Mr. SCOTCH. Ms. Teitel? STATEMENT OF RUTI G. TEITEL MS. TEITEL. My name is Ruti Teitel. I am the assistant director of the Legal Affairs Department of the Anti-Defamation League. The Anti-Defamation League opposes this amendment. Since 1913 when it was founded, the Anti-Defamation League has been committed to protecting religious freedoms in this country, just as did our Founding Fathers, by maintaining a wall of separation between church and state. The instant proposal, we submit, threatens these protected religious freedoms. The amendment before us today seeks to make equal what is not equal. In the name of so-called equal access, it proposes to allow prayer and meditation in our public schools and to treat clubs devoted to religious worship just as those devoted to stamp collecting or hockey. There is something disingenuous in all of this. Religion in America's political system has never been treated equally with secular activities. It is precisely because of the special nature of religion that the Founding Fathers distinguished religion, by making particular provisions for religion in the Constitution through the first amendment's establishment and free exercise clauses. These provisions are concerned with demarcating the place of religion and government in our society-a chief concern of the Founders of this country, because of the historical alignment of government with religion in Europe, which resulted in persecution of minorities and the resettlement in the New World. The central purpose, then, of the establishment clause "rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion." It is because of the more than equal first-class status of religion in our system that we have these special constitutional protections. As Madison wrote, it is because "religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy." This thought, that something so personal and sacred as religion should not be in the public schools but rather, should be at home or in places of worship, is labeled by some proponents of this amendment as hostile to religion and as "Soviet" in nature. This notion is misbegotten. It ignores the purposes of the first amendment protections, grounded not in hostility but in respect for religion. The premise of these first amendment protections, as the Supreme Court held in 1948 in McCollum v. Board of Education, is that "both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere." Today, this purpose can best be understood by subjecting the proposed amendment to the Supreme Court's tripartite establishment clause test. What will become evident are the inevitable dangers of intertwining religion and government. The legislation today contravenes all three prongs. It does not reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose; its primary effect will be to advance religion, and it excessively entangles the Government with religion. 39-015 0-84-37 First and foremost, the purpose of this amendment is concededly religious and thus, unconstitutional. The second section, couched in secular terms such as an "equal access" open forum policy, has a clear religious purpose. As Secretary of Education Terrell H. Bell stated in his testimony before the Subcommittee on the Constitution-and I quote "The 'equal access' concept would serve to restore voluntary religious activity to an equal status with other extracurricular activities permitted on public school premises." This testimony makes clear the religious purpose of "equal access" policy. Under the "equal access" section of the proposed amendment, all types of religious activity would be permitted in the public schools-beyond the silent prayer or meditation of section 1 of the amendment-including singing hymns, liturgy, Bible readings and proselytization. Thus, the purpose of this amendment is to bring prayer and Bible instruction into the public schools, an objective that, since 1948, has been found unconstitutional. Second, the effect of this amendment would be to impermissibly advance religion. Prayers and Bible readings in public schools confer the imprimatur of State approval on religious practices. For young and impressionable public school students, the mere presence of prayers and religious activities in the public schools shows Government approval of religious exercises and has the effect of promoting religion. Moreover, the fact that the silent prayer or Bible clubs would be voluntary is of no significance. The voluntariness of student participation fails to diminish the effect of the appearance of Government sponsorship of these activities when they take place in the public schools. Further, it is an abstraction to speak of voluntariness at the public school level. What are students to do if they do not wish to participate in these exercises? Should the burden of distinguishing him or herself as nonreligious fall upon a student attending a public school? Further indication of this proposed amendment's unconstitutionality is the entanglement it would entail of government and religion. The State is entangled because the prayers will occur in public school facilities. But the State sanction here is not just a matter of light and heat. The State is further entangled through the use of the State's compulsory public school machinery. Under State law, children are obliged to be in school. When religious activities take place in school, it is State law which mandates that students be in the religious environment. More entanglement occurs through the inevitable participation of schoolteachers and other school officials in these exercises. At a minimum, the State has a duty to supervise its students while on school premises. Thus, school officials must take attendance at the voluntary religious activities and supervise them to make sure that students are safe. Here, however, there is even more potential for entanglement because teachers and school officials may not play a neutral role in their supervision of these activities. Section 1 of this proposed amendment does not restrict itself to student silent prayer or meditation. It speaks, rather, of persons. Under this amendment, teachers and school officials have a right to worship during the schoolday. Thus, under this amendment, during the schoolday, the entire school, including all teachers and the principal, could pray together in unison, and this would be deemed constitutional. This involvement of State employees in religious activities constitutes fatal entanglement under the establishment clause and is impermissible. Teacher supervision of athletics is an entirely different matter. Athletics are not a matter of faith-thus, school participation by school authorities in such clubs does not provide a stamp of government approval. Thus, the proposed amendment unconstitutionally creates an establishment of religion. The compelling government interest here in preventing such an establishment vitiates any so-called free speech interests. As to the free exercise claim, which maintains that failure to pass this amendment permitting voluntary prayer would constitute prohibition of the free exercise of religion, this claim is a specious one. The free exercise clause in no way mandates the proposed amendment at issue today. Under the free exercise clause, the school is obliged to provide religious facilities only if its failure to do so would foreclose a person's practice of religion. Here, there is no problem with students being foreclosed. They are in school several hours a day, 5 days a week, 9 months of the year. All remaining time is available to students to pursue religious activities at places other than State-supported schools. As to those who would distinguish meditation from other forms of prayer, this distinction is a hollow one. A fixed period of silence, always at the same time, with the teacher presiding, bears the hallmark of a religious ritual. Indeed, for various religions, such as the Quakers, a moment of silence is the major component of religious exercises. For virtually all religions, including Judaism, it also plays a significant portion of the liturgy. For these reasons, this amendment, which provides for religious worship in the schools, cannot stand. Notions of equal access gloss over the special concern of our Founding Fathers with religious freedom. This special treatment of religion in the eyes of the law is no act of discrimination. It is an indication of an historic national priority. Thank you. Mr. SCOTCH. Thank you very much. [The following was received for the record:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF RUTI G. TEITEL Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: My name is Ruti G. Teitel. I am the Assistant Director of the Legal Affairs Department of the Anti-Defamation League. During my tenure with the ADL, I have written and lectured on the subject of church-state relations, as well as coauthored various amicus briefs in the federal courts and the United States Supreme Court in civil liberties matters, including May v. Cooperman concerning the New Jersey "moment of silence" statute and Donnelly v. Lynch concerning the constitutionality of a nativity scene in Pawtucket, Rhode Island. Two decades ago, the Supreme Court of the United States held that prayer and Bible readings in the schools are unconstitutional. Today, by this proposed amendment which relates to permitting voluntary prayer and meditation in the public schools, this body seeks to overturn those decisions. Moreover, it seeks sub silentio to repeal the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Anti-Defamation League, on whose behalf I appear today, opposes this amendment. Since 1913, when it was founded, the Anti-Defamation League has been committed to protecting religious freedoms in this country, just as did our Founding Fathers, by maintaining a wall of separation between church and state. We have evidenced this continuing concern by our amicus curiae participation in such seminal Supreme Court cases as Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) which disallowed as unconstitutional, Bible reading and prayer recitation in public schools; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) which held unconstitutional state aid to private religious schools; and by testimony before the Congress and state legislative committees. The instant proposal, we submit, threatens our protected religious liberties. The amendment before us today seeks to make equal what is not equal. In the name of "equal access," it proposes to allow prayer and meditation in our public schools and to treat clubs devoted to religious worship, just as those devoted to stamp collecting, classical literature, lacrosse or hockey. There is something disingenuous in all of this. Religion in America's political system has never been treated equally with secular activities. It is precisely because of the special nature of religion that the Founding Fathers distinguished religion, by making particular provisions for religion in the Constitution through the First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. These provisions stating that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," are concerned with demarcating the place of religion and government in our society --a chief concern of the founders of this country, because of the historical alignment of government with religion in Europe which resulted in persecution of minorities and in the resettlement in the New World. The central purpose, then, of the Establishment Clause providing that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, as noted by the Supreme Court in 1962, "rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). It is because of the more than equal, first class status of religion in our system that we have these special constitutional protections. As Madison wrote, it is because "religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy." Memorial and Remonstrances against Religious Assessments, II Writings of Madison, at 187. When the Supreme Court of the United States interpreted the Establishment Clause to bar prayer in the schools, the Court specifically addressed the discrimination or inequality argument raised by this committee today. As to those who "argue[d] that to apply the Constitution in such a way as to prohibit state laws respecting an establishment of religious services in public schools is to indicate a hostility toward religion or toward prayer," the Court declared: "[n]othing, of course, could be more wrong." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 433-434 (1962). "It is neither sacrilegious nor anti-religious to say that each separate government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962). This thought that something so personal and sacred as religion should not be in the public schools but rather at home or in places of worship labelled by some proponents of this amendment as hostile to religion and as - is "Soviet" in nature. |