to settle the squatters' claims, when in fact they were neither so needed nor
used, but misappropriated by A. to his own use; and that in consequence
of said misrepresentations the other expenses were incurred; and he joined
a count in contract, alleged to be for the same cause of action, which set
forth the agreement and his payment of said sums to A. under it, alleged
that he paid them in consequence of the false representations and statements
set forth in the first count, and sought to recover them as money had and
eceived by the defendant to the plaintiff's use. At the trial, B. gave notice
that he did not seek to recover anything from A. by reason of any alleged
statements of A. touching the value or minerals of the land. Held, that,
after striking out all such allegations, either count still set forth a good
cause of action. Pease v. Brown, 291.

2. On the trial of an action on counts in tort for deceit, and contract for money
had and received, to recover sums paid under an agreement of the plaintiff
to pay them to the defendant to be applied by him to a certain purpose if he
should need and desire them for it, facts agreed showed that the whole
amount of them was not needed or used by the defendant for that purpose,
and the plaintiff testified that he paid them because the defendant repre-
sented to him that they were needed for it. In relation to one of the sume,
the defendant requested a ruling that it could not be recovered if the jury
should find that the parties believed that it was paid with the impression,
created by the phraseology of the contract or otherwise, that it was not to be
applied to that purpose; and on the whole case, he requested a ruling toa:
there was no evidence to sustain the action. The judge refused the second
request; declined to rule in the terms of the first request; and submitted
the case to the jury with instructions which required them to find, in order
to return a verdict for the plaintiff, that the payments made by him were
made for the purpose named, and that he was induced to make them by false
representations of the defendant that they were needed for it. Heid, that
the defendant had no ground of exception. Ib.

8 On the issue between A. and B., whether B. was induced to pay A. money
by false representations of A. that it was needed for a certain purpose, if A.
contends that B., when he made the payment, did not understand that the
money was to be used for that purpose but for another purpose, it is compe-
tent for B. to testify that he paid the money supposing that it was to be ap
plied to the first purpose. Ib.

GIFT.

See SAVINGS BANK.

GOODS SOLD AND DELIVERED.

In an action for goods sold and delivered, the defendant has good ground of
exception to instructions which authorize the jury to return a verdict for
the plaintiff even if they find that the goods were not all of the kind con-
tracted for and that the defendant did not accept them. Brewery. Housa

tonic Railroad Co. 593.

See EVITENCE, 14.

GRANT.

See CORPORATION, 1.

GUARDIAN AND WARD.

See NEGLIGENCE, 2, 4, 5.

HARVARD COLLEGE.

An assessment by the aldermen of Boston upon land of Harvard College, under
the Sts. of 1866, c. 174, and 1868, c. 276, of a part of the expense of altering
a street, proportional to the benefit received by the assessed land from the
alteration, is a "civil imposition," within the meaning of that term in the
clause of the college charter of 1650, exempting from all civil impositions,
taxes and rates, lands of the college not exceeding a certain annual value;
and if at the time when the land was acquired by the college, before the
adoption of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, it was within the limit
of the exemption, and continued within it until and at the time when the
Constitution was adopted, the college is entitled to continue to hold it ex-
empted, notwithstanding that its annual value now greatly exceeds the limit,
and that the college holds other lands, also exceeding the limit, in value,
aside from lands exempted under the general tax acts. Harvard College v.
Aldermen of Boston, 470.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Neither keeping a colt for use, nor buying materials to build a house for her-
self and husband, is such a carrying on of business by a married woman as
to require the filing of a certificate under St. 1862, c. 198, in order to protect
the colt and materials from attachment for her husband's debts. Proper v.
Cobb, 589.

Bee DIVORCE; JUDGMENT, 6; TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 1; VENDOR AND
PURCHASER, 1.

ILLUMINATING FLUIDS.

See ACTION, 3-5; EVIDENCE, 2; SALE, 6.

INDICTMENT.

See FALSE PRETENCES; LARCENY, 1-3; SALE, 6.

INFANT.

See NEGLIGENce, 2–5.

INFORMATION.

See EQUITY, 1

INSOLVENT ESTATE.

Bee EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 2, 3.

INSURANCE.

1. Life Insurance.
See TAX.

II. Marine Insurance.

1. An abandonment of insured property to the insurers relates back from the
time of their acceptance of it to the time of the loss, and enables them to sue
in their own name for the property or its proceeds. Sun Insurance Co. 7.
Hall, 507.

2. A policy of insurance on a vessel to a port of discharge and until she te
moored twenty-four hours in safety does not cover a loss occurring after she
has lain three weeks at a place to which she was destined as a place of dis-
charge, where she has discharged a substantial part of her cargo, and at
which similar vessels uniformly discharged in whole or in part; although
one of her owners, being present at the port, intended to take her into an
inner basin in the same port to complete her discharge. Bramhall v. Sun
Insurance Co. 510.

8. At the trial of an action on a policy of insurance on a ship, the case was
reserved for the determination of the full court, with an agreement of parties
that if upon the evidence the jury would be warranted in finding a verdict
for a total loss, judgment should be rendered for the plaintiff; if the plaintiff
was entitled to recover for a partial loss, the amount thereof should be ascer-
tained by an assessor; and if the jury would not be warranted in finding &
verdict for either a total or a partial loss, the plaintiff should become non-
suit. The full court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover for a
total loss; but was entitled to recover for a partial loss, if it could be shown
that the ship sustained damage to a certain amount upon a certain voyage;
and the case was referred to an assessor to determine that question. Held,
that at the hearing before the assessor, or before the court on the return of
his report, it was not open to the defendant to contend that the partial loss
was merged in a subsequent total loss; nor to the plaintiff to claim a general
average loss. Paddock v. Commercial Insurance Co. 521.

4. In an action on a policy of insurance upon a ship, the plaintiff is bound to
offer evidence by which injury by perils of the sea may be distinguished
from defective condition arising from wear and tear and other ordinary

5. Under a policy of insurance upon a ship, which provides that the insurers
shall not be liable for a partial loss, unless it shall amount to five per cent.,
successive partial losses by distinct gales or storms upon different passages
cannot be added together to make up the requisite five per cent.; and the
burden of proving a partial loss amounting to five per cent. from one gale or
storm is upon the assured. Ib.

5. When a ship cannot be fully repaired at a port of distress, the needful tem
porary repairs to enable her to proceed on her voyage, as well as compiste

Ispairs made at a subsequent port, are subject to the deduction of one third
new for old, in computing the amount of a loss under a policy of insurance.
Ib.

7. In estimating a loss under an open policy of marine insurance on goods, the
rule of damages is based on their market value at the inception of the risk
and not on the invoice price; and evidence of the usage of a particular port
is ir admissible to vary this rule. Warren v. Franklin Insurance Co. 518.
8. A rclicy of insurance provided that in case of loss all sums due to the in-
ss when the locs became due should be first deducted, and all sums
coming due should be paid or satisfactorily secured, before payment of the
loss. Held, that, in making up judgment in an action on the policy for the
amount of a loss, the defendants could deduct the amounts of notes due to
them from the insured, although they were not due at the beginning of the
action; and the less being payable in gold and the notes in currency, that
the value of the notes in gold at the time they fell due should be ascertained
and such value deducted from the amount of the loss. Ib.

See EVIDENCE, 12; TRUSTEE PROCESS, 3.

INTEREST.

See PARTNERShip, 1; Replevin.

INTERROGATORIES.

In an action for an injury alleged to have been caused by a defect in a high-
way which the defendant town was bound to keep in repair, the answer was
only a general denial of the plaintiff's allegations. The town, before the
trial, filed interrogatories to the plaintiff, as to the nature, location and de-
ecription of the defect; the manner, circumstances and nature of the injury ;
what the plaintiff did immediately after being injured; whether she had
since done work, and if so, what and where; and the names and residences
of any physicians she had consulted. These interrogatories the plaintiff
neglected to answer; and the judge refused a request of the town to require
her to answer them. On the trial, the plaintiff testified as a witness, and a
verdict was returned in her favor. Held, that exceptions to the refusal to
require answers to the interrogatories could not be sustained, which did not
expressly show that the town was injured by the refusal to answer them.
Sheren v. Lowell, 24.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

On an issue between seller and purchaser of intoxicating liquors, whether the
sale was in violation of a statute which forbids the sale of such liquors ex-
cept by the manufacturer or a person having a license, and except to munic
ipal officers, or for medical, mechanical or manufacturing purposes, or for
sacramental uses, or made from fruit grown within the state, the refusal of
the seller to testify whether he had a license, on the ground that his answer
might criminate himself, and evidence that the liquors were part of his stock

In trade as a druggist, and that the subject of the sale was the entire stock,
will warrant a jury in finding that the sale was illegal. Andrews v. Frye,

234.

JUDGMENT.

1. A specific judgment payable in gold coin is to be rendered for damages as-
sessed for the breach of a contract for the payment of a sum in gold. Inde
pendent Insurance Co. v. Thomas, 192.

2. Judgment on a contract payable in gold must be rendered for gold coin spe-
cifically, and the pound sterling is to be estimated at $4.84. Warren v.
Franklin Insurance Co. 518.

8. Judgment against one joint trespasser without satisfaction does not bar an
action against another. Elliott v. Hayden, 180.

4. Judgment recovered against one of two joint debtors by the creditor bars a
subsequent action by him against the other. Kingsley v. Davis, 178.

5. If A., having made a contract with B. and sued him thereon, recovers judg
ment against him after ascertaining that he acted as agent only and all the
facts, it is a bar to a subsequent action by A. against B.'s principal. Ib.
6. A judgment recovered on the merits, by a laborer, for the full amount of his
claim, in an action against a married woman and her husband for work done
on her separate estate, which she defended on the ground that he was negli-
gent in doing the work, though without seeking to recoup therefor, is a bar
to a subsequent action by her against him for such negligence. Merriam v.
Woodcock, 326.

7. An order of the superior court that judgment should be entered for the
plaintiff in an action as of the last day of the preceding term, in accordance
with an order made by it at that term, cannot be revised by this court on the
ground that, after the original order, but before the close of said term, the
defendant petitioned to be adjudged a bankrupt, and filed a motion for
the continuance of the case, if he failed to bring the motion to the notice of
the court until after the end of the term. Dunbar v. Baker, 211.

See ASSIGNMENT; BOND, 2, 3; CONSTABLE; CONTRACT, 2; COSTS, 3; EVI-
DENCE, 3; INSURANCE, 8; PILOT; REPLEVIN; REVIEW; WRIT OF EB-

ROR.

JURISDICTION.

See COSTS, 3; EQUITY, 1; PARTNERSHIP, 1; PILOT; RECEIVER; Review;
TRUSTEE PROCESS, 1; WRIT OF ERROR.