240. The manifestations of the benevolent af fections, in their influence upon the habitual external Behaviour, have various names. Such affections, regarding a particular person, and not necessarily leading to action, are Good-will. When they produce a current of cheerful thoughts, they are Good-humour. When benevolent feelings lead a man to comply readily with the wishes of others, or to seek to give them pleasure, we have Good-nature. When this Disposition is shown on the part of a superior, we term him gracious and benign. When a person's Good-nature makes it easy to address him, he is affable. If, in his behaviour, he avoid all that may give offence to others, he is courteous. This Disposition is conceived to have generated in the inhabitants of cities, Habits of behaviour which are termed Urbanity and Civility. The opposite of these is Rudeness.

241. Good-humour may often be disturbed by the Provocations which offences and outrages occasion; but there are virtuous Dispositions which support our benevolence under such provocations. Such dispositions are Gentleness, Mildness, Meekness. Under the influence of these, we repress or avoid the resentment and anger, which offences against us, and insults offered to us, tend to produce; we preserve benevolence, tranquillity, and good-humour in our minds; and manifest such a disposition in our behaviour. With these dispositions, if men act wrongly or foolishly, we are tolerant and indulgent; if they of fend us, we pardon and forgive them. We are ready to do this; we are placable. To be intolerant, unforgiving, implacable, is a vicious Disposition.

242. The Benevolent Affections are also modified by a regard to the circumstances of the object. We naturally share in the emotions which we witness in men: we have a Fellow-feeling, a Sympathy with them. When this Disposition leads us to feel pain at the sight of pain, it is Compassion: we commiserate

the object. This feeling, being strongly confirmed by Piety, came to be called Pity. Such a Disposition, as it prompts us to abstain from adding to the pain felt, is Mercy, or Clemency; as it prompts us to remove the pain or want which we see, it is Charity. But this word has also a wider sense, in which it describes Benevolence, as it makes us abstain from judg ing unfavourably of other men. All these are virtuous Affections, and lead to the performance of Duties of Benevolence.

243. Admiration can hardly be called a benevolent affection towards its object; for we admire what does not draw our Love; as when we admire a great geometer. But if we admire a man as a good man, we also love him (91). Esteem is the benevolent affection which we entertain towards that of which we approve. Persons whom we esteem, but to whom we are not drawn by love, we respect. When, with such a Disposition, we look at them as our Superiors, we reverence them; in a higher degree, this Affection is Veneration; when combined with Fear, it is Awe. Reverence assumes, in its object, Authority and Power, combined with Justice and Goodness.

244. The irascible Affections are, for the most part, opposed to the virtue of Benevolence; and thenfore are to be repressed and controlled. Yet these Affections also have their moral office, and give rise to Virtues. They act as a Defence against harm and wrong; and hence, in their various modifications, they may be termed Defensive Affections. As opposed to harm, inflicted or threatened, they are Resentment; as directed against wrong, they are Indignation (56). And these Emotions may be blameless or praiseworthy; as when we feel natural and proper Resentment, or just Indignation. Such Sentiments are an important and necessary part of Virtue; not of Benevolence, strictly speaking, but of Justice. Without Indignation against cruelty, fraud, falsehood,

foulness, disorder, the Virtues have not their full force in the mind.

But Anger, in order to be virtuous, must be directed solely against moral Wrong. Malevolent Affections directed towards Persons are Vices; Antipathy, Dislike, Aversion to any person, independently of his bad character and conduct, are vicious. It is vicious to be displeased, irritated, incensed, exasperated at any person, merely because his actions interfere with our pleasures and desires. The proneness to such Anger is Irascibility. Still more vicious are our Emotions, when they swell into Rage and Fury, or settle into Malice and Hatred. The term Rancour denotes a fixed Hate, which, by its inward working, has, as it were, diseased the Soul in which it exists. Spite implies a vigilant desire to depress and mortify its object. All these malevolent Feelings are vicious.

245. Moderate Anger, arising from pain inflicted on us, is Offence; which term is also used for the offensive Act. A person commits an offence, or offends, in the lattér sense; and takes offence, or is offended, in the former. If the Act be one which violently transgress common rules, it is an Outrage. Anger at pain received, impelling a man to inflict pain in return, is Revenge. This term also implies the object or aim of the feeling, as well as the feeling itself. A man is stimulated by Revenge, and seeks his Revenge. The same may be said of the word Vengeance, another form of the word, but of the same origin. The man who admits into his heart this Affection, and retains it, is revengeful, vengeful, vindic

tive.

246. The Malevolent Feelings, as manifested in the external behaviour, have various names. As they affect our disposition to a person, without necessarily leading to action, they are Ill-will. When they disturb the usual current of cheerful thoughts, they are Ill-humour. When malevolent feelings lead

us to speak or act with a view of giving pain to others, they are Ill-nature. When they make us rejoice in another person's pain, they are Malignity. If the pleasure, which a malignant man takes in another man's pain, be unchecked by compassion, when the pain is evident, he is cruel; and as such a disposition shows a deficiency in the common feelings which bind men together, he is inhuman. If this character be strongly marked, the man is savage; he approaches to the character and temper of wild beasts; he is brutal.

The Malevolent Affections are also modified by a regard to the circumstances of the object of them, as compared with our own circumstances. Malevolent Pain at the Good which happens to another, and at our own Want of this Good, is Envy.

247. Contempt can hardly be called a malevolent feeling; for we may despise persons without hating them. Contempt consists rather in an estimate of a man as below a certain Standard of Character, to which our Esteem is given. We despise a man for Cowardice, because we admire Courage. The verb despise (despicio, to look down upon,) shows that such a view is implied. The word Scorn implies a condemnation of this kind, so strong that it approaches to Indignation. The expression of contempt, in a marked manner, is an Insult. If the discrepance of the contemplated character with the assumed standard be extravagant, so as to excite a sudden and poignant feeling of Incongruity, our Contempt expresses itself in Laughter. The character is regarded as ridiculous.

248. There are various modifications of character and conduct which arise from the greater or less Energy of the affections, and appear as Virtues or as Vices. The feelings of Love of Right, and Anger at Wrong, in a permanent and energetic form, are virtuous Zeal. Courage, the habit of mind which rejects Fear, is allied to this virtue; as is Fortitude, the

habit of not yielding to Pain. From such dispositions of mind, arise Energy and Activity in action; which are important virtues when the action is virtuous.

249. Though Hope and Fear are not Affections, they operate in increasing or diminishing our energy and activity, as the Affections do. The Disposition in which the emotion of Hope predominates is also termed Hope, or Hopefulness. Joy and Joyfulness describe rather Delight produced by some special event, than any permanent Disposition; but Cheerfulness, like Hopefulness, is rather an habitual Disposition; and when governed by Rules of Duty, is an auxiliary Virtue. A tranquil yet cheerful flow of the spirits keeps the thoughts and feelings in a condition suitable to virtuous action. The want of activity and energy is Sluggishness, Sloth, Idleness, Laziness, Indolence; which are habits alien to virtue, and connected with the Vice of Apathy, the absence of lively affections and desires. As the influence of Fear predominates, the character becomes timid, and tends to Cowardice, the opposite of Courage. Such habits are at variance with the Rules of Duty; for these Rules often direct us in a course which leads through danger, either to the Person or Fortune of the Actor, or to the Good-will which others feel for him. In order that a man may act rightly, he must act freely, independently. Men wanting in Independence of Character, and seeking the favour of others, without regard to moral Rules, are slavish, servile, obsequious, cringing, fawning; they are Flatterers and Sycophants. Such dispositions make men abject and base. The want of cheerfulness and hopefulness is Despondency, Dejection, Sullenness, Melancholy, Gloom; which are habits of mind adverse to active virtue. The theological moralists have made Acedia (axnčía), Apathy with regard to Good, one of their seven deadly sins.

250. We have placed here the Virtues and Vices which are connected with Energy or Zeal, be