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the House passed it after little debate and only a minor modification.' It also recommended an amended version of the proposal limiting congressional action, but, in contrast with the limitation on state action, this proposal was debated by the First Congress at greater length than almost any other item in the Bill of Rights.

The committee version of the limitation on congressional action, which was to be changed several times during the course of the debates over the Bill of Rights, read:

No religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal

rights of conscience be infringed. 18 This committee version made two major changes from the original Madison proposal. First, the committee dropped the phrase "the Civil Rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship." Since there was no committee report, any explanation of the meaning of this change must be conjectural. One plausible reason for the omission is that the phrase seems to be redundant, protecting nothing not covered either by Article VI of the original Constitution or by the other clauses of the proposed amendment.

The second committee change was the omission of the word “national" used in Madison's proposal, making the amendment read, "No religion shall be established by law." This change was more significant than the other one, but it would be best to defer an explanation of its meaning until the debate is analyzed.

Another two weeks passed between the July 28 filing of the Special Committee's report and the consideration of the Bill of Rights on the floor. In other words, more than two months elapsed between Madison's June 7 introduction of the amendments and the start of floor debate on August 15.

This waiting period may seem normal to a student of the modern Congress, who is used to seeing bills become lost in standing committees. But it was exceptional in the early Congresses, and, as the months wore on, the time element became an important factor in the political strategies of those interested in the amendments.

Anti-Federalists who had opposed the Constitution had used the lack of a bill of rights as an argument against ratification. Now, these same anti-Federalists hoped to stall the Bill of Rights and thus weaken support for the new Constitution. The tactic might have succeeded. There was a delay in assembling a quorum at the beginning of the First Congress and time was short.

"The House's rewording involved only a minor shift in grammar. 1 Annals 755. 181 Annals 729.

Madison understood this tactic for what it was. 19 Once the amendments reached the floor, he acted forcefully to expedite debate and to arrange the compromises necessary to assure passage before adjournment.20 Readers looking at the Annals of Congress for the first time have to bear this in mind as they read the Bill of Rights debate. Much of the character of the debate, as well as some specific features of the compromises made, derive directly from the tactical situation created by this time pressure.

The August 15 Debate

Debate on the Bill of Rights opened in the House on August 15, when the ligion amendment received its principal consideration. The debate left many questions unanswered-one day was hardly sufficient for a matter as complex as religious disestablishment and toleration. But one day was more than the Congress spent on most other items in the Bill of Rights. After the pressure of time had become more obvious, the members accepted some of the clauses, including the free exercise clause, with little or no debate.

The August 15 speeches concentrated on the establishment question, bypassing the “rights of conscience" or "free exercise" clause almost completely.21 Peter Sylvester, a fifty-year-old lawyer from New York who served on the Committee of Safety in 1774, opened the debate.

Sylvester's speech indicated that he was unhappy with the language in the Select Committee's version of the establishment clause. His objection, he said, was that the particular words used could lend themselves to an unintended construction. In particular, he feared that

"James Madison, The Writings of James Madison, Gaillard Hunt, ed., 9 vols. (New York: Putnam, 1900-1910), vol. 5, p. 335. 20See, for example, Madison to Edmund Randolph, August 21, 1789, ibid., vol. 5, pp. 417-18. A similar point about the delaying tactics of the opposition was made in a letter from John Brown to William Irvine, August 17, 1789. The letter is held in the Caryl Roberts Collection of the Irvine Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Brown wrote, "the Antis, viz, Gerry, Tucker, etc., appear determined to obstruct and embarass the business as much as possible." A similar picture of Gerry and Tucker's motives appears in a letter dated August 18, 1789, from Frederick A. Muehlenberg to Benjamin A. Rush. Copies of both letters are available in the files of the First Congress Project. ?'The entire debate may be found at 1 Annals 729-31, and is reproduced in Stokes, Church and State, vol. 1, pp. 541-43. Unfortunately, there seems to be some variation in the pagination of different prints of the Annals. In a footnote, Stokes refers to this debate as occurring on pp. 757-59, and this author has seen other numberings as well. The numbers given here seem to be the most common. Any researcher having trouble using the Annals, however, would be best advised to rely on dates rather than page numbers.

the clause "might be thought to have a tendency to abolish religion altogether."22

Sylvester's objection seems a strange one. Readers trying to make sense of the debates have to ask themselves how anyone ever could think that an amendment reading "no religion shall be established by law” could be dangerous for religion. Unfortunately, Sylvester never explained his reasons.

What seems likely is that Sylvester had two premises in mind as he spoke: (1) He probably was concerned that the phrase "no religion should be established by law" could be read as a prohibition of all direct or indirect governmental assistance to religion, including land grants to church schools, such as those contained in the Northwest Ordinance, or religious tax exemptions. (2) Sylvester apparently thought some form of governmental assistance to religion was essential to religion's survival. Unless these premises are assumed, it is difficult to see how Sylvester could have seen the establishment clause as a threat to religion.

This reading of Sylvester's statement obviously supports this author's view of the historical meaning of the establishment clause. But as convenient as it is, it involves too many assumptions to be accepted without corroboration. It is necessary, therefore, to continue reading beyond the debate's first speech.

As we continue reading, however, we discover rapidly that something said by the Massachusetts anti-Federalist leader Elbridge Gerry supports this interpretation of Sylvester's remarks. Gerry spoke after Select Committee Chairman John Vining, of Delaware, who would have reversed the order of the "rights of conscience" and “establishment" clauses as a way of showing concern for the continued existence of religion. Gerry urged the Congress to reword the amendment to read "no religious doctrine shall be established by law."23 The effect of this would have been to prohibit the most serious form of religious establishment, the proclamation of an official credo, without prohibiting all things that might conceivably be regarded as "aids” to religion.

What did Gerry's proposal have to do with the two speeches preceding his? Gerry apparently was responding to something, rather than starting the debate anew. Gerry may have been dissatisfied with Vining's response to Sylvester's criticism of the clause. Since Gerry's alternative language would have allowed some assistance to religion, that seems to confirm our earlier reading of Sylvester.

Roger Sherman, of Connecticut, was the fourth speaker whose

221 Annals 729. 23Ibid., p. 730.

39-015 0-84--10

remarks were recorded by Lloyd. Sherman reiterated the Federalist delegated-powers argument against having any bill of rights. Sherman said that he saw no need for an amendment, since the government had no authority to pass legislation dealing with religion. Daniel Carroll, the fifth speaker, disagreed with Sherman, not because of his understanding of the powers delegated to the federal government, but because of the need for conciliating the anti-Federalists, who wanted amendments to quiet their fears about the new government's powers.

The next speaker was James Madison. Lloyd's summary of his speech reads:

Mr. MADISON said, he'apprehended the meaning of the
words to be, that Congress should not establish a religion,
and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men
to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience.
Whether the words are necessary or not, he did not mean to
say, but they had been required by some of the State Con-
ventions, who seemed to entertain an opinion that under the
clause of the constitution, which gave power to Congress to
make all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the
constitution, and the laws under it, enabled them to make
laws of such a nature as might infringe the rights of con-

science and establish a national religion.24 Madison's response to Sherman in this speech is obvious and on the surface: whether the amendment really was needed or not-he privately agreed that it was not-some states wanted it. But there is another interesting aspect of this speech. In two places Madison misquoted his own proposal, adding a word to it by saying that Congress should not establish a religion. The additional word is significant. If it had been in the original, Sylvester would never have objected. If the added word had been in Madison's clause, it could not have been read as a prohibition of indirect, nondiscriminatory assistance to religion. To say that Congress should not establish a religion differs from saying it should not assist religion as such.

Benjamin Huntington, speaking after Madison, returned to this problem of the difference between the clause's language and the intentions of the members of Congress. Huntington said that he agreed with Madison about what people wanted the amendment to say. In a phrase similar to Sylvester's, however, he expressed concern that the words might be taken in such latitude as to be extremely hurtful to the cause of religion," and he “hoped, therefore, the amendment would be made in such a way as to secure the rights of conscience, and a free exercise of

24Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

the rights of religion, but not to patronize those who professed no religion at all."25 That is to say, Huntington thought the amendment should not require the government to be neutral to all differences between religion and irreligion.

Madison responded by suggesting that if the word "national” were added before the word "religion"—which would return the clause to the language he presented on June 28—the questions raised by both Sylvester and Huntington would be answered. He then indicated clearly that he accepted the Sylvester-Huntington view of what the clause should be saying, by stating its most important purpose in

this way:

Madison believed that the people feared one sect might obtain
a pre-eminence, or two combine together, and establish a
religion to which they would compel others to conform. He
thought that if the word national was introduced, it would
point the amendment directly to the object it was intended to

prevent.26 Up to this point in the debate, everyone seemed agreed on what they wanted the amendment to say. The major disagreement was over the language reported by the committee, and whether it could be misconstrued to mean something other than what was intended. All of the speakers, except Sherman, agreed that the Bill of Rights should prohibit the new government from establishing a national religion. In addition, they did not want the government to have the power deliberately to favor one religion over another. But every one of them also seemed to agree that the Bill of Rights should not prevent the federal government from giving nondiscriminatory assistance to religion, as long as the assistance is incidental to the performance of a power delegated to the government. Both Sylvester and Huntington thought that the failure to extend this kind of assistance would be the equivalent of active hostility to religion. Madison, even though he privately questioned the efficacy of governmental assistance to religion, accepted the Sylvester-Huntington view throughout the First Congress debates.

A new element was added to the debate immediately after Madison's speech urging the addition of the word “national." Samuel Livermore, of New Hampshire, objected to the rewording and offered in its place the language proposed by the New Hampshire ratifying convention: “Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of conscience."'27 This was the first statement in the debates

as[bid., 730-31.
20[bid., p. 731.
* Tbid. (Emphasis added.)

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