are usually styled misdemeanors-that is, offences punishable by fine, or imprisonment, or both.

Though the office of justice of the peace may be unknown in Gibraltar and Malta, yet if, for offences of this class-that is, offences punishable in the manner above-mentioned-parties may be arrested and held to bail, the same course of proceeding may be adopted under this Act.

We have already stated that offenders against this Act cannot be apprehended and sent to England.

We are of opinion that any vessel which should arrive at Gibraltar or Malta, having any such offenders on board, might be lawfully detained and prevented from proceeding with such persons on her voyage. The vessel can only be detained for this purpose, and if the commander should put the offenders on shore he would be entitled immediately to proceed upon his voyage. But as long as the persons continued on board it would be lawful to detain the vessel. Authority is given for this purpose to the principal officers of his Majesty's customs, if there be any such; and, if not, then to the Governor or person having the chief civil command. There must be an information upon oath to justify the detention, and such information must also state the facts upon which the knowledge or belief of the informer is founded. The officers who may be called upon to act upon this clause of the statute must be particularly directed strictly to conform to its provisions.

In a subsequent section (the 7th), authority is given to seize and condemn the vessels therein described, viz. :-vessels fitted out as transports or storeships, or cruisers for the service, or in aid of any foreign power, &c. The mode of proceeding in the seizure and condemnation of any such vessel, and the tribunal by which the adjudication is to be made will be the same as where a vessel is seized and condemned for any forfeiture incurred under the laws of customs or excise, or the laws of trade and navigation. The seizure may be by any officer of his Majesty's customs or excise, or any officer of his Majesty's navy who is empowered to make seizures for forfeitures incurred under the laws above-mentioned. The officers who may be required to act upon this section of the statute should also be directed to attend carefully to its provisions.

J. S. COPLEY.
CHARLES WETHERELL.

(5.) JOINT OPINION of the King's Advocate, SIR HERBERT JENNER, and the Solicitor General, SIR N. C. TINDAL, as to whether Slaves escaping to a Foreign Territory could be brought back to a Colony to be there dealt with as Slaves.

Doctors' Commons, May 30, 1829.

SIR,-We are honoured with your letter stating that during the last autumn three slaves belonging to the Bahama Islands obtained possession of a boat in which they effected their escape to Cuba. On their arrival at Cuba, they were seized by the authorities at that island and placed in confinement. The commandant of the port of Remedios, in Cuba, reported this transaction to the Governor of the Bahama Islands, offering to restore the slaves to their owners in that colony upon payment of the expenses which had been incurred. The Governor has applied for instructions for his guidance on this occasion, and has expressed a doubt whether, if the slaves were restored, they could lawfully be brought back to the Bahamas, there to be dealt with as slaves.

And you are therefore pleased to desire that we would report our opinion, whether these slaves could lawfully be brought back from Cuba to the Bahama Islands for the purpose, and with the intention, of dealing with them as slaves in those islands upon their return.

In obedience to your commands, we have the honour to report that we think, that these slaves, having made their escape from the Bahamas to a colony under foreign dominion, cannot, with reference to the provisions of the statute 5th Geo. 4, c. 113, be legally brought back into any of the territories or dominions belonging to his Majesty, there to be dealt with as slaves.

Right Hon. Sir George Murray,

&c. &c. &c.

HERBERT JENNER.
N. C. TINDAL.

(6.) JOINT OPINION of the Attorney and Solicitor General, SIR JOHN CAMPBELL and SIR R. M. ROLFE, as to jurisdiction over offences committed in Territory outside of the Gates of

Gibraltar.

Temple, July 23, 1838.

MY LORD, We have had the honour to receive your Lordship's letter of the 14th instant, transmitting to us various papers relating to the question, how far the courts established in Gibraltar are

entitled to take cognizance of offences committed on any portion of the territory outside of the gates of the garrison, and requesting our opinion on this subject.

After attentively perusing all these papers, we entertain no doubt whatever that the courts established in Gibraltar are entitled to take cognizance of offences committed on any portion of the territory between the gates of the garrison and the extremity of the English lines. This territory is clearly held in full sovereignty by the English Crown, and is included in the charters establishing courts with jurisdiction over the garrison and territory of Gibraltar. We entirely concur in the view taken of the subject by Mr. Attorney General Cochrane, and we do not see any foundation for the scruples of Chief Justice Field or his predecessors.

Even under the strictest interpretation of the Treaty of Utrecht, this ground, which is indispensably necessary for the occupation and defence of the fortress, is to be considered part of the fortress of Gibraltar; and by our exercising jurisdiction over it there is no pretence for saying that we assume any territorial jurisdiction, or open any communication with the surrounding country, against the stipulations of the treaty.

To gain the object desired by the Governor, as to the ground between the fortress and the British lines, there appears to us to be no occasion whatever for any new treaty with Spain, or any new

charter from the Crown.

The Lord Glenelg,

&c. &c. &c.

J. CAMPBELL.

R. M. ROLFE.

(7.) JOINT OPINION of the Attorney and Solicitor General, SIR JOHN JERVIS and SIR JOHN ROMILLY, that an assault on a Native in a Colony, by British Subjects, is not triable in the Court of Queen's Bench in England.

Temple, April 16, 1850.

MY LORD,-We were honoured with your Lordship's command, contained in Mr. Hawes' letter of the 6th ultimo, in which he stated that he was directed by your Lordship to request that we would favour your Lordship with our joint opinion on the following questions :Certain officers of Her Majesty's 1st West India Regiment are charged with having given directions for the ill-usage of a native

Q

of Cape Coast Castle, named Robert Erskine, by torture, in order to compel him to disclose an alleged robbery.

That the circumstances, as far as known to your Lordship, are detailed in the statements of Robert Erskine, and certain other parties, enclosed in a despatch from the Acting Governor of Cape Coast Castle, dated October 22, 1849, a copy of which is annexed, and also in the declarations of other parties taken before a Committee of the Aborigines' Protection Society, and likewise annexed.

That Captain Murray and Lieutenants Bingham and Stuart, the officers whose names are mentioned in the account of this transaction, are now believed to be on service in the West Indies.

That the papers relating to this transaction have been submitted by the Commander-in-Chief to the Judge Advocate General, whose letter thereupon is likewise annexed.

That the questions which the Judge Advocate General recommends to be submitted to us are-whether the persons who are charged with having tortured Robert Erskine can be tried and punished for it, either upon an information exhibited by the Attorney General, or upon an indictment found in the Court of Queen's Bench in England; and would it be proper in a case of this kind to resort to such mode of trial?

Mr. Hawes then stated that your Lordship requested that, in the event of our being of opinion that such proceedings might be taken, either on information or indictment, we would further favour your Lordship with our opinion in what manner, and by what authority, the examination of the witnesses and other preliminary proceedings should be taken, with a view to the committal of the accused parties for trial?

In obedience to your Lordship's commands, we have perused the several documents transmitted to us, and have the honour to report that, in our opinion, the persons who are charged with having tortured Robert Erskine cannot be tried and punished in this country by information or indictment in the Queen's Bench; at common law no such proceeding could be instituted in this country, and we are of opinion that the case is not within the provisions of the statute 42 Geo. 3, c. 85.

The Right Hon. Earl Grey,

&c. &c. &c.

JOHN JERVIS.

JOHN ROMILLY.

(8.) JOINT OPINION of the Queen's Advocate, SIR JOHN DODSON, and the Attorney and Solicitor General, SIR JOHN ROMILLY and SIR A. E. COCKBURN, on the construction of the Statutes 59 Geo. 3, c. 44 (an Act relating to offences committed in Honduras), and 12 & 13 Vict. c. 96 (an Act to provide for the Prosecution and Trial in the Colonies of Offences committed within the Jurisdiction of the Admiralty).

Doctors' Commons, March 14, 1851.

MY LORD, We are honoured with your Lordship's commands, signified in Mr. Merivale's letter of the 5th instant, stating that he was directed to transmit to us an extract of a despatch from the Governor of Jamaica, with copies of so much of its enclosures as relates to the trial and conviction at a Commission Court held at Honduras of two persons for piracy on the high seas.

Mr. Merivale is pleased to request that we would take these papers into consideration, and report to your Lordship our joint opinion as to the validity of the objections which we should find to have been taken to the conviction in this case.

In obedience to your Lordship's commands, we have taken the papers into consideration, and have the honour to report that we think that the first objection, viz.: "That the Commission Court, according to the statute 59 Geo. 3, c. 44, and the letters patent of the Crown, by which it is constituted, has no jurisdiction to try, eo nomine, for piracy,' and that the subsequent imperial statute of the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 96, which the Chief Justice of Honduras seems to think has given that jurisdiction to the Court, only contemplated the trial by any colonial court of the same offences when committed on the high seas which the same court might previously have tried if committed upon any inland waters," is valid.

We are of opinion that the second objection, viz.: "That the crime of which the prisoners were convicted was committed before the Act of the 13 & 14 Vict. was passed," is invalid, inasmuch as the prisoners were charged after the passing of the statute of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 96.

We think that the third objection, viz.: "That British Honduras does not come within the meaning of the 5th clause of the 12 & 13 Vict., as being neither a colony, island, plantation, dominion, fort, or