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settlement of any of these questions, except such as were for the advantage of his own country.

But, sir, I trust that no other American minister may ever follow the example of Mr. Webster in this particular. Such a mode of negotiation can only be tolerated between absolute sovereigns; but under a Government where every public agent is responsible to the people, either directly or indirectly, our most important affairs with foreign nations ought never to be concluded without a record of the conferences which led to the result. I myself negotiated an important treaty with Russia; and I felt it to be my imperative duty to write down, before I retired to rest, the substance of every conference with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and afterwards transmit it to my Government by the very first opportunity.

These observations, sir, will account for the remarkable fact, that, although Lord Ashburton arrived in Washington, and was presented to the President in the beginning of April, and his mission did not terminate until the 9th of August, yet the whole correspondence in relation to impressment, to the Caroline question, and to the Creole question, took place within the last week or ten days of its termination. All had been agreed upon beforehand in privaté conferences; and the correspondence was only making up the record for public view. What Mr. Webster originally proposed, what he insisted upon, and what he retracted, can now only be known to himself and to the British Government.

But, in regard to this eighth article of the treaty, we have not even any formal record made up, nor any explanation whatever. There it stands in the treaty; but how, or why it got there, we are left to conjecture. We bind ourselves to England that we shall maintain a naval force of eighty guns on the coast of Africa; whilst the condition of our treasury is so deplorable, that we have been compelled to reduce our small army, and leave our fellow-citizens beyond the Mississippi exposed to the attacks of the numerous savage tribes transported to that region by our own policy. Did the British Government demand this sacrifice at our hands? Was it necessary to appease the wounded pride of England at the disappointment she experienced when France-our ancient and faithful ally-refused to ratify the quintuple treaty, and identified herself with us in resisting the right of visitation and search? All is obscurity--all is darkness. We do not know, and we never shall know, what passed between the negotiators on this subject in their private conferences. Under a Government where every public minister is responsible, we find a most important article inserted in a treaty, and know not even by whom it was proposed.

Now, sir, in common with all America, I abhor the slave-trade. Our duty both to God and man requires that we should prevent it from being conducted under the American flag. For this purpose, we ought to send a naval force to the coast of Africa, whenever this may become necessary for its suppression. This course we have always hitherto pursued. But why should we yield up the exercise of our own free will, at the dictation of England? Why should we bind ourselves in bonds to her that we shall do our duty? The Father of his Country, while he advised us to cultivate peace and friendship with all nations, at the same time warned us against entangling alliances with any. We have hitherto acted upon this wise and salutary maxim; and the present is the first entangling alliance we have ever contracted with any nation, since the date of his solemn warning. Hereafter, whether it be convenient or inconvenient to us-whether it be necessary or not,--we have solemnly pledged ourselves to England, that, at all times, and under all circumstances, during the period of five years, we shall keep eighty guns afloat on the coast of Africa: and she, of all others, is the nation which will exact a strict performance of this pledge. There is no reciprocity, except in name, in this article of the treaty. The naval force of Great Britain is so large, that, without any engagement whatever, she would keep a greater number than eighty guns on the African coast. In the face of all these objections, and in this moment of our depressed finances, we agree to expend $700,000 per annum, to enable England to present to Christendom this new trophy which she has won in the cause of universal emancipation. I take my estimate of the expense from the Senators from Missouri and New Hampshire, [Messrs. BENTON and WOODBURY,] who state that

The British Tealy-Mr. Buchanan.

the cost of each gun at sea (including ship-building and all) amounts to $9,000.

But, sir, much as I dislike this article in the aspect in which it has already been presented, I dislike it still more when viewed in another light. To me, it appears, under all the circumstances, to be the price paid to the British Government for a relinquishment of its claim, during the continuance of the treaty, to the right of visiting and searching .American vessels on the coast of Africa. On this subject, we must grope our way in the dark-having no light to direct our steps, but what appears on the face of the article itself, and the intimations contained in the President's message.

We have the declaration of the President, "that the treaty obligations subsisting between the two countries for the suppression of the African slavetrade, and the complaints made to this Government within the last three or four years, (many of them but too well founded,) of the visitation, seizure, and detention of American vessels on that coast, by British cruisers, could not but form a delicate and highly important part of the negotiations which have now been held." We thus learn, from the highest authority, that the right of visitation and search on the African coast did form a delicate and highly important part of the negotiations. This was all conducted in private conferences; as nothing on the subject appears in the correspondence. Mr. Webster must unquestionably have complained to Lord Ashburton of the outrages committed upon our flag by British cruisers; and his Lordship most probably replied that these were necessary to suppress the slave-trade in American vessels. How was the question to be compromised? By a stipulation, on the part of the United States, that they would keep a sufficient force on the coast of Africa to visit and search their own vessels, thus rendering unnecessary their visitation and search by British cruisers. In this inference I am sustained by the language of the President. He says that "the examination or visitation of the merchant vessels of one nation, by the cruisers of another, for any purpose, except those known or acknowledged by the law of nations, under whatever restraints or regulations it may take place, may lead to dangerous results. It is far better, by other means, to supersede any supposed necessity, or any motive, for such examination or visit. Interference with a merchant vessel by an armed cruiser, is always a delicate proceeding, apt to touch the point of national honor, as well as to affect the interests of individuals. It has been thought, therefore, expedient, not only in accordance with the stipulations of the treaty of Ghent, but, at the same time, as removing all pretext, on the part of others, for violating the immunities of the American flag upon the seas, as they exist and are defined by the law of nations, to enter into the articles now submitted to the Senate." These articles, then, were entered into for the purpose of removing all pretexts, on the part of the British Government, for examining and searching our vessels on the coast of Africa. These articles are the price which we have agreed to pay for the privilege of not being searched by British cruisers. But the eighth article of the treaty may be annulled, at the pleasure of either Government, at the end of five years; and if it should be, what will then be our condition? All the arrogant and unjust pretensions of the British Government to visit and examine American vessels will then revive; because the treaty contains no renunciation whatever of these pretensions. The parties will then be remitted to the condition in which they were placed before it was concluded. Nay, more; the claim of Great Britain will be strengthened by the fact, that we have agreed to purchase a temporary exemption from its exercise, at the price of maintaining a squadron of eighty guns on the coast of Africa during a period of five years.

The President has referred to the stipulations contained in the treaty of Ghent as one reason for the adoption of this eighth article. The tenth article of that treaty declares as follows: "Whereas, the traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice, and whereas both his Majesty and the United States are desirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire abolition, it is hereby agreed, that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavors to accomplish so desirable an object."

The whole world knows how early, and with what persevering energy, the United States have exerted themselves to suppress this odious trade.

Senate.

They were the first, a few years after the treaty of Ghent, to denounce it as piracy under their laws; and other nations have followed their example. They have faithfully complied with the treaty of Ghent, in using their best endeavors for the suppression of this trade. But will any person pretend that the tenth article of this treaty imposes any obligation upon them to make a new and distinct treaty, abridging their liberty of thinking and acting for themselves in accomplishing this desirable object, and compelling them to maintain a squadron on the coast of Africa, to act in concert with a British squadron, for this purpose? Surely Lord Ashburton never set up any such pretension. The tenth article of the treaty of Ghent is complete in itself, and contemplated no new stipulation between the two Governments.

Senators say that the two squadrons are to act independently of each other; and no danger now exists that American vessels will be visited and examined by British cruisers. I trust that the facts may justify their prediction. But the treaty itself provides that the two Governments shall "give such orders to the officers commanding their respective forces, as shall enable them most effectually to act in concert and co-operation." The British squadron on the coast of Africa will necessarily be larger than the American; and it will be com manded by an admiral, or other officer of high rank. Although no direct orders may be issued from the British commander to an American offi cer; yet, when the two squadrons are bound to cooperate with each other, influence will, probably, be substituted for command. The American squadron will thus, in effect, become a mere subsi diary force to that of England. Upon a review of all the considerations involved in this subject, I feel deeply solicitous that the pending motion should prevail, to strike this eighth article from the treaty. There is not the least danger but that it will be ratified by England without this article. The honor of the nation requires that we should make this amendment. After all that has passed, we should stand upon that sacred principle of the law of nations, that the American flag-waving at the masthead of an American vessel, shall protect her from visitation and search by British cruisers. In what condition do we place France by yielding to the demands of England,-that France, whose people have been ever ready and ever willing to Stand by us in the day and hour of danger? It is known to us all that England, by her persevering solicitations, had obtained from the Governments of France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, a treaty yielding the right of search on the coast of Africa; and she expected to extort this concession from us, through the moral influence of these nations. The treaty had not yet been ratified by France, when our minister at Paris interposed. His powerful protest against it aroused the French people to a sense of their danger. They took the alarm, and, like their fathers in the Revolution, they united with us in asserting the independence of their flag and our flag. Such a storm of indignation was thus raised, that the French Government withheld its ratification from the quintuple treaty. And yet, after all this, we have deserted our ancient allywe have framed a treaty with the British Government, by which they not only do not renounce the right of search, but have obtained from us an implied acknowledgment of the existence of such a right, by our engagement, in consideration of the temporary suspension of its exercise, to maintain a squadron of eighty guns on the coast of Africa for five years, to act in concert and co-operation with the British squadron. Surely, surely, the Senate will not ratify this article of the treaty. Surely, surely, the Senate will not ratify the unjust claim of the British Government to be the supreme protector of the rights of humanity, either on the ocean or on the land.

I have now reached the Northeastern boundary question; and I have, on former occasions, written and spoken so much in support of our title to the disputed territory, that I shall trouble the Senate with but a few observations on this branch of the subject. I entirely concur in the opinion formerly expressed by Mr. Webster, that the claim of the British Government "does not amount to the dignity of a debatable question." The Senate unani. mously adopted a resolution on the 4th of July, 1838, reported by myself, as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, declaring, "That after a careful examination, and deliberale consideration of the whole controversy between the United

27TH CONG....3D SESS.

States and Great Britain, relative to the Northeastern boundary of the former, the Senate does not entertain a doubt of the entire practicability of running and marking that boundary in strict conformity with the stipulations of the definitive treaty of peace of seventeen hundred and eighty-three; and it entertains a perfect conviction of the justice and validity of the title of the United States to the full extent of all the territory in dispute between the two powers." The distinguished predecessor [Mr. CLAY] of the Senator from Kentucky, [Mr. CRITTENDEN,] then a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, cordially approved both of the report and of this resolution; and, upon his motion, the latter was considered and adopted on the anniversary of our independence. He said that there was a peculiar fitness in resolving to maintain the integrity and independence of the old thirteen United States on the anniversary of that memorable day on which our independence was declared. I can never, then, admit that our title to the disputed territory was even doubtful.

Dr. Franklin, and the other American commissioners who negotiated the definitive treaty of peace, in 1783, were wise and sagacious men. They knew that, in every delineation of boundary, it was all important clearly to fix the starting-point; and "that all future disputes might be prevented," to use the language of the treaty, the northwest angle of Nova Scotia was established as the place of beginning. At the date of the treaty, this was a wellknown point, at the intersection of the western line of the province of Nova Scotia with the southern line of the province of Quebec; and although these two lines had never been actually run and marked upon the ground, yet their position was so clearly described by royal proclamations, by acts of Parlia ment, and by the commissions granted to the Gov. ernors of Nova Scotia and Quebec, that our commissioners deemed it impossible that any serious difficulty could arise in discovering this angle. Nothing more was necessary than to follow upon the ground the due-north line, plainly marked upon Mitchell's map; from the source of the St. Croix to the line of highlands dividing "those rivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence, from those which fall into the Atlantic ocean;" and at the intersection of these two lines, the northwest angle of Nova Scotia must be found with mathematical precision.

All admit that Mitchell's map, published in 1755, was the map used by the commissioners in designating the boundaries of the United States. Until the year 1763, the northwest angle of Nova Scotia was the point where the line marked upon that map, as the dividing line between Nova Scotia and New England, struck the river St. Lawrence. In February, 1763, Great Britain acquired Canada from France by treaty. Under the King's proclamation of October, 1763, which created the province of Quebec, and afterwards, by act of Parliament, in 1774, this province was extended south of the St. Lawrence, "by a line from the bay of Chaleurs, along the highlands which divide the rivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence from those which fall into the sea, to a point in forty-five degrees of northern latitude, on the eastern bank of the river Connecticut." The bay of Chaleurs on the north, in latitude between 48 and 49, and a point on the Connecticut, in latitude 45, were to be the two extremities; and the intermediate southern line of the province of Quebec was to pass between these two points along the highlands which divide the rivers that empty themselves into the St. Lawrence, on the one side, from those falling into the sea, upon the other. The definitive treaty of peace adopts the language of the act of Parliament of 1774, and describes the northwest angle of Nova Scotia to be "that angle which is formed by a line drawn due north from the source of St. Croix river to the highlands" "which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic Now, sir, let any Senator cast his eyes ocean." upon Mitchell's map, and follow the well-marked due-north line from the source of the St. Croix; and he will find that it crosses the river St. John very little north of the 47th degree of latitude, and does not arrive at the highlands from which rivers empty themselves into the St. Lawrence, until north of the 48th degree of latitude. And yet, in the face of all these official documents of the very highest authority, I was astonished to find that Lord Ashburton, in his letter to Mr. Webster of the 21st June last, declared "his settled conviction that it

The British Treaty-Mr. Buchanan.

was the intention of the parties to the treaty of peace of 1783, however imperfectly those intentions may have been executed, to leave to Great Britain, by their description of boundaries, the whole of the waters of the river St. John." In order to entertain this conviction, he must believe that the southern boundary of the province of Quebec, under the royal proclamation of 1763, and the act of Parliament of 1774, extended not merely to the dividing highlands whence streams flow into the St. Lawrence; but about a hundred miles south of these highlands, embracing a region of country watered by a large river, (the St. John,) and its numerous tributaries, which flow, not into the St. Lawrence, but into the sea. And Dr. Franklin and our other commissioners, with Mitchell's map before them, and the St. John with all its tributaries in full view, in the opinion of his Lordship, intended to bring the northwestern angle of Nova Scotia down to Mars Hill, one hundred miles south of those dividing highlands; from the opposite slopes of which, rivers flow on the one side into the St. Lawrence, and on the other into the ocean. With this map before them, they were wholly ignorant of the language which they had employed when clearly and distinctly fixing the northwest angle of Nova Scotia in this dividing range of highlands, and intended to fix it in highlands one hundred miles south, which divide not the sources of streams falling into the St. Lawrence and the Atlantic ocean, according to the description of the treaty, but the sources of streams falling into the St. John on the north, and the Penobscot on the south.

In opposition to this treaty line, so clearly defined by Dr. Franklin, and to make Dr. Franklin contradict himself, the copy of an old French map by D'Anville has been produced, the original of which was recently found by Mr. Sparks in the office of Foreign Affairs at Paris, among 60,000 other maps. It is dated in 1746; and upon its face there is a line traced, in red ink, running along the highlands which divide the head waters of the Penobscot and Kennebec on the south, from the tributaries of the St. John on the north. Much importance seems to have been attached to this map by the Secretary of State. It was communicated to the Committee on Foreign Relations in great confidence, and with an air of solemn mystery; and serious apprehensions were expressed lest Lord Ashburton might obtain information of the existence of so precious a document. The dreaded inference was, that this must be the very map which had been marked by Dr. Franklin for Count Vergennes, at his request; and that the red lines upon it were the boundary lines of the United States, according to the treaty, traced by the hand of its chief negotiator. In plain English, that, notwithstanding Dr. Franklin had signed the provisional treaty on the 30th day of November, 1782, defining the northeastern boundary of the United States to be a line drawn due north from the source of St. Croix river to the highlands, and thence along the highlands dividing the rivers which flow into the St. Lawrence from those which empty themselves into the Atlantic; yet that, only six short days thereafter, he had marked this very treaty line upon a map for Count Vergennes, as a line not running north at all from the source of the St. Croix, but running west; and not separating the head-waters of the tributaries of the St. Lawrence from the rivers which fall into the Atlantic ocean, but dividing the tributaries of the St. John from the head-waters of the Kennebec and the Penobscot. To credit this, we must believe either that the Doctor had a very short memory, or that he did not understand the plainest provisions of the treaty to which he had just become a party. Neither the one supposition nor the other can be tolerated for a moment. Those who attach such importance to this map, surely could not have been aware of the fact, that, previous to the year 1763, when Canada was ceded by France to England, all the French maps that were published had the dividing line between the possessions of France and England marked in this very manner. By this line France claimed against England prior to the year 1763; and it would have been "passing strange" if this old map of 1746--bearing date thirtysix years before the existence of our provisional treaty with England-should not have been thus marked. The wonder would have been to have found any map of that date in the French Foreign Office marked in any other manner.

The logic by which Dr. Franklin would be made to stultify himself is, that he certainly did mark some map for Count Vergennes with the

Senate.

lines of the provisional treaty; but what has become of this map, no man living can tell. An old French map of 1746, however, has been found by Mr. Sparks, among sixty thousand other maps, marked as all French maps were previous to 1763. Therefore, this must be the very map which Dr. Franklin sent to Count Vergennes sixty years ago. Quod erat demonstrandum. Such an assumption is too absurd to be assailed by serious argument.

Lord Ashburton, in his first letter to Mr. Webster, of the 13th June, appears peculiarly solicitous to free his Government from the imputation of having urged a claim which they knew to be unfounded. In order to accomplish this purpose, he attempts to prove that the claim had been asserted previously to the treaty of Ghent. Now, sir, this I utterly deny. No question was ever made, until after that treaty, but that our line extended north of the St. John. On the contrary, this fact was clearly admitted in 1797, by agents of high character, acting under the express authority of the British Government. Ward Chipman, esq., the agent of that Government, under Jay's treaty, for determining the true source of the St. Croix, expressly admits the fact. In his argument, he says that "this north line must of necessity cross the river St. John." Nay, more: he insists that, "if a north line is to be traced from the source of the Cheputnatecook, (which was eventually established as the point of beginning,) it will not only cross the river St. John, within about fifty miles from Frederickton, the metropolis of New Brunswick, but will cut off the sources of the rivers which fall into the Bay of Chaleurs, if not of many others-proba-` bly the Merramichi among them-which fall into the Gulf of St. Lawrence." Robert Liston, esq., then his Britannic Majesty's minister to the United States, in his correspondence with Mr. Chipman-and this, but fourteen years after the date of the definitive treaty-clearly admits that this north line would cross the St. John. And yet Lord Ashburton, at this late day, is firmly convinced, not only that it would not cross the St. John, but that it would stop short at Mars Hill, and turn to the west some forty or fifty miles south of that river.

Previously to the treaty of Ghent, in 1814, the British Government had discovered the vast importance of obtaining a cession of that portion of our territory in the northern part of Maine, through which the direct communication lies between their provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick and the city of Quebec. The British commissioners, at the first, did not insinuate that they had any right, under the treaty, to this northern angle of Maine; but merely proposed "such a variation of the line of frontier as might secure a direct communication between Quebec and Halifax" and for this cession they were willing to yield an equivalent, "either in frontier or otherwise." It was not 'until after the American commissioners had declared "they had no authority to cede any part of the territory of the United States," that the British commissioners insinuated (rather than_asserted) the first doubt in regard to our title. This faint pretension was ably and promptly repelled by the American commissioners: and the correspondence on this subject ended with a note from the British commissioners, in which they declare that "the British Government never required that all that portion of the State of Massachusetts (now Maine) intervening between the province of New Bruns wick and Quebec should be ceded to Great Britain; but only that small portion of unsettled country which interrupts the communication between Quebec and Halifax-there being much doubt whether it does not already belong to Great Britain." Great Britain would then, sir, you perceive, have gladly accepted this small portion of the disputed territory by cession, and granted an equivalent therefor, either in frontier or otherwise. What has she now obtained under the present treaty? Not merely the small intervening territory necessary to connect her two provinces-which was all she desired in 1814-but all the territory of Maine north of the St. John and the St. Francis, containing 2,636,160 acres, or 4,119 square miles; and, in addition thereto, a strip of territory south of the St. Francis, 110 miles in length, along the highland frontier of that State, containing 571,520 acres, or 893 square miles. No man can even set up the pretence that this strip of territory is in any manner necessary to secure a direct communication between Quebec and Halifax. It has been wrested from us for a far different purpose. Instead of yielding us any equivalent for this cession, either in land or in

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money, as Great Britain was anxious to do at Ghent, we ourselves have agreed to purchase it from Maine and Massachusetts, at a stipulated sum, in order that we may cede it, without money and without price, to satisfy the arrogant pretensions of this domineering nation. The King of the Netherlands, although much under the influence of England at the time he made his award, never thought of giving her more of our territory than she claimed to be necessary for a free and direct communication between her provinces. It was reserved for an American Secretary of State to surrender this territory-and that, too, the highland boundary which secured Maine against the assaults of Great Britain-of eight hundred and ninety-three square miles, in order to satisfy her rapacity. The Dutch King had never dreamed of imposing on us any such humiliating terms.

But I am in advance of my subject, and must return. Lord Ashburton, intent upon proving (as well he might be, for the honor of his country) that the British claim was not a mere unfounded pretence to extort territory from a neighboring nation, refers to the instructions of Mr. Madison to Mr. King, in 1802, and the message of Mr. Jefferson to Congress, in 1803, for the purpose of showing that the treaty highlands, at the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, could not be found upon the ground. Recent surveys have clearly established that these distinguished men were both mistaken in this particular. But no matter. Has Mr. Madison or Mr. Jefferson ever admitted, if an actual mountain ridge could not be found upon the ground, that our north line from the monument should stop short south of the St. John, and should not be extended as far north as the region where the sources of those rivers "that empty themselves into the St. Lawrence" interlock with the sources of those "which fall into the Atlantic ocean?" This will not be pretended. The fact is directly opposite; because Mr. Madison, in these very instructions to Mr. King to which his Lordship refers, declares distinctly, upon the presumption that a mountainous ridge could not be found upon the ground, that "due regard ought to be had to the general idea that the line ought to terminate on the elevated ground dividing the rivers falling into the Atlantic from those emptying themselves into the St. Lawrence." If no actual highlands could have been found, it would nevertheless remain a geographical fact not to be contested, that there exists a range of country dividing the streams which flow on the one side into the St. Lawrence, from those which flow, on the other side, into the Atlantic ocean. It was here, then, that, under the treaty, the northwest angle of Nova Scotia was to be found, and not in a range of highlands far to the south of the St. John, and far to the south of the sources of the streams which fall into the St. Lawrence. Accordingly, we find that in the second article of the treaty concluded at London, on the 12th May, 1803, between Mr. King and Lord Hawkesbury, the commissioners appointed under its authority were directed "to cause the said boundary line between the source of the river St. Croix, as the same has been determined by the commissioners appointed for that purpose, and the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, to be run and marked, according to the provisions of the treaty aforesaid" [of 1783.] You will observe, sir, that this treaty was negotiated under the very instructions from Mr. Madison to Mr. King, on which Lord Ashburton relies to defend his Government against the imputation that their claim to the disputed territory was not a mere unfounded pretence. The negotiators of this treaty of 1803, from its very terms, could have entertained no doubt but that the line between the monument and the northwest angle of Nova Scotia could be run and marked, according to the definitive treaty of peace. It is true that the treaty of 1803 was never ratified; but no objection was ever made by either party to the article containing this stipulation.

The truth is, that the present British claim was all an afterthought. It owes its origin entirely to the discovery that it was necessary, by some pretence or other, to wrest from us the territory which, if in our possession, might interrupt the communication between Nova Scotia and Quebec. They then contended that no actual highlands could be found upon the ground, such as those described by the treaty. They placed particular emphasis on the word "highlands;" and insisted that, if a mountain range could not be found, the treaty was absolutely void, for uncertainty. But, when "highJands" are spoken of as dividing waters flowing in

The British Treaty-Mr. Buchanan.

opposite directions, is not the meaning of the term perfectly palpable? From the very laws of nature, such highlands must exist and slope off in opposite directions. Whether they consist of table-land, or even swamp, or shoot up into mountain ridges, still, if there be a height of land from which streams flow down in opposite directions, this most clearly answers the description of the treaty. It is not the elevation of these highlands, but their capacity to divide waters, which stamps upon them their char

acter.

After the British Government had thus summarily annihilated the "highlands" of the treaty, they had still to perform other wonders. Even if this part of the description were gone, enough would still remain clearly to identify the treaty line-as Mitchell's map, and all other maps, plainly show a range of country separating "those rivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic ocean." What task, then, had they next to perform? After sinking the highlands, they contended, with all imaginable gravity, that no rivers existed in that region which fell into the Atlantic. And why? The St. John (say they) is not a river falling into the Atlantic ocean, because it has its mouth in the Bay of Fundy; neither is the Ristigouche, because it has its mouth in the Bay of Chaleurs. And what is this Bay of Fundy itself, but a part of the Atlantic ocean? A bay is a mere opening of the main ocean into the land; and you might, with the same justice, contend that the Bay of Naples is not a portion of the Mediterranean, as that the Bay of Fundy is not a portion of the Atlantic ocean. What absolute trifling it is to contend that a river does not fall into the Atlantic, because, in reaching the main ocean, it may pass through a bay. The Delaware does not fall into the Atlantic, because it flows into it through the Bay of Delaware; and, for the same reason, the St. John does not fall into the Atlantic, because it flows into it through the Bay of Fundy! By the same process of reasoning, there is not a single river in the State of Maine which falls into the Atlantic ocean. They all have their mouths in different bays. Truly, the British claim does not rise to the dignity of a debatable question. It is not even a decent pretence.

But even after the British Government had thus annihilated the treaty highlands, and proved that the St. John, whose northern tributary streams rise in these highlands, did not fall into the Atlantic, there was another description still left of the treaty boundary, against which they have never been able to utter a word. It is a settled common-sense rule of construction, that if any portion of a description of boundary fail, yet if enough remains clearly to manifest the intention of the contracting parties, this is sufficient. Now, the British Government have never pretended that rivers do not exist which empty themselves into the St. Lawrence exactly in accordance with the description of the treaty. On Mitchell's map, you perceive the river St. Lawrence running from the southwest to the northeast; whilst numerous tributaries rising to the south of it, and passing north through its valley, empty themselves into the main.stream. This portion of the description remains, and would be just as conclusive in favor of our right as though the treaty had referred to nothing else. The bad does not and cannot vitiate the good.

I have said much more on this branch of the subject than I had intended, not for the purpose of establishing our right, but to show that the miserable pretexts to which the British Government have been compelled to resort in order to obtain our territory, are unworthy of a great nation, and that Lord Ashburton can never free them from the imputation of demanding that to which they must have known they had no right.

Let me now present a sketch of the history of this negotiation between Mr. Web-ter and Lord Ashburton, in relation to the Maine boundary, in a plain and distinct form, before the Senate. The first fact which strikes the mind with astonishment is, that Mr. Webster should have agreed, in their preliminary conferences, to waive all discussion "on the general grounds on which each party considers their claims respectively to rest," as not calculated to lead to any practical result. This ap. pears conclusively from the very first paragraph of the first letter addressed by Lord Ashburton to Mr. Webster, on the 13th June, 1842, and his answer of the 8th July.

I may be asked what course Mr. Webster, in my

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opinion, ought to have pursued. I answer, he ought to have invariably insisted on our right to the disputed territory; but, at the same time, to have expressed his willingness, for the sake of good neighborhood, and in consideration of a fair equivalent in territory, to have yielded this right so far as to grant to Great Britain what her commissioners had so earnestly desired at Ghent-"such a variation of the line of frontier as might secure a direct communication between Quebec and Hal ifax." Nature herself seems to have pointed out these mutual equivalents. Whoever will cast his eye over the map of Maine and New Brunswick, must be forcibly struck with this truth. If the right of way over our territory between Halifax and Quebec had been alone solicited, it ought to have been conceded to Great Britain in exchange for the right to navigate the St. John. But, as the British Government earnestly desired to possess the right of sovereignty in the soil over which this way passed, the northern triangle of Maine ought to have been surrendered for the much smaller triangle belonging to the province of New Bruns wick, west of the St. John. This would have established a river boundary between the two countries, from the point where the due-north line from the monument strikes Eel river, all the distance round by Eel river, the St. John, and the St. Francis, to the western highland boundary of the treaty. But what is our present condition, under this treaty? We have ceded to Great Britain all the territory she desired; and yet we have not obtained this narrow strip of territory west of the St. John She still retains it: and there an organized system of smuggling can be established; and from thence, in case of war, her troops can be poured into the very heart of the State of Maine. To preserve peace and good neighborhood between inde pendent nations, a river or a mountain boundary has always been deemed of essential importance. And yet, strange as it may seem, we have never insisted upon this river boundary, on the east of Maine, which Nature herself seems to have estab lished; whilst we have actually surrendered into the keeping of Great Britain the whole of our western mountain boundary.

Lord Ashburton having obtained from Mr. Webster the important concession that the right of the United States to the disputed territory should no longer be a subject of discussion, the next conces sion which this shrewd practical diplomatist desired to obtain seemed to follow as an almost necessary consequence. For years the British Government have contended that the whole territory of Maine north of these pretended highlands, which take a westerly direction from Mars Hill, was in dispute; and that it was impossible to ascertain the rights of the respective parties, according to the treaty. Assuming these facts, they had, over and over again, proposed to divide the disputed territory between the two countries, without granting any equivalent to us beyond its limits. When the American negotiator, therefore, in the very beginning, admitted that it would be vain for us to insist upon our rights under the treaty, it seemed to follow, as a necessary consequence, that the disputed territory must be divided between the parties, according to the suggestion of the British Government. But this was far from the opinion of the Legislature of Maine. Indeed, it does not even seem to have originally been the intention of Lord Ashburton himself to make any such extravagant demand. The Secretary of State, in his letter to Gov. Fairfield, dated 11th April, 1842, informs him that his Lordship had "officially announced to this department, that, in regard to the boundary question, he has authority to treat for a conventional line, or line by agreement, on such terms and conditions, and with such mutual considerations and equivalents as may be thought just and equitable." I would ask every Senator of this body, if, when he first read this letter of Mr. Webster, it entered into his imagination to conceive that Lord Ashburton, by these expressions, meant no more than a division of the disputed territory between the parties. Had he thus expressed himself, in distinct terms--my life upon it, Maine never would have appointed commissioners. But Maine did not leave this question in doubt. Her Legislature, on the 20th May, 1842, at the time when her commissioners were chosen, resolved, "That this State cannot regard the relinquishment, by the British Government, of any claim heretofore advanced by it to the territory included within the limits of the line of this State, as designated by the treaty of

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1783, and uniformly claimed by Maine, as a consideration or equivalent within the meaning of these resolutions."

It is a most curious point of diplomatic history, how, in the very face of this resolution of in. structions, the Maine commissioners were led on, step by step, to give their assent to the present treaty. It will be well worth while to spend a few moments in tracing this strange history.

The commissioners of Maine had their first audience with Mr. Webster on Monday, 13th of June. On the 17th June, Mr. Webster informed Lord Ashburton that he was prepared to commence the negotiation. On the 18th June, they held their first conference; but what transpired at this conference is buried in oblivion. No record of it will ever meet the public eye. If Mr. Webster had evinced half as much skill in managing Lord Ashburton as he displayed in managing the commissioners of Maine, that State would have acquired the strip of territory on the right bank of the St. John, which she so much desired to possess.

The result of this conference was the letter of Lord Ashburton to Mr. Webster of the 21st of June. This Letter, although conciliatory in its terms, is one of bold and barefaced pretension. It asserts the principle (which both the State of Maine and the General Government had so long resisted) that there must be a division of the disputed territory between the two countries, without any other equivalent to us; and it not only demands for Great Britain all the disputed territory north of the St. John and the St. Francis, but also the whole of the Madawaska settlement south of the St. John. Nay, more: his Lordship asserts a claim, of which we never had before heard, to the whole territory south of the St. Francis and west of the St. John, down to "some one of its sources" in the highlands-thus intending to deprive Maine not only of her western highland boundary, but of the whole valley beHe tween that boundary and the river St. John. seems to have well understood the policy of asking much more than he would be willing to accept. In making this demand, his Lordship resorts to the common diplomatic finesse, that he could not, in any case, abandon the obvious interests of the Madawarka settlement south of the St. John; and, to give this and other declarations the greater effect, he solemnly declares: "I have not treated the subject in the ordinary form of a bargain, where the party making the proposal leaves himself something to give up. The case would not admit of this, even if I could bring myself so to act." And yet the case did admit of this; and his Lordship did bring himself very quietly so to act, within a few days, and as soon as he discovered that the Maine commissioners had resisted this claim to the Madawaska settlement with becoming spirit; his pretended instructions to the contrary notwithstanding.

Mr. Webster refers this letter of Lord Ashbur ton to the commissioners of Maine, and reserves to himself the part of mediator between them and Lord Ashburton. In their note to him of the 29th Jane, they declare (page 56) that they can never surrender the Madawaską settlement south of the St. John; "and that, if the adoption of such a line is a sine qua non on the part of the British Government, the commissioners on the part of the State of Maine feel it their duty as distinctly to say, that any attempt at an amicable adjustment of the controversy respecting the Northeastern boundary on that basis, with the consent of Maine, would be entirely fruitless."

The Maine commissioners then proceed to offer to Mr. Webster a counter projet, and to propose a conventional line. And here permit me to observe, that it is a most astonishing fact, that these commissioners never even asked for a cession of the narrow triangular strip of land west of the St. John. I venture to say that no American statesman, who has ever examined the subject of a conventional line, has entertained any other idea than that this strip of land ought to be the equivalent for the tract of country north of the St. John and St. Francis. If a bare right of way was to be surrendered to England over the disputed territory, the navigation of the St. John would be the natural equivalent; but if, in addition to this, the British Government asked a cession of the sovereignty and soil of the territory north of the St. John, then the equally fair equivalent was a surrender by them to Maine of the strip of land north of Eel river, on the right bank of the St. John-thus establishing a river boundary between Maine and New Brunswick. This impression has been deeply fixed upon

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my mind for years. I have talked of it a hundred times, and every person with whom I have conversed has been under the same impression. This was the "general and confident expectation of the people of Maine," as we are informed by her commissioners. With a view to this, the Legislature of that State had solemnly resolved that no relinquishment of territory on the part of the British Government, within what it chose to denominate the disputed territory, should ever be considered by Maine as an equivalent for the surrender of any portion of that territory to Great Britain.

This resolution, it is well known, pointed clearly and distinctly to the acquisition of the strip west of the St. John. And yet the Maine commissioners, in their counter-projet, not only did not demand this territory, but they expressly surrendered all claim to it. And why? Because, to use their own language, "they have been assured that Lord Ashburton is restrained, by his instructions, from yielding the island of Grand Menan, or any of the islands in Passamaquoddy bay, or even any portion of the narrow strip of territory which lies between the due north line from the source of the St. Croix and the St. John river, above Eel river, (so called,) as an equivalent for any portion of the territory claimed by Maine as within her boundaries." By whom had they been thus assured? Unquestionably by Mr. Webster. By whom had they been prevailed upon to surrender the claim of their State to this strip of territory? Certainly by Mr. Webster, upon the assurance that Lord Ashburton was restrained, by his instructions, from yielding it. This was the fatal point of the negotiation for the State of Maine. It was here that the rights of that State, and of the United States, were abandoned. This territory ought to have been resolutely demanded as an equivalent for the darling object which Great Britain had for so many years eagerly pursuedthat of acquiring the territory over which lay the communication between New Brunswick and Quebec. If Lord Ashburton's instructions prohibited him from surrendering this strip of territory, new instructions could and would have been obtained, had they been found necessary. If this had not been the case, I would have referred the question to another arbitrator, (an alternative to which Lord Ashburton often alludes,) or have hazarded any other consequences, rather than have tamely yielded the principle against which we had so long contended that our right to the disputed territory was doubtful; and, therefore, because it was so, that a division of it ought to be made between the two nations. But his Lordship (according to his own dec. laration) never could have surrendered the Madawaska territory south of the St. John; and yet he did agree to surrender it, before it was possible for him to have obtained new instructions from Eng-, land. Had the Maine commissioners insisted upon this tract of country with the same manly firmness as they had done upon retaining the Madawaska settlement south of the St. John, in all hu-\ man probability it would have been attended with a similar result. His Lordship's alleged instructions would have yielded to circumstances, as they had done before; and this negotiation might have closed with honor to the country. The moment that the Maine commissioners were prevailed upon to yield this point without a struggle, all was lost. Every principle for which we had so long contended was at once abandoned; and nothing more remained than to decide how much of the territory of Maine should be conceded to the demands of Great Britain. The Maine commissioners seem themselves to have been deeply sensible of this degrading truth. They declare that, as they can obtain no equivalent beyond the disputed territory, "they feel themselves constrained to say that the portion of territory within the limits of Maine, as claimed by her, which they are prepared, in a spirit of peace and good neighborhood, to yield for the accommodation of Great Britain, must be restrained and confined to such portion only, and in such reasonable extent, as is necessary to secure to Great Britain 'an unobstructed communication and connexion of her colonies with each other."

They then proposed to yield to Great Britain all that had been awarded to her by the King of the Netherlands, (whose award, the Senate had so promptly rejected, but which had been so eagerly accepted by the British King.) with the exception of a small portion of the territory north of the St. Francis. This proposition gave to England all the territory that was necessary to secure the communication between her provinces; but whilst

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doing this, it would, to a partial extent, have saved our Government from the disgrace of having, for so many years, warred against the award of the King of the Netherlands, and afterwards accepted worse terms than it proposed.

Mr. Webster, on the 7th of July, transmits this letter of the commissioners of Maine to Lord Ashburton, accompanied by a long diplomatic note. In this note he expressly recognises that his Lordship is not at liberty "to cede the whole or a part of the territory, commonly called the strip, lying east of the north line, and west of the St. John." How had Mr. Webster acquired a knowledge of this most important fact? It must have been in their verbal conferences; for Lord Ashburton had not previously committed himself by any such declalation in any portion of his correspondence. In it he has nowhere stated that his instructions forbade him to make such a surrender.

It is also worthy of remark, that whilst Mr. Webster, with the strange inconsistency between his archaracterizes guments and his actions which this negotiation, is communicating to Lord Ashburton a proposition to surrender to him all that portion of the disputed territory for which England had originally contended, and although he had thus rendered it impossible that any discussion of our title could benefit his country, yet he does, not withstanding, demonstrate the right of the State of Maine to all this territory, with irresistible clearness and power. He is equally triumphant on this question, as on the Creole and Caroline questions or in resisting the doctrine of impressment; but, unfortunately, his arguments have fallen to the ground, without producing any beneficial result.

Lord Ashburton, with that skill and address which have characterized him throughout the whole negotiation, now eagerly seized the advantage which he had obtained over Mr. Webster and the Maine commissioners. They had fatally, in advance, bound themselves to grant all that England originally sought or desired. To this extent they stood committed; and his object now was to obtain, in addition, a cession of the western highland boundary of Maine, for the purpose of covering Quebec, and of assailing us with tremendous advantage in the event of war between the two countries. He now departs from the moderate and conciliatory tone which he had assumed everywhere else throughout the negotiation. In his letter to Mr. Webster of the 11th July, he scouts the proposition of the commissioners of Maine; indeed, he treats it almost as if it were an insult. He feels himself "quite at a loss" to account for such a proposal, and he appeals to the candid judgment of Mr. Webster to say "whether this is a proposition for conciliation." He says that he need not examine the line proposed by the Maine commissioners in its precise details, because he is obliged to state frankly that it is inadmissible.

He

But with all this affected indignation and astonishment, he is very careful not to break off the negotiation. He was too wise and too wary thus to endanger the advantage he had obtained. therefore suggests to Mr. Webster that the nego tiation "would have a better chance of success by conference than by correspondence." He trusts more in the diplomacy of the secret conclave, where there was no ear to hear and no pen to record their conferences, than in the bold, open, manly mode in which a negotiation ought to be conducted between the responsible ministers of responsible Governments.

In this letter of the 11th July, his Lordship insists upon our surrender of the district between the St. John and the highlands west of that river, and, without disguise, declares that he wants it "for no other purpose than as a boundary." This, permit me to say, is the very reason why it should never have been yielded. These highlands were natural boundary, as well as our treaty boundary; and we ought never to have surrendered them into the hands of the only formidable enemy we can ever have on this continent.

our

The prediction of his Lordship, that there would be a better chance of success by conference than by correspondence, was very soon verified. In four short days, these personal conferences produced a wonderful effect. On the 15th July, 1842, Mr. Webster proposes to the commissioners of Maine and Massachusetts the lines of the present treaty; urges them in the strongest terms to surrender the western highland boundary of Maine to England; proposes to pay them out of the treasury

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of the United States the sum of $250,000, as an equivalent for the surtender of this territory of 893 square miles; promises to refund the expenses which they had incurred for the civil posse they had maintained, and the survey they had made; and concludes with the expression of his "conviction that no more advantageous arrangement could be made."

Let us here pause for a moment upon the astonishing fact, that this proposition made to the Maine commissioners proceeded not from Lord Ashburton, but from Mr. Webster; not from the British envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, but from our own Secretary of State. It was a proposition previously concocted between the negotiators, and its acceptance urged upon the Maine commissioners as the British ultimatum, by the very man to whom the President had intrusted the rights and the honor of his country.

We now first hear from the Massachusetts commissioners; and their letter is truly characteristic. That State had no direct interest in the question of territorial sovereignty over the disputed territory; but merely in the right of soil. They accordingly treat it as a question not of national honor, but of dollars and cents. They say to Mr. Webster, in their letter of the 20th July: "Whether the national boundary suggested by you be suitable or unsuitable; whether the compensations that Great Britain offers to the United States for the territory conceded to her be adequate or inadequate; and whether the treaty which shail be effected shall be honorable to the country, or incompatible with its rights and dignity, are questions not for Massachusetts, but for the General Government, upon its responsibility to the whole country, to decide." They thus waive the question of national honor; but not so the question of dollars and cents. They higgle about the price to be paid for their land. They demand $25,000 more than Mr. Webster had offered. This seems to have been their sine qua non; and if the sum to be given them "shall be increased to the sum of $150,000, [instead of $125,000,] the State of Massachusetts, through her commissioners, hereby relinquishes to the United States her interest in the lands which will be excluded from the dominion of the United States by the establishment of the boundary aforesaid." It is needless to say that Mr. Webster would not stand long for $25,000, in such a bargain, especially when the money was to be paid out of the treasury of the United States.

The Maine commissioners seemed then to be abandoned by the whole world, and their position became truly embarrassing. This proposition was urged upon them, not by Lord Ashburton, but by their own Secretary of State, with the approbation of their own National Administration. That man of gigantic intellect, whose great powers ought to have been taxed to the utmost to save Maine from dismemberment, was the very man who urged them to consent to the dismemberment. They were deserted, at the most critical moment, by the coinmissioners of Massachusetts, who had assented to the proposition of Mr. Webster. They were induced to believe that the question of peace or war was suspended on their decision. It was proclaimed in the streets of Washington that the obstinacy of the Maine commissioners alone prevented the settlement of all our questions in dispute with England. I was myself induced to give credit to this rumor; and when I was confidentially informed, by a Senator now on this floor, of the true nature of the case, my astonishment and mortification knew no bounds.

Under these circumstances, a most reluctant conditional assent to the proposition of Mr. Webster was extorted from the Maine commissioners. It is due to them that I should read to the Senate the terms in which it is given. Their letter to Mr. Webster bears date 22d July, 1842, and concludes with the following paragraphs:

"We are now given to understand that the Executive of the United States, representing the sovereignty of the Union, assents to the proposal; and that this department of the Government at least is anxious for its acceptance, as, in its view, most expedi ent for the general good.

"The commissioners of Massachusetts have already given their assent on behalf of that Commonwealth. Thus situated, the commissioners of Maine, invoking the spirit of attachment and patriotic devotion of their S ate to the Union, and being willing to yield to the deliberate convictions of her sister States as to the path of duty, and to interpose no obstacles to an ad justment which the general judgment of the nation shall pro nounce as honorable and expedient, even if that judgment shall lead to a surrender of a portion of the birthright of the people of their State, and prized by them because it is their birthright, have determined to overcome their objections to the proposal, so far as to say, that if, upon mature consideration, the Sen ute of the United States shall advise and consent to the

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ratification of a treaty, corresponding in its terms to your proposal, and with the conditions in our memorandum accompanying this note, (marked A,) and identified by our sig natures, they, by virtue of the power vested in them by the resolves of the Legislature of Maine, give the assent of that State to such conventional line, with the terms, conditions, and equivalents herein mentioned."

This conditional assent casts the responsibility of the treaty upon the Senate of the United States. It is for us to pronounce, in the language of the Maine commissioners, whether this treaty is honorable and expedient, and such a one as the general judgment of the nation will approve. We must encounter this responsibility, whether we will or

not.

It would be a waste of time to pursue the subject further, in detail. Mr. Webster, on the 27th July, in form, made the proposition to Lord Ashburton, which had, in substance, been previously agreed upon between them, in personal conference, before it was presented to the Maine commissioners; and which he, therefore, knew would be accepted: and the treaty was concluded accordingly.

Thus have we yielded to a foreign power that ancient highland boundary for which our fathers fought. Thus has it been blotted out from the treaty which acknowledged our independence. Thus has England reclaimed an important portion of that territory, which had been wrested from her by the bravery and the blood of our revolutionary fathers. We have restored to her not only all the land north of the St. John and the St. Francis, but also our mountain boundary south of these rivers, down to the Metjarmette portage. Along the base of these mountains she can, and she will, establish fortifications and military posts, from which she may at once penetrate into the very heart of Maine. It is a vain labor for the Secretary to prove that the territory ceded is unfit for cultivation. England did not demand it for its agricultural value. Why did Lord Ashburton insist upon its surrender with so much pertinacity and zeal? Because it not only covered Quebec and Lower Canada from our assaults, but exposed our territory to the assaults of England, without any interposing natural barrier. On the east, on the north, and on the west, Maine is now left naked and exposed to the attacks of our domineering and insatiable neighbor; and we have bestowed upon her all this territory, without having asked her to grant us even the small strip north of Eel river, on the right bank of the St. John, which would have given us, to that extent, a river boundary. These highlands, throughout their whole range, from the northwest head of the Connecticut river to the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, which divide the rivers flowing into the St. Lawrence from those which empty themselves into the At lantic ocean, will exclusively belong to England, shou'd this treaty be ratified by the Senate. The Alpine boundary (which Adams and Franklin and Jay had secured to their country by the treaty of Independence) has been extorted from us by our most formidable enemy. We have acted as the Roman Republic would have done, had she surrendered the Alps to the hostile nations of Gaul and Germany, and thus opened the way for the invasion of Italy. And this suicidal policy has been adopted, upon the principle, or the pretext, that our Alpine barrier and boundary were not fit for cultivation! This is the argument of Mr. Webster.

The ancient Romans worshipped a god called Terminus. He was the guardian of the boundaries of the Republic; and such was his power, that he would not yield even to Jupiter himself. Upon this principle, it was a sacred maxim both of their religion and their policy, that their boundaries should never recede. The Republic was more than once driven to the last extremities. Her capital was sacked, and ruin seemed more than once to be her inevitable destiny; but, in the midst of desolation and defeat, no Roman Senator ever dared to propose the smallest cession of her sacred soil. The boundaries of the Roman Republic never receded; and we ought to have imitated her policy in this respect, however much we may condemn her love of conquest-unless, indeed, we had obtained an equivalent cession of territory. The demand to surrender the highlands which protected our frontier south of the St. Francis, ought to have been met by an instant and absolute refusal, no matter what might have been the consequence. Instead of buying them from Maine and Massachusetts, in order that we might surrender them to England, we ought at once to have announced that we never could permit such a surrender to become the subject of negotiation,

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It has been said (and probably with truth) that, in case we should ever determine to invade Canada, we would not march over these highlands. But this is not the question. Let us reverse the case, and suppose that England should determine to invade us from Canada: would she not gradually collect and concentrate her forces on the territory which we have yielded to her east of these highlands, and from ther.ce pour her forces into Maine without ob struction? And it must have been chiefly to obtain this very advantage, that Lord Ashburton was so anxious to acquire this territory, which, forsooth, we are told is not fit for cultivation. The only crop which she desires to raise upon it, like that of Cadmus, is a crop of armed men.

And yet, to excuse this surrender, we are presented with the pretence of having obtained equivalents in lands better fitted for cultivation. What are these pretended equivalents? In describing them, I cannot do better than to adopt the language of the commissioners of Maine. "In New Hamp shire (say they) Lord Ashburton consents to take the true northwest source of Connecticut river, instead of the northeast source." That is, in other words, he consents to abide by the clear language of the treaty of Independence, instead of persisting in the demand of England to substitute the northeast for "the northwesternmost head of Connecticut river." "In Vermont, he will abide by the old line which was run, marked, and solemnly established nearly seventy years ago. In New York, he will abide by the same old line, the effect of rectifying it being merely to give to New York a small angular strip on the west, and Great Britain a small angular strip on the east." "These small tracts and parings" (to use the language of the commissioners) are to be the equivalents for surrendering our mountain boundary into the keeping of Great Britain, without any estimate of the value of the strip which we have surrendered to her of our undisputed territory, along the line running due north from the monument. He has thus most gracious

ly consented not to take advantage of the very trifling mistake committed by the British Government itself, more than 70 years ago, in running and marking the 45th parallel of latitude, and under which we have held possession ever since we were an inde pendent nation.

I shall not speak of the equivalents which the Secretary claims to have obtained in the Northwest. The Senator from Missouri [Mr. BENTON] has already placed this part of the subject in so clear a light, that it would be a waste of time again to present it to the Senate. He has demonstrated that, instead of acquiring any territory in that quarter to which we were not clearly entitled under the treaty of 1783, we have actually sacrificed important ter ritorial rights which we held under that treaty.

The only concession on the part of Great Britain, which has even the appearance of an equivalent for the 5,012 square miles of territory which we have ceded to her north of the St. John and the St. Francis, and the 893 square miles south of the St. Francis, is the navigation of the St. John. I say the appearance; for there is no reality in it. Had we yielded to Great Britain no more of the territory of Maine than that which was awarded to her by the King of the Netherlands, there would have been some plausibility in calling this a partial equivalent. But what is now the state of the case? We have surrendered to her a territory embracing the head-waters of several of the branches and tributary streams of the St. John. The moment we made this concession, the surrender of the free navigation of that river became a matter of necessity, not of choice, for England. In order to purchase a right for the inhabitants of this ceded territory on the upper St. John, and the military posts which may be established there, to navigate that portion of the river which flows through our territory, England had no alternative but to grant to us a similar right of navigation along that portion of the river below, within her exclusive jurisdiction. Hence we find in the article of the treaty relating to this subject, a stipulation on our part that "the inhabitants of the territory of the upper St. John, determined by this treaty to belong to her Britannic Majesty, shall have free access to and through the river for their produce, in those parts where said river runs wholly through the State of Maine." Thus it appears, on the very face of the treaty, that the right of each party to navigate the river within the territories of the other, is a mutual and reciprocal right. They are the equivalents of each other, and nothing more, and can be an equivalent for