A power of attorney is revoked by the death of the person who granted it, and a contract afterwards made under the authority given by it, though without notice of the death, is void: Watson v. King, 4 Camp. 272; and see the note to Smart v. Sanders, 5 C. B. 917. And so, although the act was appointed to be done after the death of the principal, "A letter of attorney to deliver livery of seisin after the decease of the feoffer is void :" Co. Litt. 52 b. In the note there it is said, "by devise or by special custom authority may be created executory after the party's death.' By the civil law a sale by an agent after the death of the principal, but before notice, binds the property: Dig. lib. 17, tit. 1, 1. 26. In general, a ministerial officer can appoint a deputy unless the office Appointment is to be exercised by the ministerial officer in person. But where the of deputy. office partakes of a judicial and ministerial character, although a deputy may be made for the performance of ministerial acts, one cannot be made for the performance of a judicial act. A sheriff, therefore, cannot make a deputy to hold an inquisition under a writ of inquiry, although he may appoint a deputy to serve a writ: Com. Dig., Officer, D. In Lane v. Cotton, 1 Salk. 18, Holt, C.J., said: “What is done by the deputy is done by the principal, and it is the act of the principal, who may displace him at pleasure, even though he were constituted for life, vide Hob. 13, 1 Mod. 85; and the act of the deputy may forfeit the office of the principal: 39 Hen. 6, c. 34."-See Campbell v. Hewlitt, 16 Q. B. 258. It was said by Lord Abinger, C.B., in Jewison v. Dyson, 9 M. & W. 585, that many officers may be called judicial to a certain extent who are not judicial within the general meaning of the law, which says that the Crown cannot delegate to another its right to appoint judicial officers. That rule is confined to judicial officers who determine causes inter partes. In that case the question was, whether the Crown, in right of the Duchy of Lancaster, had the exclusive right, under a charter of Edward III., of appointing a coroner within the province of Pontefract. The Crown may, by charter in express words, grant to a commonalty or corporation the power to make another commonalty or corporation: Bro. Abr. Prerog. 53; and see The Queen v. Dulwich College, 21 L. J. (N.S.) (Q.B.) 36, where, per Lord Campbell, C.J., “The Crown could not delegate the appointment of magistrates." A deputy cannot make a deputy, on the principle that delegatus non potest delegare : Com. Dig., Viscount B. 7 Vin. Abr. 556. The statute 22 Geo. 3, c. 75, enacts that no office to be exercised in any colony shall be granted by patent for any longer term than while the grantee shall discharge the duty thereof in person and behave well therein. This statute was passed to put an end to the practice of exercising offices in the colonies by deputy while the holders were resident in this country: see Montagu v. Lieutenant-Governor of Van Diemen's Civil liability of Governor. Land, 6 Moore, P. C. 489. Where the Judge of a Vice-Admiralty Court (at Sierra Leone), who was also Chief Justice, with the concurrence of the Governor, appointed a Deputy Judge of the court, and left for England, and the Deputy Judge died soon afterwards, and then the acting Chief Justice, with the concurrence of the Governor, appointed another Deputy Judge of the Vice-Admiralty Court, it was contended that such deputy was illegally appointed, and had no jurisdiction; but the Judicial Committee said that they had no doubt whatever that he was duly appointed, and had full jurisdiction: Rolet v. The Queen, L. R. 1 P. C. 198; see 26 Vict. c. 24, s. 4. With respect to the civil liability of the Governor of a colony to an action brought against him in this country for a wrong committed by him while holding the office of Governor, the leading cases are— Mostyn v. Fabrigas, Cowp. 161; Campbell v. Hall, Cowp. 204; and see also Wall v. Macnamara, 1 T. R. 536; Wilkins v. Despard, 5 T. R. 112; Wytham v. Dutton, 3 Mod. 160; Way v. Yally, 6 Mod. 195; Rafael v. Verelst, 2 W. Bl. 982, 1055; Glynn v. Houston, 2 M. & G. 337; Basham v. Lumley, 3 C. & P. 489; Phillips v. Eyre, L. R. 4 Q. B. 225, which clearly establish the principle that a Governor is liable to an action in this country for a wrong done by him during his government. In Lord Bellamont's Case, 2 Salk. 625, the Attorney General moved for a trial at bar in an action against the Governor of New York for matter done by him as governor, and it was granted "because the King defended it." In Phillips v. Eyre, ubi sup., it was decided that a Colonial Act of Indemnity, by which the right of action in respect of an act otherwise lawfully done by the Governor of the colony, is taken away before an action has been brought in this country, is a good defence to such action (1). In Dutton v. Howell, Show. Parl. Ca. 24, it was held that the Governor of a colony could not be sued in this country for imprisoning a person guilty of official delinquency under his government; but this proceeded on the ground that the Governor and his Council had acted judicially see Hill v. Bigge, 3 Moore, P. C. 482; and as to the non-liability of a judicial officer, Kemp v. Neville, 10 C. B. (N.S.) 523. The Governor of a colony may be sued in an action of debt in one of the Courts of the colony, but it seems that he would not be liable while resident in his government to be taken in execution upon judgment recovered: Hill v. Bigge, ubi sup., 465. In that case the Court commented upon the dictum of Lord Mansfield, in Fabrigas v. Mostyn, that the Governor is in the nature of a viceroy, and that, therefore, locally during his government no civil or criminal action will lie against (1) Two of the earliest instances of Acts of Indemnity in this country are the statutes passed 7 Edw. 2: (1) Ne quis occasionetur pro reditu Petri de Gaveston; (2) Ne quis occasionetur pro captione et morte Petri de Gaveston. But these are said to have been repealed within a year after they were passed. By statute 15 Edw. 2, an indemnity was granted to all persons for felonies and transgressions done in the case of the two Le Despencers; but this indemnity was afterwards revoked. him" (1); and pointed out the difference between the liability to be sued and the liability to process in execution; and also upon the case of Tandy v. Earl of Westmoreland, 27 State Tr. 1264. The same distinction between liability to action and liability to process of execution was thought to apply to the case of ambassadors in Taylor v. Best, 14 C. B. 487; but the contrary was decided in The Magdaléna Steam Navigation Company v. Marten, 28 L. J. (Q.B.) 310. As to the extent of protection from civil liability accorded to public officers on grounds of policy, see Lane v. Cotton, 1 Salk. 17; Whitfield v. Lord Despencer, Cowp. 754; Cunningham v. Collier, 4 Doug. 233; Le Caux v. Eden, 2 Doug. 594; Allen v. Waldegrave, 2 J. B. Moore, 621; Macbeath v. Haldemand, 1 T. R. 172; Unwin v. Wolseley, 1 T. R. 674; Myrtle v. Beaver, 1 East, 135; Rice v. Chute, 1 East, 579; Nicholson v. Mounsey, 15 East, 384; Oliver v. Bentinck, 3 Taunt. 456; Gidley v. Lord Palmerston, 3 Brod. & B. 275; Hodgkinson v. Fernie, 26 L. J. (C.P.) 217; Buron v. Denman, 2 Ex. R. 167; Broughton v. Jackson, 21 L. J. (Q.B.) 265; Auty v. Hutchinson, 6 C. B. 266; Tobin v. The Queen, 33 L. J. (C.P.) 199; Priddy v. Rose, 3 Mer. 102; Dickson v. Viscount Combermere, 3 Fost. & Fin. 585; The Athol, 1 W. Rob. Adm. 374. In a case where several actions for false imprisonment were brought by sailors belonging to a merchant vessel which had been captured by a privateer with a letter of marque, but liberated by the Court of Admiralty, against the captain of the privateer, Lord Mansfield said: "This is a new attempt which, if it succeeded, would destroy the British If an action at law should lie by the owners, and every navy. man on board a ship taken as prize, against the captain and every man on board his ship, the sea would be safe for the trade of our enemies, however great our naval superiority:" Lindo v. Rodney, 2 Doug. 613. Where some slaves escaped from a territory where slavery was lawful, and got on board a British ship of war in the high seas, it was held that the owner could not maintain an action against the commander of the ship for harbouring the slaves after notice: Forbes v. Cochrane, 2 B. & C. 448. There Bayley, J., said that if it could be made out that the defendants acted malâ fide, they would be liable to an action, but in order to support an action against a person who fills a public office like that which the defendants filled, it is essential to shew mala fides. And, per Holroyd, J.: "I have given my opinion upon this question supposing that there would be a right of action against these defendants, if a wrong had been actually done by them; but I am by no means clear that even under such circumstances any action would have been maintainable against them by reason of their particular situation as officers acting in discharge of a public duty, in a place flagrante bello." Although not liable to actions of contract at the suit of individuals for (1) This is in accordance with the Roman law: "In jus vocari non oportet neque consulem, neque præfectum, neque prætorem, neque proconsulem, neque cæteros magistratus qui imperium habent, et qui coercere aliquem possunt, et jubere in carcerem duci."-Dig. ii. tit. 4, § 2. Privileged communica tion. Act of State. Criminal liability of Governor. goods supplied for the public service, public officers may be compelled by mandamus to perform their duty in paying over monies in their hands: R. v. Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, 4 Ad. & Ell. 286. (In the Banker's Case, 14 State Tr. 1, temp. Wm. III., the proceeding was by petition to the Court of Exchequer: see 12 & 13 Wm. 3, c. 12, s. 5.) The Queen v. The Lords of the Treasury, 16 Q. B. 357; Ex parte Sir Charles Napier, 21 L. J. (Q.B.) 332. As to how far orders given by the Governor of a colony, or by a public officer to a subordinate, are privileged communications, see Anderson v. Hamilton, 2 Brod. & Bing. 156 (note); Cooke v. Maxwell, 2 Stark. 183; Wyatt v. Gore, Holt, 299; Lee v. Birrell, 3 Camp. 337; Horne v. Bentinck, 2 Brod. & Bing. 130; Fairman v. Ives, 5 B. & Al. 642 ; Blagg v. Sturt, 10 Q. B. 899, s. c. in Error, 906. See also the Trial of the Seven Bishops, 12 State Tr. 349, where the Clerk of the Privy Council gave evidence as to what passed in the council chamber. And as to the rule of public policy in Government prosecutions which protects a witness from answering questions to discover the informer, see Attorney General v. Briant, 15 M. & W. 169; Rex v. Hardy, 24 State Tr. 753, 808, 816; Rex v. Watson, 32 State Tr. 102. A Governor is not liable to a suit for an act done by him in his With respect to the criminal liability of a Governor, it is enacted by statute 11 & 12 Wm. 3, c. 12, intituled "An Act to punish Governors of Plantations in this Kingdom for crimes by them committed in the Plantations," that such offences shall be tried in the Court of Queen's Bench in England, or before such Commissioners, and in such county of this realm, as shall be assigned by Her Majesty's commission. And by statute 42 Geo. 3, c. 85, any person employed in the service of the Crown in any civil or military station, office, or capacity within Great Britain, who shall commit any crime, misdemeanor, or offence in the execution, or under colour, or in the exercise of his office, may be prosecuted in the Court of Queen's Bench. It has been held that these statutes do not extend to felonies: Rex v. Shawe, 5 M. & S. 403. ExGovernor Wall was tried in 1802 for a murder committed by him by inflicting excessive corporal punishment in the island of Goree in 1782, he being at that time Governor of the island, and he was convicted and hanged (1): 28 State Tr. 51. (1) Lord Campbell says, in his "Lives of the Chief Justices," iii. 149: “Then a very young man, just entered at Lincoln's Inn, I was present at the trial, and carried away by the prevalent vengeful enthusiasm, I thought that all was right; but after the lapse of half a century, having dispassionately examined the whole proceeding, I came to a very different conclusion." In 1804, General Picton was tried for a misdemeanor in causing torture to be inflicted upon a mulatto woman in the island of Trinidad, of which he had been Governor. Lord Ellenborough left to the jury the question whether the punishment of torture was allowed by the law of Trinidad at the time of the cession of the island by Spain to England. They found that there was no such law existing at the time of the cession, and a verdict of guilty was recorded. A rule for a new trial was afterwards made absolute; and on the second trial the jury found a special verdict, setting out the facts of the case, and stating that, whether the defendant were upon these facts guilty or not they were wholly ignorant. They found that by the law of Spain torture existed in the island at the time of the cession of the island, and that no malice existed in the mind of the defendant independent of the illegality of the act. The proceedings lasted from 1809 until 1812, when the Court ordered the defendant's recognizances to be respited until further orders; and no judgment was finally pronounced. The prosecution was still pending when General Picton fell at Waterloo : 30 State Tr. 225-956. In Wall v. Macnamara, cited in Johnstone v. Sutton, 1 T. R. 536, Lord Mansfield said: "In trying the legality of acts done by military officers in the exercise of their duty, particularly beyond the seas, where cases may occur without the possibility of application for proper advice, great latitude ought to be allowed, and they ought not to suffer for a slip of form if their intention appears by the evidence to have been upright; it is the same as when complaints are brought against inferior civil magistrates, such as justices of the peace, for acts done by them in the exercise of their civil duty. There the principal inquiry to be made by a court of justice is, how the heart stood? And if there appears to be nothing wrong, then great latitude will be allowed for misapprehension or mistake." And in Mostyn v. Fabrigas, Cowp. 161, the same great judge said: "I can conceive cases in time of war in which a Governor would be justified, though he acted very arbitrarily, in which he could not be justified in time of peace. Suppose, during a siege or invasion, the Governor . . . . upon a general suspicion should take people up as spies; upon proper circumstances laid before the Court, it should be very fit to see whether he had acted, as the governor of a garrison ought, according to the circumstances of the case." To this may be added what was said by Macdonald, C.B., in Wall's Case, 28 State Tr. 143: "On the one hand, as the Attorney General has most liberally and most sensibly said, when a well-intentioned officer is at a great distance from his native country, having charge of a member of that country, and it shall so happen that circumstances arise which may alarm and disturb the strongest mind, it were not proper that strictness and rigour in forms and in matters of that sort should be required when you find a real, true, and genuine intention of acting for the best for the sake of the public. .... But, on the other hand, it is of consequence that where a commander is so circumstanced, that is, |