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will be a mere superficial remedy; it cannot reach the seat of the disease. What is the cause of the present distresses? The remote cause is undoubtedly the expansion of the currency; and the more immediate cause, its sudden contraction. From facts which I have before me, it appears that, in the course of three years, the currency of this country expanded from ninety-four millions of dollars to one hundred and forty-nine millions; and, in a similar period, sunk down to some seventy millions. Now, I beg Senators to impress upon their minds this single circumstance. It furnishes a lesson which ought not to be forgotten; it is a lesson which we have but too much cause to remember.

When, from any cause, the bank circulation of a country is extended beyond a certain degree--for instance, fifty millions beyond the proper and natural amount of the circulation demanded by the business of the country-this redundancy of circulation, by a law as immutable as the law of gravitation, tends to carry down the quantity of the circulation even below its natural level. This is the cause of the existing distress. Our currency was unnaturally expanded, and prices swelled to a hundred per cent. beyond their natural average. The system, of course, could not continue in this state of inflation. Any currency professing to rest upon a specie basis must sink into utter ruin, as the inevitable result of such an expansion. Now, sir, what has actually taken place? The currency has been reduced to one half its former dimensions. In the very nature of things, it was obliged to be thus reduced, if the system was to rest on a specie basis, affording a sound and uniform currency. That reduction has, perhaps, not gone to the extreme point which it must reach. And now what are we about to do? After the country has suffered the utmost distress, and been driven to the verge of bankruptcy-after we have gone through the painful process of contracting our circulation-after we have suffered all the evils which must follow from its undue expansion;-after all this, what is the remedy proposed? Why, sir, some seem to imagine that, in legislation, according to the old adage, "the hair of the mad dog is good for the bite." And now, after we have suffered the evils incident to reforming a rash and ill-devised system of bank credit and bank circulation, and see the dawn of returning prosperity; after natural causes and the laws of trade have nearly corrected them, and we are once more almost standing on a platform of a sound and uniform currency, the most intelligent and sagacious minds of the country are calling out for a new system of paper circulation, which must carry the country through the same circle of expansion, contraction, and ruin, from which we are just recovering.

Sir, we find the patient in a state in which the administering of medicine is no longer salutary; and when, though at present debilitated, he is about to recover by a natural process, we are required to continue tampering with his system, by the use of new and additional nostrums. Believe me, sir, any scheme-the Bank of the United States, under any possible modification--an exchequer board, with all the checks and guaranties which human wisdom can provide-will be utterly inadequate to furnish a remedy. The truth is, the country is very much in the condition of a patient who is unwilling to trust to the vis medicalrix natura, but is perpetually calling out for medicine; and, as is usual in such cases, mistaking entirely the nature of the remedies required. What do gentlemen propose to do? They tell you that their object is to reform the condition of the currency, and to establish a bank circulation on a sound basis and of uniform value. Now, in regard to the stimulating causes of these schemes of currency-the existing sufferings of the people-a restoration of the currency to a state of soundness is the very last thing in the world which the patient could endure, or which his real wants require. A sound currency! Why, gentlemen seem to imagine that the Government possesses a sort of political legerdemain, by which it can accomplish direct incompatibilities. Can you reform the currency and expand it at the same time? The very act of increasing the circulation would defeat your professed object of reforming the currency. You can reform a vitiated currency by no other process than by curtailing it.

But, Mr. President, under existing circumstances, as to those who have fallen victims to the popular delusions and speculations produced by the excesses of the credit system, their case is hopless;

Assumption of State Debts-Mr. McDuffie.

it is beyond the power of surgery or even of galvanism, to revive them. However rapidly you hurry on these schemes, they will come too late for them. But I am aware there is a very plausi ble argument which gentlemen have frequently urged on this point-that their desire is not so much to increase the quantity of circulation, to induce the banks to go into a system of excessive discounts and circulation, as to restore confidence. Yes, sir, that is the watchword--to restore confidence to the country. Confidence! Mr. President. Confidence in what? Confidence in banks, that have made promises only to violate them? How can we have confidence in a system which all experience proves must, in the nature of things, result in those very revulsions and distress, the consequences of which we are at this moment experiencing? Are we to encourage the people of the United States to indulge false hopes, which must inevitably be disappointed? God forbid that this sort of confidence ever should be restored. No, sir; like the confidence that Eve reposed in the serpent, and by which she was tempted to eat of "that forbidden fruit, whose mortal taste brought death into the world," it is the real source of all our woes-all our calamities.

But, Mr. President, when you attempt to establish a sound system of currency; when you endeavor to lay the foundation for a just and wellfounded confidence, having reference to the future-no bank, no exchequer board will be necessary to enable the country to recover from the distress into which it has been thrown. No man can be more sensible than I am of the necessity of a sound and stable currency; but how is this to be effected? If I were asked what system of currency I would now propose, I would candidly confess that I am not prepared at the present moment to fix upon any. I should say this much, however, with entire confidence: leave nature to work in her own way for a time; leave the people to their own industry and resources; do not place too much reliance upon artificial systems and legislative contrivances.

Is it supposed by any one (I will not say in this Senate, but in the country) that the mere issue of a bank circulation-if you could to-morrow restore the delusive confidence which formerly existed, so far as to create seventy millions in addition to our present circulation-will add one solitary cent to the wealth of the United States? You have no creative power. There is no power in legislation by which you can add a single blade of grass, a grain of corn, or a pod of cotton, to the wealth of the country. The remedy is not to be found in legislation, or in any artificial contrivances. Our only hope is in undoing the mischief which such artificial contrivances have already done.

Sir, upon the subject of bank circulation, I feel that it is due to myself that I should read a sentence or two from the first public document which I ever presented to the Congress of the United States in relation to it. They are contained in a report which I submitted to the House of Representatives on the question of renewing the charter of the Bank of the United States, which always sustained a salutary check on the State banks, and was a means of preserving the soundness of the paper currency, by preventing them from running into excessive is

sues.

In that document the following opinion is expressed on the general question of currency:

"It must be assumed, as the basis of all sound reasoning on this subject, that the existence of a paper corrency, issued by banks deriving their charters from the State Governments, cannot be prohibited by Congress. Indeed, bank credit and bank paper are so extensively interwoven with the commercial operations of society, that, even if Congress had the constitu. tional power, it would be utterly impossible to produce so en. tire a change in the monetary system of the country as to abolish the agency of banks of discount, without involving the community in all the distressing embarrassments usually at tendant on great political revolutions, subverting the titles to private property. The sudden withdrawal of some hundred millions of bank credit would be equivalent, in its effects, to the arbitrary and despotic transfer of the property of one por tion of the community to another, to the extent, probably, of half that amount. Whatever, therefore, may be the advan tages of a purely metallic currency, and whatever the objec tions to a circulating medium partly composed of bank paper, the committee consider that they are precluded, by the exist ing state of things, from instituting a comparison between them, with a view to any practical result.

"If they were not thus precluded, and it were submitted to them as an original question, whether the acknowledged and manifold facilities of bank credit and bank paper are not more than counterbalanced by the distressing vicissitudes in trade incident to their use, they are by no means prepared to say that they would not give a decided preference to the more costly and cumbersome medium."

Such were then my sentiments, and such are they at this time; and the course of events has now brought us to such a condition, that, without any

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further revulsion or suffering, specie may be made not only the basis of our circulation, but to constitute a large portion of that circulation. Let us attempt to create no system by which the banks may be again drawn into their former excesses; but leave them, with their recent experience, and under the salutary restraints of public opinion, to recover public confidence by a prudent course of self-reform; by which they will deserve it. The course of events will do infinitely more than we can do by legislation.

If I were clothed with unlimited power at this moment to regulate the currency, I would say I am not prepared to decide. And no man ought to decide upon any specific plan in regard to it, until we have had the experience of some years. Believing, then, as I confidently do, that all plans of relief heretofore proposed must be absolutely im. potent to relieve the existing distresses; and that a system of currency having reference to the future should be a work of mature deliberation, I am decidedly of opinion that the time has not arrived when any legislative enactment should take place upon the subject. The relief which the country demands is of a much more radical character. What is that relief? It has been indicated in the first of those resolutions which I have had the honor to submit to the Senate. The commerce of this country is in a state of decay; and, from the documents which I have before me, I may almost say, in an expiring condition.

What shall be done, then, to restore this import ant source of the nation's wealth? Shall we hope to revive commerce by continuing that system of policy by which it is now shackled? Shall we invent new contrivances of a similar character for the future? No, sir: undo the mischief you have done; knock off the fetters you have already imposed; leave trade to her own laws; permit your people to enjoy their natural advantages, and the fruits of their industry, free from all unjust restrictions. Do this, and you will insure prosperity to the country; and, at the same time, replenish your exhausted treasury.

I come, therefore, to the consideration of the sec ond resolution, which proposes reducing the exist ing tariff from its present prohibitory character, to a proper and reasonable revenue standard, so as to make it in reality what it professes to be-a constitutional measure merely for the purpose of raising revenue.

And here, Mr. President, I cannot but remark that there never was a time more inappropriate for the introduction of such a measure, than the moment selected for the introduction of the tariff of the last session, in view of what had taken place, and of what was then in progress in other countries, as well as in our own. Sir Robert Peel, the British minister, yielding to the force of public opinion, had mitigated, to a very great extent, the commercial restrictions which existed in Great Britain. Had we pursued our true national policy, we would have met these advances to a system of free trade in a liberal spirit of reciprocity. But what did we do? Instead of reciprocating the advances which Great Britain made to us, we turned our backs upon her at the very moment when measures were taken by Great Britain to enable your farmers of Pennsylvania, of New York, and of all the grain-growing States of this Union, to find a market abroad for their produce. Our Legislature--thinking, perhaps, that these great advantages tendered to our farmers might seduce them into the heresy of free trade-passed the tariff bill of last session, more prohibitory than any of its predecessors.

I have before me a letter from an officer of the Treasury Department, showing, from the customhouse returns for the city of New York, the extraordinary falling-off which has been occasioned by the passage of the measure in question. In a statement showing the monthly income from customs, we have for the month of January $1,263,000, while that of December amounts to but $255,000; and the intervening months exhibit a regular falling off, from the time it was expected the tariff bill would pass, until the close of the year. Now, if the month of December is a fair indication of what the revenue is to be next year, the whole revenue from customs at New York will not be more than three millions of dollars. This, of itself, is alarming enough, as it regards our financial prospects; to say nothing of the more important considerations of commerce destroyed, and the people oppressed by unjust burdens. Now, what are the considerations

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by which we are called on to submit to these unnatural and unjust exactions?

To protect the domestic industry of the United States! To carry out the American system! These delusive phrases have operated so extensively, as almost to confound the understandings of the people.

I pray you to bear with me for a moment while I take a brief review of the commerce and the revenue of the United States. And I will, at the close of that review, ask the Senators who voted for the tariff of the last session, to tell me on what ground it was they thought it necessary to sacrifice those great interests?

From the very beginning of the Government, with the exception of a few years of war, the whole revenue by which the machinery of Government has been kept in motion, has been derived exclu sively from foreign commerce. But that to which I beg leave to call the particular attention of the Senate, is, that since 1816, at least three-fourths of the revenue, which has not only paid the current expenses of the Government, but performed the unexampled achievement of extinguishing the public debt, has been derived from that branch of your commerce which consists entirely of the exchanges received for the agricultural exports of the Southern and Southwestern States-less than one-third of the Union; and that it is against this very branch of commerce that the whole power of your prohibition tariff is directed, professedly with a view to destroy it! Yes, sir; this great branch of your national industry has done all this, and more. It has made us a great commercial and naval power, and contributed largely to enrich the people, by supplying them with the comforts and luxuries of life cheaper than they could be obtained from any other source. And for all these great services to the country and the Government, what grateful return have you made? What acknowledgment of your obligations? None, sir; but, on the contrary, and to the eternal reproach of this Government, it has destroyed what it was under the most sacréd obligations to protect and defend-like an unnatural monster, plunging a dagger into the bosom of his best friend and benefactor. And on what ground is this monstrous outrage to be justified? What great rival interest is there in this country, which can assert a paramount claim to the protection of the Government?

It is the domestic manufactures of the country which demand the sacrifice. The protection of home industry!-the suffering industry of the country! These are the watchwords. But what, I ask, is that industry which has supplied you with all the blessings of an enriching commerce? Is it not domestic industry? Is it not home industry? Do you get from abroad foreign manufactures to the value of a dollar, that are not procured by means of domestic industry? Unless you rob-unless you steal--unless you obtain by fraudulent devices,you cannot get the worth of a farthing, but by an exchange of the products of domestic industry. In this respect, commerce and manufactures, then, stand upon the same footing precisely.

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There is a vast interest represented by those who are engaged in the production of the great staple articles of exportation-in exchanging those articles for foreign manufactures, by means of ital; in transporting them to foreign ports; and in conveying foreign merchandise, received in exchange for them, to the United States. These constitute the great exporting interest identified with foreign commerce. Whatever destroys the one, destroys the other. And, although the States producing these exports constitute, perhaps, less than one-third of the Union; and although they have been contemptuously reproached as being barren sand-hills,-yet they have mainly sustained the commerce of the United States-having furnished two-thirds of the entire exports of the Union, since cotton and rice and tobacco have become the great staples of exportation. Two-thirds of the productions which sustain foreign commerce have been furnished by less than one-third of the Union. And upon this great branch of domestic industry, with the capital which it employs, has devolved the whole burden of supporting the Government, by furnishing the subjects of taxation. Now, I ask the friends of the tariff, in all candor, and with the utmost respect, what is that branch of industry for which they exclusively claim the name of domestic industry? They will answer, home manufactures! Upon what ground are we to destroy commerce to sustain the manufacturers? Why should these

Assumption of State Debts-Mr. McDuffie.

be protected by the sacrifice of foreign commerce, and at the expense of this Government? Has the Government ever derived a solitary cent of revenue from domestic manufactures? Does this branch of domestic industry contribute one solitary cent to the support of the Government? Do they not, on the contrary, diminish the revenue? And yet, you are to destroy that great branch of national industry which has supported the Government and enriched the people, in order to afford assistance to a branch of domestic industry which has been itself an enormous tax both upon the people and the Government. A more monstrous combination of injustice and ingratitude can hardly be conceived. To destroy commerce, the great agent of civilization, and bond of peace among nations, to foster a rival branch of industry, by measures which convert the United States from mutual customers to commercial rivals, is as unwise and impolitic as, in reference to other considerations, it is unjust and oppressive.

But there is yet a larger and more pervading view of this subject, showing the suicidal character of a prohibitive tariff. The great exporting interest-that of the planters, merchants, and ship-owners-say to the Congress of the United States, If you will permit us freely to exchange the productions of our industry for the productions of other countries, subject to a revenue duty merely, even with this discrimination of 20 per cent. against us, we will pledge ourselves to supply the people with all the manufactures they need one-third cheaper than they now obtain them from the manufacturers of the United States.

To this the tariff majority in Congress practically reply, that they regard cheap manufactures a great national evil, if obtained by exchanging the products of domestic agriculture for foreign manufactures; that this cheapness is the very reason they prohibit their importation; and that they would rather the people should pay a third more for the manufactures they consume, and that the treasury should be impoverished, than the manufacturers of the United States should not receive from 33 to 100 per cent. more for their fabrics than their natural price.

Such is a true exposition of the misnamed protective policy.

But I am aware of the arguments with which I shall be met on this subject. After the experience of twenty years, and the lessons to the contrary which that experience has taught us, gentle. men will still urge those arguments by which they sustained their policy in its incipient stages. I remember well, on my first entry upon the stage of public life, how confidently the manufacturers of the United States predicted, if you would only give them protection for a few years, they would be able to supply all your wants with articles cheaper and better than you could procure them from abroad. This was their confident prediction. And in that day, Mr. President, no man dared to rise and avow the purpose of making this system of unjust and oppressive restriction a permanent measure of national policy. Our establishments, said they, are in a state of infancy. Protect them for a few years, and we will ask no further aid, but will defy competition. I well remember the reply I then made to these promises-which subsequent experience and the conduct of the manufacturers have confirmed even beyond my anticipations. I showed, from documents of undoubted practical authority, that the cost of producing manufactures in Great Britain consisted of three elements-viz., three-eighths of the wages of labor, three-eighths of the interest upon capital, and one-fourth of the cost of the raw material; and I then argued that, as capital could be obtained in England at half the interest at which it could be obtained here, and labor be procured for less than half the wages, it was apparent that the cause of the inability of the American manufacturers to maintain a competition with the foreign was founded on permanent causes the low wages of labor, and the low rate of interest; causes which, I trust, will be eternal; for no patriot can desire that wages here should be reduced to sixpence a day, or the profits of capital to three per cent., even to enrich our manufacturers. And now, after the lapse of twenty years, the wages of labor and the rate of interest in Great Britain are as much below what they are here as they ever were; and, though the machinery employed in our manufactories is in many respects superior to the British, our manufacturers clamor as loudly for protection as they did in 1824. Is this

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oppressive system, then, to last forever? Have gentlemen reflected on the consequences which must result from it, if thus perpetuated? Have they estimated the frightful amount of burdens imposed by it on the people of the United States?

I believe, sir-though I have not the documents before me, but from a general recollection-that the amount of manufactures of this country, which are embraced in the operation of the protecting laws, was, in 1841, about nine times as large as the amount of foreign importations of the same description; that is to say, that the amount of such importations was about forty millions of dollars, and the amount of domestic manufactures of a similar kind three hundred and sixty millions. Now, I beg gentlemen to dwell a moment on these facts, and consider what is the amount of the tax imposed on the people of the United States, estimated from these statistics? An average duty of thirtyfive per cent. on forty millions of foreign imports, would impose a burden of $14,000,000, though the revenue should be less, by means of its prohibitory operation. The price of these imports must rise 35 per centum, or the trade will cease. This duty upon foreign imports would be distributed among the consumers, and would be cheerfully borne if it ended here. But this is by far the smallest part of the burden it imposes; for the law cannot raise the price of imported manufactures, without raising in the same degree the price of similar domestic manufactures. This is a self-evident proposition-as much so as any in mathematics. No ingenuity can evade it. Now, sir, my mind shrinks back from the contemplation of such enormous burdens! Three hundred and sixty millions of domestic manufactures indirectly taxed at the rate of thirty per centum, as a bounty to incorporated wealth! Sir, will gentlemen deny that this tax is real? Will they come forward now, and contend that they can manufacture cheaper than we can import, in the very face of the law passed by themselves? Not satisfied with the duty imposed by the fair operation of the compromise act, and in palpable violation of its solemn pledges, they have made the duty on many articles prohibitory; thus clearly admitting that they cannot compete with the importers, even with the protection afforded by a revenue duty.

Such, sir, are the enormous burdens imposed on the people of the United States! Make any allowance you please-reduce the rates I have stated, even to the revenue standard of 20 per cent.; and yet the burden exceeds anything which human patience would endure, if the people were actually sensible of the true extent of those burdens. But, sir, it is the result of an indirect system of taxation, which imposes these burdens upon the people under such disguises that they know not what they suffer. They are sinking under the weight of their burdens; and yet, like a man who falls a victim to the influence of a corrupt atmosphere, they are totally unconscious of the real causes of their distress.

So much, Mr. President, for the operation of the tariff, and the claims of the manufacturers to special protection. In regard to the influence of the system upon the great mass of the people of the United States, it is distinctly making an issue whether you will sustain a few wealthy capitalists at the expense of the country at large.

But there is one portion of the Union which has an especial claim to our consideration. I allude to the States which produce the great staples of exportation. Upon these States, this tariff operates with a crushing weight of oppression. And no man, who nourishes in his bosom a proper sense of justice, can fail to give an attentive consideration to the gross and monstrous inequality of their burdens. Independently of the tax they pay as consumers, they are exposed to a burden incomparably greater from the prohibitory effect of the tariff upon that branch of commerce which regulates the value of their staples. In fact, sir, these prohibitions have reduced the planting States to a condition of strict colonial dependence on the manufacturing States. They are excluded from the best markets, and confined to the worst, both for selling their staples and purchasing merchandise in exchange. While they were dependent upon Great Britain, their colonial vassalage was not, in point of fact, half so oppressive as that under which they at this moment labor. What are their real interests, and the sources of their prosperity? What the productions of their industry? They cultivate the soil, and thank God for the boun

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of his providence in giving them a genial sun and productive soil. Providence has done much for us; but what has the Government done?

Before I proceed, allow me to remark, that the first object which gave cause to the formation of the Federal Government was the protection of foreign commerce. The first convention called to meet at Annapolis, was for that especial and avowed purpose. Such was the main purpose of the Government formed by our forefathers. The power of "regulating foreign commerce" was obviously conferred solely for its protection. And what, I pray, has Congress been doing, since 1824, under its constitutional obligation to protect and preserve the most beneficial and enriching commerce ever enjoyed by any people? It has, deliberately, avowedly, and perseveringly, levelled the power which imposed on it the sacred duty of protecting this great branch of national industry, at its very existence, in order to foster a less beneficial one, over which it has no constitutional power whatever.

Sir, all the pirates that ever infested the ocean-all the stormy elements that ever agitated the surface of the Atlantic-all the disasters occasioned by human villany and the other perils of the deep combined--cannot produce half the injury to the exporting States to which I have alluded, that Congress is now producing, deliberately and intentionally, by its unjust and destructive legislation. And let me add, that you violate one of the most sacred of all the rights of property by this iniquitous system of legislation. It is in vain that I flatter myself that I own property, while any man, or any combination of men, by unconstitutional and irresponsible legislation, claim the right, and exercise the power, of taxing it at pleasure, to provide bounties for themselves. What, sir, is involved essentially in the first elementary notion of the right of property? Have I property in my cotton-in that which I have lawfully and honestly produced by my capital and labor? Is it really and exclusively my own? If so, it follows, as a necessary consequence, that I may rightfully dispose of it, whenever and wherever I please--provided I violate the rights of no other man, by fraud or violence. It is one of the natural and inalienable rights of man-a right which no Government on earth can constitutionally violate.

It is no exaggeration, therefore, to say this is a system which reduces the exporting States to a condition of colonial bondage, as it makes their interests subservient and tributary to the interests of distant States, by pecuniary penalties restricting their natural rights, and constraining them to go to a market, every way unfavorable to their inter

ests.

Sir, I have turned over in my mind the various systems of policy of the different Governments of Europe, and, as God is my judge, I do not think my mind was ever brought to contemplate anything in the form of human legislation more unjust than the system I have attempted to delineate in its most striking features.

To render still more plain the injustice and inequality of this system, and to show that this is really a competition between different branches of domestic industry, I will now present a practical illustration, which will address itself to the common sense of every just and unprejudiced mind. I, sir, as a cotton-planter, have been in the habit, for several years, of exporting my crop to Europe. I have not, to be sure, exchanged the whole for merchandise; but I had a right to do so. Now, let us suppose that I had done so, to supply the community around me with the manufactures they might require. It will not be denied that the manufactures thus imported would be as rightfully and truly the productions of my industry as the cotton Iexchanged for them. Yet, sir, when I bring that merchandise to the port of Charleston, I meet there a manufacturer who has goods of the very same description, fabricated in a distant State. He comes to the custom-house, and, clothed with the exclusive privileges of your tariff laws, introduces his manufactures into my own State, without duty; while I cannot introduce the same description of manufactures, the exclusive production of my own industry, without paying a high discriminating duty, to provide a bounty for a distant rival, and diminish the value of my manufactures, as compared with his, precisely to the amount of the duty. For it is an undeniable proposition, that, after paying say 35 per cent. as a protective duty, I could not obtain a cent more for my manufactures, than the

Assumption of State Debts-Mr. McDuffie.

Northern manufacturer could obtain for his, paying no duty at all. If human injustice can go further than this, I am entirely at a loss to conceive how. But I shall not go at large into this subject; but will briefly call the attention of the Senate to one or two items in the present tariff, which I regard as peculiarly illustrative of the genius of this system.

In the first place, I shall call your attention to the duty on iron-a duty which I believe has mainly contributed to draw the honest farmers of Pennsylvania, and of some other States, into the support of the protective system; though that system imposes a very high duty-more, I believe, than 100 per cent. on rolled iron-operating as a tax upon all the farmers and agriculturists of the United States, to promote the interest of a few wealthy iron-masters. Now, sir, this is a material of universal use, out of which the implements of the agriculturist and the tools of the mechanic are made, while the shipping interest consumes itto a very large amount. Now, a system of free trade on our part--reciprocated as it would be by foreign countries-would give the farmers of Pennsylvania a market for their products, of much more value to the State than any benefit the iron-masters can derive from the high duties imposed upon iron.

I must here beg the attention of Senators, particularly those from Kentucky-to another item in the tariff of the last session--the duty upon cottonbagging, raised to from 50 to 100 per cent., according to the cost of the article, and which should certainly have gone down to 20 per cent. under the pledges of the compromise act. But, at the very moment of violating these pledges, by the act of the last session, which struck a fatal blow at the whole commerce of the cotton States--as if to add a sting to injustice and violated faith, this duty was enhanced beyond the rate imposed by the tariff of 1828. Now, sir, this duty is distinguished from others, as unjust as they are, in this: that the whole of its burden is imposed on the cotton-planters, and its whole benefits upon some twenty-one manufacturers of cotton-bagging. No other class in the country has any interest in it, one way or the other. It is, then, a duty which simply takes money out of the pockets of the planters, to put in the pockets of a few manufacturers of cotton-bagging. Now, sir, when I tell you that the duty on the bagging I annually use to bale my crop exceeds the amount of the taxes I pay to my State, you may form some estimate of its gross injustice-inflicted, I suppose, by the paternal authority of a protecting Government, to punish the planting States for opposing the protective system.

But I can assure the Senators from Kentucky, that, in supporting this, and all other items of protection in the tariff, they are pursuing a suicidal policy as regards the great interests of their State. For, let me tell them that, under the combined influence of interest and indignation, the people of the cotton States are not only making their own bagging out of cotton, but raising their own supplies of live stock. And I can, moreover, assure them, that where they can add one hundred dollars to the demand for their bagging, by this policy, they will diminish the demand for their live stock to the amount of ten thousand. Sir, I confidently believe that Kentucky and all the Northwestern States are as deeply interested in free trade, and the consequent prosperity of the exporting States, as those States themselves. There is the great market for their live stock. And, although the manufacturing States furnish them with scarcely any market at all, they are destroying the prosperity of their best customers, and the price of their own staple of trade, to give bounties to the Eastern manufacturers, at the expense of the great body both of their own producers and consumers. And I will here state, in confirmation of these views, that the price of Kentucky pork in South Carolina, in the last year, sunk down from four to two dollars a hundred-a depression wholly without example.

A few words, Mr. President, as to the mode in which a prohibitive tariff, whether partial or absolute, operates to reduce the value of the staples of exportation-an operation now in active progress. Your tariff, to the amount of its prohibitions, creates a necessity of importing specie to pay for the staples we export. It may be safely assumed that the present tariff excludes twenty-five millions of foreign manufactures, annually, that would be imported under a revenue duty of 20 per cent. This gives rise to the importation of specie to a large amount. Now, every dollar of specie imported.fdi

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minishes, in that proportion, the value of the whole mass; and, if we assume that in two or three years the imports beyond the exports would amount to thirty-five millions, our currency being seventy millions, the value of money for all domestic purposes would be depreciated in proportion, and ev. ery domestic article increased in its money price. But the very operation which would depreciate the value of specie, and increase money prices here, by draining the specie from the nations of Europe who consume our cotton, would appreciate the value of specie, and depress money prices there. Such was the experience of Great Britain in 1840, from having to export specie to the continent for grain. Now, as the price of the staples of expor tation is fixed by the money price abroad-principally in England-it is clear that a prohibitive tariff depresses the price of our staples at home and abroad, while it increases that of every species of protected articles.

Having thus examined the operation of the preseni tariff as a general burden upon the great consuming interest, and a special one upon the exporting interest, I will say a few words on its operation on the revenue. I have shown that the gross income from imports in New York has been reduced from $1,263,000 in January, to $255,000 in December. If this latter month be assumed as a criterion for the present year, the custom-house at New York will yield only about $3,000,000; and all of them to gether, probably, not more than six or seven mil. lions. If this falling off in the customs should continue, the Government will have to live principally on loans, or by direct taxes, or come to a stand As I am sure the country is prepared to sanction neither of these, the only remaining course is to reduce the tariff so as to render it a mere revenue measure; and I confidently believe this would increase the revenue five millions of dollars. Let the average duties be twenty per cent--none rising above twenty-five per cent.; and I will hazard my reputation on the result. The experienced statesmen of England concur in the opinion that, even there, with a limited coast covered with reve nue-cutters, that rate of duty gives indemnity to the smuggler for all his hazards. How much more truly must this be the case here, with our immense maritime and inland frontier, the latter of which offers such temptations and facilities for smuggling from the British provinces?

Then, sir, if we look to the people at large-the wealth of the country, the credit and honor of the Government-every consideration requires us to fulfil the terms of the second resolution, in so modifying the tariff as to reduce it to a fair constitu. tional measure.

I have occupied the attention of the Senate so long upon these topics, that I shall make but a few very brief remarks upon the third resolution. No reform can be radical' which does not reduce the expenditures of the Government. These expenditures have enormously increased since I first entered Congress; and it is almost astounding to look at the progress of this increase in the last twenty years. I will first remark, that the current expenses of this Government since the year 1823-viz: the expenses of the army, the navy, and all the branches of the Government--have increased 100 per cent. But, to give the Senate some idea of this tendency to increase-surpassing that even of the currency--I will call its attention to some of the contingent branches of expenditures: they will serve to illustrate the effects of our system of duties, more than any reasoning. In 1823, the expenses of collecting the customs were $756,000 with a revenue of $19,000,000. In the year 1840, the expenses of collecting the public revenue were $1,542,000, more than double the amount, with a revenue of but $16,000,000. The contingent expenses of Congress for the year 1823 were $50,000. The contingent expenses of the same body for the year 1840 were $276,000-an enormous increase! This serves to illustrate the genius of the times. We are going on in a course of extravagance, the natural result of which must inevitably be the utter destruction of the Government, sinking under its own corruptions.

Mr. President, I have very great doubt (and it has been a subject of consideration with me for many years) whether a free representative Government can permanently exist under any system of indirect taxation. But I have no hesitation in expressing the opinion, that a federal republic like ours, embracing manifold pursuits and conflicting interests, jaffected by taxation, cannot endure under

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a system of impost duties combining revenue and protection. Such, unfortunately, is our system: and I now propose to show that it renders Congress practically an irresponsible and despotic power, in exercising the greatest and most vital of all the functions of Government-that of imposing the burdens of taxation on the people. To be satisfied, we need only to look around us. Never, since I entered Congress-more than twenty years agohave I known a time when a fixed majority, which controlled our legislation on the subject of taxation, were not in favor of high duties, and heavy taxation. In this they were sustained, and many of them urged on, by the clamors of their constituents.

Now the apparent anomaly is easily comprehended by those who have studied the philosophy and marked the working of the protective system. It confers bounties, instead of imposing burdens, upon the constituents of those who constitute a legislative majority on all measures in relation to the sub. ject. This majority which impose taxes, so far from contributing to pay them, actually receive the largest portion of them in the shape of bounties. They have a pecuniary interest in the taxes-receiving nine dollars where they pay one, or the Government receives one. Thus, the entire balance of the Government is destroyed. The majority here impose burdens upon those to whom they are not responsible. If we had an equal system of taxation, every member would feel his responsibility to his own constituents, and, through them, to the whole country; as it is, he is not responsible to his constituents for imposing taxes, but for not imposing them. His greatest political offence would be, to reduce taxation. Now, I ask you, what hope is there that economy and retrenchment will ever supersede waste and extravagance while we adhere to the protecting system? We see members of Congress, representing States proverbially economical in the management of their own affairs, voting here for all sorts of extravagant appropriations. Now I invoke Senators to bring their minds to the solemn consideration of this subject. They cannot long evade it.

The welfare of the country, and the very existence of the Government, are involved in it. Let us, then, retrace our seps, and bring back the Government to the good old doctrines of the primitive days of Jefferson. Reduce the duties to a revenue scale; reduce the expenses of the Government to a scale of rigid economy; leave industry unshackled; protect every one from violence and injustice, and leave him to enjoy, undiminished, the fruits of his labor. Do all this, and you will restore the people to prosperity and contentment; restore the credit of the Government, replenish its exhausted treasury; arrest the Government's sinking under its own corruptions, and make it-what our ancestors intended it to be-an example and a light to all the nations of the earth.

SPEECH OF MR. TAPPAN,

OF OHIO.

In Senate, January 16, 1843-On the joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, so as to limit the term of office of the judges of the supreme and inferior courts, as follows:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (two-thirds of both Houses concurring therein,) That the fol lowing article be proposed to the Legislatures of the several States as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which, when raufied by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the said States, shall be valid as a part of said Constitution; namely:

The judges of the supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices for the term of seven years, if so long they shall behave themselves well; and the commissions of all judges of said courts who may be in office at the time of the adoption of this amendment shall expire as follows-that is to say: those who shall have been in office twenty years, shall expire in one year; those who have been in office ten years, shall expire in three years; and the commissions of all who have not been in office ten years, shall expire in seven years.

Mr. PRESIDENT: If any man supposes that the Constitution of the United States is so perfect that no alteration in any part of it would make it better, he is as far from truth, in my opinion, as he who seeks to change it to suit the party tactics of the day; and who, finding himself thwarted in some favorite project, by the independent exercise of some constitutional power, should, for that reason, seek to abrogate that power. The Constitution was formed by as wise and patriotic a body of men as ever assembled together; but they were men, who were agreeing upon the mode in which new and untried experiment in government

Amendment to the Constitution-Mr. Tappan.

should be made. With but limited experience in the working of a Government founded on the principle of popular sovereignty, it is astonishing that their work is as perfect as it is; that it is so well adapted "to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity."

But, sir, the Constitution did not come from the hands of its founders perfect in all its parts. The State conventions, in adopting it, recommended many alterations and amendments, which have been agreed to; and other amendments have from time to time been made; so that it is, in many particulars, changed from its original form. It should be further amended, from time to time, as experience may point out its defects; and so as to adapt it more and more to the objects which the States of this Union had in view in establishing it; and especially should it be amended, whenever it is found to contravene those principles upon which our Governments are founded. Ithink that the Constitution, in establishing the judicial department of our Government, does contravene those fundamental principles. I am satisfied that experience has proved its defects, and that public opinion calls loudly for its amendment. I therefore perform an obvious duty in proposing this resolution.

The Constitution of the United States substantially and practically makes the judges of the United States courts officers for life. In form they are to hold their offices "during good behavior;" they may "be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors;" but no judge "shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members [of the Senate] present" [at his trial.] The power of impeachment has been tried, until it is well settled that no judge can be removed from office in that way. This Senate is a political as well as a judicial body. Our judges are most of them zealous, if not active politicians; and when impeached, find, in more than one-third of the Senate, political friends willing to screen them from punishment. A judge may become insane the day after his nomination is confirmed; and yet he remains a judge for life: no power but death can constitutionally remove him from office. So, if he becomes an habitual drunkard, drunkenness is not technically a crime, or misdemeanor. So it is of many things which disqualify a man from being a judge, and which (if the office were elective) would induce the people to leave him out as totally unfit. They are not impeachable offences, and therefore not sufficient to remove him from office.

To discharge the duties of a judge, it is requisite that the individual should have "a sound mind in a sound body." The duty of a judge cannot be well performed without great labor. There is no occupation of the mind which requires more study. In the prime and vigor of life, this labor may be performed, and its performance may be a pleasure; but your judges grow old, and infirm; neither fit for, nor capable of, the bodily or mental labor exacted by their station. In consideration of this, some States have introduced a limitation of age, and do not allow a judge to remain on the bench after he has arrived at the prescribed time of life. We have no way to get rid of such a judge, but by impeachment.

Many cases have occurred since the adoption of the Federal Constitution, of judges having become unfit to discharge their duties. Two in our history place the operation of the constitutional provision as to tenure of office, in such a strong and absurd point of view, as to justify their special notice. The first is the case of Judge Pickering, formerly of the United States court for the district of New Hampshire. He had become insane by sickness, or intemperance, (it does not appear clearly which,) and was wholly incapable of performing his duty. The people of New Hampshire wished to get rid of the judge, and there was no way in which this could be done, but by impeachment. He could not regularly be impeached, unless he had committed "treason, bribery, or some other high crime or misdemeanor;" all he had done, was, to go on the bench in court time, either insane or drunk, swear some profane oaths, and decide a cause differently from-what, by law, it ought to be decided: all this was bad enough; but it would not have happened, if the persons attending the court had conducted with propriety, and had left the judge to hold his court by himself, if they could in no other way prevent

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such outrageous conduct. But in all this, the judge had committed no impeachable offence. There was no treason or bribery to charge him with; and to determine what were crimes or misdemeanors, it was necessary to examine the statute laws of the United States, and in no other place could a description of them be found; but no law of the United States made it a crime or misdemeanor in a judge to make an erroneous adjudication. Nor did the law declare it a crime to be insane, or drunk, or to use profane language. The United States have no common-law offences, and these were not declared such by statute. This was a sad dilemma for a great nation to be in; but the necessity of getting rid of the judge was imperative, and, instead of taking the straightforward course, and recommend ing an alteration of this absurd provision of the Constitution, which they had found so mischievous in practice, the House of Representatives exhibited four articles of impeachment against the judge: the three first were for his decisions in a cause on trial before him, which were undoubtedly erroneous, but not criminal; the fourth was for appearing on the bench of his court drunk, and using profane language; which was indeed highly reprehensible, but it was not contrary to law. And there is much reason to doubt whether insanity was not construed drunkenness, from the necessity of the case-it being more plausible ground for impeachment; for it seems, by the proceedings, that it was suggested to the court by a son of the judge, that, at the time of the conduct charged against him, he was insane, and remained so at the time of trial; which suggestion was supported by the testimony of two members of the court, and by the affidavits of several persons whose integrity and veracity were unimpeached. After having this matter before them a year, the Senate at last tried the judge in his absence, found him guilty on all the charges, and removed him from office.

The other case was that of Judge Duvall, of the Supreme Court, who sat on the bench of that court more than ten years after he had become so deaf that he could not hear a word that was spoken in court. If the whole court had been as deaf as Judge Duvall, they must have sat there until death removed them; for, after the farce of removing Judge Pickering, it was not possible to get up and carry through such another perversion of law and justice. Now, if a judge become insane, a drunkard, deaf, superannuated, or in any way incapable of performing his duty, he must remain an incumbent of the office. Let the necessity of getting rid of him be ever so urgent, he cannot be removed by impeachment, for he has committed no crime; and it would not now be suffered that any man should be impeached, and convicted of high crimes and misdemeanors, for acts which no court of law would dare to pronounce such.

The fundamental principle on which society and government repose in these States, is the perfect liberty and equality of our citizens. We adopt in theory, and without any limitation, the doctrine that the sovereign power exists at all times in the whole body of the people; and that so much of that power as the public peace and safety require to be exercised, can only act legitimately when it acts according to their will, as their instrument or servant. The State Governments and the General Government are differently organized, and have different duties to perform; but the same principles are the foundation of all of them in theory: in practice, there have been departures from themone of which it is the object of this amendment to correct. I believe, sir, that, for the number of our people, we are the strongest Government on earth. We owe this strength to our institutions-to the extent to which, in practice, we carry out our theories of government. And does not nis prove nat t will add to our security and strength to conform the practice of our State and National Governments entirely to the principles we profess? For myself, I declare freely, that I have no doubt it would add greatly to our security in "the enjoyment of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," and strengthen our Government much more, to have the exercise of all power more immediately by the people, in the election of all officers (judícial, as well as executive and legislative) for short periods of time, and by direct vote of the people.

Government, with us, is a practical science; so that there is little or no danger that theories will stand their ground long, unless they are tested and approved by experience. If our Government, instead of being spread over a continent, was in

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Amendment to the Constitution-Mr. Tappan.

cluded in a small territory, the inhabitants of which could meet with convenience in one assembly, to consult and agree on the manner in which their affairs should be conducted, no delegation of legislative power would be necessary; but, even then, the executive and judicial powers of such a community could not, with as much convenience, be exercised by the whole body of the people; and, therefore, the plan of delegating such powers to individuals, selected for their fitness to discharge such duties, would be adopted. Such has been the course of action of democratic communities in all ages. Power has been delegated from necessity, and always for short periods. Of the executive power of states, it is true that it has much oftener been held by usurpation, and force, or hereditary descent, than by delegation, in all Governments but our own. But the judicial power has, in all states, free or otherwise, been delegated by the sovereign for limited periods-generally not exceeding a year. I need not cite instances of such limited delegation of judicial power; history gives an account of no other. No nation or government ever made their judges entirely independent of themselves, until these States established their judicial tribunals.

We borrow, Mr. President, many of our fashions from England; but in giving our judges office during good behavior, removable only by impeachments, for high crimes or misdemeanors, we have committed a folly beyond what England or any other nation has given an example of. In England, at least from the time of the conquest, judges were appointed by the King, and held their offices during his pleasure. Their courts were often made the instruments of gross and outrageous tyranny-particularly under the Tudors; they became much more so under the Stuarts. This race of imbecility and vice (from the tyranny of whom our forefathers fled to America) exercised such a constant controlling power over their judges, and so openly dictated to them the judgments they rendered in prosecutions for political offences, that the impression became strong in the colonies in favor of a judiciary which should be independent of the appointing power. The same feeling had been created in England; so that at the revolution of 1688 the judges of England were made independent of the crown, by the enactment that they should hold their offices "so long as they should behave themselves well," but to be at all times removable by vote of both Houses of Parliament; so that every judge in that Government, since the revolution under William and Mary, has been dependent upon, and held his office at the will and pleasure of, the sovereign power in the state; for the Parliainent in that Government is not only held to be omnipotent, but is, practically, the sovereign power.

In forming the Federal Constitution, the tenure of judicial office seems to have been settled without debate, and without much consideration; and we are left to conjecture why the great men who composed the convention went so much beyond every other Government in creating a judiciary. Mr. Hamilton, in discussing this subject in the Federalist, states the desire the convention had to establish independent courts; but he gives no reason why the convention deemed it necessary to establish a judiciary who were not to be removed from office for any cause of disqualification whatever, unless they were convicted of a high crime or misdemeanor, by a court so constituted as to render a conviction impossible. I consider this part of our Constitution grossly defective. It is worse than defective; it is a provision in direct opposition to the whole spirit and intention of our Government; a power in the state holding office independent of the people-existing, as Mr. Burke said of the nobility of England, in contempt of the people.

I have not offered this amendment, Mr. President, from any view of its effecting the removal of incapable incumbents of office. If I had, I might refer Senators to the judges in this District, for an illustration of the monstrous folly of creating an independent judiciary upon the plan of the Federal Constitution. No, sir: it is not because A, B, or C is weak or wicked, that I press this amendment; it is because its direct and inevitable tendency is to create imbecility, and perpetuate igno

rance.

Men never have exerted themselves to acquire knowledge, or to be eminently useful to mankind, without the stimulus of ambition or necessity. Let

your soldiers understand that no service they can perform will raise them from the ranks, or secure them anything beyond their monthly pay-they may stand firm in battle; they may perform the usual routine of their duty; but this is all. If you would incite to heroism, you must hold out the incentive to heroic action-honors, rewards, promotion. How is it with your judge? What inducement has he to acquire knowledge, to make himself useful to his country? None whatever. He has an office for life, with a competent salary, which no power can diminish. He may be as idle and careless as he pleases; he may sell off his library, and forswear study; he may become imbecile and childish, or wicked and immoral; and he cannot be removed from office, unless he commits some high crime or misdemeanor. He has nothing more to expect. By our habits, a judge is not considered eligible as a candidate for any other office. Some gentlemen of the Supreme Court have, by themselves or friends, made, occasionally, feeble attempts to become candidates for the Presidency; but it is very clear that no such attempt can succeed. They must resign, and come without the charmed circle of judicial independence, before they can be on an equality, in this respect, with their fellow-citizens. He is like the soldier, who, by the usage of the service, can never become a captain. He may perform his circle of duty, and nothing more.

In an office which would seem to require more laborious study to qualify a man for the discharge of its duties than any other in our Government, you have made his continuance in office to have no dependence whatever on his industry or learning. "I have been appointed" (I have heard a judge say) 'for the learning I had, not for what I was expected to acquire." The judge performs his part of the contract with good faith if he does not become more ignorant, stupid, and vicious, as he grows older. Why is it that our chief executive officers are elected for short periods, but because reason and experience prove it necessary to secure the faithful performance of their duties, that they should be kept in constant dependence on the people? We would not have presidents or governors elected for life, or even for a long term of years; because it has been found unsafe and dangerous to intrust men with irresponsible power. It is as necessary to have wise and good men to expound, as to execute your laws. Like causes will always produce like effects. If it would be likely to corrupt the character, and destroy the usefulness of a president, to give him office for life, why would it not have the same effect upon a chief justice? If providing one with an office for life, with an ample salary, which cannot be diminished during his continuance in office, would render him an unsafe depositary of power in a free Government, why would it not the other? In both cases, the officer would have nothing more to expect from the people; it would, therefore, be altogether indifferent to him whether they were pleased with his conduct or not. The danger of removal is nothing, and to be left out is impossible to the judge; and yet you expect that he will be faithful to the Constitution; that he will be a vigilant guardian of public liberty, and feel a common sympathy with his countrymen in the support and maintenance of free principles of government.

Mr. President, the article in our Constitution which I seek to amend is utterly repugnant to, and at variance with, not only our principles of government, that the people are the sovereign power, but it is equally repugnant to our practice in every other office. All other officers-executive and legislative in the Federal and State Governments, are elected periodically. And for what reason are they so elected? Because, in no other way yet discovered can the Commonwealth be sure of being constantly served by the most capable men. All officers of Government are servants of the sovereign; but, in these United States, the freest country on earth, we have invented a plan by which the public servant is altogether above his master, and accountable to no one for his conduct. The only person who is free from all responsibility, independent of all control, is the judge. It was the intention of the convention which formed the Constitution to establish an independent judiciary, say the defenders of this article. "A judiciary, independent of a king or executive alone, is a good thing; but independence of the will of the nation is a solecism, at least in a Republican Government," says Mr. Jefferson. Of what, it may be asked, was it the intention of the convention to render the judges independent? By adequate sal

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aries their pecuniary independence may be secured; but office for life does not secure them from private and personal influences. They will have as strong political attachments as other men; and they will make their judicial action subservient to par y purposes, if so disposed, the more readily, as ney are n no danger of .oss by for life place them above or beyond the influence of personal prejudices for or against those who may be suitors in this court? Most certainly it will not; but it will leave them free to indulge such prejudices to any extent.

Wi.. offree

This clause of the Constitution was inserted by the enemies of free government-by those who did not believe in the people governing themselves— who wanted to build up some power in the State which should exist and act independent of the will of the people, and should also control that will. The real friends of freedom in the conventionthe majority-were deceived by the notion of an independent judiciary, without seeing clearly of what it was sought to render judges independent, and without reflecting upon the inevitable conse quences of building up in the State a power not independent, but really hostile to its fundamental principles.

"The judicial power" (says Mignet) "may be temporary when it is derived from the people, because, being dependent on all, it is dependent on no one."

The two great parties that exist in all free governments (which may justly, and without offence to any one, be styled the conservative and the movement parties,) had their representatives in the convention which formed the Federal Constitution, as they have their representatives now in Congress. It was this conservative party which wanted an Executive and Senate for life, and which obtained a judiciary, that, from its organization, naturally belongs to them. With the fact that the ju diciary are of the conservative party, I find no fault if the majority of the people are of that party. But, if the conservative party in our Government is in a minority, (as it has been most of the time since the adoption of the Constitution) then the arrangement which gives to that minority the whole judi cial power of the nation is extremely unjust; it is what the majority ought not for a day to submit to. If the conservative party persuade a majority of the people of the United States to adopt and act on their theories of government, they can, on my principles, elect a judiciary to please them, and I will be content; but I cannot consent that their influence should be made perpetual in any depart ment of the Government, whatever may be the fluctuation of parties. We have seen the consequences which have resulted from a conservative judiciary opposed to a majority of the nation in political prin ciples. More than two generations of men have passed off the stage while the late Mr. Marshall was chief justice of the United States; he and his brethren were Federalists or conservatives, liberal constructionists, and interpreted the Constitution in a way to strengthen and consolidate the Federal power; while the executive and legislative officers, and a great majority of the people of the United States, were of the movement party-were Democrats, and in favor of a strict construction of the Constitution, and of preserving to the State Governments every power not expressly delegated to the General Government. The judiciary of the United States, (says Mr. Jefferson,)

"Is the subtle corps of sappers and miners, constantly work ing under ground to undermine the foundations of our confederated fabric. They are construing our Constitution from co-ordination of a general and special Government to a general and supreme one alone. This will lay all things at their feet, and they are too well versed in English law to forget the maxim "Boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem."

After the election of Mr. Jefferson, the judiciary of the United States ceased to be the representative or servant of the people in our courts, but it was the faithful representative of exploded princi ples and obselete maxims in government. It perpetuated the power of the Federal or conservative party, and gave them, though a small minority in the nation, the whole judicial power. Equally wrong would it have been in principle, had all this been reversed-had the court been of the Democratic or movement party, and the majority of the people of the Federal or conservative; because, in such case, as in the real one, they would not have been the true exponents of the public will on the bench of justice. As well might we allow a foreign Government to appoint our judges, asto allow a generation of men to appoint them, who, with all

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