27TH CONG....3D SESS. State, twenty-eight years thereafter, an alliance for the suppression of the slave trade, by arms and remonstrances, was negotiated between the two powers. The President of the United States, in his message to the Senate, and in that part of it which relates to the African articles, three times refers to the article in the Ghent treaty; and so refers to it as to make it the cause and the justification for the present stipulations. He says: "The early and prominent part which the Government of the United States has taken for the abolition of this unlawful and inhuman traffic, is well known. By the 10th article of the treaty of Ghent, it is declared that the traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice, and that both his Majesty and the United States are de sirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire abolition: and it is thereby agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavors to accomplish so desirable an ob ject" "In my message at the commencement of the present ses sion of Congress, I endeavor to state the principles which this Government supports, respecting the right of search and the immunity of flags. Desirous of maintaining those principles fully, at the same time that existing obligations should be fulfilled, I have thought it most consistent with the honor and dignity of the country, that it should execute its own laws, and perform its own obligations, by its own means and its own power. "It has been thought, therefore, expedient, not only in ac cordance with the stipulations of the treaty of Ghent, but at the same time as removing all pretext on the part of others for violating the immunities of the American flag upon the seas, as they exist and are defined by the law of nations, to en ter into the articles now submitted to the Senate." Here the Ghent treaty is quoted--three times quoted-to justify this alliance. The stipulation for the eighty-gun squadron is presented as growing out of the Ghent treaty-as fulfilling the obligations of that treaty-as being in accordance with the stipulations of that treaty; when a rerecurrence to the treaty shows that it contains no such obligation--no such stipulation. That treaty was made near thirty years ago; and certainly this is very late in the day to find out a new meaning in it. But no such meaning is there; and our Secretary of State has taken a great liberty with the President, in getting him to sign what the facts will not justify. The next piece of evidence to which I refer, to show that the British are the authors of the alliance articles in the present treaty, is the engagement entered into between a British and an American captain on the coast of Africa, in 1840; and which was so promptly rejected by Mr. Van Buren. That engagement was in these words: "Commander William Tucker, of her Britannic Majesty's sloop Wolverine, and senior officer on the west coast of Africa, and Lieutenant John S. Paine, commanding the United Stats schooner Grampus, in order to carry into execution, as far as possible, the orders and views of their respective Governments respecting the suppression of the slave-trade, hereby request each other, and agree to detain all vessels under American colors found to be fully equipped for and engaged in the slave. trade; that, if proved to be American property, they shall be handed over to the United States schooner Grampus, or any other American cruiser; and that, if proved to be Spanish, Portuguese, Brazilian, or English property, to any of her Bri tannic Majesty's craisers employed on the west coast of Africa for the suppression of the slave-trade, so far as their respective Jaws and treaties will permit. "Signed and exchanged at Sierra Leone, this 11th day of March, 1840." This engagement, as I have said before, was the seminal principle of the present alliance; and the promptitude with which it was disavowed and rejected by Mr. Van Buren, as contrary to the principles and policy of this Government, gives us the fullest assurance that, if he had continued President, the double alliance which we now have, and of which that little Sierra Leone agreement was the seed, would not have taken place. The 8th and 9th articles of the Washington city treaty, of 1842, are nothing but the enlarged edition of the Sierra Leone engagement of 1810; and the British negro colony on the coast of Africa was a very proper place to commence the entanglement in which we are now involved, and from which a wise and patriotic President temporarily relieved us. Truly, the British had many reasons for interfering in our late Presidential election, and seconding the Federal cry of--change! change! change! . I crown these historical facts in favor of my assertion, that the British minister was the author of the articles in the present treaty, by recurring again to the studied and ominous ambiguities of the President's message. I recur to them, to prove the contrary of their intention. Their intention was to establish the alliance as being of American origin, and voluntary: I recur to them to prove its origin to be British, and compulsory. Without reading the passages over again, I refer to the phrases: "Seizure and detention of American vessels by British cruisers on the coast of Africa: The British Trea'y—Mr. Benton. treaty signed in London by the five powers: not officially communicated to this Government: no application to become party to it: but the five powers attentive to our course: discussion, warmth, and excitement in Europe about our course: better to execute our laws, by our own means, and our own power: delicacy of the right of search: immunity of flags: visitation by cruisers lead to dangerous results: as removing all pretext on the part of others for violating the immunities of the American flag: therefore, entered into the articles now submitted to the Senate." I point to these phrases in the President's message, so ambiguous and so unsatisfactory, always raising a curiosity which they do not satisfy; and the second member of each sentence always turning off from the conclusions to which the first member of it would lead. I point to these as the crowning evidences of my assertion, and as betraying what they were intended to conceal-that these anti-slave-trade stipulations are of British origin, were given to our Secretary by the special minister, and by our Secretary presented to the American public as his own. This is my opinion; and if anybody wants any further evidence, they may have it in the magnitude and openness of the kindred movements--the abolition movements-now going on in London. Abolitionism is the father of these articles: that father resides in London, but his children are here. Conscious of the dangerous ground upon which he was treading, the President has endeavored to shield his work behind the stipulations of the Ghent treaty. Three times, in the course of a few brief paragraphs, he has invoked that treaty, and called it in for the justification of his own. Three times he has called it to his help. But, stop. Let the message speak for itself. Hear it. "By the tenth article of the treaty of Ghent, it is declared that the traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of hu manity and justice; and that both his Majesty and the United States are desirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire abolition; and it is, therefore, agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavors to accomplish so desirable an object. The Government of the United States has. by law, declared the African slave trade piracy," &c. Desirous of maintaining those principles fully, at the same time that existing obligations should be fulfilled, I have thought it most consistent with the honor and dignity of the country that it should execute its own laws, and perform its own obligations, by its own means, and its own power. It has ben thought, therefore, expedient, not only in accordance with the stipulations of the treaty of Ghent, but, at the same time, as re moving all pretext on the part of others for violating the immu. nities of the American flag upon the seas, as they exist and are defined by the law of nations, to enter into the articles now sub. mitted to the Senate." This is the message-this its appeal to the Ghent treaty, to its obligations, its stipulations: as if it contained any stipulation or any obligation in favor of this alliance! Vain invocation! and more insidious than vain! The Ghent treaty can give them no help. It has no aid or countenance to lend them. Though weak and reprehensible as is this tenth article, yet it binds us to nothing, and was harmless under the previous administrations. It was an imprudent concession to dormant abolitionism at the time it was made; but it is impossible to charge it with the crime of this alliance. We are fulfilling no existing obligation arising under it, in raising this subsidiary fleet, or in sending forth our Quixotic ambassadors. There is no accordance, in these naval and diplomatic engagements, with anything in the vague stipulations of the Ghent treaty. This fighting on the coast of Africa, and remonstrating through Europe, Asia, Africa, and the two Americas, is no continuation of the statutory enactments against the slave-trade contemplated by the treaty of Ghent. That treaty cannot father the eighty guns, and the remonstrating ambassadors; and the appeal to it to justify these measures, was an admission that justification was wanted, and could not be found. And here we must pause, to remark the disingenuousness of this invocation. Always remembering that I consider the message the work of the Secretary, I point out, to the reprehension of the Senate and the country, the errors of fact which it contains, to mislead the public mind; and, among these, I now have to point out these three invocations of the Ghent treaty to justify this British alliance, when that treaty contains not a syllable which can justify the invo cations. The French Government has taken care of itself: it has refused to sign the quintuple alliance, or the substitute for it. We have signed the substitute; and may thank the French Chamber of Deputies, and the pamphlet of General Cass, that it is no worse. The debates of that chamber, the arguments of that pamphlet, and the refusal of France Senate. to sign, have doubtless prevented the "official" communication of the five-powers treaty to us, and the formal application to us to become parties to it. Such a communication, and such an application, in the present deplorable constitution of the Federal Executive-diseased dread of war, and cankered love of peace--must have been indescribably calamitous. One more view of this eighty-gun squadron, and I dismiss it from my speech. ments. 1 am no man to invoke our Constitution on every petty occasion, and to eke out all arguments with a cry of a violation of that sacred instrument. The Salaminian galley was only launched on great occasions. I am slow to cheapen our Constitution by appealing to it in doubtful or frivolous circumstances. But it does seem to me that here there is room neither for doubt nor frivolity; and that the raising this squadron for the defence of Africa, and for the redress of moral evils in that remote region, is an act wholly without the pale of our Constitu tion. To Congress alone it belongs to raise fleetsand that, for the defence of our own country: but here is a fleet to be raised, not by Congress, but by the President, the Senate, and the Queen of Great Britain; and this fleet for the defence, not of these confederated States, but of African tribes; and for the suppression, not of political, but of moral evils. It does seem to me that Congress itself could have no power to do this-still less the President, Senate, and Queen Victoria. To provide and maintain navies, is a power specifically granted to Congress: it is a legislative power-and properly so; because, with us, the questions of war and peace, of fleets and armies, of loans and taxes, are all legislative powers, and peculiarly under the charge of the people's immediate representatives. It will not do to deceive ourselves by analogies to other governOurs is a government of limitations, and of separate departments. Each department must keep within its own sphere. It must not transcend its own limits-much less invade those of another. The treaty-making power is a distinct power, and its acts are the supreme law of the land. But it is not everything which the President and Senate, and a foreign prince, or an Indian chief, may choose to insert in a treaty, that is this supreme law. Were it so, there would soon be no power in our country but that of the President and Senate, acting with some foreign kings, or with savage tribes. To gain this character of supreme law, or even of law at all, the subject-matter of the treaty must be within the competency of the treaty-making power: it must be a subject for treaty regulation, and not for legislative, judicial, or executive action. And this competency must be tried by our own Constitution, and not by the constitutions or practices of European monarchs. What is fit matter for treaty regulation in one country, is not so in another; and in no country is the treaty-making power more limited and circumscribed than in our own. The mass of the powers of our Government are given to Congress; and whatever is given to Congress is taken away from all other powers. Now, apply these principles to the act in question. This treaty stipulates to prepare, equip, and maintain a squadron-to keep it up for five years, and afterwards, until the President of the United States, or the British Government, gives notice for it to be withdrawn-to employ it, in conjunction with a British squadron, for the defence of Africans, and for suppressing the moral evil of slave-taking; the squadron to be of eighty guns at the least. Now, the preparing, equipping, and maintaining in service this squadron, is a legislative act, specifically given by the Constitution to Congress. Thus far, it is an invasion of the legislative department. All the rest is sheer usurpation, such as Congress itself could not make legal. Congress itself cannot create a squadron for five years; for the same, or any other Congress, may repeal the law. It cannot make the continuance of the squadron dependent upon the will of the President, or of a foreign prince; but it must depend upon the will of Congress itself. It cannot raise fleets for objects foreign to the objects of the Union-as the defence of Africa; or for redressing moral wrongs--as the suppression of the African custom of selling one another; but the fleet must be raised for the defence of the Union, or of the rights and interests of its citizens abroad. Thus, the treaty stipulation for this squadron is, in its first step, an invasion of the legislative authority, and is void: in every subsequent step, it is sheer usurpation, and such as Congress could not legalize if it would. I wish to be 12 27TH CONG....SD SESS. APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE. understood; and what I mean to say is, that Congress itself cannot legalize this treaty !--that Congress itself cannot raise this squadron for five years, for this foreign object! The Constitution names this subject, and gives to Congress a certain degree of power over it: it was to prohibit the importation of slaves after the year 1808. That power has been exercised; it has been exhausted; and it is fair to infer that it was all that was intended to be granted. In a government of limited powers, when a certain quantum is given, it is all that is to be taken. In this case, the authority to prohibit the importation of slaves after a given period, was an authority obtained by compromise, and after much hesitation and difficulty in the convention. It was a long time before even this much, on a subject so differently viewed in different sections of the Union, could be agreed upon. After this, is it to be supposed that a clause could have been obtained to clothe Congress-to clothe the Representatives of the people themselves, much less the President, Senate, and a foreign prince--with power to raise fleets for terms of years, to put down the slave-trade in Africa itself? Certainly not! No one that reads the Madison Papers on this head can suppose, for an instant, that this power ever would have been granted. Then how is it obtained? By assuming the illimitability, as well as the supremacy of the treatymaking power! by assuming that that power is as large here as it is in Great Britain! by assuming that it may absorb the legislative power-that it may transcend the legislative power-that it may do what Congress can, and what Congress cannot-that it may employ arms for the suppression of moral evils, and send the ships and armies of the United States quixotting through the world to redress the wrongs of the human race. the treaty-making power, I, for one, deny the conAs part of stitutionality of this squadron engagement; and shall vote against the ratification of this treaty. As part of the legislative power, 1 again deny its constitutionality; and shall vote against the appropriations to carry it into effect. I shall have two chances at the unconstitutional, dangerous, and improvident scheme; and shall make the best use of both. I will fight the appropriations annually, through so many of the five years they are to continue as I shall have to remain here. But it is not so much on this floor, as in the other end of the Capitol, that these appropriations should be fought. That duty belongs especially to the immediate Representatives of the people. If they give up to these eighty guns, and five years, and this redress of moral wrongs in Africa, they give up everything. The President and Senate, with a king or a savage that can sign a writing and call it a treaty, may send as many ships as they please, to as many countries as the please, for as many years as they please, and for any object that suits the pleasure or interest of the moment. I shall move to strike these articles from the treaty. Even if proper in themselves, (which they are not,) they are improperly placed in this treaty, and made to play an undue part in its ratification. The Senators from the non-slaveholding States can hardly be expected to vote against a treaty that contains stipulations which, in the present state of the abolition question, presents itself so powerfully to the sympathies of so many. It is presented as an indissoluble part of the treaty, involving the loss of the whole in its own loss; and war, horrid war, is denounced if the treaty fails. Of course, all the lovers of peace, be it what sort of peace it may, must retain the articles, to save the treaty. They act a great and undue part in assuring the ratification; and, therefore, are wrongly placed, even if proper in themselves. But it is a stipulation which is not proper in itself, but hideously and frightfully wrong. It is unconstitutional and impolitic, novel and dangerous. It entangles us in a foreign alliance for a foreign object. It engages us in a foreign, distant, dangerous, and expensive service It requires money which we have not to spare, and men who are wanted on our own frontiers. It hitches on our little navy to the great navy of Great Britain, and threatens us with a realization of the fabled alliance of the giant and he dwarf. It deprives us of our independence for five years certain, and longer if the present party shall continue in power. If I fail in my motion to strike out if this stipulation is retained in the treaty, and ratified, and the appropriations by the two Houses-if all this is done, I do not voted Say, tear up the Declaration of Independence! But The British Tenty- Mr. Benton, talks too neces I do say, Take it down; dislodge it from its con- I proceed to the third subject and last article in as the correspondence on all these points; and it is only from looking into past history, and cotemporaneous circumstances, that we can search for the origin and design of this stipulation, so unnecessary in the present state of international courtesy, and so useless, unless something unusual and extraordinary is intended. Looking into these sources, and we are authorized to refer the origin and design of the stipulation to the British minister, and to consider it as one of the objects of the special mission with which we have been honored.* Be this as it may, I do not like the article. Though fair upon its face, it is difficult of execution. As a 'Since the ratification of the treaty by the United States Sen. "Lord Ashburton went into an explanation of the 10th ar ed upon his duties, and was probably desirous, t that juncture, August, 1842. Senate. general proposition, atrocious offenders, and especially between neighboring nations, ought to be given up; but that is better done as an affair of consent and discretion, than under the constraints and embarrassments of a treaty obligation. Political offenders ought not to be given up; but, under the stern requisitious of a treaty obligation, and the benefit of an ex parte accusation, political offenders may be given up for murder, or other crimes, real or pretended; and then dealt with as their Government pleases. Innocent persons should not be harassed with groundless accusations; and there is no limit to these vexations, if all emigrants are placed at the mercy of malevolent informers, subjected to arrest in a new and strange land, examined upon ex parte testimony, and sent back for trial if a probable case is made out against them. This is a subject long since considered in our country, and on which we have the benefit both of wise opinions and of some experience. Mr. Jefferson explored the whole subject when he was Secretary of State under President Washington, and came to the conclusion that these surrenders could only be made under three limitations: 1. Between coterminous countries. 2. For high offences. 3. A special provision against political offenders. Under these limitations, as far back as the year 1793, Mr. Jefferson proposed to Great Britain and Spain (the only countries with which we held coterminous dominions, and only for their adjacent provinces) a mutual delivery of fugitive criminals. His proposition was in these words: "Any person having committed murder of malice prepense, not of the nature of treason, or forgery, within the United States or the Spanish provinces adjoining thereto, and fleeing from the justice of the country, shall be delivered up by the Government where he shall be found, to that from which he fled, whenever demanded by the same " This was the proposition of that great statesman: and how different from those which we find in this treaty! Instead of being confined to coterminous dominions, the jurisdiction of the country is taken for the theatre of the crime; and that includes, on the part of Great Britain, possessions all over the world, and every ship on every sea that sails under her flag. Instead of being confined to two offences of high degree--murder and forgery-one against life, the other against property-this article extends to seven offences; some of which may be incurred for a shilling's worth of property, and another of them without touching or injuring a human being. Instead of a special provision in favor of political offenders, the insurgent or rebel may be given up for murder, and then hanged and quartered for treason; and in the long catalogue of seven offences, a charge may be made, and an ex parte case established, against any political offender which the British Government shall choose to pursue. To palliate this article, and render it more acceptable to us, we are informed that it is copied from the 27th article of Mr. Jay's treaty. That apology for it, even if exactly true, would be but a poor recommendation of it to the people of the United States. Mr. Jay's treaty was no favorite with the American people, and especially with that part of the people which constituted the Republican party. Least of all was this 27th article a favorite with them. It was under that article that the famous Jonathan Robbins, alias Thomas Nash, was surrendered-a surrender which contributed largely to the defeat of Mr. Adams, and the overthrow of the Federal party, in 1800. The apology would be poor, if true: but it happens to be not exactly true. The article in the Webster treaty differs widely from the one in Jay's treaty--and all for the worse. The imitation is far worse than the original-about as much worse as modern Whigery is worse than ancient Federalism. Here are the two articles; let us compare them: MR. WEBSTER'S TREATY. "It is agreed that the United States and her Britannic Majes ty shall, upon mutual requisitions by them, or their ministers, officers, or authorities, respectively made, deliver up to justice all persons who, beingcharged with the crime of murder, or as sault with intent to commit murder, or piracy, or arson, Or robbery, or forgery, or the utterance of forged papers com. mitted within the jurisdiction of either, shall seek an asylum, or shall be found, within the territories of the other: provided, that this shall only be done upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the crime or offence had there been committed; and the respective judges and other magistrates shall have power, jurisdiction, and authority, upon com plaint made under oath, to issue a warrant for the apprehension of the fugitive or person so charged, that he mag be brought before such judges, or other magistrates, respec tively, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered, and if, on such hearing, the evidence MR. JAY'S TREATY. Article 27. "It is further agreed that his Majesty and the United States, on mutual requisitions by them, respectively, or by their respective ministers, or officers, authorized to make the same, Will deliver up to justice all persons who, being charged with murder, or forgery, committed within the jurisdiction of either, shall seek an asylum within any of the countries of the other: provided, that this shall only be done on such evidence of crim. inality as, according to the laws of the place where the fugi tive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial if the offence had there been cominitted. The expense of such apprehension and delivery shall be borne and defrayed by those who make the requisition, and receive the fugitive." These are the two articles, and the difference between them is great and striking. First, the number of offences for which delivery of the offender is to be made, is much greater in the present treaty. Mr. Jay's article is limited to two offences --murder and forgery: the two proposed by Mr. Jefferson; but without his qualification to exclude political offences, and to confine the deliveries to offenders from coterminous dominions. The preşent treaty embraces these two, and five others; The five added making seven in the whole. offences are-assault, with intent to commit murder; piracy; robbery; arson; and the utterance of forged paper. These additional five offences, though high in name, might be very small in degree. Assault, with intent to murder, might be without touching or hurting any person; for, to lift a weapon at a person within striking distance, without striking, is an assault: to level a fire-arm at a person within carrying distance, and without firing, is an assault; and the offence being in the intent, is difficult of proof. Mr. Jefferson excluded it, and so did Jay's treaty; because the offence was too small and too equivocal to be made a matter of international arrangement. Piracy was excluded, because it was absurd to speak of a pirate's country. He has no country. He is hostis humani generis-the enemy of the human race; and is hung wherever he is caught. The robbery might be of a shilling's worth of bread; the arson, of burning a straw shed; the utterance of forged paper, might be the emissi on or passing of a counterfeit sixpence. All these were excluded from Jay's treaty, because of their possible insignificance, and the door they opened to abuse in harassing the innocent, and in multiplying the chances for getting hold of a political offender for some other offence, and then punishing him for his politics. Striking as these differences are between the present article and that of Mr. Jay's treaty, there is a still more essential difference in another part; and a difference which nullifies the article in its only material bearing in our favor. It is this: Mr. Jay's treaty referred the delivery of the fugitive to the executive power. This treaty intervenes the Judiciary, and requires two decisions from a judge or magistrate before the Governor can act. This nullifies the treaty in all that relates to fugitive slaves guilty of crimes against their masters. In the eye of the British law, they have no master, and can commit no offence against such a person in asserting their liberty against him, even unto death. A slave may kill his master, if necessary to his escape. This is legal under British law; and, in the present state of abolition feeling throughout the British dominions, such killing would not only be considered fair, but in the highest degree meritorious and laudable. What chance for the recovery of such a slave under this treaty? Read it-the concluding part--after the word "committed," and see what is the process to be gone through. Complaint is to be made to a British judge or justice. The fugitive is brought before this judge or justice, that the evidence of the criminality may be heard and considered--such evidence as would justify the apprehension, commitment, and trial of the party, if the offence had been committed there. If, upon this hearing, the evidence be deemed suffi cient to sustain the charge, the judge or magistrate is to certify the fact to the executive authority; and then, and not until then, the surrender can be made. This is the process; and in all this the new treaty differs from Jay's. Under his treaty, the delivery was a ministerial act, referring itself to the authority of the Governor: under this treaty, it becomes a judicial act, referring itself to the dis cretion of the judge, who must twice decide against the slave (first, in issuing the warrant; and next, The British Treaty-Mr. Benton. in trying it) before the Governor can order the surrender. Twice judicial discretion interposes a barrier, which cannot be forced; and behind which the slave, who has robbed or killed his master, may repose in safety. What evidence of criminality will satisfy the judge, when the act itself is no crime in his eyes, or under his laws, and when all his sympathies are on the side of the slave? What chance would there be for the judicial surrender of offending slaves in the British dominions, under this treaty, when the provisions of our own Constitution, within the States of our own Union, in relation to fugitive slaves, cannot be executed? We all know that a judicial trial is immunity to a slave pursued by his owner, in many of our own States. Can such trials be expected to result better for the owner in the British dominion, where the relation of master and slave is not admitted, and where abolitionism is the policy of the Government, the voice of the law, and the spirit of the people? Killing his master in defence of his liberty, is no offence in the eye of British law or British people; and no slave will ever be given up for it. [Mr. WRIGHT here said, that counterfeiting American securities, or bank notes, was no of fence in Canada; and the same question might arise there in relation to forgers.] Mr. BENTON resumed. Better far to leave things as they are. Forgers are now given up in Canada, by Executive authority, when they fly to that province. This is done in the spirit of good neighborhood; and because all honest Governments have an interest in suppressing crimes, and repelling criminals. The governor acts from a sense of propriety, and the dictates of decency and justice. Not so with the judge. He must go by the law; and when there is no law against the offence, he has nothing to justify him in delivering the offender. Conventions for the mutual surrender of large offenders, where dominions are coterminous, might be proper. Limited, as proposed by Mr. Jefferson in 1793, and they might be beneficial in suppression of border crimes and the preservation of order and justice. But extended as this is to a long list of offenders-unrestricted as it is in the case of murder-applying to dominions in all parts of the world, and to ships in every sea,--it can be nothing but the source of individual annoyance and national recrimination. Besides, if we surrender to Great Britain, why not to Russia, Prussia, Austria, France, and all the countries of the world? If we give up the Irishman to England, why not the Poledo Russia, the Italian to Austria, the German to his prince; and so on throughout the catalogue of nations? Sir, the article is a pestiferous one; and as it is determinable upon notice, it will become the duty of the American people to elect a President who will give the notice, and so put an end to its existence. Addressing itself to the natural feelings of the country, against high crimes and border offenders, and in favor of political liberty, the message of the President communicating and recommending this treaty to us, carefully presents this article as conforming to our feelings in all these particulars. It is represented as applicable only to high crimesto border offenders; and to offences not political. In all this, the message is disingenuous and deceptive, and calculated to ravish from the ignorant and the thoughtless an applause to which the treaty is not entitled. It says: "The surrender to justice of persons who, having committed high crimes, seek an asylum in the territories of a neighbor. ing nation, would seem to be an act due to the cause of general justice, and properly belonging to the present state of civilization and intercourse. The British provinces of North Amer. ica are separated from the States of the Union by a line of sev eral thousand miles; and, along portions of this line, the amount of population on either side is quite considerable, chile the passage of the boundary is always easy. "Offenders against the law on the one side transfer themselves to the other. Sometimes, with great difficulty, they are brought to justice; but very often they wholly escape. A con sciousness of immunity, from the power of avoiding justice in this way, instigates the unprincipled and reckless to the commission of offences; and the peace and good neighborhood of the border are consequently often disturbed. "In the case of offenders fleeing from Canada into the United States, the Governors of States are often applied to for their surrender; and questions of a very embarrassing nature arise from these applications. It has been thought bighly important, therefore, to provide for the whole case by a proper treaty stip ulation. The article on the subject, in the proposed treaty, is carefully confined to such offences as all mankind agree to re gard as heinous and destructive of the security of life and of property. In this careful and specific enumeration of crimes, the whject has been to exclude all political offences, or crim inal charges arising from wars or intestine commotions. Trea son, misprision of treason, libels, desertion from military ser vice, and other offences of a similar character, are excluded." Senate. In these phrases the message recommends the ar ticle to the Senate and the country; and yet nothing could be more fallacious and deceptive than such a recommendation. It confines the surrender to border offenders--Canadian fugitives: yet the treaty extends it to all persons committing offences under the "jurisdiction" of Great Britain-a term which includes all her territory throughout the world, and every ship or fort over which her flag waves. The message confines the surrender to high crimes: yet we have seen that the treaty includes crimes which may be of low degree--low indeed! A hare or a partridge from a preserve; a loaf of bread to sustain life; a sixpenny counterfeit note passed; a shed burnt; a weapon lifted, without striking! The message says all political crimes, all treasons, misprision of treason, libels, and desertions are excluded. The treaty shows that these offences are not excluded--that the limitations proposed by Mr. Jefferson are not inserted; and, consequently, under the head of murder, the insurgent, the rebel, and the traitor who has shed blood, may be given up; and so of other offences. When once surrendered, he may be tried for anything. The fate of Jonathan Robbins, alias Nash, is a good illustration of all this. He was a British sailor-was guilty of mutiny, murder, and piracy on the frigate Hermione--deserted to the United States--was demanded by the British minister as a murderer under Jay's treaty-given up as a murderer--then tried by a court-martial on board a man-ofwar for mutiny, murder, desertion, and piracy-found guilty-executed-and his body hung in chains from the yard-arm of a man-of-war. And so it would be again. The man given up for one offence, would be tried for another; and in the number and insignificance of the offiences for which he might be surrendered, there would be no difficulty in reaching any victim that a foreign Government chose to pursue. If this article had been in force in the time of the Irish rebellion, and Lord Edward Fitzgerald had escaped to the United States, after wounding, as he did, several of the myrmidons who arrested him, he might have been demanded as a fugitive from justice, for the assault with intent to kill; and then tried for treason, and hanged and quartered; and such will be the operation of the article if it continues. The article is improper in itself; unequal in its operation; intended to give the British the right of demanding all fugitives, or emigrants from all parts of her dominions, and all her ships; intended to authorize their arrest for desertion or political offences, under the guise of reclaiming them for crimes; worth nothing to us on the two main points of fugitive slaves and forgers; and actually putting us in a worse condition than we were in without this agreement. Lord Ashburton says it cannot take effect in England without an act of Parliament to sanction it. I have not examined the question; but would suppose that if an act of Parliament were necessary in England to give it validity, an act of Congress would be equally necessary here for the same purpose. In that event, the Representatives of the people may yet save an immense emigrant population from the persecutions and annoyance to which political offenders as well as criminals, and the innocent as well as the guilty, may be subjected under this renewed and aggravated edition of one of the worst parts of Jay's treaty. I have done with the consideration of this article; and with it, I have done with my detailed and special objections to the contents of the treaty, Other general objections I have to it, and so stated at the opening of my speech. Besides the leading general ob'jection, that this treaty was not a settlement of all matters in dispute; that it settled what concerned Great Britain and the Northern States; and was, in fact, a virtual separate treaty with those States;besides this objection, which I stated at large, there were other general objections which I barely named, and will now proceed to state more fully. "He (President Adams) considers an offence committed on board a public ship of war on the high seas, to have been com• mitted within the jurisdiction of the nation to which the ship belongs. Nash is charged, it is understood, with piracy and murder on board the British frigate Hermione, on the high seas, and, consequently, within the jurisdiction of his Britannic Majesty; and, therefore, by the 27th article of the treaty of amity with Great Britain, Nash ought to be delivered up as requested by the British minister, provided such evidence of his criminality be produced as, by the laws of the United States, or of South Carolina, (where the fugitive was,) would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the offence had been committed within the United States."(Mr. Pickering's letter to the British minister, Mr. Liston, surrendering Robbins, alias Nash, by order of President Adams.) 14 27TH CONG....SD SESS. APPENDIX TO THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE. 1. The employment of a sole negotiator in a business of such magnitude and variety, and one who had not been approved by the Senate for this purpose. The negotiations embraced the most important concerns, and the most various--some peculiar to sectional divisions of the Union, as the boundary, to the North; the liberation and enticement of slaves, to the South; the Columbia river, to the West; and then to the Union in general, in the important questions of impressment, of search, and of the insult at Schlosser. Such varied and important interests required several commissioners on the part of the United States; and they specially approved by the Senate for this purpose. Never, in the anna's of our history, was such a negoti ation before committed to a single hand. In all previous administrations, Federal or Republican, where great questions were at stake, several ministers were appointed, and they taken from different parts of the Union, and from both political parties. Witness the three ministers in France (Marshall, Pinkney, and Gerry) in Mr. J. Adams's time; the two ministers to England (Mr. Rufus King and Mr. Monroe) in Mr. Jefferson's time; the five ministers to Ghent (Messrs. J. Q. Adams, Bavard, Clay, Russell, and Gallatin) in Mr. Madison's time; and numerous other instances, within the recollection of all. The present occasion was as important as any of these; for, besides embracing so many, and such various questions, it also involved, as we are constantly told, the great question of peace or war! If the British Government chose to confide its interests' to a single negotiator, that was no rule for us. It is a monarchy; and concentration is its principle. We are a confederacy of Republics; and diffusion is our tendency. The monarchy and the monarchical Government is alone to be consulted in Great Britain. The State Governments, the political parties, the sectional divisions, are all to be considered here; and certainly there never was a time when an Administration was more bound to defer to the States, to the sections, and the parties. Having no State, no section, and no party to support it, it was little able to disregard the claims of justice, and the observances of propriety towards any. It is to no purpose to say, It is no matter: the Senate has the control; it can reject. This is idle. We know that treaties are confirmed; that not a single Senator would recommend; that various influences are brought to bear upon the ratification of a treaty; and that ratification is no test of its merits. No. The security is in precaution-in preventive remedies--in taking care to secure a safe treaty beforehand; and not in the rejection by the Senate afterwards. In this case, the employment of a single negotiator was unjustifiable. The occasion was great, and required several, both for safety and for satisfaction. The negotiation was here. Our country is full of able men. Two other negotiators might have been joined without delay, without trouble, and almost without expense. The British also had another negotiator here, (Mr. Fox;) a minister of whom I can say, without disparagement to any other, that, in the two and twenty years which I have sat in this Senate, and had occasion to know the foreign ministers, I have never known his superior for intelligence, dignity, attention to his business, fidelity to his own Government, and decorum to ours. Why not add Mr. Fox to Lord Ashburton, unless to prevent an associate from being given to Mr. Webster? arranged in London that the whole negotiation should be between two, and that these two should act without a witness, and without notes or minutes of their conferences? Be this as it may, the effect is the same; and all must condemn this solitary business between two ministers, when the occasion so imperiously demanded several. Was it 2. The assumption of the Secretary negotiator to treat the boundaries of the republic, established by the war of the Revolution, as matter of bargain and sale--of gifts and equivalents--in the hands of the negotiators. This was done, and in the whole extent of the boundary. In his very first letter to Lord Ashburton--in his brief note of the 17th of June, acknowledging the receipt of his Lordship's very first note, and in announcing his own authority to treat--our negotiator throws up the whole question of rights under the treaty of '83, declares for a conventional line, and invites a negotiation upon the basis of grants and equivalents-the very thing which he had condemned in the award. This is what he says in his note--hear him; The British Treaty-Mr. Benton. "Lord Ashburton having been charged by the Queen's Government with full powers to negotiate and settle all matters in discussion between the United States and England; and having, on his arrival at Washington, announced that, in relation to the question of the Northeastern boundary of the United States, he was authorized to treat for a conventional line, or line by agreement, on such terms and conditions, and with such mutual cen siderations and equivalents, as might be thought just and equitable; and that he was ready to enter upon a negotiation for such conventional line, so soon as this Government should say that it was authorized and ready on its part to commence such negotiation,--the undersigned, Secretary of State of the United States, has now the honor to acquaint his Lordship, by direction of the President, that the undersigned is ready, on behalf of the Government of the United States, and duly authorized to proceed to the consideration of such conventional line, or line by agreement; and will be happy to have an interview on that subject, at his Lordship's convenience." [Mr. Webster to Lord Ashburton, June 17. To this most obliging proposition-which gave up the whole question!--the British minister very naturally and very promptly (i. e., on the same day) returned a note of acceptance, fully accepting what the Secretary offered. The note is in these terms: "The undersigned, plenipotentiary of her Britannic Majesty on an extraordinary and special mission to the United States of America, has the honor of acknowledging, with much satisfac. tion, the communication received this day from Mr. Webster, Secretary of State of the United States, that he is ready, on be half of the United States, and duly authorized, in relation to the question of the Northeastern boundary of the United States, to proceed to the consideration of a conventional line, or line by agreement, on such terms and conditions, and with such mu tual considerations and equivalents, as might be thought just and equitable. And, in reply to Mr. Webster's invitation to the undersigned to fix some time for their first conference upon this subject, he begs to propose to call on Mr. Webster, at the Department of State, to-morrow, at 12 o'clock, for this purpose, should that time be perfectly convenient to Mr. Webster." [Lord Ashburton to Mr. Webster, June 17. Here is acceptance, quick and cordial, with a time and place named for the first conference. The Secretary agrees to the time and place mentioned; and immediately, (to wit: on the same aforesaid 17th day of June,) writes back to the British minister as follows: "The Secretary of State will have great pleasure in seeing Lord Ashburton at twelve o'clock to-morrow, as proposed by him." This was rapid work, and long will this dayTHIS FRIDAY, JUNE 17, 1842-be remembered and noted in the annals of this confederacy. In the Roman calendar, it would have had a place among their unlucky days. Its memory would have been perpetuated by a black monument; and most appropriate it will be for us to mark all the new boundaries of Maine with black stones, and veil with black the statue of the god Terminus, degraded from the mountain which overlooked Quebec, to the humble valley which grows po tatoes. Let us mark this black Friday. On that day, a question of national boundaries was settled-and settled by giving it up!-and given up before the first conference! A conventional boundary was agreed to, in violation of the Senate's decision in the case of the awarded line, and in contradiction to the negotiator's recorded principles on that occasion. The King of the Netherlands awarded a conventional line: it was rejected, because it was conventional; and now two conventional lines-the same, and another far worse-are agreed upon; and agreed upon before the first conference, and by the negotiator who was potential in preventing President Jackson from accepting the first. The new boundaries thus agreed upon must be, and ought to be, repugnant and humiliating to the American feeling. But humiliation and repugnance are not all; danger and mischief follow in the rear. Five hundred miles of first-rate smuggling ground is added to the 1,500 miles of northern smuggling boundary which we already possessed. Passamaquoddy bay is converted into a great naval station, for the scourge of our coasts in time to come by British steamers. Halifax and Quebec are united, and a new military frontier created, in which Great Britain exults and Maine mourns. 3. The omission to keep protocols; and the mystery and doubt which hang over the origin and progress of the different propositions, and the degrees by which they ripened into their ultimate form. This neglect, or omission, as we have already seen, was total and invariable. It pervaded every part of the negotiation; and the correspondence which has been communicated to us-incomplete as it is, in leaving wholly unmentioned several subjects of the negotiation-has all, the air of an after performance-the air of an arranged correspondence to justify foregone conclusions. All the main work seems to have been done tête-à-tête, August, 1842: Senate. without a witness to hear it, or pen to note it. 4. The assumption of the American negotiator "GENTLEMEN: You have had an opportunity of reading he would agree to a line of boundary between the United States B. and line sugested, with the compensations and equiva lents which have been stated, is now submitted for your con "The President has felt the deepest anxiety for an amicable This extract shows, in express terms, that the American Secretary of State presented the British proposition for the Maine boundary; that he not only presents it, but brings both the British and American Governments to bear upon Maine, to coerce her submission. identified by the Secretary's signature, is evidently The paper marked B, from the British legation; and is the precise writing, word for word, which now constitutes the first article of the treaty. The American Government is made to express its desire for the acceptance of the boundary designated in that paper; and then a train of the most extraordinary argument is addressed to Maine, in which the Secretary evidently speaks for Great Britain. First, he speaks of the equivalents which Maine is to receive, and declares them to be of undoubted value. What are they? The half of $300,000 for the two conventional lines and the two territorial losses! when President Jackson had proposed a million and a quarter of dollars (one million of acres of good land in Michigan) as a compensation to Maine for one of these lines and one of these losses only; and that offer had been spurned by the present negotiator. He now adds 110 miles of new boundary, and 572,000 acres of new territorial loss; reduces the equivalent from $1,250,000 to $150,000, and then presses it upon Maine as an equivalent of undoubted value. And this is all she gets; for the navi 27TH CONG..... 3D SESS. gation of the St. John, due to Maine under the laws of nations, is balanced by navigation conferred, as well as received. The Secretary then goes on to threaten Maine with war, if she does not submit to his British proposition. He warns her that no better occasion-no other occasion-for SETTLING the boundary by AGREEMENT, and for EQUIVALENTS, is ever likely to happen; he tells her that no ARRANGEMENT more AD. VANTAGEOUS can be made; and then submits the proposition, as a unit, without alteration or amendment, to the GRAVE DELIBERATION of the commissioners. Now, my first objection to all this, is a threat of war to coerce Maine; for what else can be understood from this last chance for settling by agreement, and for equivalents, and that no better arrangement can be had? What is this but saying to Maine, that if you do not accept this settlement of the boundary, it will be settled without agreement, and without equivalents, and in a more disadvantageous manner?-that is to say, it will be settled by war, and you will be flogged into submission. This is the plain import of the Secretary's language; and here we have the root and origin of that Walpole cry of war-that craven cry-which has been made to resound through the land. The same threat which was made to Maine, is made to us; and, like her commissioners, we are desired to take the proposition into our grave deliberation. The next objection I have to this threat is, that it is false; for we all know that Great Britain not only agreed to better terms than these for us, but demanded them; and made it matter of remonstrance that we refused them. I speak of the King of the Netherlands' award. That award was 'infinitely better for us; and it was not only accepted by the British, but insisted upon; and its non-execution on our part was made a subject of remonstrance and complaint against us. After this, can any one believe that the "peacemission" was sent out to make war upon us if we did not yield up near double as much as she then demanded? No, sit! there is no truth in this ety of war. It is only a phantom conjured up for the occasion. From Jackson and Van Buren the British would gladly have accepted the awarded boundary: the Federalists prevented it, and even refused a new negotiation. Now, the same Federalists have yielded double as much, and are thanking God that the British condescend to aceept it. Such is Federalism: and the British well knew their time, and their men, when they selected the present moment to send their special mission; to double their demands; and to use arguments successfully, which would have been indignantly repelled when a Jackson or a Van Buren was at the head of the Government-or, rather, would never have been used to such Presidents. The conduct of our Secretary-negotiator is inexplicable. He rejects the award, because it dismembers Maine; votes against new negotiations with England; and announces himself ready to shoulder a musket and march to the highland boundary, and there fight his death for it. This was under Jackson's administration. He now becomes negotiator himself; gives up the highland boundary in the first note; gives up all that was awarded by the King of the Netherlands; gives up 110 miles on this side of that award; gives up the mountain barrier which covered Maine, and 'commanded the Halifax road to Quebec; gives $500,000 for Rouse's Point, which the King of the Netherlands gave us for nothing; becomes the agent of the British minister in presenting the new boundary to the Maine commissioners; and crowns all this inexplicable conduct by keeping no record of his proceedings, and using threats and menaces which no English gentleman would have used, and which were as false in fact as they were insolent in spirit. I say this conduct is inexplicable! I shall publish what I say, and defy the Secretary and his friends to explain this conduct. This is sufficient to prove my assertion that the American negotiator became the champion of the British Government; that he offered the British proposition as the American proposition; that he brought both Governments to bear upon Maine, in order to force her to accept it; and that he used arguments to accomplish his purpose, which were unjustifiable and untrue. The proof in his own letter is sufficient; but the answer of the Maine commissioners seals it; and here is that answer: "The undersigned, commissioners of the State of Maine on the subject of the Northeastern boundary, have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note, addressed to them under The British Treaty—Mr. Benton. date of the 15th instant, with enclosures therein referred to. The proposition first submitted by the special minister of Great Britain, on the subject of the boundary, having ben dis agreed to; and the proposition made on the part of the United States, with the assent of the commissioners of Maine and Massachusetts, having been rejected as inadmissible, coupled with an expression of surprise that it should have been made; and Lord Ashburton, in the same communication, having intimated a preference for conference rather than correspondence, and having omitted in his note to make any new proposition, except a qualified withdrawal of a part of his former one; we learn from your note that you have had full and frequent conter. ences with him respecting the Northeastern boundary,' and that you believe you understand what is practicable to be done on that subject, so far as he (Lord Ashburton) is concerned,' We also learn that 'in these conferences he has made no posi tive or binding proposition; thu king, perhaps, it would be more desirable, under present circumstances, that such a prop. osition should proceed from the side of the United States;' but that you have reason to believe that he would agree to a line of boundary such as is described in the paper accompanying your note, (marked B:) and, also, that you entertain the conviction that no more advantageous arrangement can be made;' and, with this conviction, you refer the subject to the grave deliberation of the commissioners. "Regarding this as substantially a proposition on the part of the United States, with the knowledge and assent of Great Britain, and as the one most favorable to us which, under any circum. stances, the latter Government would either offer or accept, the undersigned have not failed to bestow upon it the grave deliber ation and consideration which its nature and importance, and their ever responsible position, demand. "We are now given to understand that the Executive of the United States, representing the sovereignty of the Union, as sents to the proposal, and that this department of the Govern ment at least is anxious for its acceptance, as, in its view, most expedient for the general good, The commissioners of Massachusetts have already given their assent, on behalf of that Commonwealth "Considering, then, this proposition as involving the surren der of more territory than the avowed objects of England require; as removing our landmarks from the well-known and well-defined boundary of the treaty of 1783, on the crest of the highlands, besides insisting upon the line of the arbiter in its full extent, we feel bound to say, after the most careful consideration, that we cannot bring our minds to the conviction that the proposal is such as Maine had a right to expect. "We are now called upon to consider the final proposition, made by or through the Government of the United States, for our consideration and acceptance. The line indicated may be shortly defined as the line recommended by the King of the Netherlands, and an addition thereto of a strip of land at the hase of the highlands running to the source of the southwest branch of the St. John. The examination and consideration of all other lines, which might better meet our views and objects, have been precluded by the declaration, and other plenary ev. idence we have, that the line specified in your communication is the most advantageous that can be offered to us; and that no one of less extent-or yielding, in fact, less to the other partycan be deemed admissible. We are, therefore, brought to the single and simple consideration of the question whether we can, consistently with our views of our duty to the State we represent, accept the proposition submitted by you."-The Maine Com missioners to Mr. Webster, July 22. 5. The mixing up of incongruous matter in the treaty, and presenting the whole as a unit, to be ratified in tolo, under penalty of loss of the whole, and war if any part of it was rejected. This is a serious objection to the treaty. Incongruities are not to be put into laws, whether they be the The African supreme or the subordinate law. alliance for five years, is an incongruity in a British treaty of permanent boundaries. The only reason for putting this temporary convention into a permanent treaty, is the very reason which should prevent its being put there; it is to fetter the Senate-to embarrass and coerce them--to make one part of the treaty carry another. I shall move to strike out this alliance article, as well for incongruity, as for its unconstitutionality, inexpediency, and gross impolicy. 6. The irregular manner in which the ratification of this treaty has been sought, by consultations with individual members, before it was submitted to the Senate. Here I tread upon delicate ground; and if I am wrong, this is the time and the place to correct me. I speak in the hearing of those who must know whether I am mistaken. I have reason to believe that the treaty has been privately submitted to Senators-their opinions obtained-the judgment of the body forestalled; and then sent here for the forms of ratification. [One Senator said he had not been consulted.] Mr. B. in continuation Certainly not, as the Senator says so; and so of any other gentleman who will say the same. I interrogate no one. I have no right to interrogate any one. I do not pretend to say that all were consulted; that would have been unnecessary; and besides, I know I was not consulted myself; any I know many others who were not. All that I intend to say is, that I have reason to think that this treaty has been ratified out of doors! and that this is a great irregularity, and bespeaks an undue solicitude for it on the part of its authors, arising from a consciousness of its indefensible character. 7. The want of instructions from the President Senate. to guide this negotiation. This is a glaring objection to the treaty. By the theory of our Government, the President is the head of the Executive Department, and must treat through his agents and ministers, with foreign powers. He must tell them what to do, and should tell that in unequivocal language, that there may be no mistake about it. He must command and direct the negotiation; he must order what is done. This is the theory of our Government, and this has been its practice from the beginning of Washington's to the end of Mr. Van Buren's administration; and never was it more necessary than now. Being but one negotiator, and he not approved by the Senate for that purpose, and being from an interested State, it was the bounden duty of the President to have guided and directed everything He is the head of the Union, and should have attended to the interest of the whole Union; on the contrary, he abandons everything to his Secretary, and this Secretary takes care of one section of the Union, and of his own State, and of Great Britain; and leaves the other two sections of the Union out of the treaty. The Northern States, coterminous with Canada, get their boundaries adjusted; Massachusetts geis money, which her sister States are to pay; and Great Britain takes two slices and all her military frontiers from the State of Maine! the the S. and W. States are left as they were !--the natural result of a negotiation committed, without instructions, to a single negotiator; and that nego. tiator the man who declared he would not vote the money for defence which President Jackson required, even if the enemy was battering at the doors of the Capitol! and whose subserviency to British interests, has so often and so deplorably been manifested. 8. The fear of war. This Walpole argument is heavily pressed upon us, and we are constantly told that the alternatives lie between this treatythe whole of it, just as it is-or war! This is a degrading argument, if true; and infamous if false! and false it is: and more than that, it is as shameless as it is unfounded! What! the peace mission come to make war! It is no such thing. It comes to take advantage of our deplorable condition-to take what it pleases, and to repulse the rest. Great Britain is in no condition to go to war with us, and every child knows it. But I do not limit myself to argument, and general considerations, to dis. prove this war argument. I refer to the fact which stamps it with untruth. Look to the notes of Sir Charles Vaughan and Mr. Bankhead, demanding the execution of the award, and declaring that its execution would remove every impediment to the harmony of the two countries. After that, and while holding these authentic declarations in our hands, are we to be told that the peace mission requires more than the award? more of requires one hundred and ten miles boundary? requires $500,000 for Rouse's Point, which the award gave us without money? requires a naval and diplomatic alliance, which she dared not mention in the time of Jackson or Van Buren? requires the surrender of "rebels" under the name of criminals? and puts the South and West at defiance, while conciliating the non-slaveholding States? and gives us war, if we do not consent to all this degradation, insult, and outrage? Are we to be told this? No, sir, no! There is no danger of war; but this treaty will make a war, if it is ratified. It gives up all our advantages; leaves us with great questions unsettled; increases the audacity of the British; weakens and degrades us; and leaves us no alternative but war to save the Columbia, to prevent impressment, to resist search, to repel Schlosser invasions, and to avoid a San Domingo insurrection in the South, excited from London, from Canada, and from Nassau. 9. I conclude this head of general objections with the notice of an exhibition on this floor, preceded by private and impressive revelations to Senators without, which the honor of the contrivers would This has since been publicly declared by Mr. Webster at Boston. The edition of his speech, revised and corrected by himself, says: "I never can forget the frankness and generosity with which, after an interchange- free and liberal isterchange-he (the President) finally said to me, that the business was in my hands; that upon my shoulders rested the responsibility; and on my decision depended the conclusion of the negotia. tion." This declaration, so authentically made at Boston, has since been contradicted by its author at New York; but the papers communicated to the Senate show that the Boston statement was correct, and that the whole business was in the hands of the Secretary. |