considered solely with reference to this question of keeping the public money.

Under Mr. Van Buren's sub-treasury, his officers were to keep only the ordinary surplus revenues of the Government. The officers of the present subtreasury are to have the handling and keeping of vastly greater sums. They begin with the surplus revenues amounting (say) to three millions. Then they are to have in possession a redemption fund in specie of five millions, for the fifteen millions of treasury notes issued to creditors-all which notes, by the way, must first pass through their hands. Here would be eight millions in hand, under the operation of the exchequer, if confined strictly to Government business. But then come the banking powers, under which the Government is to deal with individuals on individual account. And here there is to be another redemption fund of five millions of specie, for the fifteen millions of certificates of deposite issued to private depositors. Then there will be the habitual surplus on hand, of cash received for exchange sold-amounting, perhaps, to three millions;-all the money amounting to one hundred millions in a year, more or less, for exchange sold having, in the mean time, passed through the hands of the officers of the exchequer. And, finally, there will be the amount habitually on hand, of the proceeds of five millions of stock, issued to supply the exchequer with capital to be employed in the purchase of exchange; this amount may be (say) two millions. Of course, I do not pretend to give more than approximate sums in any of these cases. They are near enough to show that this treasury and sub-treasury scheme contemplates the actual and habitual keeping, by personal manual possession of executive officers, of an amount of cash (principally gold and silver) not less than some fifteen, eighteen, or twenty millions of dollars! The improved plan of the gentleman from Massachusetts contemplates the keeping of twenty millions of hard cash for a redemption fund alone! And, besides the capital and surplus moneys habitually on hand, these exchequer schemes enable and require these executive officers to handle and possess, receive and pay out, in the business of deposite and exchange which they are to transact, it may be a hundred, it may be a hundred and fifty millions of dollars in a year; for every dollar of which the Government and people are responsible, and for which they can have no security beyond a few thousand dollars of doubtful surety ship and the honesty of their officers! Sir, whoever else may be in favor of such a scheme, I am not, and never can be.

Mr. Speaker, it is a cardinal Whig doctrine, that all unnecessary increase of the executive power of this Government, already vast, overshadowing, and corrupt, I speak plainly, and mean to,-must be opposed. But, for myself, sir, though a Whig, I shall never be found opposing any manifestly necessary or useful measure, merely because it involves an increase of patronage. And I am free to avow that, were there no other difficulties in the way, I should not oppose the President's exchequer, merely because it involved the necessary increase of executive officers. The Government cannot be carried on without administrative agents, and a great many of them; and I would never stop one essential wheel in its vast machinery, simply because it requires an agent to watch and tend it, and the appointment of that agent is so much added to executive patronage.

But, in the present case, it is to be remarked, that there is something more to be considered than barely the number of new officers to be appointed, and the amount of their salaries to be paid. These officers are to hold the most delicate and seductive of all public trusts. They are to come into possession of large sums of money, not merely to handle and hold, but actually to trade and traffic upon;-of this I shall have something more to say shortly. There is something in the very fact of an officer being known to be intrusted with the personal possession of heavy sums of money by Government, which gives him importance, and weight, and sway in the community, and over the popular mind; even though it be well known, at the same time, that he cannot legally use or employ a dollar

The Exchequer-Mr. Barnard.

of it for his own or others' advantage. His opinions on public affairs have something of the solidity and weight, in popular estimation, of the pondrous money bags and chests on which he sits. And before I can ever consent to authorize the creation of a large number of executive officers of this description, I must have strong proof of the vital, the almost indispensable, necessity of the measure which calls for their services.

But there is another objection to this executive treasury, on the score of political principle, of a still higher and stronger kind; which I advert to, lest, by omitting all allusion to it, I should be deemed to acquiesce in the argument by which it is sought to be obviated. By placing the public moneys in the manual keeping of officers of executive appointment, as proposed by this measure, I do not say there is an actual union of the purse with the sword in executive hands; but I do say that that union is approximate, and that the thin legal partition which is interposed may be very easily broken down. It is true, according to the law, that "the President cannot touch a dollar of the public money, by his own authority, nor change its custody;" and that "whoever shall come to the exchequer for money, must show the law of Congress under which he comes; and no payment can be made but in compliance with such law." All very true; and yet all this is no answer to the rule, which requires that neither the executive nor his officers shall have the personal custody of the public money. In one important sense, their custody is his custody; and so it has been expressly claimed to be by high political authority in our own day. And the rule referred to is precautionary; it looks ahead, to some alarming conjuncture in our public affairs, when some bold, popular chief and President, having his army in the field to meet a threatened war, or, perhaps, at the close of a contest, in which the commander-in-chief has covered himself and his army with glory, shall be tempted to try his hand at the establishment of an imperial dynasty in his own person and family; when he might call on his brave soldiers, shortened in pay, perhaps, and suffering injustice at the hands of an ungrateful country, which they had defended and saved by their valor and their blood-like the American army at the close of the Revolution; when he might call on them to follow him, their companion in arms and commander, to conquer by their swords that justice for themselves which was denied them by their country. It is to a state of things like this, that the rule referred to looks forward, when nothing shall be wanting to consummate the ambitious designs of the bold and unprincipled leader, but the ways and means-the money for the enterprise; and when he might find the public moneys-all that belonged to the public treasury, whether five or twenty or fifty millions of good gold and silver-not deposited in independent banks, which would refuse to yield it up to his demand, but in the hands of his own officers and agents, appointed by his authority, devoted to his interests, and ready to do his will.

But, Mr. Speaker, I must hasten now to say a word or two about this exchequer board and its agencies, considered as an executive commercial bank of deposite and exchange. The earnestness with which the original report, made to Congress in behalf of the exchequer, denies and protests that this is no Government bank-a course which has been followed with more than equal earnestness and zeal by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. CUSHING]-demonstrates plainly enough that the friends of this measure regard a Government bank as exceptionable and indefensible, and that they would not dare openly to advocate before the country any such proposition. This is well, and it argues a deference to the Constitution and to popular sentiment, in these quarters, which may yet prove the salvation of the country.

Now, sir, on this important matter of fact, I take issue with these gentlemen, one and all; and I confess myself not a little astonished when I consider what intellect and what learning have been applied to the question, that even doubts, much more that positive opinions, should have been expressed from such quarters against the idea that it was any part

H. of Reps.

of this exchequer scheme to establish a Government bank. The point is too plain for argument or opinion. It is a thing palpable to every vision, standing out in bold relief on the face of the scheme, and cannot be taken or mistaken, either for nothing or for anything else. It is not a bank, because it makes no discounts! And it is not a bank, because it is not a joint-stock company! Well, let those who argue thus, enjoy their opinions; thank God, there is little danger that such opinions can be propagated.

I affirm that this scheme does propose a Government bank, with all the elements essential to a bank. The bank is to be conducted, too, by Government, as a corporation, just as other corporations conduct their banking operations-through the agency of officers and clerks of its own appointment. It is to deal with individuals, on individual account, as any other bank; and, though it may not be sued, yet it can sue in the name of the corporation—namely, the Government.

I put out of consideration here, the issues to creditors; these are made on Government account, and this may be a legitimate business for Government to transact. Besides, these issues belong not to the bank, but to the sub-treasury part of the scheme. And this, by the way, constitutes the only essential difference between this sub-treasury and that of Mr. Van Buren. The latter contemplated the use of coin only, as the sole currency to be used between the Government and its creditors and debtors; though, as is well known, this feature in the plan failed utterly in practice, and bank paper and bank checks were used instead, almost exclusively. The subtreasury offered to us, provides for the use of Gov. ernment paper to be issued to creditors, and to be receivable for all public dues.

I also put out of consideration here all dealings in exchange on Government account. All this belongs also to the sub-treasury part of the exchequer. The power to buy and sell exchange, for the transfer of the public revenues, has been often exercised, and it was part of the authority expressly given under the sub-treasury of Mr. Van Buren. All this Government has done, and may do; though it is a power subject to great abuse, and liable to strong objections.

I desire, then, that it may be distinctly understood that I do not charge that this exchequer scheme includes a Government bank, because the board and its agencies are to receive deposites of public money, or revenue; nor because it is to issue convertible paper in payment to the public creditors; nor because it may draw drafts, or buy and sell exchanges, for the transfer of Government funds for Government use. These are operations analogous to banking operations; but it is not on account of these operations that I find a Government bank in the powers conferred on the board of exchequer and its agencies. Nor, on the other hand, does the fact that these operations have been carried on, and may be carried on (if they may) by the Treasury Department, tend to prove-which was the argument of the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. CUSHING,]— that whatever other commercial operations analogous to these, in mere matter of form, but totally distinct in substance, object, and character, the Government may carry on, yet it will not conduct the proper business of a true commercial bank. The gentleman from Massachusetts says this cannot be a Government bank on account of the exchequer receiving deposites, because the treasury always receives deposites; nor on account of its issuing paper for currency, because that the Treasury Department has done, and may do; nor on account of its buying and selling exchange, because that also has been done by the Treasury Department when it was no bank. But all this is arguing (if there be argument in it) without advancing us one step towards a conclusion. It is, in effect, declaring that Government may establish an agency of Government officers to conduct all the operations of a commercial bank-not on Government account, but wholly on individual account, just in the manner of any private bank or banker; and yet that agency cannot be a Government bank, because it is the Government, or a part of it.

But let us see what this Government machine i

27TH CONG.......3D SESS.

to do, and then let us determine whether it be a bank or not.

And, first, it is to carry on the business of receiving on private deposites money, gold and silver, "the property of individuals, to be held, as in other cases of deposites made by individuals, for convenience and security;" and for these private deposites it is to issue certificates of deposite, charging a premium therefor not exceeding the one-half of one per cent. The certificates outstanding at any one time must not exceed fifteen millions of dollars, and they are to be prepared so as to circulate as bank money,

or currency.

Now this is precisely the business transacted by the Bank of Amsterdam; and this was its principal, if not its only business. It was not a bank of discount; it did not loan a dollar of money; it did not deal in exchanges. The original subscribers deposited their coin, which was of short weight, and received a credit on the books of the bank equivalent to the intrinsic value of the coin; and these credits were bank money; and all payments of considerable sums were made in this bank money, by the transfer of credits from the name of the debtor to that of the creditor. The bank also received on deposite the money of individuals, placing an equivalent of bank money to the account of the depositor, with a small deduction only for profit and expenses, and giving him a receipt payable to bearer. This was the sum of the business of the bank; and was the Bank of Amsterdam a bank, or was it not? The Bank of Hamburg operates in the same way to this hour; and is the Bank of Hamburg a bank, or is it not? And if they are banks, why is not this board of exchequerconducting this identical business in the same form, wholly on individual account-why is this exchequer not a bank?

But the exchequer is to deal in exchanges, solely on individual account. It may buy exchange, restricted only to bills running from State to. State, and to such as shall be payable in thirty days from date or from sight. With these restrictions only, it may purchase exchange to an amount limited only by its means, and the offers which shall be made. And it may discount also the bills which it buys, only taking care that it do not take more than eight per cent. for both interest and exchange. And all this it may do, not in any manner on Government account, or connected in the remotest degree with the management of the proper revenue and funds of Government; but solely and exclusively on individual account, and for the accommodation of the trading and business community.

And then the exchequer may sell exchange to any amount for which a demand may exist-receiving the money of individuals, and furnishing to them commercial bills, just as other banks and bankers furnish such bills; and all this, not for the Government, or on Government account; but for individuals, and on individual account. The only restriction is, that the premium charged for this business shall not exceed two per cent.

Such, and so vast, is the business to be done by this bank, under the powers conferred on the board of exchequer-all of it a legitimate banking business, precisely such as is commonly transacted by banks and bankers, and all to be done on individual accountand yet, this is no bank!

And this is no bank, because, after all, it is only receiving deposites and giving paper for them; or it is only selling or buying exchange. And all this the Treasury Department has done, and may do again, and yet be no bank. But has the Treasury Department ever received private deposites, "the property of individuals, to be held, as in other cases of deposites made by individuals, for convenience and security," and issued paper to circulate as currency upon such private deposites? And has the Treasury Department ever dealt in exchanges, buying and selling bills, for the sole purpose of accommodation to individuals, and to enable such individuals to anticipate or transfer their funds? If this Government, or any other Government, had ever attempted a bu siness of this sort before, there might be something in the argument. But what is it to the purpose, when we charge that, if the Government deals in private deposites, and in bills of exchange wholly on individual account, it conducts the proper business

The Exchequer-Mr. Barnard.

of a bank-what is it to the purpose to reply, that the Government does deal, or has dealt, and may deal, in deposites and exchanges on Government account, and for the management of its own proper revenues and funds? Does it follow, therefore, that the Government may deal in deposites, and exchanges on individual account; and that, in so doing, it does not conduct the proper business of a bank?

Sir, this sort of reasoning leads to very strange conclusions. The Government sets up an official agency to deal in money and exchanges, just after the manner of a bank, and in no manner or degree for Government account; and that agency is not a bank, because the Government may and does deal in money and exchanges in its own proper business. Well; the Government buys and sells real estate, and buys and sells merchandise for Government account, and in the transaction of its own proper business: can Government, therefore, establish an official agency for dealing and trading in real estate, or in merchandise, in no manner or degree for account of Govern. ment, and yet deny that it is a speculator or a trader?

Mr. Speaker, there can be no plainer proposition than that this exchequer scheme includes a regular, out-and-out Government bank--an executive commercial bank of deposite and exchange-to be conducted by this Government as a corporation, through its own officers, wholly on individual account, and precisely in the manner of any other bank. It may transact a banking business in a single year equal to a hundred millions of dollars. In discounting paper in the form of bills, in buying exchange, and in selling exchange, though terms are prescribed, yet there is latitude enough to enable the Government-the administration for the time being-to distinguish, among its customers, between its friends and its enemies; bestowing favors upon some, and imposing hard or uncomfortable terms upon others. It may discount paper on easier terms than its neighbor banks; it may buy exchange at a higher premium, and may sell exchange at a lower premium, than the market price. And it is the Executive Government that is to do all this; and we, the Representatives of the people, are to give the authority. The Executive, through officers deriving their places from him, is to deal and trade in money and commercial paper to the tune (it may be) of a hundred millions a year, with individuals all over the country, and with the whole trading and commercial community. Liberty! Liberty! what has become of that jealous spirit which once made the American people so watchful for freedom, and filled them with alarm and indignation at the slightest encroachments, or the offered blandishments of Executive power!

But, Mr. Speaker, it is time to ask soberly and seriously after the power of this Government to deal, as a banker, in money and exchanges, in the way and manner proposed. I should be glad to hear some gentleman rise in his place and maintain the naked proposition, that this Government has the constitutional authority for this kind of business. I should like to hear the argument, that I may understand in what particular clause in the Constitution the authority is found, or from what particular or what general power it is derived. A power to deal and trade in money and commercial paper, as here proposed, is a substantive power, in no manner incident merely to some other power, so far as I can discover. This Government has full authority, of course, for the management of its own revenues and funds; and it may manage its revenues and funds itself, by its own proper officers, or it may create a bank or a fiscal agent for that purpose. If it create a bank for this purpose, it may give to it all the ordinary powers of a bank, to enable it to maintain an independent existence as such. It may authorize the bank to receive private deposites, to discount paper and loan money, to issue currency, and to deal in exchanges. All these powers are appropriate to a bank, and some or all are essential to its existence as a bank. It cannot be a bank without them, or some of them. It must have an independent corporate existence; it must have capital; and it must transact business enough in its proper line to live upon. But does it follow, therefore, that the Government itself may turn banker, as a corporation; set apart a capital to trade upon; and conduct all

H. of Reps.

the various and complex business and operations of a bank? These operations are appropriate and essential to a bank as a fiscal agent; but they are in no manner appropriate or essential to the Govern ment, in the management of its own revenues and fiscal affairs by its own officers. It is not necessary that the Government should deal in money and exchanges on individual account, to enable it to keep, transfer, and disburse its own money, or even to enable it to put forth its own paper for currency. This it may do by issues to its own creditors, and for money borrowed. These would be issues on Government account, and not a trading in money or paper by the Government on individual account. This Government, by an express authority, establishes post offices and post roads. If necessary for carrying the mail on a particular route, the Government inay set up a line of stages of its own for the purpose, and, as incident to the carrying of the mail, perhaps it might carry passengers. This has actually been done by the Post Office Department in former times. It was done on the route between this city and Baltimore. But what would be thought, because the Government sometimes carried the mails with passengers in its own post coaches, if it should undertake to set up lines of post coaches all over the country, for the carrying of passengers without the mails? And this may serve to illustrate the distinction between the transaction of business on Government account, or as incident to the proper business of Government, and the transaction of the same business wholly on individual account. In the same way, the Government might, if necessary for the transportation of the mails, construct roads or railroads, or build and own steamboats; and, perhaps, the carrying of passengers might be connected with the carrying of the mails. But nobody, I believe, would think that the Government might, therefore, by its own official agency, construct railroads and build steamboats, solely for the accommodation of the public in the carrying of passengers, without any connexion with, or reference to, the carrying of the mails whatever. And yet, is not this, in substance and principle, precisely what this exchequer scheme supposes the Gov ernment may do? The Government may keep its own money; therefore it may keep the money of of individuals. The Government may buy and sell drafts for the transfer of its own funds; therefore it may do the same thing for the transfer of the funds of individuals. The Government may issue paper, as the evidence of its own proper debts contracted in its own proper business; therefore it may issue paper wholly on dealings with individuals, and solely for the accommodation of such individuals and the commercial community in general. The Government may create a bank as its fiscal agent, not because a bank is necessary, but a fiscal agent is; and may authorize such bank, while performing the duties of fiscal agent, to conduct the ordinary operations of a bank, as necessary to its support and existence; and, therefore, the Government, being its own fiscal agent if it choose to be, may also conduct the ordinary operations of a bank, though those operations are in no way connected with its management of its own funds and fiscal affairs;—at any rate, in no way essential, or even important, to such management. It cannot facilitate, or tend to facilitate, the operations of the board of exchequer and its agencies, in receiving, keeping, transferring, and disbursing the proper public money of the Government, or in paying the public creditors in treasury notes instead of gold and silver, that it should also receive the money of individuals on private deposite, furnishing currency therefor, or that it should buy and sell exchange for the accommodation of the commercial community. It must create embarrassment, rather; at any rate, additional labor, care, and expense. These banking operations are separate and distinct, and are so regarded in the plan itself. "The board of exchequer and its several agencies," says this plan, "shall keep separate and distinct sets of books, for the purpose of entering and recording, in one set, all transactions respecting the collection, keeping, and disbursing of the public revenue, and transmitting the public moneys from place to place, for the service of Government; and, in another, all transactions and accounts arising from dealings in

27TH CONG....3D SESS.

exchange, and other transactions not on Government account." And these "dealings in exchange and other transactions not on Government account," are as distinct from the duties required of the exchequer "for the service of the Government," as they could be if they had been assigned to a separate board-a distinct agency.

And I repeat, that the banking operations here proposed seem to me to require some substantive and direct authority in the Constitution to sanction them, inasmuch as they do not appear to stand in any manner essentially connected with the operations of Government, under any of the substantive or granted powers relating to the revenue or the management of the public finances. If any gentleman on this floor is prepared to maintain that this Government may, by constitutional warrant, as a political corporation, through its own officers, set up a commercial bank of deposite and exchange, with a proper banking capital, to deal and trade in money and paper, and in commercial bills, solely on acount of individuals and for the accommodation of the commercial community, and without the slightest necessary connexion with the management of the proper funds and finances of Government,-if any gentleman will do this, I shall, for one, be gratified to hear him; and I shall expect to get some new light in regard to the constitutional powers of the Govern

ment.

Until I am enlightened in this way, I must hesitate to give my sanction to the powers now proposed to be exercised; and I must leave it to those to support this proposition, from the President down--strict constructionists-who can find no warrant of authority whatever in the Constitution for a bank as a fiscal agent of the Government, because such bank, if created, must, or may be, authorized to deal in money and exchange! On all this subject it is enough for me to say, at present, that this is a Government bank-demonstrably so, and not the less so because it is denied; and that, by the plain admission of the originators and friends of the exchequer scheme, power or no power, a Government bank ought not to exist in this country.

Mr. Speaker, my opinions, in part, at least, both of this new executive treasury and sub-treasury, and this executive bank, are, I think, by this time, pretty well understood. The support they have received from a particular quarter, which has commanded at all times, and on all great questions of public interest, my profound respect-that support, and nothing else, could ever, for a moment, have made me doubtful about the true character of this measure, or made me hesitate to express that condemnation of it which I have believed it merited;I may say, that utter abhorrence of it which I have constantly felt.

Mr. Speaker, at the last session, feeling it to be the duty of the majority here to do something-whatever they could, without any sacrifice of principle, which should promise relief, I proposed a substitute for the bill reported from the Select Committee, by the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. CUSHING.] That substitute contemplated the issuing, by the Government, of fifteen millions of convertible paper, or notes, to be issued to creditors, or to those who should lend the Government their cash-redeemable on demand, in specie, at the Treasury in Washington, or at an agency of the Treasury in the city of New York. Of course, no issues were to be made, except on Government account; there was to be no sub-treasury, and no board of exchequer, for no such board was required; any more than the like machinery was or is required for the issue of inconvertible treasury notes.

This measure was offered by me, that it might be considered whenever the exchequer plan should be brought forward. It expressed my ultimatum in regard to paper for currency, to be issued directly by this Government, which I hold to be a practice always liable to abuse, and to be avoided as far as possible. In truth, I should, at any time, have given my own proposition a reluctant support; though, if the subject had come up, it should have had from me a firm support as an antagonist measure to that proposed by the Executive.

The House is aware that a few days since I offered another measure, referred to by me at the Commencement of my remarks, as a substitute for

The British Treaty-Mr. Buchanan.

the exchequer scheme, which, at my instance, was laid on the table and ordered to be printed. This measure I greatly prefer to the former one submitted by me; and it is my purpose, as I have already said, to urge it at a proper time upon the consideration of the House. If gentlemen have not turned their attention to it, I beg they will do so. It will explain itself. It is perfectly simple, and to all parties concerned, as a pecuniary transaction, perfectly safe; and it is as little liable to exceptions from political considerations, as any plan for the same objects could well be. While it will enable the Government to borrow cheaply, at home, fifteen millions of dollars, it will afford the means, not of creating, but of adopting fifteen millions of sound currency, which, by the act of adoption, will be made to put on the character of nationality. I am not permitted now to enter further into this plan, as the time allowed me is just about to expire. A further opportunity, I trust, will be afforded me when the House shall go into committee on the bill of the gentleman from Massachusetts, which I hope it will do very soon; and, in the mean time, I beg leave again earnestly to commend to the attention of gentlemen on all sides of the House the measure and plan to which I refer.

BRITISH TREATY.

SECRET SESSION.

SPEECH OF MR. BUCHANAN,

OF PENNSYLVANIA.

In Senate, August 19, 1842-On the ratification of the treaty with Great Britain.

Mr. BUCHANAN rose and addressed the Senate as follows:

MR. PRESIDENT: It is now manifest that the treaty under discussion is destined to be ratified by a large majority of the Senate. The news of this ratification will spread joy and gladness throughout the land. It will be hailed by the country as the pledge of a lasting peace between two great nations; and those who were instrumental either in its negotiation or ratification, will be esteemed public benefactors. Beyond all question, such will be the first impression upon the public mind. Amidst this general joy, it will be a subject of surprise and astonishment that some eight or ten Senators should have separated themselves from the mass, and voted against the ratification of this treaty. The first impulse of public feeling will be to condemn these Senators. Now, sir, as I shall be one of this small number, I rise to make my defence before the people of the country in advance, not doubting but that the justice, if not the generosity of the Senate, will remove the injunction of secrecy from our proceedings, and enable me to publish my remarks.

There is no Senator who has felt more anxious to vote in favor of this treaty than myself. I am conscious of all the happy effects upon the country which might result from unanimity in this body; and I may say, in all sincerity, that I have endeavored to agree with the majority. Nay, moreI was disposed to distrust my own judgment, believing that it might have been prejudiced by the zealous and persevering efforts which I had formerly made, both as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and as a Senator on this floor, to sustain the rights of Maine against what I believed to be the unjust pretensions of the British Government. I have, therefore, earnestly endeavored to keep my mind open to conviction until the last moment; but after all, I cannot vote for this treaty without feeling that I had violated my duty to the country, and without forfeiting my own self-respect. In the emphatic language of the Senator from Maine, [Mr. WILLIAMS,] I believe it to be a treaty unjust to Maine, and dishonorable to the whole country; and thus believing, if it depended upon my vote, it should be rejected without regard to consequences. These I would leave to that superintending Providence which has ever been our shield in the day of danger. Even if war should be the result, (which I do not by any means anticipate,) I would rely with perfect confidence upon the courage, patriotism, and energy of my countrymen, for the defence of their rights.

When the mission of Lord Ashburton was first announced, I hailed it as the olive branch of peace and friendship, presented by England to this country. The auspices were all favorable. I believed then, and I believe still, that she was sincere. Her revenue was insufficient for her annual expendi

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tures; she had experienced reverses in the East, where she was waging two expensive, unjust, aud bloody wars; a large portion of her own population was almost in a state of open rebellion, and she had signally failed in her darling policy of extorting from France a ratification of the quintuple treaty, which would have given her the right of searching all European vessels on the coast of Africa. Such was the condition of England when Lord Ashbur ton arrived in Washington, "having been charged with full powers to negotiate and settle all matters in discussion between the two countries." When I make this declaration, I employ the very language used by Mr. Webster himself, in the very first sentence of his first diplomatic note, dated on the 17th June last. His Lordship's powers were not confined to the Northeastern boundary question, which is the only disputed question settled by the treaty; but they would have enabled him to terminate all the vexed and dangerous questions which still remain open to disturb the harmony and threaten the peace of the two nations.

Not only did a crisis then exist in the affairs of England eminently calculated to predispose her to a fair and amicable adjustment of all the disputed questions; but the British Government well that these questions were of such a distinct and varied character, that some one of them had strongly enlisted the feelings of each portion of our country; and, when combined, that they would unite the American people almost as one man in demanding justice. There was the Northeastern boundary question, which peculiarly interested the Eastern States, as did the Northwestern boundary the Western States, whilst the Creole question had deeply affected the sensibilities of the Southern and Southwestern portions of the Union. Redress for the Caroline outrage, and an abandonment of the right of search, were questions of national honor, in which every man with an American heart, throughout the broad extent of our country, felt the deepest interest. The varied wrongs of England had united us together in an adamantine chain, no link of which ought ever to have been broken until these wrongs had all been redressed. I believe in my soul that the propitious moment had arrived for settling all these questions upon just and honorable principles. Feeling this to be the case, I declared, on the floor of the Senate, at the period of Lord Ashburton's arrival, that our motto ought to be-All or none. This I did, because I felt that all could be adjusted. I believe still that all might have been adjusted; although I knew it would be the policy of the British Government to obtain a cession of that portion of Maine necessary to consoli date her power in North America, and leave the other questions-particularly that of the Creolefor "a more convenient season." This Creole question, from peculiar causes, which I need not explain, was the weakest, except in point of justice, of all the questions in dispute; whilst the prejudices of the British people were most strongly enlisted against its fair and honorable adjustment. Lord Ashburton has succeeded in obtaining all that his Government most desired, and in postponing for future negotiation all which was most desirable for the American people. Until within the last few weeks, we had every reason to believe that all matters in dispute would be adjusted by the treaty. I appeal to Senators whether they have not heard, over and over again, throughout the negotiation, that the only obstacle in the way of settling all our difficulties was the obstinate adherence of the Maine com. missioners to the line of the treaty of 1783. I often made inquiries concerning the Creole question, believing that its adjustment would be the most difficult; and was as often informed that there would be no difficulty in providing for the future, although Lord Ashburton might not be able to grant indemnity for the past. I believed that all things were in successful progress; and never have I been more astonished and disappointed than when I first learned that the Maine question alone had been settled by the treaty, and that all the rest of the disputed questions had merely been made the subjects of a diplomatic correspondence.

Had all the questions been adjusted between the two countries, a career of happiness and prosperity would have been opened to both, on which the imagination of the philanthropist might love to dwell. Time might have soothed, or even obliterated, the memory of the successive wrongs and insults which we have suffered from England since she first acknowledged our independence; and we might have forgotten those unfriendly feelings towards her

27TH CONG.... 3D SESS.

which, unquestionably, now pervade the great body of the American people. Senators on this floor may speak of the two nations as the mother and the daughter, and may please their fancy by such epithets of mutual endearment; but, in the opinion of a large majority of our countrymen, England has ever acted as a harsh and severe stepmother towards this country. I had fondly hoped that this unnatural relationship would end with the termination of Lord Ashburton's mission; and, had all the questions been settled, I was prepared to yield much for the sake of such a happy consummation.

I shall now proceed to discuss each of the subjects separately, involved in the correspondence and the treaty. And, first, I shall refer to the question of impressment. The two last letters of the series relate to this subject. On the 8th of August, (the day before the termination of the special mission,) Mr. Webster addressed a letter to Lord Ashburton, which presents a clear and striking view of the arguments which have been heretofore urged against the impressment of American seamen; and suggests to the British Government the propriety of renouncing the practice hereafter. His Lordship replied to this letter on the next day, (the 9th of August;) and, with this letter, his mission terminated.

This letter of Lord Ashburton is a fair specimen of his whole correspondence. It shows his Lordship to be a shrewd, sagacious, and practical man. The British Government could not have made a more fortunate selection of a minister. Whilst all his letters abound in general, and, I have no doubt, sincere professions of anxiety to establish perpetual friendship between the two countries, he never yields any of the pretensions of the British Government. He praises much the superior ability of the American negotiator; and (to use a cant phrase, common at the bar whilst I was a member of the profession) is content that Mr. Webster shall have the argument, provided he himself gets the land. He never commits himself, or his Government, on any particular point; and yet there breathes throughout his whole language such a spirit of conciliation, that, until you examine it particularly, you incline to the belief that he is disposed to grant all you desire.

In this letter, I ask, does he abandon the odious claim of the British Government to impress seamen on board of American vessels? Does he yield to the unanswerable arguments presented by Mr. Webster? No, sir; no. On this subject, he is not merely non-committal. He comes up to the very 1 point which has always been at issue between the two countries;-asserts the principle of the perpetual allegiance of all British-born subjects in the strongest terms; and justifies the practice of impressment in cases of necessity. Nay, more: he informs Mr. Webster that we ourselves would resort to the same practice, if our geographical position did not render it unnecessary. Let me quote a few sentences of his own language, to establish my position.

"The principle is (says his Lordship) that all subjects of the Crown are, in case of necessity, bound to serve their country; and the seafaring man is naturally taken for the naval service. This is not, as is sometimes supposed, any arbitrary principle of monarchical government, but one founded on the natural duty of every man to defend the life of his country; and all the analogy of your laws would lead to the conclusion that the same principle would hold good in the United States, if their geographical position did not inake its application unneces sary."

It is true that he concludes with the expression of a vague hope that some satisfactory arrangement may yet be made upon the subject-meaning nothing, and amounting to nothing.

I confess, sir, I did not anticipate that the subject of impressment would form any part of the negotiations between Mr. Webster and Lord Ashburton. This question ought never to have found a place in the correspondence, unless, from the preliminary conferences, it had been ascertained that England was prepared to renounce the practice forever. Its introduction has afforded Lord Ashburton the opportunity of insisting upon a claim to which we can never practically submit, without being disgraced and degraded among the nations of the earth. We declared war against Great Britain thirty years ago, to protect American seamen from impressment; and she, and all the world, ought to know that we shall declare war again should the practice ever be resumed. If the stars and the stripes which float over an American vessel upon the ocean cannot protect all those who sail beneath them from impressment, no matter to what land they may owe their birth, then we are no

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longer an independent nation. British officer shall dare to violate the flag of our country on the ocean, and shall seize and carry away any seaman from the deck of an American vessel, no matter what may be the pretence, (unless instant reparation should be made by his Government for the outrage,) our only alternative will then be war or national dishonor. We are deeply, solemnly pledged before the world, to avenge such a wrong without a moment's unnecessary delay. Such an act would, in effect, be a declaration of war against us; and Great Britain knows it well. She claims the right of impressment, as a belligerent right only, and when she shall go to war with France, or any other nation, she will then count the cost to herself which may result from this practice. She may refrain, from the conviction that it would convert us from being a neutral, into her most deadly enemy.. No, sir; no. This is not a question for holyday negotiation, but for war, inevitable war, should the occasion ever unfortunately arise. But Great Britain will have a care how she provokes such a conflict, in violation of every principle of national law, although she may refuse formally to renounce the practice. War must be the necessary result of impressment, or our national character must become a subject of scorn and contempt for all mankind.

Has

I proceed next to the case of the Caroline. There was nothing easier in the world than to settle this question satisfactorily. The British Government had only to acknowledge that Captain Drew and his band of volunteer desperadoes were in the wrong when, under the auspices of Colonel McNab, they had invaded our territory, burnt the Caroline, and murdered an American citizen; and then do all they could to repair this wrong, by indemnifying the owner of the steamboat for his loss of property, and providing for the family of the murdered Durfee, if he have a family. To acknowledge the wrong, and repair the injury as far as he can, is the first dictate of every just and honorable man, at the moment he becomes convinced of his error. Such ought to be the conduct of every just and honorable nation. But has Great Britain pursued this course in the case of the Caroline? Has she either admitted the national wrong, or repaired it by making compensation to those who were its victims? Neither the one nor the other. We have been told, indeed, by the Senator from Virginia, (Mr. RIVES,) that this old and haughty nation, proud in arms, has submitted to ask our pardon for the outrage; and he considers this a great triumph. But is this the fact? Let the letter of Lord Ashburton to Mr. Webster, of the 28th July, be carefully examined by any Senator, and he must arrive at a directly opposite conclusion. I assert that this letter contains an able and elaborate justification of the attack on the Caroline, and a vindication of the British officers who planned and conducted it. How could it be otherwise? not Colonel McNab been knighted, and Captain Drew pensioned, for this gallant exploit against unarmed men, who vainly believed that the American flag upon American soil was a protection against British outrage? Have we not seen, within a few days, that a public dinner at which a noble Duke presided, has recently been given to Sir Allen McNab in London, where he received such honors as will encourage him again to violate our territory, whenever interest or feeling shall again prompt to a similar outrage? I ask the Senator from Virginia to point to any portion of the letter where the conduct of McNab and Drew has been condemned; nay, more, I ask him to point to any portion of the letter where it has not been justified. It is very true that Lord Ashburton, whilst he earnestly maintains "that there were grounds of justification [for the Caroline outrage] as strong as were ever presented in such cases," declares "that no slight of the authority of the United States was ever intended;" and although this service was necessary, yet, as it involved a violation of our territory, he would deprecate its recurrence. In the very sentence to which the Senator from Virginia refe, in which his Lordship regrets "that some expiation and apology for this occurrence was not immediately made," he still continues to justify the capture and destruction of the Caroline on the plea of necessity. The whole substance of this letter may be summed up in a very few words, thus: Although the violation of your territory, and the destruction of the Caroline, were absolutely necessary and entirely justifiable, and as such have received the approbation of the British Government; yet I am extremely sorry that any such necessity existed, and hope i

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may not again occur. I also regret that such an explanation and apology for this occurrence as I have just made, had not been tendered to your Government immediately after the event. A man runs me through the body with a sword; and afterwards explains and apologises to me, by assuring me that his act was both necessary and justifiable; but yet he is extremely sorry that any such necessity existed. This is Lord Ashburton's apology for the Caroline outrage. The President vainly indulged the hope, in his annual message at the commencement of the present session, "that the British Government would see the propriety of renouncing, as a rule of future action, the precedent which has been set in the affair at Schlosser." This was a vain hope. So far from renouncing the affair as a precedent, it has been justified and approved by that Government throughout. Let an insurrection again occur in Canada, and we shall reap the bitter fruits of this precedent. The military officers of the British Government, will send expeditions across our frontier, which may plunder and murder our citizens under pretence of defending their Canadian possessions against the attacks of the insurgents. This will be done, if for no other purpose but that of displaying their zeal and devotion to their sovereign; and thus purchasing the honors and rewards which have been so profusely bestowed upon the McNabs and the Drews who planned and conducted the Caroline expedition. A necessity to justify such attacks will always exist whenever they are deemed expedient; and if, after four years' negotiation, the British Government should express its sorrow-not for the outrage itself, but because a necessity existed for its perpetration-then we must be satisfied, if we should consider the Caroline precedent as binding hereafter.

After all that I have said, it would be vain to ask whether Lord Ashburton has granted indemnity to the owner of the Caroline, or provided for the family of the murdered Durfee. It does not appear that Mr. Webster ever demanded any such in. demnity, or even alluded to the subject. He may possibly have adverted to it in his private conferences with Lord Ashburton; but if he did-my life upon it-the answer was, that the attack on the Caroline was justifiable, and therefore not a subject of indemnity. You have thus permitted this steamboat, owned by an American citizen, whilst under American colors, and moored in an American port, to be destroyed by the British authorities, without even asking them to indemnify the owner. Does not justice require that you should indemnify the citizen whom your own soil and your own flag could not protect, and for whom you asked no indemnity? I shall not at present attempt to answer this question. On the files of our executive documents, there is to be found a memorial from the citizens of Buffalo, presented in March, 1838, which places the claim of Mr. Wells, the American owner of the Caroline, in a very strong light; and as we have not even asked any satisfaction for him from the British Government, it will be a serious question whether we are not bound to indemnify him ourselves.

But Lord Ashburton, in this extraordinary letter, is not content with acting on the defensive. In the conclusion of it, he becomes the assailant. Referring to the case of McLeod, he complains that "individuals have been made personally liable for acts done under the avowed authority of their Government;" and he inquired whether the Govern ment of the United States is now in a condition to surrender those engaged in such enterprises as that of the capture of the Caroline, without subjecting them to trial.

Mr. Webster replied to this letter on the 6th of August, and informs his Lordship that the Presi dent is satisfied, "and will make this subject, [the capture of the Caroline,] as a complaint of violation of territory, the topic of no further discussion between the two Governments." And thus ends the Caroline question.

But not so the McLeod question. Mr. Webster admits, as he had done in the beginning, that McLeod ought to have been surrendered, without trial, on the demand of the British Government. He graciously explains the reason why this could not be done, and casts the blame "upon a State court, and that not of the highest jurisdiction," which "was embarrassed, as it would appear, by technical difficulties." He says, however, that the

Government of the United States holds itself not only fully disposed, but fully competent, to fulfil its acknowledged obligations to subjects of England,

His Lordship must, indeed, have been difficult to please, if all these assurances were not satisfactory: In what, then, has the Caroline outrage resulted?-that outrage, so eloquently described by the Secretary hitself, in his letter to Mr. Fox, as to make the blood tingle;-that outrage perpetrated on the Caroline "in the darkness of the night, while moored to the shore, and while unarmed men were asleep on board, killing some and wounding others, and then drawing her into the current, above the cataract, setting her on fire, and, careless to know whether there might not be in her the innocent with the guilty, or the living with the dead, committing her to a fate which fills the imagination with horror." We have settled this outrage upon our territory without any acknowledgment from the British Government that the act itself was wrong and unjustifiable, and without any indemnity to the injured individuals. Nay, more; Mr. Webster has yielded to Great Britain, while she still continued to justify the act and approve the conduct of the officers of the expedition, an assurance that we would surrender, without trial, all persons who may hereafter be engaged in similar enterprises. And, to cap the climax, the Senate have already passed what I solemnly believe to be an unconstitutional bill, which, if it should receive the sanction of the House, and be approved by the President, will deprive all State courts of jurisdiction over the foul murders which may be committed within their territory by lawless bands of desperate men sent over the lines from Canada by petty provincial officers, and will discharge the criminals from confinement in a summary manner, by a gross perversion of the writ of habeas corpus. Surely we have done everything we could to appease the British Government for the trial of McLeod before the courts of New York. I repeat that Lord Ashburton must be a most unreasonable man if he be not entirely satisfied with the settlement of the McLeod and Caroline questions.

I now come to the Creole question. And here we, who are opposed to the treaty, have been told that this is peculiarly a Southern question; and that, if the Senators from the South are satisfied with the manner in which it has been adjusted, we ought not to complain. Sir, this is not a mere Southern question, but it is a question which deeply affects the honor of the whole country. I might here repeat what I have said upon a former occasion-that all Christendom is leagued against the South upon this question of domestic slavery. They have no other allies to sustain their constitutional rights, except the Democracy of the North. I do not mean to insinuate that the Whig party of the North are generally abolitionists. Far from it. But this I will say: that Whig candidates most generally receive the support of the abolitionists; and, therefore, the Whigs, as a party, are careful not to give them offence. Far different is the conduct of the Democrats. In my own State, we inscribe upon our party banners hostility to abolition. It is there one of the cardinal principles of the Democratic party; and many a hard battle have we tought to sustain this principle. Whilst the Democrats of the North are opposed to slavery in the abstract, they are ever ready to maintain the constitutional rights of the South against the fierce and fanatical spirit of abolition. I, therefore, claim the right of discussing the Creole question. It was my anxious desire and confident hope that this question, at least, might have been settled by the treaty. I firmly believe that the propitious moment for adjusting it on honorable terms has passed away forever. The British Government might have consented to accept the bitter with the sweet; and to have done us justice on the Creole question, for the sake of obtaining that portion of Maine which they so ardently desired. But we have not improved the golden opportunity; and now what are we told? Why, that a great advance has been made towards the settlement of this question by the correspondence before us.

And what is a diplomatic note? What statesman ever dreamed of adjusting an important question, well calculated to impair the harmony and destroy the peace of two great nations, by a diplomatic note? A treaty is the only mode, known to the law of nations by which such questions can be settled. Now, sir, if the letter of Lord Ashbur ton, of the 6th August, had even contained every

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stipulation which we could desire in regard to the Creole question, to what would it amount? might possibly bind the honor of the present British cabinet; but after a change of ministry, would it bind their successors'? No man will pretend it. A new ministry would say to us, Why did you not secure your claimed rights by treaty? We are not bound by a mere diplomatic note, written by Lord Ashburton in behalf of a former ministry. And more especially are we not bound by it, when. that minister himself, in the very first sentence of the note on which you rely, disclaims all authority from his Government to enter into any formal stipulation on the subject; and in a subsequent part of it, refers "to great principles too deeply rooted in the consciences and sympathies of the British people," which might cause a disavowal of any engagement into which he might enter for the purpose of settling this question.

But even if the engagement contained in this note of Lord Ashburton were solemnly inserted in the body of the treaty itself, it would be wholly ineffectual. It is contained in two sentences, which I shall read:

"In the mean time, (says his Lordship,) I can engage that instructions shall be given to the Governors of her Majesty's colonies on the southern borders of the United States to execute their own laws with careful attention to the wish of their Government, and that there shall be no officious interference with American vessels driven by accident or by violence into those ports. The laws and duties of hospitality shall be exe. cuted, and those seem neither to require nor to justify any fur ther inquisition into the state of persons or things on board of vessels so situated, than may be indispensable to enforce the observance of the municipal law of the colony, and the proper regulation of its harbors and waters."

Now, sir, when we consider the nature of our grievance, we shall perceive at once how wholly inadequate his Lordship's stipulation will be to afford a remedy. American citizens, in transporting their slaves by sea, from the Atlantic States to States on the Gulf of Mexico and on the Missis. sippi, must pass through the Bahama channel. If their vessels are driven into any British port along this channel, by storms, or are carried there in consequence of mutiny and murder, the slaves, who can escape to the shore by any means what ever, are instantly free. Such is the law of England, which will most probably never be changed. But whilst the slaves remain on board of an American vessel, they are, in the contemplation of the law of nations, on American soil. Now, if his Lordship had stipulated that the British authorities should prevent the slaves on Board of vessels driven into port by storms, or carried there by mutiny, from making their escape to the shore, there would have been some efficiency in the engagement. This would have been a stipulation to do a positive act, which would have retained and secured the slaves in the possession of their masters. But the engagements of Lord Ashburton are all merely negative. The British colonial governors are not themselves to be instrumental in releasing the slaves,-they shall not officially interfere with American vessels driven by accident and by violence into those ports,-they shall not make any further inquisition into the state of persons or things on board of vessels thus situated, than may be necessary to enforce the municipal laws. All is negative, and is intended merely to prevent the British authorities themselves from becoming actors in violating our rights! The people of any of these colonies, without violating his Lordship's engagement, may interfere to produce the escape of the slaves from any such vessels. That they will hereafter act in this manner, there can be no doubt, judging from their past conduct.

In justice to Mr. Webster, I must say that he has placed this whole subject in a most clear, forcible, and striking light. He has proved conclusively that we ask no engagement from the British Government but what they are clearly bound to perform, under the law of nations, without any treaty stipulation whatever. What I complain of is, that while he always demonstrates his propositions, they never produce any practical effect for our advan tage. Lord Ashburton does not attempt to answer his arguments, because they are unanswerable; and yet, in general terms, his Lordship declares that some of them have rather surprised and startled him, though he will not pretend to judge them. His object was to transfer the negotiation concerning the Creole to London; and in this he has succeeded. Our object ought to have been to settle the question in Washington, and to connect together, in the same treaty, the Creole question with

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the Northeastern boundary. I most sincerely hope that I may be mistaken, but I now believe none of us will ever live to see the day when the Creole question will be settled on terms honorable and satisfactory to this country.

One remark I feel impelled to make-and that is, that this Senate deserves to be famous not only for passing abstract resolutions, but for our willingness io surrender them whenever we are called upon to carry them into effect. We have unanimously resolved and re-resolved in favor of our title to the disputed territory; and we have pursued a similar course in relation to the principles involved in the Creole question. I hope that we shall hereafter desist from such vain and idle proceedings.

On the 15th of April, 1840, we resolved, by a unanimous vote, that our ships on the high seas, in time of peace, were, according to the law of nations, under the exclusive jurisdiction of our country; and further, that, when forced by stress of weather, or other unavoidable cause, into the ports of a friendly power, they, with their cargoes, "and persons on board, with their property, and all the rights belonging to their personal relations, as established by the laws of the State to which they belong, would be placed under the protection which the laws of nations extend to the unfortunate under such circumstances." These propositions have been demonstrated by the Secretary of State. And yet, after our clear rights, under the law of nations, have been repeatedly outraged by the British authorities and people, all we have obtained for their security is a diplomatic note containing engagements which will have no practical effect whatever, and which may be recalled at pleasure by the British Government. So much for the case of the Creole.

I now approach the treaty itself, and shall first discuss the eighth article. It stipulates that each of the contracting parties shall maintain on the coast of Africa a naval force of not less than eighty guns, to enforce, separately, the laws of each country for the suppression of the slave-trade; "the said squadrons to be independent of each other, but the two Governments stipulating, nevertheless, to give such orders to their officers commanding their respective forces, as shall enable them to act most effectually in concert and co-opera'ion, upon mutual consultation, as exigencies may arise, for the attainment of the true object of this article; copies of all such orders to be communicated by each Government to the other, respectively."

Now, sir, the first remark in regard to this most important article, which must strike every mind, is, that it has become a part of the treaty, without any correspondence whatever between the two plenipo tentiaries in relation to the subject. We are left entirely in the dark as to the motives which influenced the negotiators in forming this article, except from the obscure hints which may be collected from the President's message which accompanied the treaty. And here I would remark, that this correspondence throughout presents a singular spectacle, which, Itrust, may never be exhibited again in any important negotiation with a foreign power. Everything had been previously arranged in verbal conferences, without any note or memorandum of what had transpired at them, before the date of the letters communicated with the treaty; and these letters were evidently intended merely to present results in such a form as might best satisfy the people of both nations. The original pretensions on the one side or the other-the manner in which they were resisted-the means by which they were modified and received their present form-all, all are buried in oblivion, so far as this Government is concerned. The tracks of the negotiators were made upon the sand, and the returning tide has effaced them forever. Such is the case in relation to this Government; but not so, I shall venture to assert, in regard to England.

The first duty of every responsible minister engaged in the negotiation of an important treaty is, to communicate to his Government a faithful history in detail of all his official conferences. The British Government, beyond a doubt, have been accurately informed, from day to day, of the progress of this negotiation; and though the despatches of Lord Ashburton may not, for many years, see the light, yet they will be a great diplomatic curiosity whenever published. Instructed to settle all the questions in dispute between the two countries, the means will then appear by which he succeeded in baffling the American negotiator, and evading the