either State or Federal, for corresponding services. A lieutenant receives higher pay than a very large majority of the judges of the highest judicatories known to the States; a commander far surpasses them, and equals the salaries of a majority of the Governors of the States. Remove the temptation which high pay and no labor present, and you will obviate the evil. Put down the salaries to where they were before the act of 1835, and you will have no greater effort after its offices than you had before. So long as the salaries are higher than similar talents can command in civil life, so long will applicants flock to the navy for admission, and the constant tendency will be to increase its expenses. The policy of our Government is to keep a very small army and navy during time of peace, to insure light taxes, and to induce the preponderance of the civil over the military authorities. In time of peace, we shall meet with no difficulty in sustaining an efficient navy, as we always have done. In time of war, patriotism will call forth our people to the service. Those who would not heed this call are not wanted; for those who fight for pay will, under all circumstances, fight for those who will pay the best. The navy cannot complain of this proposed reduction; for its pay was increased in view of the increasing value of labor and property throughout the whole country. No other pay was increased; and why should not this be reduced?-not the whole amount actually increased, but only a small portion of the increase? It is due to the country; and no one should object. We are now supporting the Government on borrowed money. The revenues will not be sufficient to support it hereafter; and reduction has to take place sooner or later, and upon some one or all of the departments. Upon which ought it to fall more properly than on that which has been defended against the prejudices resulting from the high prices which have recently fallen upon every department of labor and property?

By the adoption of the amendment proposed, there will be a permanent annual saving of about $400,000 in the single item of pay. And, from the embarrassed condition of the treasury, so large a sum of money might, with the greatest propriety, be saved; more especially since, by the late British treaty concluded at this place, an annual increase is to be made to the navy expenditures of some $600,000, as it is stated, to keep a useless squadron on the coast of Africa. The estimates for pay for the present year greatly exceed those of the last year. We appropriated for the last year's service for pay, &c., $2,335,000. The sum asked for the same service this year is $2,953,139. Besides, there there is the sum of $380,000 asked for clothing-a new appropriation, never asked for before. The clothing for seamen being paid for by themselves, so much of the item of pay as was necessary had hitherto been expended in clothing for them, which was received by them in lieu of money. Now, a separate fund is asked, which is to be used as pay, and will increase that item so much, making a sumtotal of $3,333,139; which is an excess of $998,139 over and above that appropriated for the like purpose last session.

It seems not to be necessary absolutely to make this increased appropriation. The Secretary of the Navy says that his plan of keeping the ships sailing over the ocean (where possibly no vessel can or will see them, and where the people with whom we trade can never learn anything of our greatness, on account of the absence of our ships from their ports, being kept constantly sailing from station to station) will "require larger squadrons than we have heretofore employed." He then states that his estimates are prepared for squadrons upon this large and expensive plan. "This," he says, "it is my duty to do, submitting to Con

gress to determine whether, under the circumstances, so large a force can properly be put in commission or not. If the condition of the treasury will warrant it, (of which they are the judges,) I have no hesitation in recommending the largest force estimated for." It is well known that the condition of the treasury will not warrant this force. We must fall back upon the force of last year, as the ultimatum that can be sustained. Our appropriations for pay last year were $1,000,000 less than those now asked for. This can be cut off without prejudice to the service; and with the reduction proposed in the salaries, $1,400,000 can be saved from waste, and applied to sustain a depleted treasury. Increase is now unreasonable and impracticable.

A portion of the home squadron, authorized in September, 1841, has not yet gone to sea, for the want of seamen. While our commerce is failing, and our sailors are idle, they will not enter the service. The flag-ship of that squadron is yet in port without her complement of men. Why, then, only increase officers and build ships, when you cannot get men to man them?

NOTE.-The following is the law fixing the pay of the navy. Gordon's Digest, page 670:

The pay of captains, commanding ships of 32 guns and upwards, shall be $100 per month, and eight rations per day; of captains, commanding ships of 20 and under 32guns, $75 per month, and six rations per day; of a master-commandant, $60 per month and five rations per day; and of lieutenants, who may command the smaller vessels, $50 per month and four rations per day.

Whenever any officer as aforesaid shall be employed in the command of a squadron on separate service, the allowance of rations to such commanding officer shall be doubled during the continuance of such command, and no longer, except in the case of the commanding officer of the navy, whose allowance while in service shall always be at the rate of sixteen rations per day.

The pay and subsistence of the respective com mission and warrant officers shall be as follows:

A lieutenant less than a master-commandant, or lieutenant commanding a small vessel, $40 per month, and three rations per day; a chaplain, $40 per month and two rations per day; a sailing-master, $40 per month and two rations per day; a surgeon, $50 per month and two rations per day, &c. By the act of 26th August, 1842, the pay of other officers is increased, to wit:

Boatswains, gunners, carpenters, and sailmakers, now receive per annum

On other duty

On leave or waiting orders for the first
10 years
And after

Pay since 1835. Senior captain, in service waiting orders

Captain of a squadron

on other duty waiting orders Commander, in sea service

H. of Reps.

$800

700

500 600

$4,500

3,500

4,000

3,500

2,500

2,500

on other duty waiting orders

2,100

1,800

1829

1,800

1830

1,500

1831

1,200

1832

Lieutenants commanding

on other duty waiting orders

Surgeons, from $1,000 per annum to Assistant surgeons, waiting orders and from that sum to $1,200 per annum. Pursers, on ship of the line on a frigate

on leave Midshipmen, waiting orders on sea service

Passed midshipmen, on sea service waiting orders

Masters, of a ship at sea

on other duty

waiting orders

Boatswains, gunners, carpenters, and sailmakers, from $700 to $800 per annum; waiting orders $500.

6 naval constructors, each

600

1,100

1,000 750

3,000 2,300 1,700

Chief naval constructor

Naval storekeepers, from $1,400 to

The chief of the Medical Bureau, in his annual report, presents the following facts, as illustrative of the manner in which some of the appropriations made for the naval service are disposed of; and what fidelity characterizes the expenditures! Speaking of the expenditure of the appropriation for medicines, he says:

"Six hundred and sixty-five dollars and fifty-seven cents were, unauthorizedly, paid out of the appropriation for medi cines, surgical instruments, &c.,' for 31 blue cloth frock-coats, with navy buttons, and a silver star on them; 31 pairs of blue cassimere pantaloons, and 31 blue cassimere vests, with navy buttons;-and all this toggery for 'Jack' for pensioners who never had worn anything longer than a sailor's jacket, or, at most, in storms, a monkey or pea jacket, the cost of which is gight dollars, instead of fourtee

27TH CONG.......SD SESS.

dollars charged for the frock coats, made in officer's undress fashion. This will serve to show the unwarrantable intrusions on the appropriation for medicines, referred to in the text. But it may more strongly be set forth by this fact: Of seven thousand one hundred and twenty-one dollars and sixty-four cents, paid by the navy agent at Philadelphia, from the 1st of October, 1841, to the 25th of October, 1842, out of the appropriation for 'medicines, &c.' only one thousand and forty dollars and nineteen cents were for medicines, surgical instruments, and sugical purposes. The remaining six thousand one hundred and eighty-one dollars and forty-five cents were for items of expenditure, wholly foreign to the intent of the appropriation, and, of course, were what have been appropriately called intrusions on the fund, not known to be practised, nor thought of by Con. gress, when they made the appropriations in question.

"How could thirty thousand dollars, appropriated for the whole naval service, for the whole year 1842, Le deemed suffi cient, when a mal-administration of the fund on one station swept off at once, in a few days more than twelve months, $6,181 45, not lawfully chargeable to the medical fund? Could the balance, $23,818 55, be for a moment thought competent to supply all the ships, sick quarters, hospitals, &c., in the United States for a whole year? That this mal-admnistration may be understood, the navy agent's return to the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery is annexed, in toto, as an appendix. It will not be understood, however, that the slightest blame is imputed, in these irregular transactions, to that gentleman, officially, or in any other way. The irregularity is chargeable, and it is now unhesitatingly charged, on the governor of the naval asylum, who approved the bills, and thus ordered their payment out of an appropria. tion which no sophistry could make chargeable with such burdens. In addition to these irregular outlays, the sum of $3,500 19 reported on the purser's pay rolls as paid annually, for wages or pay alone (exclusive of officers' pay,) in that institution; $428 of which is the wages of a person rated and paid as hospital steward, who never performed five minutes' duty as such in the hospital, but was employed solely as purser's clerk, and to buy provisions, for which he was regularly paid, as any agent not connected with the institution might have done. Of this whole amount of $3,500 for wages-the subsistence of those so paid being a further charge, and paid out of the appropriation for medicine-only $936 were allowed in the estimates of the Secretary of the Navy; and, subsequently, $30 per annum were allowed for a carpenter's mate-making $1,239 allowed; the balance ($2,361) being entirely unauthorized, or, at least, very doubtfully authorized.

"It may illustrate this remark to state, that the records of this bureau show that an eminent surgical instrument-maker, of Philadelphia, sold certain instruments of his manufacture, of the first-rate workmanship and approved pattern, for the sum of $669 81, to certain druggists largely supplying the medical outfits of vessels in a neighboring seaport. The commission alluded to in the text, conducted by Benjamin Homans, now of the Navy Department, shows that these identical instruments were furnished by the druggists alluded to, to certain vessels, and that they charged Government for them the sum of $1,224 54; thus exhibiting a profit of $554 73-in other words, an exorbi tant charge of about 83 per cent.! This, too, on articles of well-known established price. These prices were approved in the usual way, and actually paid.

"The same commission brought to light, from actual vouchers, the charge by the same druggists of $287 82, in four years, for the recipients of medicines and freights, although they state, on oath, that the "drayage, freight, &c., was always paid by them." Epsom salts was invariably charged, in wholesale quantities, at ten cents per pound, when it can anywhere be purchased of the wholesale dealers at five cents, and even much less. Half an ounce of veratria was charged at eighteen dollars! An ounce of gold is worth sixteen dollars (a doubloon, or ounce.) Thus was a small white powder charged at thirty-six dollars an ounce-four dollars more than twice the value of an ounce of gold. One ounce of strychnine, a similar powder, was charged at thirty-four dollars-that is, two dollars more than twice the value of an ounce of gold. Two dozen bottles Bedford spring water were charged eight dollars, viz, thirty-three cents per bottle. Two scabs of vaccine virus were charged at nine dollars. Oiled silk, worth (of the best quality) $ 37 per yard, was charged eighty dollars for twenty yards-that is, four dollars per yard. Seventy two bottles compound sirup sarsaparilla were charged at $108, viz., $1 50 a bottle. The retail price is everywhere seventy five cents a bottle, and it has been purchased by this bureau, in Philadelphia, at $7 50 per dozen, or $49 per 72 bottles.

"In the examination of vouchers by the same commission, still more extortionate charges appeared on some articles. In short, the whole of the charges now printed in the documents of Congress are of the same ortionate character.

"The illustrations given are ample to prove the truth of the remarks in the text, on the veracity of furnishers. Of $42,504 34 paid by a navy agent at the seaport alluded to, out of the ap propriation for 'medicines, &c,' these furnishers received $22,676 10."

The following are some of the expenditures under the head of appropriations for "medicine:"

The Oregon Bill-Mr. Archer.

SPEECH OF MR. ARCHER,

OF VIRGINIA,

In Senale, January 30, 1843-On the Oregon bill. Mr. ARCHER commenced by remarking, that he had been in some degree anticipated by the gen. tleman from South Carolina, [Mr. McDUFFIE,] who had so well discussed this measure, the other day, in the line of observation he intended to pur

sue.

His opinions not conforming, in some other respects, however, to the views which had been expressed by other gentlemen, he was desirous of an opportunity to state them at this time.

The debate had deviated a good deal from, but had now reverted to, the appropriate topics-the consistency of the clause of the bill pledging allodial grants of land to emigrants, with the tenor of our convention with England on the subject of the territory; and the general policy of accelerating the settlement of it by our people. To both these points he would say a few words.

All admitted, of course, that we were not to adopt the clause referred to, if it operated any impairment of the obligation of the convention. A great and, it seemed to him, strange discrepancy of opinion had been exhibited on this point. The language of the convention seemed in no degree "equivocal." The import was simply a stipulation for mutual and free ingress into the territory, and a common undisturbed use, until the parties should determine further on the subject. Could there be a question of the exclusion, under such a condition, of the sight to exert and convey a full property in the oil? If the condition did not operate such exclusion, what was its effect? Had it any?

But suppose the import doubtful-susceptible of two interpretations. In what source were we to explore for the right one? to what evidence resort? There could be none other than the nature of the controversy adjusted, and the character of the discussions which attended the adjustment. Now, the proposition which he (Mr. A.) maintained was this: that in the entire progress of the negotiations on this subject of Oregon--from the beginning to the end-there had been no point brought into issue, no question touched in discussion, save the single one of the title in the territory. Here had been parties engaged in protracted negotiations as to what were the grounds of title, and whose the right to the territory. They find themselves unable to agree. What is done? Resolving nothing on the subject of title, they make a convention for a common temporary use, dissoluble at pleasure, by notice. What is the plain inference from this? Is it not, that decision on the title being suspended, the fruits of full title--all other of its privileges than temporary use; above everything, the unrestricted authority to dispose in full property--must be suspended also? If such an arrangement had not this effect, where is the matter to be found to give it any operation? What has it been made for? What purpose is it to subserve? Is it any more than a blank?

It was in the face of this indisputable fact, that the negotiations had had relation to no other point or subject than the title to the territory, that the honorable Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. WOODBURY] had maintained that the conventions in which the negotiations resulted were to be regarded as no more than conventions of commerce, leaving unimpaired and unaffected the right to carry our claim of title into the fullest effect, by disposal of the soil in absolute property, or pledges to make this disposal of it. A treaty of commerce! Not only had there been no mention of commerce, or regulation on the subject of it, in the negotiations; but, in truth, there had been nothing to which the name of commerce could be applied. The sole business pursued by our people or Englishmen, at the time, had been the pursuit and trapping of animals for furs! At the last adoption or renewal of the convention, we had very little interest of this kind; the prosecution of this business by our people having nearly ceased on the western side of the Rocky Mountains. There had been no occasion, therefore, for arrangement on our part to regulate this subject; nor a convention at all, unless for the preservation of our title, liable to be put in hazard by our non-user, and the overspreading of the territory by English use and occupation.

Exclusive title to the territory, or any part, had not been asserted for England by her negotiators. Their object had been only to rebut and repel our claim of this character. They admitted our right as largely as their own, and only went into the in

Senate.

vestigation of the grounds of exclusive title, for the purpose of showing that their title on these grounds was as defensible as ours. They maintained that the title of all the world to colonize was equal to ours and to theirs. This was all shown by the paper delivered by Messrs. Huskisson and Addington to our commissioner in 1827, as the summary of the pretensions of their Government. How was it conceivable that, in these circumstances, they had consented to a convention,the just construction of which left us at full liberty to pursue our exclusive title, and give the fullest effect to it?

In the last discussions, in 1827, it had become a subject of consideration whether we should consent to any renewal of the convention. Gentlemen would see this in the correspondence of Mr. Gallatin, at that day, with the State Department. But why make this a question, if the convention were to be no restraint on us-if, after admitting it, we might go on, as before, to execute our claim of exclusive title, as we saw occasion? Mr. Gallatin gave the answer to this inquiry. The renewal was of use to preserve our title, there being no other interest at that time to preserve. That was the sble interest to be consulted. The sole object was to preserve it. Well! if the convention secured the preservation of our claim, how could the protection of the counter claim be excluded from its influence? Was it to be effective for us-null for our adversary? Was that the principle of construction we were to contend for? And where was the limit of our right to make grants in full property, or engage for them? Why might not these come to cover the whole territory? And where was the room for the operation of the convention then?-what the part England was to have in it?--the benefit she was to realize or preserve?

And what were the modes in which the objection, that a breach of the compact would be involved in the adoption of this clause of the bill, was met? First, by the allegation that Great Britain had preceded us in this same form of breach of compact. That position, however, had been found untenable -having encountered refutation from the document furnished under the call of the gentleman from Kentucky, [Mr. MOREHEAD.] What was the next ground? That Great Britain had come to enjoy almost the entire usufruct and advantages of the territory--nearly as much as she would under an exclusive title. But by what means? Not by constraint or intimidation exerted on our people-that was not pretended; but as the consequence of a dexterous management of the Indians, and the prac tice of overbidding for furs, and underselling in merchandise! Well! superior adroitness in the use of a subject of stipulation, no more than the same adroitness displayed in obtaining it, consti tuted an effect of contravention, which set at work the rule, that breach on one side remitted obligation on the other! His friend from Kentucky [Mr. MOREHEAD] could hardly, he thought, feel himself strong on this ground. There was none left to countervail the allegation of breach of compact prominent in the clause of the bill assuring the grants of title to the emigrants whom it invited to the territory.

Passing by this consideration, however, (which, prevailing as it was, has formed his chief inducement to trespass on the Senate:) suppose we could be justified in the conclusion, that the controverted clause of the bill involved no breach of compact, it was to be remembered that there was another party besides ourselves to exercise the of fice of interpretation. The aspect in which that party might regard it was not devoid (as the action of the advocates of the clause to be intelligible must conceive) of interest to us. Suppose the construc tion of the clause by Great Britain, differing from ours, should infer a deviation from the compact. There were gentlemen in this body, indeed, who could not be found to admit that a question had more than one side in our controversies with other nations. This did not make it less true, in the event that there might prove to be two sides. What if there did here? Great Britain had commercial relations with us far too valuable to be sacrificed for any value she could attach to Oregon in a naked, simple estimate of values and advantages. That she should put the one in the scales with the other, in this view, was not conceivable, in her largesighted commercial policy.

But another consideration there was, which, mixed with this, no English ministry of any party had the power, more than the inclination, to disregardand this was the point of national honor. Rupture

I

27TH CONG....3D SESS.

for the mere sake of Oregon, he repeated, was not conceivable. But he would tell gentlemen what was entirely conceivable: that England, if she considered the mode of occupation we proposed as infringing our arrangement with her, might stand on that point, when she would not on the value of the territory; or would proceed on our own plan, and occupy in the same manner the portion she aspired to possess. What he (Mr. A.) maintained, was, that either of these procedures on her part must have an effect to complicate the question of adjustment, augment the chances of a less favorable result than might otherwise be expected, and put us in a position of contest less commanding than that which we were entitled to оссиру.

Both the gentlemen from Missouri, and indeed all the friends of the bill, insisted that, situated as we were in relation to the territory-our people coterminous, and with the irresistible propensity of a portion of them to migration-the result was inevitable, that the country would fall into our possession. This opinion was, to all appearance, well founded. Why, then, from impatience to accelerate, adopt a course which had an obvious tendency to compromise this result? And did we not adopt such a course, when, with negotiation long permitted, yet depending, recently resumed, we decided to disregard it, and to establish the measure of adjustment for ourselves? He might safely appeal to candor to give the answer to this inquiry.

If we took a step of this character, we must be prepared, of course, to maintain it. Then, prudence demanded that we should estimate the consequences. He had no design to hold up the power of England in terror. We were well able to maintain conflict with her, if just occasion should require it. But, in reference to this Territory of Oregon as one of the theatres of contest, in the event of war, it was worthy of inquiry-on which side lay the balance of advantage, in waging this contest? The territory was remote from both the contending parties-the means of either, for military operations there, inconsiderable. But Great Britain had, if no formal military force, a considerable body of men connected with the Hudson Bay Company disposable for military purposes, as not engaged in agricultural pursuits, and of military habits. She had established relations of control with the Indians contiguous, who must become auxiliaries in the contest. She had command of the ports by which access to supplies-military or other-was to be afforded; superiority on the ocean, over which these supplies must be transported. She had dependencies and relations with the opposite continent of Asia, bringing her into comparative neighborhood to Oregon. In all these respects we were inferior; our settlements being recent, and agricultural merely. We were under no disadvantage, indeed, as regarded the transportation of forces by land; but neither had we any considerable advantage in that respect, as Canada was nearly as convenient as our territories to the scene.

Then, in the event of war, if neither party deemed the object worth the additional force its maintenance would require, our means of maintenance already there were inadequate and inferior; and we must be exposed to the loss of the territory. If the object should be considered worth the transfer of further force, on the other hand, then England would enjoy decided advantage over us in transporting to the scene the force and supplies required for operation; and we should, in this event, too, probably incur the loss of this subject of contest. If we got it back at the close of the conflict, in this result we must pay the price in some form of compensation elsewhere. Would it be worth any equivalent we might probably have to offer? If the war was to end on the ground of the status quo--that is to say, leaving the parties as they were at the outset-then we should have our own, minus the sacrifices of the contest. If it were to end on the ground of the uti possidetis--or of each party retaining what it was in possession of at the close--then we should lose the subject of contest, without a compensation. In one or other of the three modes mentioned, the conflict must have its termination. In neither would we be a gainer, as respected this particular subject; which we must be exposed to lose, or to a cost for preservation; or, in the event of recovery after loss, for restoration, incomparably superior to any value which could, in a sober estimate, be attached to it at the present, or at any early period. He had to say to his friend from Missouri, therefore, that he-not

The Oregon Bill-Mr. Archer.

his friend--was the true advocate of our interest in this territory; that the plan proposed was the course to put the territory in jeopardy, and the only course; that it was the conviction of this truth, mainly, which led to the opposition to this

course.

There was a further, and it ought to be a prevailing consideration, bearing on this view of the subject. The bill extended our jurisdiction over the entire contested territory to latitude 34 degrees 40 minutes, the limit of the Russian possession. But in both the negotiations we have had on this question, we had yielded our assent to being restricted to the line of the 49th parallel of latitude. Were we now to recede from this proposition, proceeding from ourselves, and at the instant of consenting to the resumption of negotiation? We were authorized to do this in negotiation, propositions not binding unless accepted. But how far would it be consistent in itself, or conformable to comity, or prudent, to adopt such a course, with a negotiation depend ing, in which this very proposal may have been (as it probably has been) renewed, to form the basis of discussion? Who ever, indeed, heard before the present instance, of authorizing negotiation, and at the same moment proceeding to terminate the issue by action which was conclusive of it? Was not such a mode of proceeding novel in international transactions?

Whatever the course we pursue, this affair must be settled by negotiation at last. Nobody supposed that Great Britain was going to recede before our claim, and yield us the whole subject of controversy, part of which we had professed our willingness to surrender. Then! war, or no war, negotiation must untie the knot, and put the conclusion. If there were war-that must have an end too, and by negotiation. Why not let the conclusion in this mode be the antecedent to war, not the result of it? The truth was, that negotiation would furnish a settlement more advantageous for us, than the allowance of our claim to the 49th degree of latitude. From the character of the country, and the deficiency of harbors within the limits of the 42d and 49th degree-the boundaries of our latest demand a conventional line could probably, nay certainly, be run on the basis of the proposition to that effect, (not the exact proposition,) which had been made by the British commissioners to Mr. Gallatin in 1827; which would be more advantageous than the line of 49 degrees FOR BOTH THE PARTIES. Why preclude the chance of this mode of adjustment, by a step which (to say the least of it) might tend to the rupture of negotiation? There could be no advised policy in such a proceeding.

He came now to the views which he partook with the gentleman from South Carolina, [Mr. MCDUFFIE,] who had asked what the considerations were which called on us for the indulgence of a spirit of impatience on this subject of the occupation of Oregon? The Senator from Missouri told us, indeed, that our people had already gone there, and that it ought not to be a question as to our following them with adequate protection. He would not now discuss the doctrine how far a migratory population was allowed to give (not take) the law from the discretion of their own Government, as respected the progress of the settlement of territory, and to drag forward the public authority to any distance, expense, or exposure to collisions with foreign powers. However this might be, the proposition could not be controverted-that regard to the general interests ought to weigh for something in deciding on the policy to be observed; at least as to the form and measure of the subsidiary action which was required of the Government. If we were bound to follow our population to Oregon, we were not bound to adopt a plan to fill the territory up with population; for that was the scope of the present project-to hold out a lure to emigration to it. Now, let us look a little at the inducements to this course-the advantages to be anticipated.

The country was separated not only from our present, but any settlement we could ever have, (unless we expelled the Indians from all habitation within the limits of our claim of territory,) by a vast tract of Indian territory-much of it a desert. Then came the utterly barren and almost impracticable chain of the Rocky Mountains, penetrable at only infrequent passes, remote from each other. Then the territory proper, divided in its whole length by ledges of mountain ranges, barren, little practicable, penetrated by streams unnavigable save in detached portions, and not admitting of being rendered navigable in their full ex

Senate.

tent. These led to the third and last tract of valley on the seaboard of the Pacific, suited for an Asiatic (not an American) dependency, if it were to be regarded of value as a dependency at all.

This portion was suitable for agriculture; but the only really valuable part for this purpose (that in which our people were settled) was destitute of any tolerable harborage, and could never command any by art. The country, taken in its whole extent, could at no day certainly have a very large production, nor any considerable trade. From the production and trade it might come to command, owing to our position, the share of advantage could never be very considerable to us. And this was the country of which we were called upon to precipitate the settlement, by a forced operation! At what cost? Not the mere promise of the landthat would be nothing in itself; but, first, of considerable expense, then at the hazard of national embroilment.

We had passed a bill to reduce the army last year. But we had also learned, from a report of the War Department, responsive to a call, that the prosecution of the proposed plan of the occupation of Oregon would demand an addition to our military establishment (not the reduced-the full) of sixteen hundred men. The estimate had been given in detail; the number of forts, the number of men stated. Were we now to retrace our policy of retrenchment, as respected our military establishment, and make a large advance in the opposite policy of enlargement? And for what object? To gain Oregon prematurely? It was conceded that, by waiting the natural, and not slow progress of events, it must become ours. And the compensations! The business of collecting furs being confessedly nearly extinct in the region which would fall to our share, what were they? The burdens must be considerable; and as the country could not pass for a long time from the condition of a Territory, (supposing we would ever permit it to do so by incorporation in the Union,) in which all expenses were borne by this Government, these burdens must be continuous for a long, or for all time. There would be no revenue, inconsiderable trade, a frontier removed, to become a source of exposure and weakness. But there was a further view. We had 700,000,000 of acres of land, or some immense amount, on this side of the Rocky Mountains, yet undisposed of. A large proportion, besides its other advantages, was of a fertility with which no country (certainly not Oregon) could bear comparison. Why tempt our people from this region, where they would conduce to our strength by their numbers, to our revenue by their consumption?-what was more, where they would become the purchasers of land from us, instead of having it given to them to go from us?

We heard every day, on the floor of this chamber, of the deplorable deficiencies in the revenue, of the importance of the branch of it derived from the public lands, and the necessity of cherishing this great resource against over-taxation in the other department of the revenue, and all the mis chievous results of it. Yet here was a policy impairing both sources of revenue-tempting away the people-who, if they remained, would buy the lands, contribute to the imposts which nourished the General, and to the taxation which was required to uphold the revenues of the State Governments. And this was to be done at a time when the revenues of the General Government were in the last stage of depression, the State revenues sunk under their burdens, and the population of the States nearest to Oregon prompted to fly, without any lure of invitation, from the taxation demanded by these burdens!

The reverse side of the argument presented no relief to the conclusion. No revenue, little trade, fixed and continuing expense, exposure to Indian and to foreign embroilments;--the theatre of embroilment, remote from access by land, nearly cut off from access by forts, and on which the adversary with whom we must contend had preoccupied all the advantages, subjecting us to disproportioned efforts to maintain ourselves in conflict, and a price of success which bore no relation to the value of the object.

Such was the policy we were recommended by the bill, in its present form, to adopt! And the ground!--the mode of appeal!-the topic of incitement addressed to us!--what were they? Why, the penalty of acting, or seeming to act, under the fear of war with Great Britain-the intruder on all rights-the encroacher in all regions! Well

7TH CONG....3D SESS.

he confessed it; he was afraid of war; and, in particular, with Great Britain. War for no adequate cause? War-we giving the provocation, not Great Britain? He did not aspire to the courage which took no account of consequences-which was reckless for others--for the country. He feared rupture with Great Britain in particular. And why? For the reason, simply, that this power, having more and nearer points of contact with us-wider and more intimate, and more important relations--war with this power must be fraught with deeper injury to us. He must take this consideration into account, though the gentleman from Mis. souri would not. Aggression from any power was to be repelled, but not aggression made, because another power had the habit of aggression. This would be to take example from what we blamed. And he insisted that Great Britain, in availing herself of a larger and more beneficial use of the territory, under the compact for a common use, (all that had been shown against her,) practised no aggression; whilst we asserted, by this bill, an authority beyond a common use. Which was the party, then, that was to be considered as committing pacific relations to hazard?

Both the gentlemen from Missouri disclaimed, indeed, any purpose of provoking rupture with Great Britain; and doubtless they spoke in all sincerity. But what was the language they had employed, and reiterated, in speaking of Great Britain? If no provocation was designed or imputed by such language, what was the language they would resort to when provocation was designed? What language would import it? He should be glad to hear the distinction stated. Our negotiator had told us that, in his judgment, the tenacity of the British commissioners in the discussions of 1824 on this subject had been, in a great degree, attributable to proceedings here, and language held in Congress, by which the pride of the Eng lish Government had been wounded. Why should we have surprise at such an effect, at that time or this, when our own sensibility had been prompt to take exception at a mere suspicion of adroitness or success in turning the arrangement between the Governments to account?

Amid other topics of illustration of the encroaching temper of the English Government, the character of her policy towards China and Affghanistan had been introduced into the debate. Now he (Mr. A.) read the character of the latest proceedings in those quarters very differently since the present wise Administration had succeeded to the management of affairs in England. In the mid career of the most triumphant success in China, with no impediment to an unrestricted progress of her arms, what was the spectacle England had exhibited? Why, that she preferred the interests of commerce to conquest; as she would the larger interests of our commerce to Oregon, if the question were complicated with no provocation to her pride.

And, then, Affghanistan! What had been her recent conduct there? She had decided to retire from her establishments in that country, evidently from just perception of the impolicy of extension of dominion in that quarter. The present ministry were manifestly alive to the great truth, that commerce was the talisman of English prosperity -not the extension of territory, save for the interests of commerce. Before consenting to the abandonment of Affghanistan, however, let it be remembered that the English arms had returned there, after expulsion, to preserve the point of honor.

Did the history of this proceeding suggest to us no instruction? We too had an Affghanistan and a Hindostan. The Oregon Territory was as far beyond the region of our present interests of settlement and occupation, as Afghanistan was remote from any real connexion of interest with Hindostan. The valley region of the Mississippi, if its Ganges had seven mouths of discharge, as one time it must, would not be the empire of Hindostan, in its capacity of ministering to opulence and power. We could not withdraw entirely from our Affghanistan; but was it wise to make an effect to divert our population and resources from this Hindostan to that Affghanistan? No one thought of withholding protection from our people who had gone to Oregon, or might go there. The question was not on that point, but on the policy of instituting bounty on migration there; which the bill did. He (Mr. A.) made no objection to extending the jurisdiction of Iowa to Oregon, to the establishment of Indian agencies there, to an appropriation for exploration as regarded the oc

Northwestern Boundary—Mr. Benton.

casion, and position of forts, and their future establishment if found to be required, (steps which England had taken;) he had no objection, in short, to any provision which would lead us pari passu with the action of the English Government, not inconsistent with reciprocal stipulations. Considering the clause of the bill so much discussed, in relation to the allodial grants of land, as presenting that inconsistency, he was obliged to wage opposition to this provision. He did so, not on this ground only; but on the farther ground, that the effect of such provision must be more probably to compromise than advance the objects of obtaining the territory eventually; and, in doing so, might also compromise the harmonious relations with the power with which we were litigating on this subject, on which great and equal interests of both parties were dependent.

SPEECH OF MR. BENTON,

OF MISSOURI.

In Senate, Thursday, February 2, 1843.-On the alteration of the boundary between Lake Superior and the Lake of the Woods.

Mr. BENTON said he had now finished all that he meant to say on the immediate subject before the Senate; but, in the progress of the debate, another question had grown up, springing out of the main one, and constituting a episode of some length as well as of much interest. The Oregon question connects itself with the merits of the late British treaty; and the refusal of the British minister to include this question in that treaty, has placed in higher relief the vices of the treaty itself; and, among others, the unexpected sacrifice of the old line of 1783, between the Lake Superior and the Lake of the Woods, and the free admission of British fur-traders and their goods to the places within our limits, from which they were removed under Jay's treaty, forty years ago. This vice in the treaty has been several times brought to the notice of the Senate by me; and, thanks to the opposition of the Senator from Massachusetts, [Mr. CHOATE,] will now be kept before it until the attention of the Senate and the country is directed to it, and the public opinion determined and fixed.

The Senator from Massachusetts (said Mr. B.) is evidently much in earnest in all that he says; but he has fallen into two errors, which lead him entirely astray--the error of applying his testimony to the wrong river; and of confounding the treaty line of 1783, with the trading route followed at that time. The British letters, in the shape of affidavits, from which he read some parts as applicable to the northern branch of the Pigeon river route, were wholly applicable to the Kamanistiquia route, 50 miles further north; and the treaty line was the water communication along the northern branch of the Pigeon river and its connecting lakes, and not the trading route which was on the portage route of the same waters, but south of them. All this would be made clear on the maps, and would show the Senator the mistakes under which he labored, and which led to his erroneous convictions.

My complaint against the Secretary-negotiator is, that he sacrificed the boundary of the United States in this part of the north western line; gave up to the British what had belonged to us for sixty years, and which was all that was worth contending for in that quarter; and then affected to have made a grand acquisition, and to have secured to us four millions of acres of fine mineral lands, where he had actually made this sacrifice. By settling a disputed line, as he conceives, he has attained this fine result: when, in fact, there was no dispute about the line there; (Lord Ashburton refusing to second the British fur traders' demand of the St. Louis river;) and all the alteration made was to our prejudice--being the loss of all the territory between the two Pigeon river routes; the loss of the old trading route which commanded the Indian trade; and the loss of the revenue which the Brit ish fur company should have paid us on the goods carried through our territories.

The map which I have hung on the Secretary': table will explain what I say, and will show that from Lake Superior there are three routes (water and portage lines) leading from the west part of that lake to the Lake of the Woods; and that the middle one of these, (called the Lony Lakes, on Mitchell's map used in 1783, and Pigeon river in modern maps,) is the boundary under the treaty; has been so held and marked for sixty years; so

Senate.

admitted by the British fur traders in 1802; and so declared by Lord Ashburton at the late treaty. This route, by Pigeon river, divides, within twenty miles after leaving Lake Superior, into two branches; and, after joining and separating repeatedly, and going through a succession of small lakes and rivers, and sometimes diverging to the extent of half a degree, finally become united in Rainy Lake, at the distance of nearly two hundred miles from Lake Superior. The northern of these branches is called the water communication, because it ap proaches within six hundred and seventy-nine paces of the waters of the Lake of the Woods: the other is called the portage route, because it has thirty-six portages in it. The water communica tion is the boundary, under the treaty of 1783: the portage route was the trading one practised by the French when they occupied Canada, and by the British until they gave it up under Mr. Jay's treaty. This is the character of the two routes; though, in my speech upon the treaty, the northern branch was considered the trading route, which it is not. The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. CHOATE] has set me right in that particular; for which I have reason to thank him, as he shall soon see.

The other two routes are far to the north and to the south of this; the northern, fifty miles distant at the Kamanistiquia river, and through Dog Lake; the southern, at the St. Louis river, 240 miles south, at the western extremity of the Lake Supe rior. The Kamanistiquia route is called by the British the new route; being opened by them in 1802, when they had to give up the old French route. The St. Louis river route is called Fond du Lac, because at the extremity of the lake; and has no political, and but little commercial import ance. The great points in the case are-1. The old British trading-post called the Grand Portage, or Fort Charlotte, at the entrance of Pigeon river, and a few miles south of its mouth. 2. The new British post at the mouth of the Kamanistiquia, and just north of it, called Fort William. 3. Hunter's Isl and, where these two routes unite. These three points are cardinal in this inquiry; for they are the landmarks of the national boundaries, as admitted, declared, and acted upon by the British themselves, from the time that Jay's treaty compelled them to remove from our limits. The Grand Portage, as seen marked upon every map, was evacuated by the British in 1802, under the article of Jay's treaty which stipulated for the surrender of the Western posts, and was abandoned to us as our property. Fort William, as seen upon the same maps fifty miles north, was established by the British at the same time, because it was on their territory; and it be came the great depot of their goods and furs. This remained the case from Jay's treaty to Webster's treaty; but now it is the case no longer. What Jay's treaty-bad as it was-secured to us in that quarter, Webster's treaty-good as it is-has taken from us! And, more; it has drawn in the line for near two hundred miles, from the northern branch to the southern branch of the Pigeon-river route! has given the British all the territory between the two branches, including the large island called Hunter's! has given them the old trading-route which controls the Indians! and, in addition to all this, has exempted them from the payment of the duties, which they moved away to avoid at the time of Jay's treaty!

These are the allegations; and now for the proof. And the chief part of this proof shall be drawn from the British themselves-from the members of their powerful fur company, and from Lord Ashburton, who accomplished for them, in the late treaty, what they vainly attempted under the Ghent commission, and all they have been wishing for forty years.

I begin with the Grand Portage, on the western shore of Lake Superior, the former seat of trade and empire of the British Northwest Company;*

"Lake Superior is the largest and most magnificent body of fresh water in the world: it is clear and pellucid, of great depth, and abounding in a great variety of fish, which are the most excellent of their kind. The company keep a ves sel of from 50 to 70 tons on this lake, to transport the goods coming from Montreal to the GRAND PORTAGE, and to return the furs. • The Grand Portage is situated on a pleasant bay on the north side of the lake, in latitude 48, and longitude 90 west from Greenwich. At the entrance of the bay is an island, which screens the harber from every wind except the south. * The bay

27TH CONG....3D SESS.

and their reasons, given by themselves, for leaving that great post-their grand quarters-in the year 1802. I use seven affidavits from the partners and clerks of that company, used before the commissioners under the 7th article of the Ghent treaty, near twenty years ago; and all preserved in our public documents of the session of 1837-38.

The

first affidavit (in order to give a full view of the whole case) I read in full: from the others, short extracts will be read, to sustain the material points: The sworn affidavit of William Mackay, partner in the British Northwest Company, given at Montreal, June 12th, 1827.

"The undersigned, William Mackay, gentleman, now of the city of Montreal, in the Province of Lower Canada, doth hereby certify: That he was a partner of the Northwest Company, under the firm of McTavish, McGillivray, and Company, for the fur-trade of Lake Superior, and the countries east, north, and west of the said lake. That the great depot of the fur-trade was at the Great Carrying-place, a few miles west of Pigeon river, in Lake Superior. That, from a strong belief, founded on the assertions of the United States officers at the garrison of Michilimackinac, to himself in person, that the above depot was within the limits of the United States, and they would levy heavy duties on all merchandise, stores, &c., imported thereto, and on all furs, &c., exported therefrom, (which, had it taken place, would have been ruinous to the said company carrying on the fur-trade,) the said company was obliged to examine the countries to the northward and eastward of the said Great Carrying-place, for another route to the interior countries." * * * "That the undersigned, in the year 1801, at the orders of the said Northwest Company, undertook, with Mr. Jean Baptiste Pomainville, one of the clerks of the said company, eight experienced men, and a native, in a canoe, to explore a route from Lac La Pluie to the mouth of the Dog river, in Lake Superior, called Kamanistiquia; which they performed with great difficulty and hard labor. That they found the whole country through which they passed a perfect wilderness." * * "That, in the year 1802, the undersigned explored another river in the said new route, which, from its continuous rapids, was found impracticable for loaded canoes, and the present new route was then determined on as that by which, in future, they would carry on the fur trade, as being a country in which the United States had no claim.

"That, in the year 1802, the said company began clearing the forests at Kamanistiquia, for the erection of buildings, &c.; and that large parties of men, for several years, were employed in making carrying-places through the forests, some of them over deep swamps and morasses, over which causeways were laid of logs, squared on one side; and that on the Portage Savanne the causeway is more than two miles in length." * "That it was with difficulty, by making presents to some, and allowing extra wages to others, that the men engaged

*

forms an amphitheatre, and is clear and inclosed, and on the left corner of it, beneath a hill three or four hundred feet in height, and crowned by others of still greater altitude, is the fort, (Fort Charlotte,) picketed in with cedar pallisadoes, and inclosing houses built with wood, and covered with shingles. The portage hence to Pigeon river is ine miles. This is the GREAT DEPOT of he fur-trade, where the north men, coming from he interior-from the Assinaboin, the Saskatchivine, the Atabasea, the Lake Winipec, and other ar interior lakes and rivers-and bringing the furs f a year's trade, meet the pork-ealers who bring e goods from Montreal, and where the two divisons of men exchange loads. Twelve undred men often meet here. The roprietors, in part, reside there. It is the headuarters of the company. The mode of living at e Grand Portage is as follows: The proprietors, erks, guides, and interpreters mess together, to e number, sometimes, of one hundred, at several bles, in one large hall; the provision consisting bread, salt pork, beef, hams, fish, venison, butbr, peas, Indian corn, potatoes, tea, spirits, wine, d plenty of milk-for which purpose, several ilch cows are constantly kept. The mechanics ve rations of such provisions; but the canoeen, both from the north and from Montreal, (of1,200 in number,) have no other allowance, re or in the voyage, than Indian corn and meltfat,"-McKenzie's History of the Fur-trade.

Northwestern Boundary-Mr. Benton.

in the fur-trade could be prevailed on to transport the goods, furs, &c., by the new route. That, in the year 1802, the undersigned, from very good authority, received information that the United States troops had actually landed at Michilimackinac, the American garrison, for the purpose of proceeding to the depot of the fur-trade, at the Great Carrying-place, and there enforcing the duties contemplated to be levied on the merchandise, furs, &c., of the said Northwest Company, as British subjects, had they not learned the said company were then beginning to evacuate the said depot, situated at the east end of the said Great Carrying-place.

"Thus, the undersigned considers the new route from Kamanisliquia to be more dangerous, of greater length, and requires more labor than the old route by the Great Carrying-place, &c."

Extract from the sworn affidavit of John Mc Gülivray, a partner in the Norhwest Company, given at Glengarry, in Upper Canada, June 27, 1827.

"John McGillivray, of Glengarry, in the said district, gentleman, being duly sworn, deposeth and saith: That he was a partner of the ci-devant Northwest Company, furnished with capital and goods by the firm of McTavish, Frobisher, & Co., and McTavish, McGillivray, & Co., of Montreal, for the purpose of carrying on the fur-trade of Lake Superior, and the countries east, north, and west of the said lake. That the great depot of the associa⚫ tion then composing the Northwest Company was at the Great Carrying-place, on the border of Lake Superior,a few miles west of the mouth of the Pigeon river. That from a strong belief, founded upon the assertions of the United States commanding officer then stationed at Mackinac, (and, indeed, others,) that the same depot was within the limits of the United States of America, and that it was the decided intention of the Government of that country to appoint and establish a military post there, in order that they might levy duties on all merchandise, stores, &c. &.c. imported thereinto, and also on the furs exported therefrom, consonant with the laws and regulations of their own State, after mature and deliberale consideration it was then unanimously agreed to, by the association composing the Northwest Company, that the trade could not afford the heavy impost with which it most inevitably would have been burdened, and that it would ultimately prove ruinous to the concern al large.

"In the year 1802, this new route was again examined, and the road marked out then as the one by which in future the fur trade was to be carried on. That, at a very great expense, the concern had to clear away thick woods, to erect many buildings, &c., and for several years to employ large parties of men to open roads through the forests or carrying-places, to avoid many dangerous rapids and falls in the rivers, and to communicate with brooks, ponds, lakes, &c., which had no other communica

tion.

To all appearances, this route had never been practised, except by the natives whose hunting-grounds are in the vicinity thereof. It was with some difficulty, and by allowing extra wages, that the servants of the company employed in carrying on the fur-trade could be prevailed upon to undertake the transport of the goods, furs, &c., &c., by this new route. The deponent was several years in the fur-trade, both before and after that depot (or headquarters) was transferred from the Grand Carrying-place to Kamanistiquia, (or Fort William,) and was very well acquainted with both routes.

The new route is more dangerous,

is of greater length, and requires an infinite deal more labor, especially in years of low water, than the old route by the Grand Portage or the Great Carrying place, Pigeon river, &c., to Lac La Croix."

Extract from the sworn affidavit of H. Magillis, a partner of the Northwest Company, given at Glengary in Upper Canada, June 8th, 1827. "The undersigned doth hereby certify that he was a partner of the Northwest Company, under the firm of McTavish, McGillivray, and Company, for the fur-trade of Lake Superior, and the countries east, north, and west of the said lake. That the great depot of the fur-trade was at the Great Carrying-place, a few miles west of the sortie of the Pigeon river. That from a strong belief, founded on the assertion of the United States officers and others, that the above depot was within the limits of the United States, and that heavy duties would be levied on all merchandise, stores, &c., imported thereto, and on the furs exported there

Senate.

from, by the officers of the United States, which would have been ruinous to the said firm, they were obliged to examine the countries northward and eastward, for another route to the interior countries.

That, at a very great expense, they had to clear a thick forest, to erect buildings, &c., and to employ, for several years, large parties of men, to open roads through the forests, to avoid dangerous rapids, falls, &c., in the rivers, as carrying-places for their goods, furs, &c., and to communicate with brooks, ponds, and lakes, which had no other communication known; and that much of the roads was over deep swamp and morass; and to cross these, cause ways of logs, squared on the surface, were laid, in one place of more than two miles in length.

"That it was with difficulty, and by allowing extra wages, that the men employed in the fur-trade could be prevailed on to undertake the transport of goods, furs, &c., by this new route. The undersigned was several years in the fur-trade, both before and after the depot for the fur-trade was transferred from the Great Carrying place to Kamanistiquia, and was well acquainted with both That the new route is more dangerous, is of greater length, and requires more labor, than the old route by the Great Carrying-place, Pigeon river, &c., to Lac La Croix."

routes.

Extract from the sworn affidavit of Jean Baptiste Pomainville, a clerk in the Northwest Fur Company, given at Montreal, June 12, 1827.

"That in the year 1801, the undersigned, in his capacity as clerk to the said company, was placed under, the orders of Colonel William Mackay (then one of the partners of the Northwest Company) with eight men and one native, in a canoe, to explore a route from the Rainy Lake to the mouth of the Dog river in Lake Superior, called Kamanistiquia. That they did explore a route from thence to the place called Kamanistiquia; that they found the whole country a perfect wilderness, and it was with great difficulty and hard labor that they reached Kamanistiquia. *

*

That the undersigned was a clerk in the service of the Northwest Company several years before and after the depot for the fur-trade was transferred from the Great Carrying-place, a few miles west of the mouth of Pigeon river, in Lake Superior, to Kamanistiquia; and believes the said transfer of the depot to have been made on account of duties threatened to be levied on the goods imported to, and the furs exported from, the said depot at the Great Carrying-place by the officers of the United States. * That the undersigned was well acquainted with both routes, and considers the new route (by the Kamanistiquia) as of greater length, more dangerous, and requiring greater labor than the old route by the way of the Great Carrying place,(Grand Portage.")

*

*

Having read these affidavits, Mr. B. said there were others of the same tenor from other gentlemen of the late Northwest (now Hudson Bay) Company. They all testify to the same points, and so nearly in the same words, that it becomes a needless repetition to recite them. They establish, beyond controversy--1. That the Northwest Company occupied the Grand Portage, and made it the head-quarters of the company, and the great depot of their Indian trade, up to the year, 1802. 2. That they carried on their trade to the interior, up to that time, on the portage route of Pigeon river, which route commenced in the Grand Portage. 3. That the retention of Northwestern posts, in violation of the treaty of 1783, enabled them to retain possession of the Grand Portage, and the portage route, until after the surrender of those posts under Mr. Jay's treaty. 4. That they broke up from the Grand Portage, and abandoned the portage route in the year 1802, and opened a new route, and established a new post fifty miles further north. 5. That they did this for the avowed purpose of evacuating a post and retiring from a route which belonged to the United States, and to escape from the custom-house laws and the jurisdiction of the United States. 6. That they did this, upon the unanimous determination of the members of the company, at great loss and expense; and that the new route which they established was longer, more difficult, more costly, and worse in every respect than the one which they abandones. The bare reading of the affidavits establishes all this: and now the mere reading of the treaty of 1783, and that of 1842, will establi‹ ► the remainder, and show that the boundaries of