covery to the President, who-God bless him!-can appreciate any thing, from the hypocrisy of an office-seeker to the genius of a Gillmore. But of Charleston:

"Traitorous and bloodthirsty, mad with wrath,
Charleston stands in the nation's path,-
Stands and flaunts a bloody rag,

Insulting the stars on the dear old flag.
But Sumter is crumbled and ground away,
And Wagner and Gregg are ours to-day;

And over the water, on furious wings,

The shell from the 'Swamp Angel' flies and sings:
It sings of the death of the traitorous town,

It sings of red-handed rebellion crushed down.

Sharp are its cadences, harsh its song:

It shrieks for the right, and it crushes the wrong;

And never a blast shaking nethermost hell

Cried vengeance and wrath like the song of the shell."

PRACTICAL CAMPAIGNING.

No. II.

MATHEMATICS teach us that the shortest distance between two points is a straight line; and, geographically speaking, if you wish to reach a point on the circumference of a circle opposite to your own position, you should travel on the diameter, rather than on the circumference. But war is not among the exact sciences, as many of those who have attempted to dabble in it will tell you. Nature and an active, enterprising foe may place such obstacles in your way along the diameter that you may, after all, exemplify the old saying, that the longest way round is the shortest way home, and find it to your advantage, in war, to follow the arc of the circle, and thus, as is said to be the case in diplomacy, gain your object in a roundabout way, after failing in a direct.

A general, in order to judge as to when he should prefer the roundabout to the direct road, has many things to take into consideration. He should look to see whether on the direct road there are many streams or ranges of mountains, on the banks of which, or in the passes of which, his enemy may place himself with advantage to dispute his passage. He must consider the character of the roads, and whether they are such as will enable him without difficulty to transport his artillery and supplies; if railroads, whether they are liable to be suddenly broken by raids of the enemy, so as to deprive him of supplies. He must, above all, consider the length of the road, and how many troops it is going to take to guard it from the incursions of the enemy, so that he may run no risk of being deprived at the most critical

time of his provisions, forage, or ammunition. He must look to the character of the country through which he is to pass,-whether it is open or wooded, and whether roads are scarce, or intersect the country in every direction so as to enable a bold active enemy who knows the roads to traverse the country in all directions. For it must always be borne in mind that as you lengthen your line of communication and increase the distance to your supplies, the enemy is shortening his, and that whilst you are constantly offering him invitations to make raids in your rear, he is decreasing the chances of your being able to return the compliment.

Of course, the same precautions must be taken in regard to the roundabout road; and it must possess great advantages over the direct to justify its being taken. Suppose, for instance, you find on this no difficult stream or ranges of mountains to pass,-that you find strong natural or artificial fortifications on the road, which you can make use of as safe bases of supplies, thus shortening as it were your line of communication and protecting your rear. Suppose, above all, that by means of safe, secure watertransportation you can plant your troops and stores of every kind within a short distance of the point to be reached, without the possibility of your enemy preventing it. Suppose you have plenty of transporting vessels, and know that, as you advance up to the very point, these vessels can land food for your men, forage for your horses, and ammunition for your guns, almost in your very camps. With these advantages would, many people hesitate which of the two routes to choose? In addition to the advantages of the route, you compel your enemy to abandon his fortified position on the diameter, and fall back nearer to his base, thus compelling the abandonment of all the country in front of your own, and this without the loss of a single life.

Let us apply these principles to the consideration of a campaign which has been made the subject of more discussion than any other since this war commenced. Cast your eye upon the map of Virginia, and recollect, as the different points are designated, that we are speaking in a war, not in a mathematical, sense. Fredericksburg is the centre of our circle, Washington is our starting-point and base of supplies, and Richmond is the point to be reached. Do you see how, starting from W. and following the circumference of our constructive circle down the Potomac River and Chesapeake Bay by Fort Monroe, and up the James River to the very gates of Richmond, we have free open navigation for our supply-vessels? Cast your eye along the diameter from W. through F. to R., and note the distance and the obstructions cast by nature alone in your way. There are no ranges of mountains, but rivers in abundance. If we overlook the Occoquan, which lies nearer to Washington, the first in order and importance is the Rappahannock. Need we enumerate the difficulties of getting across that stream to a people who have

scarcely heard of any thing else for the past two years? When we succeed in passing that stream with our army, it will be time enough to consider whether we are able to force the passage of several others, which lie between Fredericksburg and Richmond, and still leave troops enough behind us to protect our railroad or long wagon-trains to Acquia Creek, and whether, if we do succeed, we shall have troops enough left to assault the strong fortifications which surround the city of Richmond. Then look at the country lying between the York and James Rivers, with a deep, wide river on each side to protect the flanks of your army, and a secure depot for your supplies in the strong fortress at Old Point, with but one stream to cross on the road to Richmond. Make your choice now without prejudice, and with sole regard to the principles we have laid down, and say whether General McClellan did not act the part of Columbus with the egg, when he pointed out as practicable the route by which we came nearer reaching Richmond than we have on any other. Grant that he committed military errors (from our experience, we have found there are few generals who do not), but give him the credit of at least pointing out the right road to Richmond.

There is one great advantage possessed by the enemy which is almost entirely overlooked by our people in forming their opinion upon military operations, and that is, that they have interior lines of communication, whilst ours are of necessity exterior, and that the more we reduce the theatre of operations the greater does this advantage become. And yet when military men talk of the enemy's "interior lines of communication," they are too apt to be accused of using professional twaddle, and twitted with not gallantly moving against the enemy's forces wherever found, and this, we are sorry to say, very often by people who ought to know better.

The ob

To demonstrate the advantages of these interior lines of communication, permit us to take an illustration from the insect world. Most of our readers, no doubt, have seen a spider's web, and admired the beautiful manner in which it is constructed. ject of this web is to catch flies; and, if you have ever watched long enough, you doubtless have seen how it was done. Why would not a square or round net-work, with the spider on one edge, do just as well as to have all the lines radiating from the centre, where the maker sits watching for his prey? Our insect understands strategy better than some larger animals. Let a fly strike his web: how quickly he rushes out to him and ties him wing and limb! But if, whilst so engaged, another fly becomes entangled on the opposite side, he leaves the first but partially secured, and rushes to the other, and so back and forth, until both are secured. He has interior lines of communication, and knows how to use them to advantage. Just so in war. A nation possessing roads intersecting its territory in every direction, when

acting on the defensive against forces coming from without, throws an overpowering force against its enemy at one point, partially stops or secures him there, and is enabled to do the same thing at several points in succession, whilst his enemy can concentrate to resist him only by going around on the exterior lines of communication. The spider has one great advantage over the human strategist. He has no newspapers to blazon forth to his enemy what his intentions are, or when he is going to move; and in this respect the rebel authorities are better off than we are, for their papers are either not allowed or do not permit themselves to give the information. Now decrease the size of your web: the field of operations is not so large, and, consequently, not so many flies are caught; but when they do strike the web they are sooner secured, for the spider's interior lines have been shortened, and he has not so far to travel.

The rebel spider, having partially secured our Potomac army at Harrison's Landing by overwhelming numbers, commenced concentrating forces against the other fly, General Pope, who with his army was in the vicinity of Culpepper Court-House. Being, however, afraid to detach too largely from the Richmond army whilst the Army of the Potomac was still on the James River threatening his capital, the enemy found himself outnumbered in his first encounter at the battle of Cedar Mountain, and was obliged to retire to wait for reinforcements expected from Richmond. But no sooner was our Potomac army ordered to leave the position in front of Richmond and reinforce Pope's army by the exterior lines of communication, than the whole Richmond army was pushed up by the shorter route to join the army under Jackson in front of Pope. Of course the troops moving on the interior lines reached their point soonest, and, overwhelming Pope by a series of brilliant manoeuvres, rather than by force of numbers, pushed him back to the fortifications of Washington before many of the troops belonging to the Army of the Potomac could reach him.

Many persons who censured McClellan for not taking Richmond have thrown upon him also the blame of failing to reinforce Pope in time. Let us examine the question a little, and strive to arrive at a just conclusion on military principles and without regard to prejudices.

Two armies, A and B, are facing each other in hostile attitude across the Rappahannock River, in front of Culpepper. Both have to look to the vicinity of Richmond for reinforcements. But B can get his along the short interior line, whilst A must use the exterior line and send his first down the James River, then up the Chesapeake and Potomac to Washington, and then out to join A on the Rappahannock. What is A to do? He knows, or ought to know, very well, that he cannot long maintain his position on the Rappahannock against the odds which his

enemy can hurl against him before he can possibly obtain assistance by the roundabout way his reinforcements have to travel. Nine men out of ten will say, upon looking at the map, he should fall back, shorten the distance between himself and his reinforcements, lengthen the corresponding distance for the enemy, and form a junction of his forces before the enemy can attack him. If the Army of the Potomac was not, from neglect in its chief or any other cause, moving forward fast enough, how simple the remedy to work both ends of the line, and make A's army move backwards until the junction was effected!

It will very naturally be asked, Did no one think of this very simple method of shortening the time required to effect a junction between these two armies? Our answer is, that no one in authority seems to have thought of it, since it was not done. But there was at least one man who did think of it, and urged it upon the commander of the Army of Virginia. That man was a brigadier-general commanding a brigade in the Army of the Potomac, had been wounded in front of Richmond, and had just returned to his command in time to join in the retreat of Pope's army and give this seasonable but ineffectual piece of advice. He is the same who subsequently distinguished himself at the battle of Gettysburg, where the triumphant advance of Lee's invading army was checked and driven from loyal soil, and who has more recently demonstrated the soundness of his advice twelve months ago by a most masterly retreat over the very same ground passed over by our troops last year,-Major-General George G. Meade, at present the commander of the Army of the Potomac.

[NOTE.-The opinion of our correspondent, who is a distinguished general and an eye-witness of what he describes, is given without comment; but our readers are well aware that there are other and conflicting views respecting the route to Richmond and the campaign which he has used as an illustration. -ED.]

AN INQUIRY INTO THE MILITARY RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MEDICAL OFFICERS IN THE LAND FORCES.

Ir is denied by no one that certain military rights and duties appertain to medical officers; but opinions as to their limits embrace the utmost range. Some restrict them to the simple performance of that professional service expected of every physician in civil practice. Others claim for them all the military privileges enjoyed by line and other staff officers of similar grade. There has been little formal legislation on the subject. Individuals are required to judge of these matters, and, naturally, their views are partial, from the influence of interest and the want of clearly-defined points of departure. There appears to be no meridian from which an authoritative