animals; but in racing and hunting, we see, in dogs and horses, a desire of superiority, showing itself as a distinct spring of action; and the like may be observed in other similar cases.

In man, this desire of superiority appears on a wider scale, the subjects of comparison being vastly more numerous and complicated. A man desires to know himself more swift, more strong, more skilful than another; hence the contests of the palestra, and even wanton combats for life or death. A man desires to be more wealthy than his neighbours; and hence accumulates riches by labour, agriculture, tradə or traffic. But man not only wishes to surpass, bu to guide and control other men. He wishes that they should obey when he commands. He has a Desire of Power. To this object, strength and skill and riches may all be as means to ends. The desire of being superior as regards those circumstances, may be the desire of being more powerful than others, with whom we compare ourselves.

53. This desire of being superior to others in the advantages which we possess, and especially in power, is very general among men. Most men would wish to be strong, skilful, rich; but especially to be powerful, so that other men should conform to their will and do their bidding. But all cannot be superior to others. If each desire to be the strongest, there can be no repose or order, except these conflicting desires balance each other. All cannot be superior; but none need be inferior, for all may be equal. The universal desire of superiority cannot be gratified; but if it be transformed into a universal impatience of inferiority, it may become the regulating force of society.

When we say that none need be inferior, for all may be equal; it is not meant that all may have equal shares of the objects of human desires; but that each may equally have what is his, not holding

it at the will or command of another man. The equality of which we speak, is the establishment of equal rules, not the establishment of a rule of equal division. Such a rule as the latter, would be inconsistent with the nature of property: for that which is a man's property, is his with its increase, and passes from him if he give or destroy it: so that the shares of different individuals, even if equal at first, cannot continue equal. But Equal Rules may be established; and the impatience of inferiority, which is natural to man, will not be satisfied with any rules which have not the aspect of equality. It is true, that this equality of rules may be modified by external circumstances; as we have just seen, that the equality of shares must be disturbed by passing changes: but still, the desires of men constantly point to equal rules, as those which alone are tolerable; and there can be no permanent tranquillity in a community, ex. cept under the sway of rules, which are equal for all; so far as the nature of man, and the previous condition of the society, allow of rules at the same time steady and equal. And thus, the Desire of Superiority, transformed into the Desire of Equal Rules, is one of the powerful springs of human action.

54. The Desire of Knowledge may also be enumerated among the elementary desires. Of this Desire, also, we see a sort of image, in the curiosity and prying propensities of many animals; but in them, these propensities are generally subservient to the actions by which sustenance is obtained or danger avoided.

In man, the Desire of Knowledge is identical with the desire or propensity of the mind to unfold itself (22); and with the desire which we have to contemplate our own conceptions, as distinctly and connectedly as is possible for us. Man, by his rational nature, is constantly impelled to think, to reason, to classify, to trace causes and consequences; to do

this, is to know; and to continue to do it, is to go on from knowledge to knowledge.

55. Knowledge influences human actions, not so much by the exertions which it impels men to make for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, as by the different aspects which it gives to the other objects of desire. An ugly pebble may be a most desirable possession, if we know how to extract from it a cure for disease. The desire to possess a particular piece of ground, may become very vehement, by our know ing that it is the heritage left us by our ancestors. Our impatience of the constraint which a body of men impose upon us, may be much inflamed, by our knowing that such constraint is inconsistent with ancient maxims of law, or with rules of reason, or with the true destination of man. In such cases, our desires and actions are influenced by our knowledge, that is, by our Reason. Our knowledge, thus considered as a Spring of action, is identical with the Reason, by which we contemplate abstract and general conceptions, and thus determine for ourselves rules and ends of action. This is a task which it is our object to perform in the present work.

56.

4. The Moral Sentiments.

That which is conformable to Rules of Action is right. What we mean by right, will be considered more particularly afterwards: but before we proceed to that question, we may observe, that our judgment of actions as right, or as wrong, the opposite of right, is accompanied with certain Affections, or Sentiments. That which is right we approve; that which is wrong we disapprove. What is wrong naturally excites a modification of Anger, which we term Indignation. Wrong done to ourselves excites instant resentment (31); but our anger against wrong as wrong, when we do not consider it as affecting our

selves, is Indignation. And in like manner, what is right is the natural object of a kind of love, namely, of Esteem. These Affections, Approbation and Disapprobation, Indignation and Esteem, are the Moral Sentiments.

Though the Moral Sentiments thus partake of the nature of the affections, they differ in this respect, that they have for their objects in the first instance, not Persons, but Actions. We love a friend; we approve his acts of benevolence. We are angry with a man who picks our pocket, and disapprove of his act.

But the Sentiment is transferred from the action to the agent; and thus the Moral Sentiments combine with and modify our other affections, and are powerful Springs of Action. We befriend a man, or we choose him for our friend, and do him good offices, not because he is our brother, but because we approve his actions, and therefore love him, and would treat him as our brother. We help to inflict pain or even death upon a man, not because he has done us especially any harm, but because he has committed an act of which we strongly disapprove, and which excites a strong indignation against him.

There are Sentiments which partake of the nature of Esteem or Approval, but imply no settled Moral Rule, and include feelings of surprise and conscious inferiority in ourselves. Such are Admiration and Awe.

5. Reflex Sentiments.

57. Besides the Moral Sentiments which impel us to act in one way or another to other men, accordingly as we approve or disapprove their actions, there are also certain Sentiments which have a reference to their judgment of us and their affections towards us; and these Sentiments are also Springs of Action. These we shall term Reflex Sentiments, for they imply Reflex Thought. In order to regard another

man's Sentiments concerning me, I must form a conception of his Sentiments as the image of my own; and of myself as the object of those sentiments.

58. The Desire of being loved is one of these Reflex Sentiments. In minds so far unfolded by thought as to be capable of reflex processes, this Sentiment commonly accompanies love; but it belongs to a stage of mental developement higher than mere elementary love. Yet we see traces of it in the behaviour of those animals which seek to be fondled and caressed.

59. The Desire of Esteem is a powerful and extensive Spring of Action. We desire that other men should think that what we do is right. Hence, this desire assumes some generally established Rule of what is right. Without ourselves esteeming what is right, we cannot conceive Esteem, and thus truly cannot feel the Desire of Esteem. But in this case, we may still feel the Desire of Admiration, the Desire of Honour, the Love of Fame, the Love of Glory, and the like Reflex Sentiments; which do not imply our own approval of the Rule by which others judge. Yet these are very powerful Springs of action in many

men.

60. Finally, there is a Reflex Sentiment which we may term the Desire of our own Approval. This implies that we have adopted a Rule according to which we judge Actions to be right, and that we desire to conform our own actions to this Rule. Such a Desire is a Spring of Action, which must balance all others, in order that the Rule may be really valid. What the nature of such a Rule must be, we shall have to consider: in the mean time, we may remark, that the Desire of our own Approval, of which we now speak, is included in the meaning of the term Conscience.

Among the Reflex Sentiments, we may place all those Springs of Action which are designated by some