ABANDONMENT.
HOMESTEAD, 1, 3.
LAND, 7.
The question of abandonment is almost exclusively one of intent,
and that intent must be clearly established by the best accessible evidence,
before the jury will be authorized to find a relinquishment of any rights
under the homestead law. That a party has been absent for an indefi-
nite period is not sufficient, unless accompanied with proof of intent
not to return. McMillan v. Warner, 410.
In a suit by the legal owner of a promissory note for use of the ad-
ministrator of an estate, the incapacity of the administrator to sue or to
act in the capacity of administrator cannot be pleaded in abatement.
Hitson v. Dillahunty, 585.
In a suit upon an account, a petition failing to contain a bill of particu-
lars, does not set out the plaintiff's cause of action in a clear and intel-
ligible manner, and is defective. Boynton v. Chamberlain, 604.
1. An officer interested in a deed cannot take the acknowledgment of
the grantors in such deed. Brown v. Moore, 645.
2. The commissions of a trustee is sufficient interest to disqualify him
from taking the acknowledgment to the trust deed. Id.
ADMINISTRATOR.
ESTATES OF DECEDENTS.
1. No appeal lies to the Supreme Court from a judgment rendered in
the District Court in a case which had been appealed from the court of a
mayor or justice of the peace. Burch v. Corporation of Bastrop, 80.
2. The 21st Section of the Act of October, 1866, prohibited appeals to
the Supreme Court in cases appealed to the District Court from the
County Court, in judgments less than two hundred dollars. The repeal
of said act did not confer additional jurisdiction over cases pending in
said courts. Meriweather v. Whitley, 525.
3. Appeal dismissed, it being from a judgment less than two hundred
dollars, and in a case appealed from the County to the District Court.
Id.
4. The refusal of the district judge to forfeit a recognizance is an in-
terlocutory order from which no appeal can be taken. The State v. But-
ler, 560.
5. Appeal does not lie from the action of the District Court in over-
ruling a motion for new trial in a criminal case. Fulcher v. The
State, 505.
6. In this case the jury found the defendant guilty of rape; thereupon
the court remanded the defendant to jail to await sentence. A motion
for a new trial was overruled and an appeal taken. Held, that the Su-
preme Court had no jurisdiction on appeal. Id.
7. Hoppe v. The State, in 32 Texas, overruled. Id.
APPEAL BOND.
PRACTICE, 2.
ATTACHMENT.
PARTNERSHIP, 4.
Stock in a corporation is not subject to attachment. M. M. Ins. Co.
v. Brower & Co., 230.
An attorney has no power to change the securities of his client unless
he be the attorney in fact specially authorized so to do. Scott, Admx., v.
Atchison, 384.
BAIL BOND.
SCIRE FACIAS, 1, 2.
1. A bail bond which describes A. B. as principal, "conditioned, that
whereas an indictment has been preferred against A. B.," etc., now if
the above bounden
shall make his personal appearance at the
next term," etc., if in other respects good, is not vitlated by the failure
to insert the name of A. B. after the word "bounden," but may be en-
forced as the bond of A. B. Gorman v. The State, 112.
2. A recognizance is defective which recites that defendant shall "ap-
pear from day to day, and from term to term, and abide the decision of
the Supreme Court, and not depart without leave," without stating when
and where he shall appear. Maxwell v. The State, 171.
3. A bail bond is fatally defective which does not require the defend-
ant to appear at any particular place or county, to answer the charge
against him; and it is error to render judgment final by default upon scire
facias based on such bond. Ward & Hamilton v. The State, 302.
4. A bail bond must show to what court the defendant is bound to
appear. The State v. Phelps, 555.
5. A bail bond binding the defendant to appear in Refugio county
and forfeited in the District Court of Aransas county, the judgment nisi
and scire facias describing the bond as obligating defendant to appear
and answer in Aransas county-held, such misdescription is fatal. Cush-
man v. The State, 181.
6. It is not necessary in a bail bond that the venue of the offense
named be stated therein. Cundiff v. The State, 641.
7. It will not vitiate a bail bond that it expressly requires the princi-
pal to appear from day to day, etc. Id.
8. There is no time fixed by law for the filing of the bail bond; it is
sufficient if it be in court and on file before trial. Id.
An adjudication of bankruptcy against a defendant ousts the jurisdic-
tion of the State courts over the bankrupt and his estate. Taylor v.
Bonnett, 521.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE.
PROMISSORY NOTE.
1. The words, "A. B., please pay the above bill," written and signed
upon an itemized account, do not constitute a negotiable instrument.
Platzer v. Norris & Co., 1.
2. If the drawee in a bill of exchange be insolvent at its date, the
drawer is liable without diligence. Id.
3. Suit to the first term is a substitute for presentation, protest and no-
tice; and where the latter is excused, it is not necessary to bring suit to
fix the liability of the drawer. Id.
BILL OF REVIEW.
INJUNCTION, 2.
BURDEN OF PROOF.
TRESPASS TO TRY TITLE, 9.
Where the petition alleges that the defendant executed through his
agent the instrument sued on, though the name of the defendant be not
signed thereto, the burden of proof is upon the defendant to show that
he did not sign it, or authorize it to be executed, in the absence of a
plea of non est factum under oath. Sessums v. Henry, 37.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 8, 9, 10, 11.
There is no law prohibiting champerty in force in this State. Bentinck
v. Franklin, 458.
1. Confederate notes cannot be allowed to have had any value. Kyle
v. House, 155.
2. Executory contracts made by guardians, executors or trustees, and
payable in Confederate notes, may be enforced for the use of the bene-
ficiaries; but the defendant may reduce the recovery to the actual value
of the property or other consideration for which the obligations were
given. Thompson v. Bohannon, 241.
3. It is error to render judgment by default final for the alleged value
of a contract payable in Confederate bills; proof should be introduced
of such value.
4. A judgment upon a contract on its face payable in Confederate
bills may be enjoined, even after twelve months from the date of the
judgment. Id.
5. Suit may be maintained on an obligation payable in Confederate
notes by an executor, administrator, guardian or other trustee, for the
use of the beneficiary, but the defendant may reduce the amount to the
value of the consideration of the obligation sued on, upon alleging and
proving such value. Shearon v. Henderson, 245.
6. Payments made to an executor in Confederate money do not extin-
guish the debt. Scott, Administratrix, v. Atchison, 385.
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