dealt with by the Moralists who have principally employed it. As we have already said, in order to deduce Moral Rules from it, it seems to be necessary to find some measure of Happiness; or to resolve it into some more definite elements; and then, to estimate the moral value of actions, by means of this measure, or those elements. But this course has not been followed by such Moralists. Dr. Paley, who rests Moral Rules upon their tendency to promote Human Happiness, has, indeed, begun by giving some account of his view of Happiness, It does not, he says, consist in the pleasures of sense; nor in exemption from pain, labour, and care; nor in greatness and elevated station; it consists in the exercise of the social affections; in the exercise of the faculties of body or mind in the pursuit of some engaging end; in the prudent constitution of the habits; and in health: and, as he suggests in a note, perhaps in a certain condition of the nerves. Having given this analysis of Happiness, we naturally look to see how he next brings the word into use in his reasonings. We find the word occupying a very prominent place in the first sentence of his next chapter; in which he tells us, that "Virtue is the doing good to mankind for the sake of everlasting Happiness." But it is plain that, in this use of the word, there is no reference to the analysis of Happiness contained in the preceding chapter; and we are therefore, so far as reasoning is concerned, here thrown back upon the general notion which the word Happiness, without any special explanation, suggests.

551. When Paley proceeds, a little further on, to establish Moral Doctrines, for instance the Right of Property, he rests the propriety of this Institution. of Property upon its advantages;-that it increases the produce of the earth; preserves this produce to maturity; prevents contests; and increases the conveniency of living. Doubtless all these results may

be understood, as additions to the Sum of Human Happiness; but there is no attempt made to show that these additions counterbalance the subtraction from Human Happiness arising from the wants of some persons, the superfluity of others, the contests and crimes of many, which Property produces. The Principle of the Greatest Human Happiness, thus loosely applied, leaves the Right of Property to stand upon a general apprehension of its advantages. The same is the case with the other Fundamental Rights of Man, and the Fundamental Rules of Morality. They are not proved, in Paley's work, by showing, in any distinct manner, that they increase the Sum of Human Happiness; for no way is offered of measuring this sum, or its Increase. But the Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Rules are asserted; and the student is told that they are necessary to Human Happiness. This all can readily assent to; for the end for which Rights and Rules exist, whatever other name it bear, may be considered as included in the term Happiness. And thus, Fundamental Rights and Rules, and the vague general notion of Human Happiness as their ultimate end, stand side by side in such systems of Morality, but have not really any logical connexion.

552. There is, however, one character of such Systems which is implied in this mode of employing the term Happiness. They seek to deduce the Rules of Action from a Supreme Object of Desire; whereas we have deduced them from a Supreme Rule of Action. They direct men to aim at Happiness; we direct them to aim at Acting Rightly. We deduce our Rules from the Constitution of man's nature; they, from the Objects of his desires. As expressing this difference, the Terms and Reasonings employed in such systems may be worthy our consideration.

553. There is an expression often used by Moralists of this class, which may be noticed in this

point of view. They often declare Utility to be the Ground and Measure of the Morality of actions. Now Utility cannot be in itself an Ultimate End. That is useful, which is subservient to some further end. A wheel is useful as a portion of a carriage; a carriage is useful in order to take a journey; a journey is useful, in order to visit a friend; to see and talk with a friend is useful, if it makes us happy. All things which have a value for their utility, have a reference to some ulterior end; and if we assume some Ultimate End, such as Happiness is conceived to be, all things may be estimated by their Utility. Thus the estimate of actions by their Utility may be conceived as identical with the estimate of them as contributing to Human Happiness; and accordingly, the two phrases have been principally used by the same school of Moralists.

554. The judgment which we have to pronounce upon Utility, as a ground of estimating the character of actions, is implied in what has been already said. We cannot estimate the value of anything, as being useful to an End, except by assuming the value of the End. If a Coach be a thing of no value, a Coach-wheel must be a thing of no value. If travelling be of no use, a travelling carriage is of no use. The measure of the value of actions by their Utility, is liable to all the inconvenience and indefiniteness of the determination of the End for which they are useful; and besides, to the difficulty of determining how far they are useful to the end. A system in which actions are estimated by their Utility in promoting Human Happiness, will be liable to the objections already stated against the Principle of the Greatest Human Happiness; and will also require a just mode of measuring the value of Actions as Means, the End being given. We have all along been applying a very different method, in order to judge of actions. We ask, What is right?

not, What is useful? acknowledging, as we have said, a supreme Rule, and not being content with seeking Means which derive their value from the assumed value of their Ends.

555. Another Term which has been much used by Moralists of this School is Expediency. "Whatever is expedient," says Paley, "is right*." Now we have to observe here, as before, that the main significance of such assertions is in the rejection, which they imply, of any independent and fundamental meaning in the term right. Those who make such assertions, intend to say, that Actions are right because they promote some object; Human Happiness, for instance; and that those who speak of acts, as absolutely right, are in error. In the common use of language, we speak of actions as expedient, when they promote some end which we have selected, and which we do not intend to have questioned. If we are prepared to put forwards the end of our actions as the Proper End of action, we call them, not expedient, but right. It may be expedient for a man to lie, in order to free himself from captivity. He may stay in captivity, because he will not tell a lie ; but in this case, we say, he does what is right, and rejects what is expedient. Expedient implies, according to its etymology, a way out of difficulties. But Morality places before us a higher object than merely to escape from difficulties. She teaches us to aim at what is right. What is expedient, may be expedient as a means to what is right. It may be expedient to tell the truth, in order to rescue an innocent person from death. But we do not describe such an action properly by calling it expedient. It is much more than expedient, it is right: it is recommended, not by Expediency, but by Duty. In such cases, we can speak approvingly, not only of the action, as a right means, but of the end, as a right end. Truth * Paley, B. 1. c. 6.

is not properly commended, when it is described as a good way of getting out of a difficulty, or of gaining our ends.

Those who use this term, Expediency, to describe the proper end of human action, are prompted to do so by a wish to reject Terms which imply a Supreme Rule of action; they wish to recognize none but subordinate Rules determined by the Objects at which men aim. And it is true, in this sense, that whatever is expedient with a view to an end, is the right way to the end: but this does not justify the Moralist in confounding what is relatively expedient with what is absolutely right: nor in speaking of things as expedient absolutely, without pointing out the purpose which they are expedient for.

CHAPTER XXVI.

MORAL EDUCATION.

556. THE Laws of each Community lay down certain Rules of Action, commands or prohibitions, for the members of the Community. But they do more they direct that certain Punishments shall be inflicted on those who transgress the Law; as Fine, Imprisonment, Bodily Pain, Mutilation, Infamy, Exile, Death. And the Community, by its officers, inflicts these Punishments. It is in this manner, that the Laws become real Rules of action; and that in the minds of all men, Law-keeping and Law-breaking become objects which are sought and avoided, with the same earnestness and care as the other objects of the most powerful desires and aversions of men. The Punishment which thus gives reality to the Law, is the Sanction of the Law.