27TH CONG....3D SESS. which diplomacy and treaties had given to our once certain and undisputed title, and should have prevented the submission of the territorial rights of a sovereign State to the arbitrament of any foreign power. But, unfortunately for Maine, and I think for the nation, the reference was made; and we all know the result of it-precisely what was foretold; the arbiter split the difference, recommending a line which he thought more convenient, and giving to Great Britain that portion of the territory claimed by Maine which was necessary to the direct communication between the British provinces of Canada and New Brunswick. That award or recommendation was not ratified by this Government; and further efforts have been made on our part to obtain a settlement of the line, according to the treaty of 1783; but the British Government would not treat further upon that basis, unless our Government would first agree to certain pre liminaries, which would weaken, if not destroy, our claim. And now, ten years after the award of the King of the Netherlands was rejected, Maine is told by this General Government, to which she has a right to look for the protection and preservation of her rights, and which is bound by the Constitution to defend her in the enjoyment of her whole territory, that, unless she will authorize a conventional line, her rights must again be subjected to the judgment and final disposition and arbitrament of foreigners!-that seven or eight years is the least time in which we may expect a decision; and then it may fail, as did the former attempt to settle the question by arbitration!! Mr. President, the people of Maine, as well as their Legislature, have a perfect horror of seeing their rights, or the rights of any sovereign State of this Union, submitted again to the arbitrament and disposal of any foreign sovereign whatever. Our controversy is with Great Britain--between a republic on one side, and a monarchy on the other; and this controversy relates to the line dividing our States and her provinces; to what belongs to us by the terms of the treaty which acknowledged our independence, and to what is claimed to be necessary to the safety and convenience of her provinces. Was it safe or prudent to submit our rights in such a case to any arbitration? and more especially is it safe again to submit them to such an arbitration as that held out to Maine as the only alternative, (if she will not consent to a conventional line,) consist of arbitrators to be appointed by some of the sovereigns of Europe? Mr. President, Great Britain is an old, powerful, and intriguing Government. Her influence and diplomacy pervade all European Governments; and what could Maine expect from arbitrators chosen by those Governments? We have not forgotten the result of one arbitration; and who can expect us to run the risk of another, to be constituted as proposed by the President? No, sir. Maine does not wish her rights submitted to the will or judgment of foreigners, or to arbitrators appointed by foreigners. This was well understood here, before the President made his appeal to the Governor of Maine to convene the Legislature, and submit the subject to its grave and candid consideration; and it was also known here, as well as in Maine, that while the people of Maine, and all departments f her Government, had the most unshaken confidence in her perfect right by the treaty of 1783 to all the disputed territory; yet that there was a general willingness on her part to modify the line of the treaty, so that a new line might be established more convenient to both parties than that described in the treaty;-such, for instance, as giving to Great Britain all north and east of the St. John, and to Maine all west and south of that river; or to give to Great Britain the line recommended by the Dutch king, and to Maine the strip of land north of Eel river and west of the St. John, with the right of navigation, and other equivalents; or of yielding to Great Britain a permanent right of way over our territory, to convene her provinces, for a permanent right of navigation of that part of the St. John within her limits, to convene the citizens of Maine settled upon the St. John and its tributaries. In this condition of things it was that the President announced to the Governor of Maine the arrival at the seat of Government of a minister plenipotentiary and special, with full powers from his Sovereign to negotiate and settle all matters in discassion between the two Governments, and that that minister had announced that he was authorized to treat for a conventional line, or line by agreement, The British Treaty-Mr. Williams. on such terms and conditions, and with such mutual considerations and equivalents, as may be thought just and reasonable." The Legislature was assembled, and the President's views, as contained in the letter of the Secretary of State, were submitted to it; and the result was the following, among other preamble and resolutions, viz: "Whereas the Government of the United States, not possess. ing the constitutional power to conclude any such negotiation without the assent of Maine, has invited the Government of this State to co-operate to a certain extent and in a certain form, in an endeavor to terminate a controversy of so long duration. Now, considering the premises, and believing that the people of the United States, after having already manifested a forbearance honorable to their character, under long-continued violations of their rights by a foreign nation; and though not disposed to yield to unfounded pretensions, are still willing, in re. gard to the proposal now made by the General Government, to give additional evidence to their fellow-citizens throughout the United States of their desire to preserve the peace of this Union, by taking measures to discuss and conclude, if possible, the subject in controversy in a manner that will secure the honor and interest of the State, this Legislature adopts the following 1e80lations-with the understanding, however, thati, n the event of a failure of such endeavor toward an arrangement, no proceedings thereunder shall be so construed as to prejudice in any manner the rights of the state as they have been herein asserted to exist. "Resolved, That there shall be chosen, by ballot, in convention of both branches of the Legislature four persons who are hereby appointed commissioners on the part of this State to repair to the seat of Government of the United States, and to confer with the authorities of that Government touching a conventional line, or line by agreement, between the State of Maine and the British provinces, having regard to the line designated by the treaty of 1783, as uniformly claimed by this State, and to the declarations and views expressed in the foregoing pre. amble; and to give the assent of this State to any such conven. tional line, with such terms, conditions, considerations, and equivalents, as they shall deem consistent with the honor and interests of the State: with the understanding that no such line be agreed upon without the unanimous assent of such com missioners. "Resolved, That this State cannot regard the relinquishment by the British Government of any claim heretofore ad vanced by it to territory included within the limits of the line of this State as designated by the treaty of 1783, and uniformly claimed by Maine, as a consideration or equiva ent within the meaning of these resolutions." The commissioners, thus appointed and thus authorized, came here in the fond hope of aiding the General Government in settling the long-pending and irritating question of the Northeastern boundary, in a manner honorable to both nations, consistent with the rights of Maine, and promoting the convenience of the citizens and subjects of both countries. And how were these fond hopes blasted! The first official communication in reference to our boundary is that of Lord Ashburton, of 21st June, wherein he shadows forth the line of boundary and equivalents which he came all the way from England, as the special minister of her Majesty, to offer to us as "a line by agreement, on such terms and conditions, and with such mutual considerations and equivalents, as may be thought just and reasonable." And what is it? To understand what it is, we must take the answer of the commissioners of Maine, of 29th June, in connexion with his Lordship's letter; and it will be seen that this is the amount of it:-the river St. John, from the place where the due-north line from the monument at the source of the St. Croix strikes it, to some one of its sources, (meaning the source near the head waters of the Penobscot and Kennebec,) with a strip on the south side of the St. John, to include the Madawaska settlement, and to extend from the Aroostook to Fish river, shall be the boundary; and that all lumber and produce of the forest of the tributary waters of the St. John shall be received freely, without duty, and dealt with in every respect like the same articles in the province of New Brunswick, is the equivalent!! In other words, his Lordship proposes to take from Maine about five millions of acres of her territory, and to compensate her therefor by allowing the timber of the forest of the tributary waters of the St. John to be received freely and without duty at the city of St. John'stheir market-and dealt with in every respect like their produce; thereby securing a trade quite as important and beneficial to their provinces as to Maine! Mr. President, I was glad to see that this proposition, so unjust in itself, and so insulting to the people of Maine, was promptly rejected by our commissioners; and my regret is, that they did not content themselves with simply announcing that fact. I feel confident that they would have been justified in so doing, not only by the Legislature and people of Maine, but by the nation. More especially so, when it is disclosed in that same communication of June 29th, "that they have been assured that Lord Ashburton is restrained by his instructions from yielding the island of Grand Menan, or any other of the islands in Passama Senate. quoddy bay, or even any portion of the narrow strip of territory which lies between the due-north line from the source of the St. Croix and the St. John's river, above Eel river, (so called,) as an equivalent for any portion of the territory claimed by Maine as within her boundaries!" Restrained by his instructions! Why, sir, was not the Governor of Maine assured by the President that Lord Ashburton, a minister plenipotentiary and spe cial, had arrived, charged with full powers from his sovereign to negotiate and settle all matters in controversy? And that he, (Lord Ashburton,) had officially announced to this Government, that, in regard to the boundary question, he had authority to treat for a conventional line, with such mutual considerations and equivalents as might be thought just and equitable? Further, sir; is it not true, as has been stated by many, that the Legislature of Maine were restrained from limiting the powers of their commissioners, by representations, from here that Lord Ashburton, having full powers, might object to treating at all with commissioners not possessing equally full powers? The If the commissioners on the part of Maine, upon learning the boundary and equivalents proposed by Lord Ashburton-and more especially upon finding that he was restrained by instructions-had contented themselves with rejecting the proposition of Lord Ashburton, (as they very properly did,) we would not have had such a treaty as that now under consideration to act upon. Lord Ashburton must have been relieved from the restraint imposed upon him by instructions, or have suffered the nego. tiation to terminate upon his proposition; which the nation would applaud the commissioners of Maine for rejecting. But it was not so. commissioners were unwilling to forego any reasonable chance of adjusting a controversy so long pending, and so vexatious to the people of Maine, they knew that the General Government, the State Governments, the nation itself, were all desirous that the question should be settled; and, if not settled, through any fault or obstinacy on their part, that Maine would stand worse than ever upon this all interesting question, at home and abroad; hence their counter proposition to Lord Ashburton, more liberal, and yielding more for peace and good neighborhood than could have been anticipated by the people or by the Legislature of Maine: that was rejected; and there the subject would have rested, but for the renewed efforts by the General Government itself, whereby the line and equivalents mentioned in the treaty now under consideration, were presented to the commissioners with the following remarks: "The line suggested, with the compensations and equiva lents which have been stated, is now submitted for your consideration. That it is all which might have been hoped for, look. ing to the strength of the American claim, can hardly be said. But, as the settlement of a controversy of such duration is a matter of high importance; as equivalents of undoubted value are offered; as longer postponement and delay would lead to further inconvenience, and to the incurring of further expenses; and as no better occasion-or, perhaps, any other occa sion-for settling the boundary by agreement, or on the principle of equivalents, is ever likely to present itself, the Govern ment of the Unred States hopes that the commissioners of the two States will find it to be consistent with their duty to assent to the line proposed, and to the terms and conditions attending the proposition. "The President has felt the deepest anxiety for the amicable settlement of the question, in a manner hecrable to the country, and such as stiould preserve the righ's and interests of the Siates concerned. From the moment of the announcement of Lord Ashburton's mission, he has sedulously endeavored to pursue a course the most respectful towards the States, and the fost useful to their interests, as well as most becoming to the dignity and character of the Gover ment. He will be hap py if the result shall be such as shall satisfy Maine and Mas sachusetts, as well as the rest of the country. With these sen tinents on the part of the President, and with the conviction that no more advantageous arrangement can be made, the subject is now referred to the grave deliberation of the com missioners." Ah! no better occasion, and perhaps any other occasion for settling the boundary by agreement is ever likely to present itself, and with the conviction that no more advantageous arrangement can be made, the subject is referred to the grave deliberation of the commissioners. By whom? By the President, and that Government which is bound by the Constitution to protect Maine in all her rights, and without whose protection it is rain for any State to contend with a foreign Government, however just and well founded be her claim. Thus abandoned and thus admonished by the only power to which Maine could look for the maintenance and establishment of her just rights, it is said that she has assented to the line; and hence, that we are called upon merely to ratify and confirm what has been agreed upon by the parties in 27TH CONG....3D SESS. mediately interested in the controversy. Not exactly so. Massachusetts, owning a moiety of the acres surrendered, is satisfied with the price to be paid for those acres; but the commissioners of Maine, now abandoned by her co-proprietor of the soil, and by the General Government, which is bound to protect her rights, are left to the grave consideration of the terms proposed by our own Government, under the assurance that no better, and, perhaps, no other occasion for settling the boundary by agreement is ever likely to present itself; and with the conviction that no more advantageous ar rangement can be made. In this condition of things, I pray you to hear these commissioners. The Maine Commissioners to Mr. Webster. WASHINGTON, July 22, 1842. SIR: The undersigned, commissioners of the State of Maine on the subject of the Northeastern boundary, have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note, addressed to them, under date of the 15th instant, with enclosures therein referred to. The proposition first submitted by the special minister of Great Britain, on the subject of the boundary, having been disagreed to; and the proposition made on the part of the United States, with the assent of the commissioners of Maine and Massachu selts, having been rejected as inadmissible, coupled with an expression of surprise that it should have been made; and Lord Ashburton, in the same communication, having intimated a preference for conference rather than correspondence, and hav. ing omitted in his note to make any new proposition, except a qualified withdrawal of a part of his former one,-we learn from your note that you "have had full and frequent conferences with him respecting the Northeastern boundary," and that you "believe you understand what is practicable to be done on that subject, so far as he (Lord Ashburton) is concerned." We also learn that, "in these conferences, he has made no positive or binding proposition--thinking, perhaps, it would be more desirable, under present circumstances. that such a prop. osition should proceed from the side of the United States;" but that you have reason to believe that he would agree to a line of boundary such as is described in the paper accompanying your note, (marked B;) and, also, that you entertain the conviction "that no more advantageous arrangement can be made;" and, with this conviction, you refer the subject to the grave delibera. tion of the commissioners. Regarding this as substantially a proposition on the part of the United States, with the knowledge and assent of Great Britain, and as the one most favorable to us which, under any circumstances, the latter Government would either offer or accept, the undersigned have not failed to bestow upon it the grave deliberation and consideration which its nature and importance, and their own responsible position, demand. If the result of that deliberation should not fully justify the expressed hopes, or meet the expectations and views of the Government of the United States, we beg you to be assured that such fail. ure will be the result of their firm convictions of duty to the State they represent, and will not arise from any want of an anxious desire, on their part, to bring the controversy to an amicable, just, and honorable termination. In coming to this consideration, they have not been unmindful that the State of Maine, with the firmest conviction of her absolute right to the whole territory drawn into controversy; and sustained, as she has been, by the unanimous concurrence of her sister States, and of the Government of the Union, repeatedly expressed and cordially given, and without a wavering doubt as to the perfect practicability of marking the treaty line upon the face of the earth,according to her claim,-has yet, at all times, manifested a spirit of forbearance and patience under what she could not bat deem unfounded pretensions, and unwarrantable delays, and irritating encroachments. In the midst of all the provocations to resistance, and to the assertion and maintenance of her extrenie rights, she has never forgotten that she is a member of the Union; and she has endeavored to deserve the respect, sympathy, and co operation of her sister States, by pursuing a course equally removed from pusillanimity and rashness, and by maintaining herdifficult position in a spirit that would for bear much for peace, but would yield nothing through fear. At all times, and under all circumstances, she has been ready and anxious to bring the controversy to a close upon terms honor. able and equitable, and to unite in any proper scheme to ef fect that object. In this spirit, and with these convictions, Maine instantly and cheerfully acceded to the proposal of the General Government, made through you, to appoint commis sioners. That no obstacle might be interposed to the successful issue of this negotiation, her Legislature gave to her commissioners ample and unlimited powers, which, but for the presumed necessity of the case, her people would be slow to yield to any functionaries. Her commissioners, thus appointed and thus empowered, assumed the duties imposed upon them in the spirit and with the views of the Government and people of Maine. They came to the negotiation with a firm conviction of her rights, but with a disposition and determination to meet a conventional line in a similar spirit, and to yield, for any reas onable equivalent, all that they presumed would be asked or desired by the other party. They, with the other citizens of Maine, were not unapprized of the fact so often alluded to in our former communications-that England had long been anxious to obtain the undisputed possession of that portion of the territory which would enable her to maintain a direct and uninterrupted communication between her provinces. So far as they could learn from any source, this was the only professed object she had in view, and the only one which had been regarded as in contemplation. With this understanding, the undersigned at once decided to yield, upon the most liberal terms, this long sought convenience; and they indulged the confident expectation that such a concession would at once meet all the wants and wishes of the English Government, and bring the mission to a speedy and satisfactory close. When, therefore, we were met at the outset by a proposition which required the cession on our part of all the territory north of the St. John river, and enough of the territory on the south side to include the Madawaska settle. ment, extending at least fifty miles up that river, with no other equivalents to us than the limited right to float timber down that river, and to the United States the small tracts adjacent to the 45th parallel of latitude in other States, we could not but express our regret to be thus, as it were, repelled. But, regard.. The British Treaty-Mr. Williams. ing this rather as the extreme limit of a claim, subject, not- It is well known to you, sir, that we had determined upon no The value of this tract to Great Britain, both in a civil and military point of view, cannot be overlooked. It gives her the much-covered route for the movement of troops in war, and her mails and passengers in peace; and is most particularly important in case of renewed outbreaks in her North American colonies. The assumption of jurisdiction in the Madawaska settlement, and the pertinacity with which it has been main. tained, are practical evidence of the value attached to the tract by the Government of her Britannic Majesty. We have alluded to these views of the value and importance of this territory, not with any design of expressing our regret that we have thus offered it; but to show that we are fully aware of all these views and circumstances affecting the question, and that we duly appreciate the far-seeing sagacity and prudence of those British statesmen who so early at empted to secure it as a cession, by negotiation, and the suggestion of equivalents. The answer of Lord Ashburton to your note of the 8th instant, contained a distinct rejection of our offer, with a substantial withdrawal of his claim to any territory south of the river St. John; but not modifying the claim for the relinquishment, on the part of Maine and the United States, of all north of that river. Our views in reference to many of the topics in his Lordship's reply, we have had the honor heretofore to commu nicate to you, in our note of the 16th instant; and to that answer we would now refer, as forming an important part of this negotiation, and as containing our refusal of the line indicated. We are now called upon to consider the final proposition made by or through the Government of the United States, for our consideration and acceptance. The line indicated may be shortly defined as the line recommended by the King of the Netherlands, and an addition thereto of a strip of land at the base of the highlands, running to the source of the southwest branch of the St. John. The examination and consideration of all other lines, which might better meet our views and objects, have been-precluded by the declaration, and other pienary evidence we have, that the line specified in your communication is the most advantageous that can be offered to us; and that no one of less extent, or yielding in fact less to the other party, can be deemed admissible. We are, therefore, brought to the single and simple consideration of the question, whether we can, consistently with our views of our duty to the State we represent, accept the proposition submitted by you. So far as any claim is interposed, based upon a supposed equity arising from the recommendation of the King of the Netherlands, we have only to refer to our former note for our views on that topic. We have now only to add, that we came to this conference untrammelled and free; to see if, in a spirit of amity and equity, we could not find and agree upon some new line, which, while it yielded all that was needed by one party, might fairly be the motive and groundwork for equivalent terri tory or rights granted to the other; and that we cannot make any admission, or consent to any proposition, which would not revive, but put vitality and power into that which, up to this time, has never possessed either. We base our whole action on grounds entirely independent of that advice of the arbiter. It may possibly be intimated in this connexion, as it has more than once been heretofore, that the commissioners of Maine, and the people of that State, are disposed to regard the whole territory as clearly falling within their rightful limits; and are not willing to consider the question as one in doubt and dispute, and, therefore, one to be settled as if each party had nearly or quite equal claims. Certainly, sir, the people and Government of Maine do not deny that the question has been drawn into dispute. They have had too many and too recent painful evidences of that fact, to allow such a doubt, however much at a loss they may be to perceive any just or tenable grounds on which the adv. rary claim is based. For years they have borne and forborne, and struggled to maintain their rights, in a peace. able, and yet unflinching spirit, against what appeared to them injustice from abroad, and neglect at home. But they have yet to learn that the mere fact that an adverse claim is made and persisted in, and maintained by ingenuity and ability for a series of years, increasing in extent, and varying its grounds as years roll on, is to be regarded as a reason why courtesy should require, in opposition to the fact, a relinquishment of the plain, explicit, and sincere language of perfect conviction and unwavering confidence; or that a continued, adverse, and resisted claim, may yet, by mere lapse of time and reiteration, ripen into a right. But we desire it to be distinctly remembered that, in this attempt to negotiate for a conventional line, Maine has not insisted, or even requested, that any formal or virtual admission of her title to the whole territory should be a condition preliminary to a settlement, We hold, and we claim, the right to express, at all times and in all suitable places, our opinion of the perfect right of Maine to the whole territory; but we have never assumed it as a point of honor, that our adversary should acknowledge it. Indeed, we have endeavored to view the subject rather in reference to a settlement, on even hard terms for us, than to dwell on the strong aspect of the case, when we look at the naked ques tion of our right and title under the treaty. It could hardly be expected, however, that we should silently, and thus virtually, acquiesce in any assumption that our claim was unsustained, and that "the treaty line was not executable." On this point we expressed ourselves fully in a former note. In returning to the direct consideration of the last proposition, and the terms and conditions attending it, in justice to ourselves and our State, we feel bound to declare-and we confidently appeal to you, sir, in confirmation of the declaration--that this ne gotiation has been conducted, on our part, with no mercenary views, and with no design to extort unreasonable equivalents or extravagant compensation. The State of Maine has always felt an insuperable repugnance to parting with any portion even of her disputed territory, for mere pecuniary recompense from adverse claimants. She comes here for no mere bargain for the sale of acres, in the spirit or with the arts of traffic. Her commissioners have been much less anxious to secure benefit and recompense, than to preserve the State from unnecessary curtailment and dismemberment. The proposition we made is evidence of the fact. We have heretofore expressed some opinions of the mutual character of the benefits to each party from the free navigation of the St. John. Without entering, however, upon the particular consideration of the terms and conditions, which we have not thought it necessary to do, we distinctly state that our great repugnance to the line is based upon the extent of territory required to be yielded. We may, however, in passing, remark that all the pecuniary offers con tained in your note, most liberally construed, would scarcely recompense and repay to Maine the amount of money and interest which she has actually expended in defending and protecting the territory from wrongs arising and threatened by reason of its condition and disputed ground. Considering, then, this proposition as involving the surren der of more territory than the avowed objects of England require; as removing our landmarks from the well-known and well-defined boundary of the treaty of 1783-the crest of the highlands; beside insisting upon the line of the arbiter in its full extent; we feel bound to say, after the most careful and anxious consideration, that we cannot bring our minds to the conviction that the proposal is such as Maine had a right to expect. But we are not unaware of the expectations which have been, and still are, entertained of a favorable issue to this negotiation by the Government and people of this country, and the great disappointment which would be felt and expressed at its failure. Nor are we unmindful of the future, warned as we have been by the past, that any attempts to determine the line by arbitration, may be either fruitless, or with a result more to be deplored. We are now given to understand that the Executive of the United States, representing the sovereignty of the Union, assents to the proposal; and that this department of the Government, at least, is anxious for its acceptance, as, in its view, most expedient for the general good. The commissioners of Massachusetts have already given their assent, on behalf of that Commonwealth, Thus situated, the commissioners of Maine, invoking the spirit of attachment and patriotic devotion of their State to the Union; and being willing to yield to the deliberate convictions of her sister States as to the path of duty; and to interpose no obstacles to an adjustment which the general judgment of the nation shall pronounce as honorable and expedient-even if that judgment shall lead to a surrender of a portion of the birthright of the people of their State, and prized by them because it is their birthright,-have determined to overcome their objections to the proposal, so far as to say, that if, upon mature consideration, the Senate of the United States shall advise and consent to the ratification of a treaty corresponding in its terms with your proposal, and with the conditions in our memorandum accompanying this note, (marked A,) and identified by our signatures, they, by virtue of the power vested in them by the resolves of the Legislature of Maine, give the assent of that State to such conventional line, with the terms, conditions, and equivalents herein mentioned. We have the honor to be, sir, with high respect, your obedient servants, EDWARD KAVANAGH, Hon DANIEL WEBSTER, &c, &c., &c. This is the assent (if assent it may be called) which is to authorize and induce the Senate to ratiWhat is it? fy the treaty. A clear, strong, and convincing argument against submitting to the terms proposed; and concluding that, if the deliberate conviction of her sister States shall pronounce the proposed boundary and equivalents as honorable and expedient, even if that judgment shall lead to a surrender of a portion of the birthright of the people of Maine, the commissioners have determined to overcome their objections to the proposal, so far as to say that if, upon mature consideration, the Senate of the United States shall advise and consent to the ratification of the treaty upon those terms and conditions, they give he assent of Maine thereto. Now, sir, I am not we p.eased with this mode of doing business. I would have preferred that our commissioners had agreed or 27TH CONG.... 3D SESS. disagreed to the line and terms proposed. The Legislature intrasted them with that power; and we have no reason to suppose that the Legislature would have authorized them to refer to the Senate of the United States the power to make a new line of boundary and to fix the equivalents. We know the Legislature did not so authorize them; but, on the contrary, required the unanimous consent of all the commissioners to any line which should be agreed upon; and expressly declared that it could not regard the relinquishment by the British Government of any claim heretofore advanced by it to any territory within the limits of Maine according to the treaty of 1783 as uniformly claimed by Maine, as a consideration or equivalent. How, then, stands the question of assent on the part of Maine? If the Senate, upon mature consideration, shall advise and consent to the ratification of the treaty upon the terms and conditions therein contained;-in other words, if the Senate shall pronounce it honorable and expedient that Maine shall surrender a portion of her birthright upon the terms and conditions named-then, and then only, you have the assent of Maine to the sacrifice, for the public good. For one, I cannot do it. My own convictions of the perfect right of Maine to all the disputed territory, forbid it. I would go far, very far, to compromise this dispute upon honorable terms; and I would not be particular as to the value of equivalents. But Ijhold that Great Britain has contiguous territory, convenient to us, which she might and ought to give in exchange for the territory belonging to us, which she so much needs, and ought to have, for a just equivalent. This treaty does not accomplish, fairly, either object-it gives to Great Britain more than is necessary, and withholds from Maine what she ought to acquire. But, Mr. President, I am not insensible that this question of our Northeastern boundary has been suffered, most unnecessarily, to be brought into dispute and controversy. By the treaty of 1783, and the subsequent determination of what river was intended as the St. Croix, our line of boundary was plain, practicable, and perfect; it was identical with the established lines of the British provinces of Canada and Nova Scotia-fixed and determined by the proclamation of 1763, and by act of Parliament in 1774. On a former occasion I had the honor to submit to the Senate my views upon this question; others did the same; and I will now only refer to the able exposition and vindication of the right of Maine to the whole of the territory claimed by her, contained in the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and to one of the resolutions adopted unanimously by the Senate on that occasion, in the following words: "Resolved, That, after careful examination and deliberate consideration of the whole controversy between the United States and Great Britain, relating to the Northeastern boundary of the former, the Senate does not entertain a doubt of the entire practicability of running and marking that boundary in strict conformity with the stipulations of the definitive treaty of peace of 1783; and it entertains a perfect conviction of the jus tice and validity of the title of the United States to the full extent of all the territory in dispute between the two powers." My regret is, that Congress did not then authorize and direct the running and marking that line according to the terms of the treaty of 1783, as proposed by the bill which I then presented. If that had then been done, we would have escaped the expense and hazard of the Aroostook war, the disgrace of having a portion of our territory seized and occupied by the military power of Great Britain, and the unwelcome task of deciding upon the present treaty-which sanctions the unjust pretensions of the British Government to a portion of the fruits of our glorious struggle for independ ence. I will not tax the patience of the Senate with a recapitulation of the merits of our claim to the whole of the disputed territory. Suffice it to say, that the treaty which asserts our independence as a nation, gives it to us; and that the nation recognises it. Still, it has been suffered to be brought into controversy, and is now disputed by a great and powerful nation. Unfortunately for us, at the treaty of Ghent, in 1814, a request on the part othe British negotiators to modify or vary the line det scribed in the treaty of 1783, so as to give to Greaf Britain a convenient and direct communication between the provinces of Canada and New Brunswick, was suffered to ripen into an article of that treaty, which provided for the running and mark ing that line; and, in case the commissioners to be appointed to that service should disagree, they were to report the grounds of such disagreement The British Treaty-Mr. Conrad. to their respective Governments; and thereupon the question should be submitted to an arbiter, to determine upon the points of disagreement. A very simple and innocent article in appearance, but a most fatal one in its consequences! From this sprang the submission to the King of the Netherlands, his award, and its rejection-subsequent attempts at negotiation-and the treaty now under consideration; and, if this treaty be rejected, another reference to arbitrators, to be selected by foreign powers, is to follow. Thus a title, clear and perfect by the treaty of 1783, has been suffered, by diplomacy and treaties, to be brought into doubt and controversy, 'and has been agreed to be made the subject of arbitration! This is the embarrassment which has stood, and yet remains, in the way of all our efforts to obtain possession of our entire territory; to expel a foreign power from its military possession of part of it; to assert and maintain the rights and honor of the nation; and is now held up to us as the only alternative, if we reject this treaty. What is to be done, under such circumstances, I admit, is a question of difficulty. If there be no way of escaping the obligation of again submitting the question to a foreign arbiter, the result of the former submission should admonish us to avoid the repetition of that mode of obtaining our just rights; and the present arrangement may be better than to hazard the loss, by another reference, of the whole disputed territory. In common with my constituents, I deprecate another reference to foreigners, or arbitrators appointed by foreign powers, and protest against it. We have already fulfilled the stipulation of the treaty of Ghent, by referring the question to an arbiter. It failed to settle the controversy. The British Government have insisted that another reference would be unavailing. I am willing to take them at their word; and would submit to the Senate whether, under all the circumstances of the case, the honor and duty of the nation will not be better maintained by falling back upon our original clear and certain right under the treaty of 1783, than by ratifying the present treaty, or sanctioning another reference, as indicated by the President's declaration to the Governor of Maine. I cannot agree to the ratification of the present treaty. It is unjust to Maine, and, in my judgment, dishonorable to the nation. I do not desire another arbitration, which may be more ruinous to Maine than the present arrangement. I have no contidence in further negotiation. What we have had, has greatly weakened our once perfect title; and I see no other way of getting our right as a nation, and performing our high obligation to one of the States of the Union, than by taking possession of what belongs to us, and holding it. In such a course, we will have right and justice on our side. If others interfere with us, it must be in their own wrong. With these views, I send to the Chair the following resolution, and ask the yeas and nays upon its adoption: Resolved, That the treaty and documents now under consideration, be recommitted to the Committee on Foreign Rela. tions, with instructions to report a resolution directing the President of the United States to take immed ale possession of the disputed territory, and to report such contingent measures as, in their opinion, may be necessary to maintain the just right of the nation. BRITISH TREATY. SPEECH OF MR. CONRAD, OF LOU'SIANA. In Senate, August 18, 1842.-On the ratification of the treaty with Great Britain. Mr. CONRAD rose and said It was not my intention, Mr. President, to take any part in the debate on this treaty; but as I have come to the determination to vote against it, I feel bound to assign my reasons for that vote. The chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Senator from Massachusetts, [Mr. CHOATE, have vied with each other in eulogising this treaty as a chef d'œuvre of diplomatic skill. I cannot perceive, however, in what respect it is so advantageous to the country. It contains three principal stipulations: 1st. The first and most important is, that which fixes our Northeastern boundary. 2d. It obliges us to maintain a naval armament on the coast of Africa, to aid in the suppression of the slave-trade; and, lastly, it provides for the mutual surrender, in certain cases, of fugitives from justice. In regard to the first of these provisions, I be Senate. lieve it is admitted, on all hands, that the line agreed upon falls far short of our pretensions, and is rather a compromise of the question than a settlement of it, according to our interpretation of the treaty of 1783. There probably never was a period, since the commencement of the controversy, when a com promise could not have been effected on as favora ble terms. The second stipulation, although in form a recip rocal engagement, is, in point of fact, a conces sion on our part. Great Britain already main. tains, and would, in the absence of any such stipu lation, continue to maintain on the coast of Africa a much larger naval force than she binds herself to do by this treaty. Permit me to observe, too, Mr. President, that, however willing I may be, by every proper means, to prevent the prostitution of our flag to this odious traffic, I would much have preferred that whatever we did on this subject should be our own spontaneous act, instead of appearing to have been extorted from us by Great Britain by that country which, after having long usurped the police of the seas, has recently wheedled or intimidated one half of Europe into an acknowledgment of this preposterous claim. I should have preferred to see our country maintain the proud attitude which France, encouraged by the firmness of our minister, has taken on this subject, and conceded nothing where nothing could rightfully be demanded. The third provision is, that which provides for the surrender of criminals in certain cases; in regard to which I shall only observe, that it is a provis. ion at least as advantageous to Great Britain as to us, and cannot, therefore, be viewedyas a stipulation in our favor. This is the substance of the treaty. I cannot perceive in it those advantages that some gentlemen have professed to do. My objections to it, however, are not so much on account of what it does, as of what it does not contain. Mr. President, there were three subjects of dif ference between this country and Great Britain, the prompt adjustment of which was deemed peculiarly urgent, as they all threatened hourly to disturb the harmony of the two countries. These were the settlement of our Northeastern boundary; the controversy growing out of the destruction of the Caroline; and, lastly, that arising out of the seizure and liberation of slaves belonging to citizens of the United States. When it was known that a special minister was to be deputed to this country, for the purpose of restoring and maintaining the harmony of the two countries, no one doubted that his mission embraced the settlement of all these questions, if none others. I confess, therefore, that when the treaty was read at your table, and I discovered that one, and not the least important of these questions, (I mean that relative to the seizure of our slaves,) was left precisely where it stood before the arrival of the British ambassador, I was equally surprised and disap pointed. No less than five cases have already oc curred, in which vessels bound from one port in the Union to another, by having slaves on board have been driven, either by stress of weather, or, by the vio lence of the slaves themselves, into some one of the small islands in the Bahama channel; and, in every instance, the slaves have been violently taken from the possession of their owners, and set at liberty by the colonial authorities. In the two first cases, the British Government, after a protracted negotiation, indemnified the owners. The third case was that of the schooner "Enterprise," which oc curred some six or seven years ago. Application was again made for indemnity; and what was the answer of the British Government? In substance, that this confiscation of American property was justified by a recent act of Parliament abolishing slavery in their West India possessions, and that thenceforward no indemnity was due our citizens for slaves thrown by unavoidable accidents upon their shores. As soon as this decision of the British Government was made known to ours, the distinguished Senator from South Carolina [Mr. CALHOUN] introduced the following resolutions; which, on the 15th April, 1840, were unanimously adopted by this body: "Resolved, That a ship or vessel on the high seas, in time of peace, engaged in a lawful voyage, is, according to the laws of nations, under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State to which her flag belongs; as much so, as if constituting a part of its own domain. "Resolved. That if such slip or vessel should be forced by stress of weather, or other unavoidable cause, into the portą 27TH CONG......3D SESS. and under the jurisdiction of a friendly power, she and her car. go, and persons on board, with their property, and all the rights belonging to their personal relations, as established by the laws of the State to which they belong, would be placed under the protection which the laws of nations extend to the unfortunate under such circumstances. "Resolved, That the brig Enterprise, which was forced una. voidably, by stress of weather, into Port Hamilton, Bermuda IsHand, while on a lawful voyage on the high seas, from one port of the Union to another, comes within the principles embraced in the foregoing resolutions; and that the seizure a id detention of the negroes on boar, by the local authority of the island, was an act in violation of the laws of nations, and highly unjust to our citizens to whom they belong." I well recollect the satisfaction with which the adoption of these resolutions was hailed by the Southern portion of this Union. The promptitude and unanimity with which they were adopted, proved that the "still small voice" of patriotism could yet make itself heard amid the din of party strife with which these halls perpetually resound. We flattered ourselves that Great Britain would now pause in her course of insolence and aggression; and that the petty functionaries of an insignificant island, almost in sight of our coast, would no longer beard the majesty of this republic. More than two years ago, therefore, this body solemnly resolved, in substance, that the seizure and detention of slaves, under the circumstances of those on board the Enterprise, was an act of injustice to our citizens, a violation of the law of nations, and equivalent to an invasion of our territory. This resolution was adopted, after a protracted negotiation for redress had eventuated in a rejection of the demand. Two nations could not be brought nearer to a state of hostility by any act short of a positive declaration of war, than Great Britain and this country were by the adoption of these resolutions. In fact, this left but one alternative-redress or war. Foreign nations had, therefore, a right to conclude (and I well recollect they did conclude) that the wrongs complained of would be redressBut what effect did these ed, or war would ensue. resolutions produce in the country against which they were fulminated? Scarcely had their thunder died away on the distant shores of Great Britain, when, as if in defiance of our threats, another outrage, precisely similar in character to the one complained of, is committed. The schooner Hermosa, bound on a voyage from Norfolk to New Orleans, with a number of slaves on board, is wrecked on one of the reefs in the Bahama channel. All the persons on board, including the slaves, are taken from the wreck by an English "wrecker," and carried to Nassau. As soon as they arrive there, a file of soldiers, wearing the British uniform, commanded by a British officer, march on board the wrecker, order the slaves ashore, and carry them before some petty magistrate; by whose supreme authority, and in spite of the remonstrances of the American consul, they are set at liberty. These facts being established by incontestable evidence, application for indemnity was made to the British Government. Before any answer had been given to this application, the case of the "Creole" occurred. So far as the claim to indemnity is concerned, the circumstances of this case were not as strong as those in the cases of the "Enterprise" and the "Hermosa;" for, in this case, the liberation of the slaves was not the act of the British Government, nor did it even occur within their jurisdiction. It occurred on the high seas, and was effected by the slaves themselves. The atrocities, however, with which it was attended, and the aid and protection afforded to the authors of them, justly excited public indignation, and momentarily roused our Government from its lethargy. An urgent demand for redress was made, enforced by a letter from the Secretary of State, containing an able exposition of the law of nations applicable to the question, and a complete refutation of the arguments by which the British ministry had, in the case of the "Enterprise," already referred to, attempted to justify the seizure of American prop. érty by a British statute. 1 appeal to you, Mr. President, whether, at that juncture, any one of the questions pending between this country and Great Britain was deemed more important, or more urgent in its character, than that growing out of these repeated outrages? So far as my own State is concerned, I can venture to say it stood foremost in the catalogue of grievances of which we had a right to complain. The Legislatures of many of the States (and that of Louisiana among the rest) passed strong resolutions expressive of their sense of these outrages, and of their readiness to vindicate, by a resort to arms, the insulted honor of The British Treaty-Mr. Conrad. the country. The swelling tide of public indig. The Northeastern boundary question-about Senate. 4 board the Creole were prompted to the crimes which they committed by the knowledge they had acquired before their embarcation, that if they could succeed in reaching any of the British possessions, their crimes would not only go unpunished, but be rewarded by their freedom. Am I not correct, then, Mr. President, when 1 affirm that principles vital to the institutions and safety of this country are involved in this question? and that it ought not to have been overlooked in a treaty, the very object of which is to remove the causes of discord between the two countries? And what is the reason assigned for this extraordinary omission? Why, that Lord Ashburton's powers did not embrace the settlement of this question. Has it not been But why did they not embrace it? pending for years? It is true, as Lord Ashburton says, that the case of the Creole was only known in England a few days before his departure for this country; but that of the Enterprise occurred many years ago; and the resolutions of this body, declaring it a violation of the law of nations, and equivalent to an invasion of our territory, were adopted more than two years prior to his departure. Besides, nothing would have been easier than to have enlarged his powers, had they been found insufficient. No, sir; the true reason for this casus omissus in the treaty is to be found in Lord Ashburton's letter. He there says: "There are certain great principles too deeply rooted in the consciences and sympathies of the people of Great Britain for any minister to be able to overlook; and any engagement I might make in opposition to them would be instantly disavowed." In other words, the sympathies of British abolitionists must not be shocked by having any restraint put upon their humane efforts to excite our slaves to insurrection and blood. shed! Gentlemen refer us to this letter, as containing all that was necessary on this subject. It is true, Mr. President, that, as nothing was intended to be done, it was thought necessary, at least, to say something. But if it was intended to enter into any binding engagements on this subject, why was it done in the form of a letter? Why was it not inserted in the treaty? I have looked in vain, however, in this letter, for anything which could be construed either into an apology for the past, or a pledge for the future. So far from admitting the truth of the unanswerable propositions contained in Mr. Webster's letter to him, Lord A. pronounces them to be startling; and so far from making any specific pledges, he expressly declares that, if he were to make any, they would be "instantly disavowed by his Government." It is true, he talks of transferring the negotiation on this point to London; but, at the very time when this correspondence was penned, Lord Ashburton and Mr. Webster both were well aware that a negotiation had already taken place at London, and that the British Government had adhered to their former decision. I have already stated that application was made by our Government for indemnity for slaves captured on board the schooner Hermosa, I hold in my hand copies of the correspondence which took place on this subject between Mr. Everett, our minister at London, and Lord Aberdeen, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain. As this correspondence has never been published, nor, I believe, ever seen by a single member of this body, I beg leave to read it to the Senate. Mr. C. here read a letter from Mr. Everett to Lord Aberdeen, dated 3d May, 1842, and the following answer of Lord Aberdeen, dated May 22, 1842: LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, May 3, 1842. The undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America, has been directed to bring to the knowledge of Lord Aberdeen, her Majesty's princi pal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the particulars of the case of the Hermosa, a vessel bourd from Richmond to New Orleans, with an assorted cargo, and having on board, also, thirty-eight slaves. This vessel was, on the 19th of October, 1840, wrecked upon a reef of rocks, which proved to be Spanish Key, near Abaco. Her cargo and slaves were taken possession of by a company of licensed wreckers; and being brought into Nassou, in the Island of New Providence, the slaves were set at liberty by the civil and military authorities of that island. For the facts of the case in detail, reference is made to a copy of two protests of John S. Chattin, the master of the vessel, here. with transmitted to the Earl of Aberdeen; and the undersigned is instructed to inform Lord Aberdeen, that, inasmuch as the vessel, in the pursuit of a lawful voyage, was driven, by stress of weather, within her Majesty's colonial dominions, and the slaves on board her, belonging to citizens of the United States, were set at liberty by the direct interference of her Majesty's colonial authorities, the Government of the United States, on behalf of the parties thus deprived of their property, looks to the Government of her Majesty for a just indemnification. The principles on which this clairn is founded having been heretofore frequently urged upon the consideration of her Majesty's Government, and particularly in the note of the under 27TH CONG....3D SESS. signed of the 1st March, relative to the case of the Creole, he deems it unnecessary, on this occasion, to renew the discussion. He will confine himself to restating, briefly, a portion of the argumeut contained in that note. Her Majesty's Government is understood to hold that, in con. sequence of the abolition of slavery in a portion of her Majesty's dominions, by the act of Parliament of 31 and 4th William IV., c. 73, her Majesty's authorities are prevented from recognising the relation of slavery, or any of its incidents, even on-board the vessels belonging to friendly States in which slavery legally exists. It has been already observed by the undersigned, in die note referred to, that the Government of the United States can. not admit that the vessels of a friendly power, driven by stress of weather, or by mutiny, into her Majesty's ports, can, in con. sequence of a change in the municipal law of England, be rightfully deprived of any aid and assistance to which they are entitled by the law and comity of nations. But, granting this, for argument's sake, to be an erroneous view; and that the principle above stated is correctly assumed by her Majesty's Government: it can only follow that her Majesty's authorities, in the cases supposed, are justified in refusing to perform acts not now authorized by British law, in reference to slavery; as, for instance, to employ their officers in arresting fugitive slaves. It cannot follow that when, by stress of weather, or mutiny, a foreign vessel, having slaves lawfully on board, is driven into a British port, the British civil and military authorities may forcibly interfere to liberate them; because this cannot be done without violently infringing that authority of the captain of the vessel over the ship's company, which is recognised as well by the laws of England as of all other civilized States. If the law of England converts slaves into passengers, in exempting them from one kind of control, which her laws do not recognise, it subjects them to another, which her laws do recognise. It is not exclusively in reference to cases like those which have so often been the subject of the reclamations of the United States, that these principles apply. A species of servitude not materially different from that abolished by the 3d and 4th Wil liam IV., c. 73, once prevailing throughout Europe, still exists in some of the northern portions of the continent. If a vessel from that quarter should be driven into a port in her Majesty's dominions, navigated in whole or in part by persons held in a servitude like that alluded to, the undersigned presumes it would be deemed a great violation of the comity of nations, if the vessel should be boarded by her Majesty's civil officers, supported by a military force, and proclaiming to the ship's com pany that, as servitude no longer existed in England, they were free to quit the vessel, and go where they pleased; and the undersigned cannot doubt that if pecuniary loss accrued in conse. quence of this interference, it would be held to warrant a demand on her Majesty's Government for indemnification. But, in reference immediately to the case in hand: if it should be granted that, by unavoidable force of British law, the statute of 23th August, 1933, so entirely requires the liberation of all slaves, however brought into her Majesty's dominions, as to authorize every species of civil and military agency by which such liberation is effected, (an extension of the principle which her Majesty's Government has never, it is believed, maintained,) then, the least that a foreign and friendly power can demand, is, that effect should be given to the act as a whole. It would seem peculiarly unjust, in applying the statute to the citizens of a friendly State, to call into action only so much of its provisions as is necessary to divest them of their property, without giving them the benefit of the other enactments, by which compensa. tion is made for the property of which they are thus deprived. The abolition of slavery is nowhere, it is believed, defined in the statute as a simple technical idea, importing nothing but a change of condition from servitude to freedom. But it is a complex act, consisting of several parts, all of which are equally essential, and equally established by the statute. The undersigned had the honor to observe, in his note of the 1st of March, that, in the same act which liberated the slaves in her Majesty's colonies, (and in virtue of which alone it is now held that slaves in foreign vessels, driven by stress of weather into her Majesty's doininions, must be liberated,) it is declared to be "just and expedient that a rea sonable compensation should be made to the persons hitherto entitled to the services of such slaves, for the loss which they will incur by being deprived of their right to such services." II, then, in the understanding of Parliament, in enacting the statute of 3 and 4th William IV., c. 73, it would have been unjust to liberate the slaves of her Majesty's subjec.s without compensating the master, it would seem impossible to derive from that act any warrant to liberate the slaves of the citizens of a foreign State, driven by stress of weather into a British port, without similar compensation. If such a liberation would have been unjust toward British subjects much more would it be unjust toward the citizens of a friendly and foreign State. It is only by inference that the act is considered by her Majesty's Government to apply at all to foreign citizens driven by stress of weather into a British port. To enforce against such foreign citizens liberation without compensation, as an inference from a statute declaring that justice demands compensation to British subjects whose slaves are liberated, would seem as much at varience with the rules of reasoning as with the dictates of justice. The undersigned has the honor to renew to the Earl of Aberdeen the assurance of his distinguished consideration. EDWARD EVERETT. FOREIGN OFFICE, May 20, 1812. The undersigned, her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Everett's note of the 3d instant, in which Mr. Everett states that he has been directed by his Government to bring to the knowledge of the undersigned the particulars of the case of the "Hermosa," an American veszel, bound from R chmond to New Orleans, and carrying an assorted cargo and forty-eight staves, which was wrecked on the Spanish Key reef, near Abaco-the slaves and cargo being saved by licensed wreckers, and carried by them into Nassau. Mr. Everett complains that, by the direct interference of the British authorities at Nassau, the slaves were set at liberty; and Mr. Everett claims compensation for the loss therein suffered by the former proprietors of the slaves. For the facts of the case in detail, Mr. Everett refers to two declarations made by the master of the Hermosa, before a magistrate of the United States, and enclosed in the note of Mr. Everett. There is some discrepancy in the account given by Mr. Chattin from that which her Majesty's Government Lave received from the Governor of the Bahamas. alleges that the stipendiary magistrate of Nassau was seen to The former The British Treaty-Mr. Conrad. send the slaves on shore from the wreckers' vessel; and that the Governor of the Bahamas, being then in Nassau, knew of every thing which was dene relative to the slaves. The account given by the Governor, though it does not enter so minutely into particulars, distinctly states that, upon reference being made to him, he declined any interference with the slaves; but that, under instructions formerly sent from England, they were permitted to land in Nassau. It can hardly be supposed that Col. Cockburn would have so expressed himself if he had bren aware that a magistrate of the colony had been actively em ployed in sending the slaves on shore. But, although the undersigned thinks it right to point out the discrepancy to Mr Everett, he does not consider it as in any way affecting the point at issue; for, admitting that the magis trate did interfere actively, and that, in the absence of the mas ter of the "Hermosa," he visited the negroes, and, by his own authority, sent them on shore, --it must be remembered that the vessel in which the negroes entered Nassau was not an Ameri can, but a British vessel; cons quently, that the magistrate was called upon to deal with her and her crew strictly according to British law; and that, if he had reason to suppose that any ille. gal constraint was put upon the liberties or inclinations of those whom she had rescued, it was his bounden duty to see their freedom vindicated, and the persons exercising authority on board the vessel duly punished. For this reason, the under signed cannot admit that the forcible interference on the part of the British officer, which the account furnished to Mr. Everett states to have taken place, would have formed any just cause of complaint from the late owners of the slaves; still less, that it would have been a violent infringement of the authority of the American captain. In the latter part of Mr. Everett's note, it is suggested, that if, by the act of the 28th August, 1833, British law requires the liberation of the slaves in question, effect should be given to that act as a whole; and that, as it has provided compensation for British slave-owners, it should do the same for citizens of a foreign State, and whose slaves may be liberated by being driven within its jurisdiction. The question which is here raised has been so fully discussed, and so deliberately decided upon a former occasion, that it is scarcely necessary to do more than refer Mr. Everett to what then passed between Mr. Stevenson and her Majesty's Government. In the notes addressed by Lord Palinerston to Mr. Stevenson on the 7th of January and the 11th of December, 1837, upon the case of the "Enterprise," Mr. Everett will find stated at length the reasons which forbid her Majesty's Government henceforward to entertain the question of compensation for slaves who may have acquired their liberty by passing under the jurisdiction of British law. The undersigned cannot hold out to Mr. Everett any expectation that her Majesty's Government will recede from the deter mination then tak n. The sole points of difference between the case of the "Enterprise" and that of the "Hermosa" appear to be-first, that the slaves from the latter vessel entered the port of their liberation under the British, and not under the American flag; and, sec. only, that the time of their liberation was subsequent to the complete emancipation of the slaves in the British colonies, when even the apprenticeship of the negroes had ceased to exist. The undersigned feels assured that Mr. Everett will see in these two points of difference no cause for any deviation from the course taken by her Majesty's Government on the former occasion, when it was decided by them, "that slavery, being now abolished throughout the British empire, there can be no well founded claim on the part of any foreigner for compensation in respect to slaves, who, under any circumstances whatever, may come into the British colonies, any more than there would be in respect to slaves who might come into the United Kingdom," The undersigned avails himself of this occasion to renew to Mr. Everett the assurance of his distinguished consideration. ABERDEEN. Here, then, we find (continued Mr. C.,) that, as late as the 20th May last, when Lord Ashburton was writing diplomatic notes about adjourning the settlement of this question to London, where "access could be had to all the authorities," the British Government had solemnly decided that "They would not, henceforward, entertain the question of compensation for slaves who may have acquired their liberty by passing under the jurisdiction of British laws;" and "that, slavery being now abolished throughout the British empire, there can be no well-founded claim on the part of any foreigner for compensation in respect to slaves who, under any circumstances whatever, may come into the British colonies." No, not even when the vessels containing them are driven there by tempest, like the Enterprise; by shipwreck, like the Hermosa; or by mutiny and murder, like the Creole. And this inhuman doctrine--this barbarous interpolation of the code of international law, which imposes a penalty on misfortune, and holds out a premium to insurrection and murder, is promulgated at the very moment when the bloody tragedy recently enacted on board the Creole had demonstrated the fatal consequences to which it would inevitably lead. [Mr. RIVES here interrupted Mr. C. and observed that the letter of Lord Aberdeen was a mere reference to a prior decision given in the case of the Enterprise.] It does refer (continued Mr. C.) to that decision; but it expressly adopts and confirms it; and the reference to a case which this body had already pronounced to have been a violation of our dag and of national law, only renders their rejection of our demand as offensive in form, as it was unjust in sub-tance. Why, let me ask, was this letter, rejecting our demand, withheld from the public, when Mr. Webster's letter to Mr, Everett, instruct Senate. ing him to make that demand and demonstrating its injustice, was paraded in every newspaper in the country, even before it had reached its destination? Why was the smooth, plausible diplomatic note of Lord Ashburton, who was not authorized to negotiate on this subject, sent to this body along with this treaty; when not a word was said abo the plain, unequivocal, peremptory answer of the British minister, about the extent of whose power there could be no dispute? How is it that, until yesterday, the very existence of such a correspondence was unknown to this body? Was it because it was feared that such a letter might prove an obstacle to the ratification of this treaty, and might revive anew those feelings of indignation which these outrages had excited, and which had only slum. bered since this negotiation had been set on foot? Mr. President, the moment that this answer of Lord Ashburton was known here, our Government should have made the settlement of this question a sine qua non; and, in case of refusal, have broken off the negotiation at once. Had this course been pursued, depend upon it, the powers of Lord Ashburton would have been found broad enough to cover the case, or have been speedily enlarged. Gentlemen tell us that, in that event, war would have been inevitable; and one would almost fancy that the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs already heard the distant roar of British artillery. For my own part, I entertain no such fears. Embarrassed as she is in her finances, and encumbered with two Asiatic wars, England is not more anxious or better prepared for war than we are. She would never go to war for the sake of maintaining a principle which is only important to her as a means of annoying us, and which the voice of the civilized world would pronounce to be erroneous. Her boasted philanthropy is wonderfully sagacious, and always coincides with and subserves her interests. But, even did I believe that war would be the inevitable consequence of a rejection of this treaty, I would not permit that belief to influence my decision. True, our finances are deranged, our treasury exhausted, and the administration of our affairs confided to hands that neither possess nor deserve the confidence of the country; but I would prefer to encounter war, under all these disadvantages, than to purchase an ignominous peace by the surrender of a principle of such vital importance. I would not permit any temporary difficulties to create permanent misfortunes. I would treat with Great Britain as I would treat with the weakest power in Christendom; I would treat with her now, as I would when our affairs are most prosperous. I would treat with her, with Tyler for our President, as I would with Washington or Jackson at the helm of Government. And, after all, if we ratify this treaty, will not there still remain sufficient cause for war? Did not this body, two years ago, solemnly declare that there was, when they pronounced the seizure of the slaves on board the Enterprise a violation of law and of the rights of our citizens, and equivalent to an invasion of our domain? Since those resolutions, the outrages of the Her mosa and the Creole have been superadded to that of the Enterprise. If there was cause for war then, is there not much greater cause now? If these res olutions be erroneous, repeal them. If the principles they contain be correct, preserve your consistency, and maintain them at whatever sacrifice. But do not ratify this treaty, and leave them in full force-a recorded sentence of self-condemnation. We have been told that the 10th article of the treaty would apply to cases like the Creole; and that henceforward Great Britain, although she might still continue to liberate our slaves when they came within her grasp, would be bound to surrender them when they had committed murder. I hope, for the sake of humanity and the honor of this country, it may be so; but there is a clause in that article which I do not like, and which, if not inserted for the purpose of preventing its application to cases of this description, will, I am confident, be used as a pretext for that purpose: I refer to that clause which provides that "the evidence of criminality shall be according to the laws of the place where the fugitive, or person charged, shall be found." Suppose, sir, that a slave, in attempting to recover his liberty, murders him who holds him in custody. would not an English judge (upon whom the de cision would devolve) decide that, according to the laws of England, there was no criminality? That the restraint on the person of the slave was an unlawful duress--a violent assault, which justified or excused the killing of him who committed it? Į |