cial Committee, left all the episcopal functions to the Bishop exactly as by the law of the Church of England they belonged to his office of Bishop, and that he could perform all the acts which belong to a Bishop within the diocese of Natal which he could do if he were the Bishop of an English diocese-" with this exception, that he cannot enforce the execution of these orders without having recourse to the civil tribunals for that purpose." With respect to the passage in the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Long v. Bishop of Capetown, 1 Moore, P. C. (N.S.) 461, already quoted, as to the status of the Church of England in the colonies, his Lordship said: "These expressions have created some alarm, which has, as it appears to me, arisen from an imperfect apprehension of what is meant by them. They do not mean, as some persons seem to have supposed, that because the members of such a Church constituted a voluntary association, they may adopt any doctrines and ordinances they please, and still belong to the Church of England. All that really is meant by these words is, that where there is no State religion established by the Legislature in any colony, and in such a colony is found a number of persons who are members of the Church of England, and who establish a Church there with the doctrines, rights, and ordinances of the Church of England, it is a part of the Church of England, and the members of it are, by implied agreement, bound by all its laws. In other words, the association is bound by the doctrines, rights, rules, and ordinances of the Church of England, except so far as any statutes may exist which (though relating to this subject) are confined in their operation to the limits of the United Kingdom of England and Ireland."

The Master of the Rolls added: "The members of the Church in South Africa may create an ecclesiastical tribunal to try ecclesiastical matters between themselves, and may agree that the decisions of such a tribunal shall be final whatever may be their nature or effect. Upon this being proved the civil tribunal would enforce such decisions against all the persons who had agreed to be members of such an associationthat is, against all the persons who had agreed to be bound by these decisions, and it would do so without inquiring into the propriety of such decisions. But such an association would be distinct from, and form no part of, the Church of England, whether it did or did not call itself in union and full communion with the Church of England. It would strictly and properly be an Episcopal Church, not of, but in South Africa, as it is the Episcopal Church in Scotland, not of Scotland." See the observations of the Judicial Committee in Ex parte Jenkins, L. R. 2 P. C. 270: "It seems to have been supposed that the cases of Long v. Bishop of Capetown, and In re The Lord Bishop of Natal, are authorities for the proposition that the Bishop of Newfoundland has no legal status and cannot lawfully exercise any episcopal function within the Bermudas. The first case certainly does not go the length of that proposition, for it decided only that the Crown cannot confer coercive authority on a Bishop in a colony possessing a constitutional form of

government without the consent of the Legislature. The Judicial Committee, in deciding the case of The Bishop of Natal v. Gladstone, has certainly used expressions which would restrain the power of the Crown in the creation of bishops within even narrower limits. It has been argued that the Master of the Rolls, in his judgment in The Bishop of Natal v. Gladstone, has greatly qualified the effect of the former judgment of the Privy Council. Their Lordships think that in the present case they are not called upon to express an opinion whether these two decisions can be reconciled; for they are clearly of opinion that the question whether the Bishop of Newfoundland has any lawful status, or can exercise any episcopal function, and particularly that of institution, in the Bermudas, has been set at rest conclusively by the repeated recognition of his status and functions by the colonial legislature."

In The Bishop of Natal v. Gladstone, the Master of the Rolls held that Dr. Colenso was Bishop of Natal in every sense of the word, and would remain so until he died or resigned, or until the letters patent appointing him were revoked, or until he were in some manner lawfully deprived of his see. But, in order to guard against a misapprehension which might arise from these words as if it were his opinion that the plaintiff could not by any means be removed from being Bishop of Natal, his Lordship added: "Such is not my opinion. I wish it to be distinctly understood that I do not mean to assert that as soon as the plaintiff's nomination by the Crown, and his appointment by letters patent, had been consummated by his consecration by the Archbishop, whatever might be his conduct or opinions, he must for ever remain Bishop of Natal and enjoy the endowments attached to that office, even though the letters patent appointing him had never been revoked. On the contrary, I entertain no doubt that if he had not performed his part in the contract entered into by him, that if he had failed to comply with the covenants of his trust,' he could not compel payment of his stipend. The contract he has entered into is involved in the words Bishop of the Church of England as by law established.' The duties, the teaching, the superintendence, the pastoral care, the watching of his flock, which appertains to a Bishop, he undertook and was bound to perform; and if, by his own wilful default, this has become impossible, I do not mean to lay down that he could maintain a suit in this Court for the payment of his salary as Bishop of Natal.”

The following Opinion was afterwards given by the Solicitor General (Sir John Coleridge), Sir Roundell Palmer, and Dr. Deane, in April,

1869:

Query." Assuming that the present Bishop of Natal has been guilty of an ecclesiastical offence, what steps can be taken to bring him to trial, and before what tribunal ?”

Opinion." Any tribunal competent to decide whether the doctrinal opinions advocated by Dr. Colenso, the present Bishop of Natal, are in accordance with the doctrines of the Church of England or not, must be sought for in South Africa or in England.

"The decision of the Judicial Committee in The Bishop of Natal's Case, 3 Moore, P. C. (N.S.) 115, is an authority for saying that the Bishop of Capetown has no jurisdiction over Dr. Colenso.

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"Taking the cases of The Bishop of Natal, and Long v. The Bishop of Capetown, 1 Moore, P. C. (N.S.) 411, together, they appear to determine that there is no jurisdiction ecclesiastical in the metropolitan diocese (so to call it) of Capetown which can reach the Bishop of Natal. The colonial decision in The Bishop of Natal v. Green, sent with the Case, throws some doubt upon the condition of the colony of Natal, as assumed by the Privy Council in The Bishop of Natal's Case; and it may be that the letters patent granted to Dr. Colenso were valid. But if that should be so we cannot see that any tribunal, civil, criminal, or ecclesiastical, exists in Natal which can determine whether the doctrinal opinions of Dr. Colenso are erroneous or not, and can enforce its decision.

"The authority of the judgment of the Master of the Rolls in The Bishop of Natal v. Gladstone, L. R. 3 Eq. p. 1, must not be carried beyond the point determined-viz., that the Bishop of Natal, retaining his status as bishop, was entitled to receive the endowment of the see.

"The Archbishop of Canterbury, whatever may be his authority over his own suffragans, has, in our opinion, no jurisdiction, inherent or conferred by the Crown or by Parliament, which can enable him to inquire, as a Court, into the doctrines advocated by the Bishop of Natal.

"It has been suggested that the Crown as visitor, or as supreme in causes ecclesiastical, or by virtue and in exercise of some other supposed power, may be able, either by Commissioners specially appointed, or by means of the Privy Council, to hear and determine the points raised against Dr. Colenso.

"We are unable to find the slightest ground on which this suggestion can be supported.

"The Crown is supreme over all causes ecclesiastical in the same, and in no other sense, and to no greater extent than the Crown is supreme over causes temporal-that is, by law, and by means of the various established courts of law.

"The Submission of the Clergy Act (25 Hen. 8, c. 19) gave no such power to the Crown. Section 4 of that Act made it lawful for the parties grieved by any decision of an ecclesiastical judge in England to appeal to the King in Chancery, for which court of appeal the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is now substituted. This is an appellate, and not an original jurisdiction.

"The High Commission Court, established by 1 Eliz. c. 1, is abolished by 16 Ch. 1, c. 11, and the revival of the High Commission Court or any similar court is especially provided against by 13 Ch. 2, st. 1, c. 12, and 1 Will. & M. Sess. 2, c. 2.

"With reference to the authorities referred to, intermediate in date between 1 Eliz. c. 1 and 16 Ch. 1, c. 11, it is hardly necessary to observe that they state the law as it was in force under the former of

these statutes, and which ceased to be in force on the passing of the latter.

"No argument in favour of the power of the Crown can be derived from 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 41, s. 4, by which it is enacted that it shall be lawful for his Majesty to refer to the Judicial Committee for hearing or consideration any such other matters as his Majesty shall think fit; and such Committee shall thereupon hear or consider the same, and shall advise his Majesty thereon in manner aforesaid.'

"To make this section applicable to the judicial determination of an ecclesiastical matter would be in effect to restore the High Commission Court. The section is to be taken as referring to questions not of judicial cognizance on which the Crown may desire to be solemnly advised by persons conversant with the law.

"The only remaining consideration is whether the merits of the case can be raised on a scire facias to revoke the letters patent granted to the Bishop of Natal.

"This manner of raising the question between the Bishop of Natal and his opponents was suggested by the Master of the Rolls in the case of The Bishop of Natal v. Gladstone.

"The only ground on which the letters patent would be revoked by such a proceeding is, in our opinion, that the letters were ab initio void, as having issued improvidently. This would leave the merits untouched.

"Indeed, if the view taken in The Bishop of Natal v. Green as to the status of the colony be correct, the letters patent might possibly be held valid.

"We are therefore of opinion that no means at present exist for trying before any tribunal competent to decide the question whether or no Dr. Colenso, the present Bishop of Natal, has advocated doctrinal opinions not in accordance with the doctrines held by the Church of England; and, assuming the present Bishop of Natal to have been guilty of an ecclesiastical offence, no steps can be taken to bring him, as such Bishop, before any tribunal.

"We do not, however, think that, upon the present materials, it would be satisfactory or proper for us to enter into the question, whether, if Dr. Colenso were present within the jurisdiction of an English ecclesiastical court, and were in this country to commit any offence against the laws ecclesiastical, he could, or not, be proceeded against, under the Church Discipline Act, as a clerk in holy orders of the Church of England."

The judgment of the Master of the Rolls, however, in The Bishop of Natal v. Gladstone, shows that there is a mode by which the question of heresy might be tried-namely, by the trustees of the Colonial Bishoprics' Fund refusing to pay the Bishop his salary on the alleged ground of heretical opinions, and distinctly raising this question in a suit instituted by him to enforce payment. The case might thus be decided in the Court of Chancery and carried on appeal to the House of Lords.

The East Indies.

In an appeal from two orders of the Court of Chancery in Bermuda (Ex parte Jenkins, L. R. 2 P. C. 258), upon an application on behalf of the appellant, a clergyman, for a writ de vi laicâ removendá to remove any opposition to his being inducted into a parish church as rector, the Judicial Committee decided that the Court of Chancery was justified in refusing the writ on the ground that the power of issuing such a writ had not been expressly imposed upon the Court of Chancery in Bermuda by the Act of the colony creating that Court. They said that it would be an inconvenient precedent to imply the existence of a writ not known to the Court itself as necessary to the enforcement of the legal right obstructed merely from the creation of the Court, and a general grant in large words of general jurisdiction. As to the writ de vi laicá removendâ, the Court said that it might be regarded at the present day as an obsolete proceeding: see Fitz. Nat. Brev, D. 54. They held that the appellant was duly presented by the Governor to the rectory, and was instituted by the lawful authority of the Bishop of Newfoundland. They said that it was a fact which would not be disputed, that for more than a century the Crown possessed the power of collating to all the vacant benefices in the Bermudas by direct nomination, a power which it exercised by delegation to the successive Governors, who were usually described as Ordinaries in their patents. But when a Bishop or ecclesiastical ordinary was duly appointed, the Crown, as patron, thought proper to leave to the Governor power of nominating the clerk, but recognized, by the letters patent granted to the Bishop, the power of institution belonging to his office. As to the ecclesiastical authority of the Governor of a colony as ordinary, see Basham v. Lumley, 3 C. and P. 489. As to a sentence of suspension passed by the Bishop of Jamaica, and reversed for irregularity, the party not having been cited to answer any particular charge, see Bowerbank v. The Bishop of Jamaica, 2 Moore, P. C. 449. As to the authority of a synod of a Church in connection with the Church of Scotland in Australia, see Lang v. Purves, 15 Moore, P. C. 389, and compare Craigdallie v. Aikman, 1 Dow. 1; and as to a synod of the Dutch Reformed Church at the Cape of Good Hope, Murray v. Burgess, L. R. 1 P. C. 362.

In 1813, when the British territories in India were under the government of the East India Company, the first bishopric was established there; and although the Bishop was appointed and consecrated under the authority of the Crown, it was thought necessary or right to obtain the sanction of the Legislature, and that an Act of Parliament (53 Geo. 3. c. 155, s. 49) should be passed to give the Bishop legal status and authority. In 1833, two additional bishoprics were founded, one at Madras and the other at Bombay, and an Act was passed (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 85), by the 93rd section of which it was enacted that the Crown should have power to assign limits to the dioceses of the three bishoprics, and from time to time to alter and vary the same limits respectively, and to grant to such Bishops, within their dioceses, eccle