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nity of a million of acres of good land in Michigan. The indemnity was scouted. Nothing would do but the true line!-the true line along the highlands-and that by the 4th day of a certain July! and if not peaceably, then by force! And in this patriotic and warlike ebullition, the negotiator of this treaty boiled hottest and longest; declaring loudly that he would clap a musket upon his shoulder, and march straight to the northwest corner of Nova Scotia himself, and there fight for the line of '83. After all this, he signed this treaty; and the process by which this revolution was effected in his mind and spirit, so desirable to be known, remains a profound secret for want of the protocols.

Po soften the effect of this inexplicable sacrifice, the absurd pretext of sterile and poor land is resorted to. These 893 square miles, surrendered on this side the awarded line, are depreciated as unfit for cultivation. If so, what does Great Britaid want with it, except for a purpose more valuable than cultivation? Why is poor land more desirable to her than to us? Why does she want our poor land, (and the question of peace or war depend upon her getting it,) unless it is for war purposes, and to gain a military advantage over us? And here let me say, once for all, that it is but a poor compliment to American intelligence to be turning a question of national boundaries into a question of cornfields. Every child knows that we want mountains, rivers, rocks, and deserts for the former-level and rich land for the latter; and that the nation is a fool that thinks of acres and cultivation, when the question is one of boundaries and dominion.

3. The establishment of the low-land boundary in place of the mountain boundary, and parallel to it. This new line is 110 miles long. It is on this side of the awarded line-not a continuation of it, but a deflexion from it; and evidently contrived for the purpose of weakening our boundary, and retiring it further from Quebec. It will be called in history the Webster line. It begins on the awarded line, at a lake in the St. Francis river; breaks off at right angles to the south, passes over the valley of the St. John in a straight line, and equidistant from that river and the mountain, until it reaches the northwest branch of the St. John, when, approaching within forbidden distance of Quebec, it deflects to the east; and then holds on its course to the gorge in the mountain at the head of Metjarmette creek. A view of the map will show the character of this new line; the words of the treaty show how cautiously it was guarded; and the want of protocols hides its paternity from our view. The character of the line is apparent; and it requires no military man, or military woman, or military child, to say to whose benefit it enures. A man of any sort-a woman of any kind-a child of any age-can tell that! It is a British line, made for the security of Quebec. Follow its calls on the map, and every eye will see this design. These are the calls:

"Beginning at the outlet of the Lake Pohenagamook; thence, southwesterly, in a straight line to a point on the northwest branch of the river St. John, which point shall be ten miles dis. tant from the main branch of the St. John, in a straight line, and in the nearest direction; but if the said point shall be found to be less than seven miles from the nearest point of the summit or crest of the highlands that divide those rivers which empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence from those which fall into the river St. John, then the said point shall be made to recede down the said northwest branch of the river St. John, to a point seven miles in a straight line from the said summit or crest; thence, in a straight line, in a course about south eight degrees west, to the point where the parallel of latitude of 46 deg. 25 min. north intersects the southwest branch of the St. John; thence, southerly, by the said branch, to the source there. of in the highlands at the Metjarmette portage."

4. The surrender of the mountain boundary between the United States and Great Britain on the frontiers of Maine. This is a distinct question from the surrender of territory. The latter belonged to Maine: the former to the United States. They were national, and not State boundaries--established by the war of the Revolution, and not by a State law or an act of Congress; and involving all the considerations which apply to the attack and defence of nations. So far as a State boundary is coterminous with another State, it is a State question, and may be left to the discretion of the States in terested: so far as it is coterminous with a foreign power, it is a national question, and belongs to the national authority. A State cannot be permitted to weaken and endanger the nation by dismem. bering herself in favor of a foreigner, by demolishing a strong frontier, delivering the gates and keys of a country into the hands of a neighboring nation, and giving them roads and passes into the

The British Treaty-Mr. Benton.

country. The boundaries in question were national, not State; and the consent of Maine, even if given, availed nothing. Her defence belongs to the Union; is to be made by the blood and treasure of the Union; and it was not for her, even if she had been willing, to make this defence more difficult, more costly, and more bloody, by giving up the strong, and substituting the weak line of defence. Near three hundred miles of this strong national frontier have been surrendered by this treaty--being double as much as was given up by the rejected award. The King of the Netherlands, although on the list of British generals, and in the pay of the British Crown, was a man of too much honor to deprive us of the commanding mountain frontier opposite to Quebec; and besides, Jackson would have scouted the award if he had attempted it. The King only gave up the old line to the north of the head of the St. Francis river; and for this he had some reason, as the mountain there subsided into a plain, and the ridge of the highlands (in that part) was difficult to follow: our negotiator gives up the boundary for one hundred and fifty miles on this side the head of the St. Francis, and without pretext; for the mountain ridge was there three thousand feet high. The new part given up, from the head of the St. Francis to Metjarmette portage, is invaluable to Great Britain. It covers her new road to Quebec, removes us further from that city, places a mountain between us, and brings her into Maine. To comprehend the value of this new boundary to Great Britain, and its injury to us, it is only necessary to follow it on a map -to see its form--know its height, the depth of its gorges, and its rough and rocky sides. The report of Capt. Talcott will show its characterthree thousand feet high: any map will show its form. The gorge at the head of the Metjarmette creek-a water of the St. Lawrence--is made the terminus ad quem of the new conventional lowland line: beyond that gorge, the mountain barrier is yielded to Great Britain. Now, take up a map. Begin at the head of the Metjarmette creek, within a degree and a half of the New Hampshire line--follow the mountain north--see how it bears in upon Quebec-approaching within two marches of that great city, and skirting the St. Lawrence for some hundred miles. All this is given up. One hundred and fifty miles of this boundary is given up on this side the awarded line; and the country left to guess and wonder at the enormity and fatuity of the sacrifice. Look at the new military road from Halifax to Quebec--that part of it which approaches Quebec, and lies between the mountain and the St. Lawrence. Even by the awarded line, this road was forced to cross the mountain at or beyond the head of the St. Francis, and then to fol low the base of the mountain for near one hundred miles, with all the disadvantages of crossing the spurs and gorges of the mountain, and the creeks and ravines, and commanded in its whole extent by the power on the mountain. See how this is changed by the new boundary! the road permitted to take either side of the mountain--to cross where it pleases--and covered and protected in its whole exient by the mountain heights, now exclusively British. Why this new way, and this security for the road, unless to give the British still greater advantages over us than the awarded boundary gave? A palliation is attempted for it. It is said that the mountain is unfit for cultivation; that the line along

could not be ascertained; and that Maine consented. These are the palliations--insignificant if true, but not true in their essential parts. And, first,

* Mr. Featherstonhaugh, formerly employed by the British Government in researches upon this boundary, thus displays the military importance of the new boundary, in a late speech in England:

"The treaty of 1783 proposed to establish the boundary be tween the two countries along certain highlands. The Ameri cans claimed these highlands to run in a northeasterly direction from the head of the Connecticut river, in a course which would have brought the boundary within the distance of twenty miles from the river St. Lawrence, and which, besides cutting off the posts and military routes leading from the province of New Brunswick to Quebec, would have given them various military positions to command and overawe that river and the fortress of Quebec.

"Now, gentlemen, if you will divert your attention for a moment from the conflicting statements you may have read in regard to the merits of the compromise which has been made, I will explain them to you in a few words. The American claim, instead of being maintained, has been altogether withdrawn and abandoned; the territory has been divided into equal moieties, as nearly as possible; we have retained that moiety which se Cures to us every object that was essential to the welfare of our colonies; all our communications, military and civil, are forever placed beyond hostile reach; and all the military positions on the highlands claimed by America are, without exception, se. cured forever to Great Britain.",

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as to the poverty of the mountain, and the slip along their base, constituting this area of 893 square miles surrendered on this side the awarded line: Captain Talcott certifies it to be poor, and unfit for cultiva tion. I say, so much the better for a frontier. As to the height of the mountains, and the difficulty of finding the dividing ridge, and the necessity of adopting a conventional line: I say all this has no application to the surrendered boundary on this side the awarded line at the head of the St. Francis. On this side of that point, the mountain ridge is lofty, the heights attain three thousand feet; and navi. gable rivers rise in them, and flow to the east and to the west-to the St. Lawrence and the Atlantic. Hear Captain Talcott, in his letter to Mr Webster:

"The territory within the lines mentioned by you contains eight hundred and ninety-three square miles-equal to five hun dred and seventy one thousand five hundred and twenty acres. It is a long and narrow tract upon the mountains or highlands, the distance from Lake Pohenagamook to the Merjarmette port age being one hundred and ten miles. The territory is barren, and without timber of value; and I should estimate that nineteen parts out of twenty are unfit for cultivation. Along eighty miles of this territory the highlands throw up into irregular em inences of different heights, and, though observing a general northeast and southwest direction, are not brought well into line. Some of these elevations are over three thousand feet above the sca.

"The formation is primitive siliceous rock, with slate resting upon it around the basis. Between the eminences are mo. rasses and swamps, throughout which beds of moss, of luxuri. ant growth, rest on and cover the rocks and earth beneath. The growth is such as is usual in mountain regions on this conti nent in high latitudes. On some of the ridges and eminences birch and maple are found; on others, spruce and fir; and in the swamps, spruce intermixed with cedar; but the wood eve rywhere is insignificant, and of stinted growth. It will readily be seen, therefore, that for cultivation, or as capable of furnish ing the means of human subsistence, the lands are of no value."

This letter was evidently obtained for the purpose of depreciating the lost boundary, by showing it to be unfit for cultivation. The note of the Secretary negotiator which drew it forth is not given, but the answer of Captain Talcott shows its chatacter; and its date (that of the 14th of July) classes it with the testimony which was hunted up to justify a foregone conclusion. The letter of Captain Talcott is good for the Secretary's purpose, and for a great deal more. It is good for the overthrow of all the arguments on which the plea for a conventional boundary stood. What was that plea? Simply, that the highlands in the neighborhood of the northwest corner of Nova Scotia could not be traced; and that it was necessary to substitute a conventional line in their place. And it is the one on which the award of the King of the Netherlands turned, and was, to the extent of a part of his award, a valid one. But it was no reason for the American Secretary to give one hundred and fifty miles of mountain line on this side of the awarded line, where the highlands attained three thousand feet of elevation, and turned navigable rivers to the right and left. Lord Ashburton, in his letter of the 13th of June, commences with this idea: that the highlands described in the treaty could not be found, and had been so admitted by American statesmen, and quotes their declarations. He says:

"In the year 1802, Mr. Madison, at that time Secretary of State for the United States, in his instructions to Mr. Rufus King, observed that the difficulty in fixing the northwest angle of Nova Scotia 'arises from a reference in the treaty of 1783 to highlands which, it is now found, have no definite existence." And he suggests the appointment of a commission, to be jointly appointed, to determine on a point most proper to be substi tuted for the description in article II of the treaty of 1783: Again: Mr. President Jefferson, in a message to Congress on the 17th of October, 1903, stated that a further knowledge of the ground in the northeastern and north western angles of the Uni ted States has evinced that the boundaries established by the treaty of Paris, between the British territories and ours, in those points, were too imperfectly described to be suscepti ble of execution.""

Here it is very clear that it is not the line itself, in its whole extent, between Canada and Maine, that cannot be fixed for want of finding these highlands; but merely the northeastern corner, as determined by the northwestern corner of Nova Scotia. This idea, sufficiently clear in the few words quoted from Mr. Madison, becomes still more so when we refer to the whole paragraph in his letter of June 8, 1802, to Mr. Rufus King. In that paragraph he

says:

"In fixing the point at which the line is to terminate, (the due-north line from the head of the St. Croix to the highlands which divide the waters of the St. Lawrence from those of the Atlantic,) and which is referred to as the northwest corner of Nova Scotia, the difficulty arises from a reference of the treaty of 1783 to the highlands, which, it is now found, have no definite existence. To remove this difficulty, no better expedient occure than to provide for the appointment of a third com missioner, as in article 5 of the treaty of 1794; and to authorize the three to determine on a point most proper to be substituted for the description in the 2d article of the treaty of 1783, haring due regard to the general idea that the line ought to termi nate on the elevated ground dividing the rivers falling init

27TH CONG......3D SESS.

the Atlantic from those emptying themselves into the St. Lawrence. The commissioners may also be authorized to substitute for the description of the boundary between the point so fixed, and the northwesternmost head of the Connecti cut river, namely, a line drawn along the said highlands; such a reference to intermediate sources of rivers, or other ascertained or ascertainable points, to be connected by straight lines, as will admit of easy and accurate execution hereafter, and as will best comport with the apparent intention of the treaty of 1783,"

From this full quotation of Mr. Madison's letter, it is still more clear than in Lord Ashburton's note-1. That the part at which the treaty could not be executed, for want of finding highlands, was the point to be constituted by the intersection of the due-north line from the head of the St. Croix with the line drawn along the highlands. 2. That this point might be substituted by a conventional one agreed upon by the three commissioners. 3. That from this point, so agreed upon, the line was to go to the highlands, and to follow them wherever they could be ascertained, to the head of the Connecticut river. This is the clear sense of Mr. Madison's letter and Mr. Jefferson's message; and it is to be very careless to confound this point (which they admitted to be dubious, for want of highlands at that place) with the line itself, which was to run near 300 miles on the elevations of a mountain reaching 3,000 feet high. The King of the Netherlands took a great liberty with this point when he brought it to the St. John river: our Secretarynegotiator took a far greater liberty with it when he brought it to the head of the Metjarmette creek; for it is only at the head of this creek that our line under the new treaty begins to climb the highlands. The King of the Netherlands had some apology for his conventional point and conventional line to the head of the St. Francis--for the highlands were sunk into table-land where the point ought to be, and which was the terminus a quo of his conventional line: but our negotiator had no apology at all for turning this conventional line south, and extending it 110 miles through the level lands of Maine, when the mountain highlands were all along in sight to the west. It is impossible to plead the difficulty of finding the highlands for this substitution of the lowland boundary, in the whole distance from the head of the St. Francis, where the King of the Netherlands fixed the commencement of our mountain line, to the head of the Metjarmette, where our Secretary fixed its commencement. Lord Ashburton's quotation from Mr. Madison's letter is partial and incomplete: he quotes what answers his purpose, and is justifiable in so doing. But what must we think of our Secretarynegotiator, who neglected to quote the remainder of that letter, and show that it was a conventional point, and not a conventional line, that Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison proposed? and that this conventional point was merely to fix the northwest angle of Nova Scotia where, in fact, there were no highlands; after which, the line was to proceed to the elevated ground dividing the waters, &c., and then follow the highlands to the head of the Connecticut? Why did our Secretary omit this correction of the British minister's quotation, and thus enable him to use American names against us?

The consent of Maine is the next palliation for this great sacrifice; and here I have to repeat that, even if such consent had been given, it would signify nothing. The boundaries in question are not State, but national: they are not in the custody of Maine, but of the whole Union But Maine did not consent. She was victimized into conditional submission by the arts and arguments of the Secretary negotiator! And here the strangest part of this inexplicable negotiation opens itself to our view. The consent of Maine! What was that consent? How obtained? And how used? She is said to have consented to this great dismemberment of her territory; surrender of her natural boundaries; the establishment of new boundaries within her old and natural limits; and the consolidation of the British military and naval power around her and within her. To all this she is said to have assented; and this is the short answer which is given for the enormous sacrifices she has been made to suffer. Did she consent? No more than the victim consents to its execution, because it walks, instead of being dragged, to the scaffold! Isolated from her sister States-from Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, New York, and Michigan-all of which were conciliated in favor of the treaty; pressed upon by her own Government, which presented the British proposition, and urged its acceptance; informed her that nothing better could be expected; warned her that this might be the last

The British Treaty-Mr. Benton.

chance for settling the question by agreement; presented her as the sole obstacle to the peace and happiness of two great nations:-thus isolated, urged, and menaced, the Maine commissioners so far assented as to agree to the sacrifice, upon condition that the Senate of the United States, on mature consideration, should advise and consent to the ratification of the treaty. The whole question was referred to our mature consideration: and yet, no sooner was conditional consent and reference to us obtained, than the full and absolute consent of Maine was heralded forth to forestal the public mind-to silence Maine herself; and is now incontinently repeated on this floor, to preclude our consideration of the subject. That 1 state this conditional consent correctly, I will show by presenting it to the Senate. After stating that it was this, or nothing; that Massachusetts had assented; that the General Government was anxious; that it was the last chance, and so on,-the Maine commissioners proceed to

say:

"Thus situated, the commissioners of Maine, invoking the spirit of attachment and patriotic devotion of their State to the Union, and being willing to yield to the deliberate convic tions of her sister States as to the path of dusy, and to interpose no obstacles to an adjustment which the general judg ment of the nation shall pronounce as honorable and expedient, even if that judgment shall lead to a surrender of a portion of the birthright of the people of their State, and prized by them be cause it is their birthright-have determined to overcome the it objections to the proposal, so far as to say, that if, upon ma ture consideration, the Senate of the United States shail advise and consent to the ratification of a trea y, corresponding in its terms with your proposal, and with the conditions in our memorandum accompanying this note, (marked A,) and identified by our signatures, they, by virtue of the power vested in them by the resolves of the Legislature of Maine, give the assent of that State to such conventional line, with the terms, conditions, and equivalents herein mentioned."

And this is her consent! Pressed by the Presi dent of the United States--pressed by the American negotiator--menaced--abandoned by her mother State-isolated from other States--presented as sole obstacle to the general peace--warned that it was the last chance: thus situated, this devoted State so far subdues herself as to say, through her commissioners, that she submits to the sacrifice, if, upon mature consideration, the Senate of the United States shall approve it. And no sooner is this reluctant, painful, conditional assent to the decision of the Senate obtained from Maine, than it is proclaimed as free and unqualified acquiescence! and the Senate, and the whole Union, are required to approve the treaty, because Maine had approved it! This is adding insult to injury, and serving the Senate but little more fairly than Maine herself has been served. The part which the Secretary negotiator has acted in bringing things to this pass; his arts and his arguments in victimizing a State which he should have defended; his wonderful change since the rejection of the award--all these belong to my general objections to the treaty, and will be examined in another part of my speech. At present, I limit myself to showing that Maine did not consent to the wrong which was done to her, and done to the United States; but made that consent dependent and conditional on the judgment of the Senate, after mature consideration.

I do not argue the question of title to the territory and boundaries surrendered. That work has been done in the masterly report of the Senator from Pennsylvania, [Mr. BUCHANAN,] and in the resolve of the Senate, unanimously adopted, which sanctioned it. That report and that resolve were made and adopted in the year 1838--seven years after the award of the King of the Netherlands--and vindicated our title to the whole extent of the disputed territory. After this vindication, it is not for me to argue the question of title. I remit that task to abler and more appropriate hands--to the author of the report of 1838. It will be for him to show the clearness of our title under the treaty of 1783--how it was admitted in Mr. Jay's treaty of 1794, in Mr. Liston's correspondence of 1798, in Mr. King's treaty of 1803, in Mr. Monroe's treaty of 1807, and in the conferences at Ghent--where, after the late war had shown the value of a military communication between Quebec and Halifax, a variation of the line was solicited as a favor, by the British commissioners, to establish that communication. It will be for him also to show the progress of the British claim, from the solicited favor of a road, to the assertion of title to half the territory and all the mountain frontier of Maine; and it will further be for him to show how he is deserted now by those who stood by him then. It will be for him to expose the fatal blunder at Ghent, in leaving our question of title to the arbitration of a European

Senate.

sovereign, instead of confiding the marking of the line to three commissioners, as proposed in all the previous treaties, and agreed to in several of them. To him, also, it will belong to expose the contradiction between rejecting the award for adopting a conventional line, and giving up part of the territory of Maine; and now negotiating a treaty which adopts two conventional lines, gives up all that the award did, and more too, and a mountain frontier besides; and then pays money for Rouse's Point, which came to us without money under the award. It will be for him to do these things. For what purpose? some one will say. I answer, for the purpose of vindicating our honor, our intelligence, and our good faith, in all this affair with Great Britain; for the purpose of showing how we are wronged in character and in rights by this treaty; and for the purpose of preventing similar, wrongs and blunders in time to come. Maine may be dismembered, and her boundaries lost, and a great military power established on three sides of her; but the Columbia is yet to be saved! There we have a repetition of the Northeastern comedy of errors on our part, and of groundless pretension on the British part, growing up from a petition for joint possession for fishing and hunting, to an assertion of title and threat of war; this groundless pretension dignified into a claim by the lamentable blunder of the convention of London in 1818. We may save the Columbia by showing the folly, or worse, which has dismembered Maine.

I proceed with the enumeration and consideration of the American concessions to the British.

6. The navigation of the St. John within the limits of the State of Maine. This results from the new line-the Webster line-which brings the British into the valley of the St. John, on the upper part of that river, and this side of the awarded line. The privilege of navigation is granted to the new neighbors which this line gives to Maine; and may be considered as a set-off to the navigation granted below to the inhabitants of Maine where the river is exclusively within the British dominions. It is navigation against navigation, and deprives the privilege granted to Maine of the benevolent and meritorious character claimed for it. We grant as much navigation as we receive, with the superaddition of a territorial right of way to the river where it is exclusively within our limits; a right which is denied to us where the river is wholly within the British limits.

7. The territorial right of way granted to these new neighbors to cross the Webster line, and travel over-land to the upper St. John, to enjoy their navigation within the exclusive limits of Maine. It is a privilege of no mean value, being new in principle, extensive in territory, and not reciprocated by a similar privilege to the inhabitants of Maine: on the lower part of the river. On this lower part the settlements of Maine skirt the St. John for one hundred miles, often approaching within five or ten miles of it. It would be very convenient to these settlements to cross the British line, and go straight to the river; but this advantage is denied them. They must get to the river by water, of which there is but one channel (the Aroostook;) or they must enter above, where the river is a mutual boundary, and from which they will have the exercise of carrying round, or pitching their saw-logs over, a second Niagara falls, eighty feet in the perpendicular plunge. The British on the Webster line are to have this privilege of over-land transit to and from the river, where it is within the exclusive dominion of Maine; and that, to the whole extent of the line-one hundred and ten miles. Reciprocity would have required a similar privilege to the Maine people below. Not having received it, this territorial right of way becomes a gratuitous concession, as important for its principles and consequences as for its novelty and inequality.

8. The sum of $300,000 to be paid to Maine and Massachusetts for their territorial losses under the treaty. This is to be paid by the United States, and is a concession most lamely and impotently aecounted for by the American negotiator. The want of protocols deprives us of a knowledge of its history. We only find it, for the first time, in its full-grown form, in the letter of the United States negotiator of the 15th of July to the commissioners of Maine, where it appears as an equivalent for British concessions. Speaking of it in this sense, our Secretary says:

"These cessions on the part of Englard would enure partly to the benefit of the States of New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York, but principally to the United States. The consider. ation on the part of England, for making them, would be the

27TH CONG.......3D SESS.

manner agreed upon for adjusting the Eastern boundary. The price of the cession, therefore, whatever it might be, would in fairness belong to the two States interested in the manner of that adjustment.

"Under the influence of these considerations, I am authorized to say, that if the commissioners of the two States assent to the line as described in the accompanying paper, the United States will undertake to pay to these States the sum of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, [increased to three hundred thousand dollars,] to be divided between them in equal moieties; and, also, to undertake for the settlement and payinent of the expenses in curred by those States, for the maintenance of the civil posse; and, also, for a survey which it was found necessary to make." This is the brief history of this strange item--an item strange in itself, and coming to us in a strange way. We find it in the proposition made by the American negotiator, in the name of his Government, to the commissioners of Maine: Lord Ashburton (for aught that is seen) having nothing to do with it. We find it as an American proposition; and an inconceivable one it is. Maine and Massachusetts lose 3,207,800 acres of land! Great Britain gets it! and the United States pay for it! How make the United States paymaster in a case where she was receiving nothing, and where she was losing the invaluable national boundaries established by the treaty of '83? How do this? By what legerdemain? The Secretary negotiator says it is for cessions on the part of England, which enure partly to the benefit of New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York, and partly to the United States; and also as a consideration on the part of Great Britain for adjusting the Northeastern boundary. Adjustment of boundary! What a delicate phrase for the demolition of the great boundaries purchased for us by the blood and treasure of the Revolutionary war! But the cessions enure partly to the ben. efit of the United States; and thus, being partly benefited, she must pay all the money. But how this benefit? What these cessions? and how enure to the national benefit? What are they? Not Rouse's Point; for that belongs to New York, and must be purchased from that State if wanted by the United States. But why pay Great Britain for Rouse's Point? The award of the King of the Netherlands gave it to us without pay, and we would not have

it. It has been a derelict these twenty-five years, neither the United States nor Great Britain touching it. Why this sudden value in the eyes of those who repulsed it when given by the King of the Netherlands? The same of the slips in New Hampshire and Vermont. They belong to those States. Not an inch of their soil enures to the benefit of the United States. It is not public land, but State property, which they constitute; and we have nothing to do with them. Besides, they are not cessions. They are, and always have been, and forever would be, the property of the States within whose revolutionary boundaries they lie. Great Britain would not receive them as a gift, much less demand money for their sale. No, sir, no. This mystification will not do. The United States becomes paymaster in a, case where she receives nothing--where Great Britain gains-and where Maine and Massachusetts lose. This is the short and the long of the story: and the $300,000 is put into the treaty to coerce Congress to pay it. If not to coerce Congress, why put it there? It is an ugly interposition of a foreign Government between the Government of the Union and a couple of its members; and if not put there for coercion, why is it put there? The equal division of this money between Maine and Massachusetts is another awkward circumstance: they divide equally while selling unequally. Massachusetts sells nothing but land which she wished to sell: Maine parts with land against her will-parts with jurisdiction--parts with boundaries-parts with cherished and long defended objects-and parts from all with grief and shame, and under the duresse of actual moral and menaced physical force from two powerful Governments. And, after all this, she divides equally with Massachusetts, who only sells what she wishes to sell, and with the advantage of selling to a sovereign readymoney purchaser in the mass, instead of doling out the acres in driblets, and on credits, to private individuals. One thing only is clear in this inexplicable transaction; and that is, that Maine and the United States are losers, and Massachusetts and Great Britain gainers.

F 9. The sum of about $200,000 to be paid to Massachusetts and Maine for their expenses in defending the disputed territory against Great Britain. This is an article more strange than the other to find a place in the treaty. If right to pay it, it should have rested on the faith of Congress: if wrong, it is made worse, by being put in a treaty

a foreign power. It is a dangerous practice

The British Treaty-Mr. Benton.

in confederacies to have foreign powers interposing between the confederacy and its members. Payments to States for expenditures in their proper defence is a domestic concern, and a legislative question. It belongs to our own authorities, and to the legislative department of those authorities. If these $200,000, thus stipulated to be paid to Maine and Massachusetts were for military expenses, properly incurred in their own defence through the neglect or default of the General Government, the question of reimbursement would still be one of exclusive legislative consideration. It would address itself to Congress. But it is not even a question of that kind, but of police and surveying expenses. The treaty says, vaguely, for protecting the disputed territory, and making a survey thereof: the correspondence explains this protection to be for the maintenance of a civil posse, and for a survey necessary to be made. Congress itself cannot pay States for maintaining civil posses and making surveys. It must be for defence against invasion or insurrection. This is the Constitution; and the treaty-making power is not above the Constitution, but subordinate to it. The supremacy of the treaty is not over the Constitution, but over the subjects falling within the scope of that power. It is for Congress to say whether a case has occurred to authorize Maine and Massachusetts to be reimbursed for expenses incurred in resisting invasion. The treaty-making power has nothing to do with it, and it is an invasion of the legislative power to put it into a treaty. In the light of a civil posse and a survey, Congress itself cannot pay these $200,000, The President, the Senate, and Queen Victoria cannot extend our Constitution, or bind the Congress to pass unconstitutional acts. The payment of this sum for a civil posse and a survey, unjusti fiable in itself, becomes aggravated by this unconstitutional attempt to control and coerce Congress. It was evidently put in for that purpose, and should be struck from the treaty. It is a question for legislation, and not for diplomacy; and Lord Ashburton evidently looks to this, in his ultimate note, washing his hands of all these payments to Maine and Massachusetts.

10. The naval alliance for the suppression of the slave-trade. This alliance is a part of the treaty, and evidently an indissoluble part of it. The motion to strike it out is to be resisted; and is already resisted as a motion to destroy the treaty, to prevent its ratification by Great Britain, and as exposing us to war with that power. All this is an admission that the treaty is a unit; that the alliance is a part of it; and that this alliance cannot be refused without exciting the resentment of Great Britain. I do not discuss the merits of this alliance at present; a proper time will be found for that discussion when I come to the article which stipulates for the naval co operation. At present, I only mention it as one of the considerations which make up the price which we pay for the treaty, as one of the American concessions and equivalents, and therefore proper to be enumerated in the catalogue of grants and sacrifices on, our part. I shall move to strike it out, both as wrong in itself, and as being in a wrong place, even if it was right.

11. The diplomatic alliance for remonstrances with foreign Governments which still admit the trade in African slaves. This is an undertaking of the same character with the naval alliance, subject to the same remarks, as an American consideration for making the treaty; and only mentioned now, for the sake of enumeration in the list of our grants and equivalents. Its merits will be discussed under the proper head.

12. The delivery of fugitive criminals. This stipulation is another of the American concessions in favor of Great Britain. The design of it is to get hold of fugitive "rebels" from Canada, under the pretext of getting hold of fugitives from justice. The design is political, though cloaked with the name of justice; and though equal in its terms, is unequal in its operation. Fugitive American slaves will not be given up; fugitive British subjects will be. Our slaves will still be enticed into Canada by the honors, the rewards, and the protection which await them there; and I only mention this fugitive stipulation now, as one of our concessions to Great Britain, and one to which late events in Canada have given great importance. I will discuss it when I come to the 10th article.

Such is the catalogue, and such the comparative value of the grants and equivalents (as they are called by our negotiator) which are made by this trealy. It is a long and heavy list on the part

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of the United States-a short and a light one on the part of Great Britain. So far as the Maine boundary is concerned, I have no more to say; but the other parts of the treaty-what it contains-what it omits the general objections to it-and the various questions which arise upon the correspondence, all these demand attention, and I proceed to give it.

The suppression of the African slave-trade is the second subject included in the treaty; and here the regret renews itself at the absence of all the customary lights upon the origin and progress of treaty stipulations. No minutes of conference; no protocols; no draughts or counterdraughts; no diplomatic notes; not a word of any kind from one negotiator to the other. Nothing in relation to the subject, in the shape of negotiation, is communicated to us. Even the section of the correspondence entitled "Suppression of the slave-trade"-even this section professedly devoted to the subject, contains not a syllable upon it from the negotiators to each other, or to their Governments; but opens and closes with communications from American naval officers, evidently extracted from them by the American negotiator, to justify the forthcoming of preconceived and foregone conclusions. Never since the art of writing was invented could there have been a treaty of such magnitude negotiated with such total absence of necessary light upon the history of its formation. Lamentable as is this defect of light upon the formation of the treaty generally, it becomes particularly so at this point, where a stipulation new, delicate, and embarrassing, has been unexpectedly introduced, and falls upon us as abruptly as if it fell from the clouds. In the absence of all appropriate information from the negotiators themselves, I am driven to glean among the scanty paragraphs of the President's message, and in the answers of the naval officers to the Secretary's inquiries. Though silent as to the origin and progress of the proposition for this novel alliance, they still show the important particular of the motives which caused it. The Pres ident says:

"The treaty obligations subsisting between the two countries for the suppression of the African slave trade, and the com. plaints made to this Government within the last three or four years (many of them but too well founded) of the visitation, seizure, and detention of American vessels on that coast, hy British cruisers, could not but form a delicate and highly im portant part of the negotiations which have now been held. "It is known that, in December last, a treaty was signed in London, by the representatives of England, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, having for its professed object a strong and united effort of the five powers to put an end to the traffic. This treaty was not officially communicated to the Govern ment of the United States, but its provisions and stipulations are supposed to be accurately known to the public. It is understood to be not yet ratified on the part of France.

"No application or request has been made to this Govern. ment to become party to this treaty; but the course it might take in regard to it, has excited no small degree of attention and discussion in Europe, as the principle upon which it is founded, and the stipulations which it contains, have caused warm animadversions and great political excitement.

"In my message at the commencement of the present session of Congress, I endeavored to state the principles which this Government supports respecting the right of search and the immunity of flags. Desirous of maintaining these principles fully, at the same time that existing obligations should be fulfilled, I have thought it most consistent with the honor and dig. nity of the country, that it should execute its own laws, and perform its own obligations, by its own means and its own power. The examination or visitation of the merchant vessels of one nation, by the cruisers of another, for any purpose, cxcept those known and acknowledged by the law of nations, under whatever restraints or regulations it may take place, may lead to dangerous results. It is far better, by other means, to supersede any supposed necessity, or any motive, for such examination or visit. Interference with a merchant vessel by an armed cruiser, is always a delicate proceeding, apt to touch the point of national honor, as well as to affect the interests of individuals. It has been thought, therefore, expedient, not only in accordance with the stipulations of the treaty of Ghent, but at the same time as removing all pretest on the part of others for violating the immunities of the American flag upon the seas, as they exist and are defined by the law of nations, to enter into the articles now submitted to the Senate."

The recitals in this paragraph are of momentous importance. They are conclusive to show that the stipulations into which we have entered, are the price which we have agreed to pay for the privilege of going unsearched upon the coast of Africa, and for the favor of not being officially required to join the quintuple alliance for the suppression of the slave-trade. The two first paragraphs are pregnant of these inferences: the concluding sentences of the last paragraph are conclusive of their truth, The first paragraph recites the fact of the seizure, detention, and visitation of our ships on the coast of Africa by British cruisers the second ambiguously refers to the five powers alliance, and raises surmises of their designs, which it does not satisfy: the concluding sentences of the

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last paragraph are sufficiently explicit in the declaration that we join Great Britain to avoid a junction with the five powers! and that we search ourselves, to avoid being searched by British cruisers! Studiously ambiguous, and profuse of phrases to deceive, while stinted of facts to inform, the message still lets out enough to betray these hidden and momentous meanings. The treaty has not been officially communicated to our Government. But may it not have been unofficially? and if so, by whom? for what purpose? and what are its contents? Instead of answering these pertinent inquiries, so naturally suggested by the declaration of the non-official communication, the sentence obliques off into the empty supposition that the contents are well known to the public! Why tell us this? why tell us what the public knows? We want to know what the Government knows-how it obtained its information-and what it is required to do. Instead of that, it tells us of the public: and then flies off to France, and informs us what we well knew before-that France had not signed. All this is foreign to the point. We want to know what concerns ourselves-whether the five powers are occupied with our affairs-and whether they have shown us their treaty-and for what purpose? The message says: "No application has been made to the United States to become a party to this quintuple alliance, but . . . but . . . but the course we may take is the subject of attention, and discussion, and warmth, and excitement in Europe!" But what all this tends to, and what is required of us to allay this excitement, the message does not say. Instead of satisfying the curiosity which it excited as to the course of things in relation to us in Europe, it flies back to this continent-reverts to the President's message at the commencement of the session-denies the right of searchasserts the immunity of, flags-and then most ominously declares that it is better to execute our own laws, and perform our own obligations; and do this by our own means, and by our own power. Why this declaration? Were others about to execute our laws, and perform our obligations, and to use means and powers upon us, not our own? Was this the state of the case? and, if so, why not tell us? Why this paltering and equivocation, unless to hide a damned conclusion which must be suffered, but cannot be told? The next sentence, however, approaches the point. "It is better to supersede the motive and supposed necessity for this delicate and dangerous search." And, finally, in the last words of the last sentence, the fatal secret is let out--that the articles now before the Senate were entered into for the purpose of "removing all pretext on the part of others for violating the immunities of the American flag in the African seas!" This is the secret; and after this, it stands confessed that our naval and diplomatic alliance with Great Britain is the price which we pay for five years' exemption from search, and for the favor of not being made a party to the quintuple alliance. The alliance with Great Britain is a substitute for these penalties: and a more ignominious purchase of exemption from outrage neyer disgraced the annals of an independent nation.

We will now see what is the price we have contracted to pay for these exemptions; and for that purpose I read the 8th and 9th articles of the treaty:

"ARTICLE VIII. The parties mutually stipulate that each shall prepare, equip, and maintain in service, on the coast of Africa, a sufficient and adequate squadron, or naval force of vessels, of suitable numbers and descriptions, to carry in all not less than eighty guns, to enforce separately and respectively the laws, rights, and obligations of each of the two countries, for the suppression of the slave trade; the said squadrons to be independent of each other, but the two Governments stipulating, nevertheless, to give such orders to the officers commanding their respective forces, as shall enable them most effectually to act in concert and co operation, upon mutual consultation, as exigencies may arise, for the attainment of the true object of this article; copies of all such orders to be communicated by each Government to the other respectively.

"ARTICLE IX. Whereas, notwithstanding all efforts which may be made on the coast of Africa for suppressing of the slave trade, the facilities for carrying on the traffic, and avoiding the vigilance of cruisers by the fraudulent use of flags, and other means, are so great, and the temptations for pursuing it, while a market can be found for slaves, so strong, as that the desired result may be long delayed, un less all markets be shut against the purchase of African ne groes; the parties to this treaty agree that they will unite in all becoming representations and remonstrances with any and all powers within whose dominions such markets are allowed to exist; and that they will urge upon all such powers the propriety and duty of closing such markets effectually at once and forever."

This is the price! naval and diplomatic alliance with Great Britain! And the eleventh article stipu

The British Treaty --Mr. Benton.

lates that the naval alliance is to continue for five years, and afterwards until one of the parties shall give notice for its cessation. Of course, Great Britain will never give the notice. Of course, also, the American Administration which makes it, will never give the notice. The alliance is eternal, unless we break down the party which made it. And this is the course of all revolting and dangerous innovations. It is as temporary measures they are introduced. They are continued imperceptibly; and finally made permanent, and fastened irrevocably upon the country. This will be the case with this alliance, unless the elections of 1844 relieve us from the dominion of the party now in power. And now let us see the extent of the obligations we have incurred to purchase this exemption from search, and to be excused from signing the quintuple treaty. They are: First, to prepare, equip, and maintain in service on the coast of Africa, a squadron of "at least" eighty guns, to cooperate with a British squadron in suppressing the slave trade. Secondly, to unite with Great Britain in diplomatic remonstrances and rep. resentations against the purchase of African negroes, with all the powers which still admit such purchases, and urging them to cease the practice, and to close the door against such purchases at once and forever. These are the obligations; and it is seen at once that they constitute an alliancea,double alliance-between the United States and Great Britain. The first sensation of an American in discovering this ominous conjunction, is that of astonishment, indignation, and shame. The farewell words of Washington rush to the mind. He warned us against entangling ourselves in foreign alliance: and here we are deeply entangled, and that with the very nation which, of all the others in the world, is the most to be dreaded.

The consequences of this entanglement are be yond the reach of human foresight, or of mental divination. It is the commencement of involving our America, and with it the whole New World, in the systems and vortex of European politics. We begin with going to Africa to join Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, (for France declines the favor,) in redressing the grievances of the Old World; after that, it is a natural step for these great powers to come over here to redress the wrongs of the New World. If this fatal policy is suffered to continue; if we go on to mix ourselves in the affairs of Europe; if we quit our own, to stand upon foreign ground; if we hitch our cockboat to the grand navies of Europe, and tie on our little ministers behind the gorgeous representatives of mighty monarchs;-if we do this, then it is in vain that Providence isolated us, and that Washington warned us. We are doomed to foreign connexions, and to foreign interference; and may expect to see the affairs of the two Americas, from Baffin's Bay to Cape Horn, regulated by the Sovereign congresses of Vienna, St. Petersburg, and London; and the fleets and armies of Europe sent here to enforce their decrees.

Passing from the political consequences of this entanglement-consequences which no human foresight can reach-1 come to the immediate and practical effects which lie within our view, and which display the enormous inexpediency of the measure. First: the expense in money-an item which would seem to be entitled to some regard in the present deplorable state of the treasury-in the present cry for retrenchment-and in the present heavy taxation upon the comforts and necessaries of life. This expense for 80 guns will be about $750,000 per annum, exclusive of repairs and loss of lives. I speak of the whole expense, as part of the naval establishment of the United States, and not of the mere expense of working the ships after they have gone to sea. Nine thousand dollars per gun is about the expense of the establishment; 80 guns would be $720,000 per annum, which is $3,600,000 for five years. But the squadron is not limited to a maximum of 80 guns; that is the minimum limit: it is to be 80 guns "at the least." And if the party which granted these 80 shall continue in power, Great Britain may find it as easy to double the number, as it was to obtain the first eighty. Nor is the time limited to five years; it is only determinable after that period by giving notice; a notice not to be expected from those who made the treaty. At the least, then, the moneyed expense is to be $3,600,000; if the present party continues in power, it may double or treble that amount; and this, besides the cost of the ships. Such is the moneyed expense. In ships, the wear

ern

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and tear of vessels must be great. We are to prepare, equip, and maintain in service, on a coast 4,000 miles from home, the adequate number of vessels to carry these 80 guns. It is not sufficient to send the number there; they must be kept up and maintained in service there; and this will require constant expenses to repair injuries, supply losses, and cover casualties. In the employment of men, and the waste of life and health, the expenditure must be large. Ten men and two officers to the gun, is the smallest estimate that can be admitted. This would require a complement of 960 men. Including all the necessary equipage of the ship, and above 1,000 persons will be constantly required. These are to be employed at a vast distance from home; on a savage coast; in a perilous service; on both sides of the equator; and in a climate which is death to the white race. This waste of men-this wear and tear of life and constitution-should stand for something in a Christian land, and in this age of roaming philanthropy; unless, indeed, in excess of love for the blacks, it is deemed merito. rious to destroy the whites. The field of operations for this squadron is great; the term "coast of Africa" having an immense application in the vocabulary of the slave-trade. On the western coast of Africa, according to the replies of the naval officers Bell and Paine, the trade is carried on from Senegal to Cape Frio-a distance of 3,600 miles, following its windings, as the watching squadrons would have to go. But the track of the slavers between Africa and America has to be watched, as well as the immediate coast; and this embraces a space in the ocean of 35 degrees on each side of the equator, (say four thousand miles,) and covering the American coast from Cuba to Rio Janeiro; so that the coast of Africa-the westcoast alone-embraces a diagram of the ocean of near 4,000 miles every way, having the equator in the centre, and bounded east and west by the New and the Old World. This is for the western coast only: the eastern is nearly as large. The same naval officers say that a large trade in negroes is carried on in the Mahometan countries bordering on the Red sea and the Persian gulf, and in the Portuguese East India colonies; and, what is worthy to be told, it is also carried on in the British presidency of Bombay, and other British Asiatic possessions. It is truc, the officers say the American slavers are not yet there; but go there they will, according to all the laws of trading and hunting, the moment they are disturbed, or the trade fails, on the western coast. Wherever the trade exists, the combined powers must follow it: for good is not to be done by halves, and philanthropy is not to be circumscribed by coasts and latitudes. Great is the field of enterprise which presents itself to the British-American squadrons; great, also, is the field of labor for their diplomatic remonstrants. Spain, Portugal, Brazil; Cuba, Porto Rico, and other American islands; the Mahometan, Portuguese, and British possessions in southern Asia;--all these will require the presence of the Anglo-American embassies. Great will be the expense of these embassies; for the ambassadors must not only be paid, but go loaded with costly presents when barbarians are to be treated with. And here the treating is to be double-with the savage negro chiefs who tolerate the sale, and with Christian or Mahometan kings who tolerate the purchase. Even if no unlucky consequence supervenes, the expense of these embassies must still be great; but if our ministers chance to be assassinated by the negro chief, or insulted by the Christian or Mahometan king--what then? Shall we resent the injury, at a good loss of men and money? or shall we count the cost, and pocket the outrage? What if the Emperor of Brazil, boy as he is; or the Queen of Spain, child as she is; or the Queen of Portugal, lady as she is, should give our minister advice to return home and free his own country from slaves before he went about to close the markets of the world against them? True, there is a difference between purchasing, and the purchased. The intellect can detect the difference. But still it is a case for a sarcasm, and for an insult; and the American minister who should go upon these expeditions should look out for answers very different from what may be given to the representative of Great Britain. She, having liberated her own slaves, may stand up and speak. But how will it be with the American minister, when he commences rehearsing his remonstrance? This business of remonstrating is a delicate operation between individuals; more so when a sovereign is in the case; and becomes ex

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ceedingly critical when the remonstrant is about in the condition himself which he attacks in others. Among all the strange features in the comedy of errors which has ended in this treaty, that of sending American ministers abroad, to close the markets of the world against the slave-trade, is the most striking. Not content with the expenses, loss of life, and political entanglement of this alliance, we must electioneer for insults, and send ministers abroad to receive, pocket, and bring them home.

In what circumstances do we undertake all this fine work? What is our condition at home, while thus going abroad in search of employment? We raise 1,000 men for foreign service, while reducing our little army at home! We send ships to the -coast of Africa, while dismounting our dragoons on the frontiers of Missouri and Arkansas! We protect Africa from slave-dealers, and abandon Florida to savage butchery! We send cannon, shot, shells, powder, lead, bombs, and balls, to Af rica, while denying arms and ammunition to the young men who go to Florida! We give food, clothes, pay, to the men who go to Africa, and deny rations even to those who go to Florida! We cry out for retrenchment, and scatter $3,600,000 at one broad cast of the hand! We tax tea and coffee, and send the money to Africa! We are borrowing and taxing, and striking paper money, and reducing expenses at home, when engaging in this new and vast expense for the defence of Africa! What madness and folly! Has Don Quixotte come to life, and placed himself at the head of our Government, and taken the negroes of Africa, instead of the damsels of Spain, for the objects of his chivalrous protection?

The slave-trade is diabolical and infamous; but Great Britain is not the country to read us a lesson upon its atrocity, or to stimulate our exertions to suppress it. The nation which, at the peace of Utrecht, made the asiento-the slave contract--a condition of peace, fighting on till she obtained it; the nation which entailed African slavery upon us --which rejected our colonial statutes for its suppression--which has many, many ten millions of white subjects in Europe and in Asia in greater slavery of body and mind, in more bodily misery and mental darkness, than any black slaves in the United States;-such a nation has no right to cajole or to dragoon us into alliances and expenses for the suppression of slavery on the coast of Africa. We have done our part on that subject. Considering the example and instruction we had from Great Britain, we have done a wonderful part. The Constitution of the United States, mainly made by slaveholding States, authorized Congress to put an end to the importation of slaves by a given day. Anticipating the limited day by legislative action, the Congress had the law ready to take effect on the day permitted by the Constitution. On the 1st day of January, 1808, Thomas Jefferson being President of the United States, the importation of slaves became unlawful and criminal. A subsequent act of Congress, following up the idea of Mr. Jefferson in his first draught of the Declaration of Independence, qualified the crime as piratical, and delivered up its pursuers to the sword of the law, and to the vengeance of the world, as the enemies of the human race.

Vessels of war cruising on the coast of Africa, under ou: act of 1819, have been directed to search our own vessels--to arrest the violators of the law, and bring them in-the ships for confiscation, and the men for punishment. This was doing enough-enough for a young country, far remote in the New World, and whose policy is to avoid foreign connexions and entangling alliances. We did this voluntarily, without instigation, and without supervision from abroad; and now there can be no necessity for Great Britain to assume a superiority over us in this particular, and bind us

He has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating and car. rying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation thither. This piratical warfare-the epprobrium of infidel powers-is the warfare of the Christian king of Great Britain, determined to keep open a market where men should be bought and sold. He has prosti tuted his negative for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or restrain this execrable commerce; and, that this as semblage of horrors might want no fact of distinguished die, he ja now exciting the very people to rise in arms among us, and to purchase that liberty of which he has deprived them, by murdering the people on whom he has obtruded them; thus paying off former crimes committed against the liberties of one people, with crimes which he urges them to commit against the lives of another."-[Original draught of the Declaration of Independence, as drawn by Mr. Jefferson, and before it was altered by the committee.]

The British Treaty-Mr. Benton.

in treaty stipulations, which destroy al the merit of a voluntary action. We have done enough; and it is no part of our business to exalt still higher the fanatical spirit of abolition, which is now become the stalking-horse of nations and of political powers. Our country contains many slaves, derived from Africa; and, while holding these, it is neither politic nor decent to join the crusade of European powers to put down the African slave-trade. From combinations of powers against the present slavetakers, there is but a step to the combination of the same powers against the present slaveholders; and it is not for the United States to join in the first movement, which leads to the second. "No entangling alliances" should be her motto! And as for her part in preventing the foreign slave-trade, it is sufficient that she prevents her own citizens, in her own way, from engaging in it; and that she takes care to become neither the instrument, nor the victim, of European combinations for its suppression.

save

The past administrations have been careful to us from the entanglement of these connexions: they have been as careful to save us from these dangerous connexions, as the English have been anxious to involve us in them. Mr. Van Buren rejected, as "unauthorized by instructions, and contrary to the established and well known principles and policy of the Government," the arrangement made by the commander of the United States schooner Grampus with the commander of her Britannic Majesty's sloop the Wolverine, on the 11th of March, 1840, authorizing the British commander "to detain all vessels under American colors found to be fully equipped for and engaged in the slave-trade, handing over to the American commander the vessels found to be American." Mr. Van Buren rejected this arrangement (the seminal principle of the present treaty) as contrary to the PRINCIPLES and the POLICY of the Government; and now this treaty comes to carry out on a great scale, what he wisely condemned on a small one.

The papers communicated do not show at whose instance these articles were inserted; and the absence of all minutes of conferences leaves us at a loss to trace their origin and progress in the hands of the negotiators. The little that is seen would indicate its origin to be wholly American; evidence aliunde proves it to be wholly British; and that our Secretary negotiator was only doing the work of the British minister in assuming the ostensible paternity of the articles. In the papers communicated, there is not a syllable upon the subject from Lord Ashburton. His finger is not seen in the affair. Mr. Webster appears as sole mover and conductor of the proposition. In his letter of the 30th of April to Captains Bell and Paine of the United States navy, he first approaches the subject, and opens it with a series of questions on the African slave-trade. This draws forth the answers which I have already shown. This is the commencement of the business. And here we are struck with the curious fact, that this letter of inquiry, laying the foundation for a novel and extraordinary article in the treaty, bears date 44 days before the first writter. communication from the British to the American negotiator! and 47 days before the first written communication from Mr. Webster to Lord Ashburton! It would seem that much was done by word of mouth before pen was put to paper; and that in this most essential part of the negotiations, pen was not put to paper at all, from one negotiator to the other, throughout the whole affair. Lord Ashburton's name is never found in connexion with the subject: Mr. Web. ster's only in the notes of inquiry to the American naval officers. Even in these he does not mention the treaty, nor allude to the negotiation, nor indicate the purpose for which information was sought! So that this most extraordinary article is without a clew to its history, and stands in the treaty as if it had fallen from the clouds, and chanced to lodge there! Even the President's message, which undertakes to account for the article, and to justify it, is silent on the point, though laboring through a mass of ambiguities and obscurities, evidently calculated to raise the inference that it originated with us. From the papers communicated, it is an American proposition, of which the British Legotiator knew nothing until he signed the treaty. That is the first place where his name is seen in conjunction with it, or seen in a place to authorize the belief that he knew of it. Yet, it is certainly a British proposition; it is certainly a British article. Evi

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dence aliunde establishes the fact; and as it is an important fact, and the more so from its studious concealment, I will examine that evidence; and for that purpose will have to go back near forty years in this branch of our diplomatic intercourse with Great Britain.

Sir, this is no new project with the British. They have been at it near forty years; but never found an Administration before to answer their purpose. As far back as the year 1806, when Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinckney were ministers in London, the British commenced this business; but in a form so gentle and innocent, that one is at a loss to understand, except as now explained, their anxiety to obtain a treaty stipulation for it. The request then was, for an intercommunication of laws against the slave-trade; and for co-operation to procure the consent of other powers to the abolition of the trade by law, as Great Britain and the United States had abolished it. It was an innocent request, and would have been complied with, with out the compulsion of a treaty obligation. We send our laws and public documents now to all the powers which have ministers here. Great Britain sends us all her parliamentary papers; and a valuable present they are. All this is done by virtue of the comity of nations, and from the civilization of the age, and not by virtue of national compacts.. Yet, to obtain a page or two of our laws on a particular subject, and to get us to join her in requesting other nations to abolish the slave-trade, nothing short of a treaty stipulation would content her extreme anxiety. The article was put into a treaty in 1806, and here it is:

"The high contracting parties engage to communicate to each other, without delay, all such laws as have been, or shall be hereafter, enacted by their respective Legislatures; as also all measures which shall have been taken for the abolition or limitation of the African slave trade; and they further agree to use their best endeavors to procure the co-operation of other powers for the final and complete abolition of a trade so repug. nant to the principles of humanity and justice."

This is the article. And what more harmless! To give copies of our laws, and to request other nations to abolish the trade by law, as we had done. This was the extent of the stipulation. The British proposed it, and pressed its adoption with zeal. The protocols show it; for, in those days, treaties were not negotiated without showing how; and the American ministers, in their correspondence with their Government, stated explicitly that the British proposed it, and pressed it upon them. Their words are: "The British commissioners proposed the article, and showed a great desire that we should accede to it." Now, why this great desire, unless for some ulterior purpose? The article was nothing in itself; and this anxiety about it can only be accounted for from a desire to lay a nestegg, to be hatched into life by the diplomatic incubation of future negotiators. The alliances, naval and diplomatic, of 1842, show the depth and character of their long-sighted policy.

The treaty of 1806 was not ratified; it was rejected by Mr. Jefferson, without communication to the Senate; and for a reason which I shall have occasion to mention in another part of my speech. The treaty fell, and with it the agreed article on the slave-trade. But the desires of the British did not fall, nor did they abate; and at the treaty of Ghent their instances were renewed for some stipu lation on this point, with all the warmth of a first love, and with all the pertinacity of a settled de sign. Advancing beyond the nugatory stipulations of 1806, pretermitting the unnecessary engagement for the communication of laws, and endeavoring to substitute actions for words, the British commissions at Ghent proposed an article requiring the United States "to exert every means in their power" to accomplish the suppression of this trade. The American commissioners found this proposition too strong. Though indefinite in its terms, and binding us to nothing specific, it was still deemed too strong; and, upon their objection, it was diInted into a blank engagement-"to use their best endeavors." In this diluted form, the article was agreed to; and now stand thus, as article 10 of the Ghent treaty:

"Whereas the traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the prin ciples of humanity and justice; and whereas, both his Majesty and the United States are desirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire abolition; it is hereby agreed that both the con tracting parties shall use their best endeavors to accomplish so desirable an object."

This is the article-certainly a faint one, and binding the United States to nothing. But it was a nest egg; and out of that egg, and by the maternal incubation of the present American Secretary of