other vessels laden with corn were on their way to Rhodes: was he bound in conscience to communicate this fact to the buyers?

403. The universal Rule, that we may not deceive men, must apply in this case. The Moralist cannot doubt that it would be wrong for the merchant to tell any falsehood, in order to raise the price of his wares. It would be plainly immoral for him to say, that he did not know that any other vessels were coming. But may he, the Seller, be silent, and allow the Buyers, ignorant of the truth which he knows, to raise the price by their mutual competition? This is a question belonging to trade in general; and must, as we have said, be answered according to the general understanding which we suppose to prevail among Buyers and Sellers. In common cases, both alike are supposed to have a regard to the prospect of an increased Supply, or an increased Scarcity. The Buyer does not depend upon the Seller, nor the Seller upon the Buyer, for this information. He who has, or thinks he has, superior information on this subject, takes advantage of it, and is understood to do so: and prices are settled by the general play of such opinions, proceeding from all sides. But if a Seller possess information which he is not understood to have, and takes advantage of it, he violates the general understanding, and thus, is guilty of deceit. If the merchant in question ask such an exorbitant price for his corn, as to imply that no further supply is probable, he falls under this blame. On the other hand, he is not bound to sell his corn to-day for the price to which it may fall to-morrow, when the other vessels arrive; for, as a trader, he may take advantage of the greater skill and foresight which has brought him first to the port. We cannot say that he is generally bound to reveal to the buyer any special circum. stance which may affect the market-price; as for instance, the probable speedy arrival of other vessels:

for to make this a part of his duty, would be to lay down a Rule which would place skill and ignorance, diligence and indolence, on an equality; and would thus destroy the essence of trade. But if the Buyer asks questions on this subject, the Seller may not tell a lie. And if the Seller is silent as to this circumstance, he takes upon himself the responsibility, as a moral agent, of making an equitable estimate of the gain to which his unsuspected superiority of knowledge entitles him. If it be said, that it is very unlikely that a trader will be content with this, when he can get more; we shall of course reply, that the question is not what a trader is likely to do, but what a good man, (Vir bonus, as Cicero puts the case,) ought to do.

404. Promises of Marriage often give rise to doubts and fears; for the Promise implies much ;--no less than affection and general community of interests during a whole life. A person may well hesitate before giving such a promise, and having given it, may fear whether he is not engaging for more than he can perform. But on the other hand, the Promise, sincerely given, leads to its own fulfilment; for affection grows, in virtue of the confidence which such an engagement establishes between the parties; the marriage union adds new ties to those which drew them together; and the progress of a well conducted married life makes conjugal affection continue as a habit.

But the intention of fulfilling the engagement in this sense, and the belief of a power to do so, can alone render it right to make the Promise. A Promise of Marriage, though made, cannot morally be carried into effect, by him who does not intend thus to perform the engagement, or who despairs of doing so. If, before the Marriage takes place, he find the germ of conjugal affection wanting in his heart, the course of Duty is, to withdraw from entering upon the immoral condition of a mere external conjugal union.

But still, in doing this, he violates a most serious Relative Duty to the person thus deceived. She may have to accuse him of no less an injury, than the blighted hopes and ruined happiness of her whole life. To a man of any moral feeling, or even of any natural feeling, the remorse of having done such a wrong, by the promise of affection and livelong companionship, must be intense. And his shame also must be profound: for he may be supposed to have well examined his heart before he made the promise; and if his affections be so dark to himself, or so fickle, that in spite of his self-examination, he has remained so long in error, and has been led to such a false step at last; how can he hope ever to be justified in making a like engagement with another person? A life of remorse and shame would be the proper sequel to such a fault.

The same remarks apply when the Promise is made on the other side.

The

405. We may notice here a Case of Conscience treated of by preceding Moralists*. A certain person in the lifetime of his wife had promised marriage to another woman if he should ever be free. wife died, and the woman demanded performance of the promise. The man then alleged doubts whether the promise was binding, inasmuch as it was immorally given. The question proposed has usually been, Whether the man is bound to marry the woman? But if we take the real Moral Question, Whether he ought to marry her? we must answer, that this does not depend on the Promise alone. If he wishes not to marry her, because he has ceased to bear her the affection which the conjugal union requires; according to what we have said, he ought not to marry her. If, on the other hand, he still wishes to marry her, there is nothing in the immoral condition of the

* Paley, B. III. c. 5. I state the case as Paley states it. Sanderson, from whom he professes to take it, states it differently.

promise formerly given which need prevent it. That promise was an offence against Duty in itself, inasmuch as it implied a heart alienated from the former wife. But this does not necessarily vitiate all his succeeding dispositions to the woman to whom the promise was made. We may suppose the old promise annulled, and he may, after the first wife's death, promise the same thing without blame, and perform his promise.

406. Without there being an absolute Promise of Marriage, there are often manifest suggestions of such a common purpose, between man and woman, which lead to difficulties of the same kind. In all countries, and especially in countries in which men and women are left free, in a great measure, to choose for themselves their partners in married life, marriage is the great event of life; it is the point to which the thoughts and imaginations, the hopes and designs of the young of both sexes, constantly tend. This is still more particularly the case with women; inasmuch as their social position depends mainly upon that of the husband. Hence the manner and behaviour of young men and young women, have a frequent reference, tacit or open, to the possibility of engagements of marriage among them. Conversation, of almost any kind, may disclose features of character and disposition, by which one heart may be drawn to another; and indications of such inclination may be given, in all degrees, from the slightest to the most marked. Among such a variety of elements, it may often be doubtful how far such marks of preference, on the one side and on the other, may be equivalent to an Offer of Marriage, or to an Engagement. Nor can any general Rule be laid down; for much must depend upon the conventions of society. But we may say, in general, that Morality requires of us a most serious and reverent estimate of the marriage state; and of the union of heart and community of moral pur

pose, by which the parties ought to be drawn together, Any behaviour, therefore, which, while it appears to tend to such a purpose, is really frivolous and unmeaning, or prompted only by vanity, or love of amusement, is at variance with Duty. Such behaviour is a very unfit portion of a life which has our Moral Culture for its constant purpose; and which looks upon the prospect of marriage, and the tone of intercourse with women, as means to this end,

The above are given as Specimens only of Cases of Conscience respecting Truth; not as a complete Collection, or even as including all the more prominent classes of Cases. But the remarks made upon the above cases may serve to show the manner in which we are led, by the doctrines of Morality, to treat them; and the like Rules may be applied to other Cases.

CHAPTER XVI.

OF CASES OF NECESSITY.

407. THE discussion of Cases of Conscience, which we were pursuing in the last Chapter, led us, in several instances, to Cases of Necessity; and these, we stated that we must reserve for a separate consideration. Cases of Conscience are those in which conflicting Duties and conflicting Rules are weighed deliberately, the time and circumstances allowing of this. Cases of Necessity are those in which a man is impelled to violate Common Duties and Common Rules by the pressure of extreme danger or fear; as when a man kills another in defence of himself or his family; or when he steals, or tells a lie, to save his life.