tice," this constitutes a quarterly tenancy, which may be determined by a three months' notice to quit, expiring at the same time of the year it commenced, or any corresponding quarter-day. But although the tenant under such an agreement enters in the middle of one of the usual quarters, if there appears to be no agreement to the contrary he will be presumed to hold from the day he enters, and the tenancy can only be determined by a notice expiring that day of the year, or some other quarter-day calculated from thence."

A demise, "not for one year only, but from year to year," inures as a demise for two years at least; and, consequently, the tenant cannot be ejected after a notice to quit at the expiration of the first year*.

But where furnished apartments were taken "for 12 months certain, and six months' notice afterwards," it was contended, that the defendant, under the above taking, was not at liberty to quit till six months' notice had been given after the expiration of the first year; but Lord Ellenborough was clearly of opinion, that the defendant was only bound to remain the 12 months certain, and that he was at liberty to quit at the end of that period, by giving six months' previous notice. His lordship laid considerable stress upon the word certain, applied to the first twelve months, which shewed that every thing afterwards was uncertain, and depended on the notice.

If a lessee, after the expiration of the lease, holds over and pays rent, the law presumes an agreement between the parties, that the tenant shall continue the possession according to the terms of the original demise, as far as those terms are consistent with a tenancy from year to year; in which case, if the landlord means to determine the tenancy, he must give the tenant half a year's notice to quit, corresponding with the time of the original taking. In this case, the tenancy from year to year commences at the same time when the lease began; and if the tenant assign the premises, the assignee will be tenant from year to year from the same time, and notice to quit must be given accordingly: e. g. if the original term began from Michaelmas, the notice must be to quit at Michael

mas.

The receipt of rent is evidence to be left to a jury that a tenancy was subsisting during the period for which that rent

was paid; and if no other tenancy appear, the presumption is, that that tenancy was from year to year.

A., being tenant for life', with remainder to the lessor of the plaintiff in fee, on 22d June, 1785, demised to defendant for twenty-one years, to commence from old Lady Day then past. On 30th September, 1785, A died; defendant continued in possession, and paid rent to the lessor of the plaintiff for two years, on old Lady Day and old Michaelmas Day; before old Michaelmas Day, 1787, lessor of plaintiff gave defendant notice to quit on old Lady Day then next. Adjudged, per cur., that the notice was good, on the ground, that payment of rent on the 5th of April was evidence of an agreement for a tenancy from year to year to hold from that day; although it was objected, that the interest of the tenant for life having expired on the 30th of September, the notice ought to have been to quit at the end of the year from that time.

In January, 1790, A. let a farm to defendant for seven years by parol. Defendant was to enter at old Lady Day on the land, and on, the house on the 25th of May, and he was to quit at Candlemas. On the 22d of September, 1792, a notice to quit at Lady Day next was served on defendant. The court held, that this notice was improper, Lord Kenyon, C. J. observing, that though the agreement be void by the statute of frauds, as to the duration of the lease, yet it must regulate the terms, on which the tenancy subsisted, in other respects; i. e. as to the rent, the time of year when the tenant was to quit, &c. The agreement was, that defendant should quit at Candlemas. If the lessor, therefore, chose to determine the tenancy before the expiration of the seven years, he could put an end to it at Candlemas only.

Where the in-coming tenant enters upon different parts of the demised premises, at different times, half a year's notice to quit, with reference to the substantial time of entry, that is, with reference to the original time of entry on the substantial part of the premises demised (14) is sufficient, the whole being demised at one entire rent.

a Doe d. Jordan v. Ward, 1 H. Bl. 97. c Doe v. Spence, 6 East, 120. Doe v. b Doe d. Rigge v. Bell, 5 T. R. 471. Watkins, 7 East, 551.

(14) It is not necessary, that the notice to quit should be given with reference to the time of entry on the other parts, which are only auxiliary to the principal subject of the demise. Neither is it necessary, that separate notices to quit the other parts should be given, where all the parts are demised as one entire thing. One notice, given in conformity with the rule laid down in the text, is sufficient.

Ejectment. On the 5th of October, 1769, plaintiff agreed. to let to defendant a farm, to hold the arable land from the 13th of February then next, the pasture from the 5th of April, and the meadow from the 12th of May, for seven years, at a yearly rent payable at Michaelmas and Lady Day, the first payment to be made at Michaelmas then next; and the defendant to have a way-going crop of three parts of the arable land after the expiration of the term, paying so much per acre. On the 30th of September, 1777, the plaintiff gave the defendant notice to quit the arable land on the 13th of February next, the pasture on the 5th of April, and the meadow on the 12th of May; a question arose, whether this notice was sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover the whole or any part of the premises, the defendant's counsel having objected, that the notice to quit ought to have been given on the 13th of August, viz. half a year previously to the 13th of February, from which time the arable ground was holden; it was resolved by three justices (absente de Grey, C. J.) that the notice to quit was sufficient; that the true construction of the agreement was, that it was a holding from Lady Day to Lady Day, the rent being payable at Michaelmas and Lady Day; and though part of the farm was to be entered on and quitted at old Candlemas, and the other not until old May Day, yet the custom of most countries would have directed the same in a taking from old Lady Day: that in the present case, any inconvenience, which the tenant might suffer, was obviated by that part of the agreement, which provided for his having a way-going crop.

The rule of construction laid down in the preceding case of Doe v. Snowdon, was recognised and adopted in Ďoe v. Spence, 6 East, 120., where, under an agreement by a tenant of a farm, to enter on the tillage land at Candlemas, and on the house and other premises at Lady Day following; and that, when he left the farm, he should quit the same according to the times of entry as aforesaid, and the rent, which was an entire rent for all the premises demised, was reserved half yearly at Michaelmas and Lady Day; it was holden, that a notice to quit, delivered half a year before Lady Day, but less than half a year before Candlemas, was good.

In ejectment for the recovery of messuages and landsƒ, &c. on a demise laid the 11th of June, 1805, it appeared, that the premises in question, in possession of the defendants, con

d Doe d. Dagget v. Snowdon, 2 Bl. R. f Doe v. Watkins and another, 7 East,

sisting of dwelling houses, out-houses, mills, and other manufacturing buildings, and a few acres of meadow and pasture land, and bleaching grounds, together with all water courses, &c., were holden under a written agreement for a lease, dated the 1st of January, 1792, for a term of thirty-five years, to commence, as to the meadow ground, from the 25th of December then last past; as to the pasture ground from the 25th of March next; and as to the housing, mills, and rest of the premises, from the 1st of May next; under one entire rent, viz. a yearly rent payable at Pentecost and Martinmas, the first payment to be made at Pentecost then next. A notice to quit was served on the defendants, on the 28th of September, 1804, to quit at the expiration of the then current year of their holding. It was objected that the not.ce was insufficient, on the ground that the substantial time of entry was either the 25th of December, whence the first holding, as to the meadow ground, was to commence; or from Martinmas preceding, the rent being reserved at Pentecost, and Martinmas, and the first half year being payable at Pentecost. But the court overruled the objection, and held the notice to be sufficient; Grose, J. observing, that it was right to adhere to the rule laid down in Doe v. Spence, which was founded in good sense and convenience, that the half year's notice to quit should be given with reference to the substantial time of entry of the tenant, and when that was, must depend on what was the substantial part of the thing demised, whereon the tenant enters. In the present case, the substantial part of the demise was the house and manufacturing buildings, &c. on which the tenant was to enter on the 1st of May; that, therefore, was the substantial day of entry. Le Blanc, J. added, that the substantial time of entry was not necessarily to be collected from the rent days, though it happened in the case of Doe v. Spence, that the tenant entered on the substantial part of the premises on the day from which the rent was reckoned.

It is a question of fact for the jury to decide, which is the principal and which the accessorial subject of demise.-This being found, the judge may then determine, whether the notice to quit has been given in due time.

Requisites of Notice.-With respect to the notice to quit, it may be observed, that although a parol notice is sufficient", yet it is more advisable to give a written notice. The terms in which the notice is expressed should be clear and definite, in order to avoid any objection on this ground at the trial of

g Doe on d. of Heapy v Howard, 11 East, 498.

h Per Lord Ellenborough, C. J. in Doe VOL. II.

C

d. Ld. Macartney v. Crick, 5 Esp. N, P. C. 197.

3

the ejectment; for it has been holden', that where an irregular notice is given, it is not incumbent on the party served with it, to make an objection to it at the time of service; it is sufficient if he object to it at the trial. The courts, however, seem to listen to these objections with reluctance, and will, if possible, so construe the notice as to give effect to it. Hence, "I desire you to quit, &c. or 1 shall insist on double rent;" has been holden a good notice'. So upon a taking from old Michaelmas to old Michaelmas, a notice to quit at Michaelmas will be sufficient, at least if it be proved, that the tenancy commenced at old Michaelmas". So a notice delivered at Michaelmas, 1796, "to quit at Lady Day which will be in the year 1795," was adjudged to be good; for the intention is clear, and the words, "in the year 1795," may be rejected. So a notice to quit at the expiration of the current year of the tenancy, which shall expire next after the end of one half year from the date of the notice, is sufficient, although no particular day is mentioned. It is, however, essentially necessary, that the notice should be to quit at the expiration of the current year of the tenancy; that is, if the defendant hold from Michaelmas, the notice must be given half a year before Michaelmas, to quit at Michaelmas; if from Lady Day at Lady Day, &c.; for, if a notice to quit at Midsummer be given to a tenant holding from Michaelmas, or vice versa, it will be insufficient; and a notice to quit at a particular day is not prima facie evidence of a holding from that day, though a contrary doctrine was formerly holden', unless it is served personally on the tenant, who makes no objection at the time. In a case where the notice (which was delivered on the 29th of September) was to quit on the 25th of March, or the 8th day of April, next ensuing, defendant having objected to it on the ground that it did not express with sufficient accuracy the end of the tenancy, and the time when the defendant was to quit, and that at all events it was incumbent on the lessor of the plaintiff to shew that the defendant's

i Oakȧpple d. Green v. Copous, 4. T. R. 361. But see Doe d. Leicester, 2 Taunt. 109.

k See Doe v. Archer, 14 East, 245.

1 Doe d. Matthews v. Jackson, Doug. 175.

m Per Heath, J. Gloucester Sum. Ass. 1800. Woodf. Land. & Ten. p. 224. 2d ed.

n Doe d. Hinde v. Vince, 2 Camp. N. P. C. 256. per Sr. A. Mc. Donald, C. B. and S. P. per Lord Lilenborough, C. J. in Doe v. Brookes, 2 Camp. N. P. C. 257. n.