had been the most recently erected upon a ground of policy which would no longer exist, and because, in point of fact, they admitted of that species of compensation which individuals might reasonably expect where they were called upon to make a sacrifice for the public advantage. If disfranchisement on the application of the corporators of Boroughs was thought less objectionable than compulsory disfranchisement, there could be no doubt many would prefer extinction and entire compensation to any mode of combination that could be adopted. Surrenders thus obtained might reduce the number to be classed so as to make the influence preserved of a more convenient nature: two Boroughs united, giving an alternate choice, would be held in estimation; classed beyond this number, they would retain little value. Were the number to be distributed among the 86 Boroughs to be ascertained, and it was thought advisable not to connect more than two Boroughs together, if a sufficient number of Boroughs did not apply for disfranchisement, the number requisite might be drawn by lot. If too many applied, the preference might be decided in like manner, unless agreed among the parties; but as this last suggestion proceeds upon a supposition of the number of Representatives being suffered to exceed 100, and as the voluntary surrender of the number required can alone render the principle consistent with itself, it seems rather to increase than to obviate the difficulty. The arrangement in the above statement has been considered more in a personal than in a constitutional point of view. The operation of the measure upon individual interests being less obvious and more of a local nature, it has been thought right to trace it, in order that it may be considered how far it is expedient to accommodate general principles (with a view to the success of the measure) to the ideas the proprietors have of their own private interests. As compensation is to be made, it may be worth considering how a proceeding somewhat embarrassing in its principle can be best executed. The less the detail is canvassed in Parliament the better. The general principle alone ought to be stated there, namely, that an injury is to be done to individual interests for the public good, which, in point of justice, but still more strongly in point of policy, requires compensation. The maximum of compensation that any Borough shall be entitled to ought to be settled, and, with this restriction, it may be referred to a board of Commissioners, acting on their oaths as a question of equity, to apply the amount so as to provide for each particular case. Were it possible to devise any means, in Boroughs where the influence is general, to apply the value to local purposes, so as equally to provide for the interests of the parties concerned, it would be a great point gained, inasmuch as it would enable you to class open with close Boroughs, without doing what would be considered as an injury, and which must of course impede the measure; but this appears almost impossible. It would be more practicable, as far as the voters are concerned than with respect to the persons in whom the influence is; but, upon the whole, the transaction must, from its nature, be extremely complicated, and, of course, likely to produce much clamour and dissatisfaction. These ideas are thrown out loosely, merely as materials for forming a decision upon. The question is, in itself, of the last importance, highly so in a constitutional point of view; but still more so, perhaps, as involving the fate of the question itself. The Union must be exposed to very great hazard, of private dissatisfaction, if the arrangement of the Representation shall be suffered to co-operate with the general opposition to the measure. It is indispensable that a plan for the Representation should be digested without delay, and it seems obviously desirable, when the attainment of the object cannot be placed in competition with a rigid adherence to economy, that the compensation to be given should be felt by the parties interested to be liberal, and that the general system should trench as little as possible on that portion of the Representation to which pecuniary compensation is not applicable. SUGGESTIONS OF THE LORD-LIEUTENANT RELATIVE TO THE REPRESENTATION. The Duke of Portland, in his despatch of the 25th,' calls upon the Lord-Lieutenant for his suggestions upon the future constitution of the Representation for this kingdom returnable to the Parliament of the Union, making it a preliminary condition that the number of Commoners shall not exceed 100, and that the present franchises in the several Counties, Cities, and Boroughs, shall not be impeached or extinguished. The Lord-Lieutenant, impressed with the wisdom of avoiding any infringement of chartered rights, considers it not incompatible with this principle, and for various reasons highly expedient in the management proposed, to follow the Scotch precedent, and to give a preference to the County Representation, as also that of the great commercial towns over that of the close Boroughs. As no place can aspire to return more than one member, his Excellency considers that much real embarrassment would arise to the commercial interests of the trading towns, and well founded objections be stated on the part of the Counties, were they exposed to be left without a Representative in the Legislature, specially charged with an attention to their local concerns. His Excellency, therefore, proposes that every place now returning two members should hereafter return but one. That each County should return one member absolutely to the United Parliament. That the Cities of Dublin, Drogheda, Newry, Londonderry, Galway, Limerick, Cork, Waterford, and should return one member absolutely. That the University should return one member absolutely, 1 of November, 1798, ii., 19. making in all 42 members. That from the remaining 108 places now returning members, 54 should be chosen, making the gross number of Representatives 96; and in order to avoid the cabal of delegating from amongst themselves, as in the case of the Scotch Peers, or of the uncertainty of selection by lot, which would be peculiarly inconvenient to official men, or of incorporation, which would be altogether impracticable in a representation so constituted as ours, that the Boroughs should alternately choose a member to the United Parliament, classing them so that the different parts of the kingdom might be proportionably represented in each Parliament. This would, in a certain degree, affect the value of Borough property, and, it is to be presumed, might proportionably disincline their patrons to a Union. The Lord-Lieutenant is of opinion that means might be found, without resorting to the embarrassing principle of avowed compensation, so as to satisfy the private interests of at least a sufficient number of the individuals affected to secure the measure against any risk arising from this consideration. At all events, he considers the reasons before stated for giving a preference to the Representation of Counties and Cities to be so weighty as to counterbalance any additional difficulty in reconciling the individuals to the arrangement. REMARKS ON THE PARLIAMENTARY RESOLUTIONS RESPECTING THE UNION. The resolutions state : 1. That each country is to remain separately chargeable with their past debts, and with any future debts which it may contract according to the proviso contained in the 9th resolution. 2. All joint debt hereafter contracted, together with the general expenses of the United Kingom, to be defrayed proportionably by the respective countries. 3. The United Parliaments are to have a discretion to sub stitute a common system of taxation in lieu of any proportion, as the means of contributing to the common expense; but each country is still to remain subject to its separate expense. This regulation cannot, in point of fact, take place till the amount of separate expense, to which either or both countries is liable, shall bear but an inconsiderable proportion to what is common expense; and it would much accelerate the period at which common taxes might supersede proportional contributions if some principles were established, by which, without violating the interest of either country, their respective separate debts, so far as they are commensurate, might, not only now but hereafter, as often as any separate charge shall be incurred, be consolidated into a common debt, the charge to be borne in the ratio of their respective contributions. The annual charge of the debt of Great Britain is about £18,000,000. The annual charge of the debt of Ireland is about £1,400,000. The proportion between the charge of their debts is nearly as 12 to 1. The proportion of their contributions is fixed at 6 to 1 in peace, and 9 to 1 in war, suppose the medium 7 to 1. Were the charge of the English to the Irish debt in the proportion of 7 to 1, and were the periods of their extinction the same, there could be no objection on the part of either country to their being consolidated, and borne proportionably as joint debts. If the whole of the debt of England is too large in amount to admit of consolidation, such a proportional part may be consolidated as will charge the respective countries in the proportion of their contributions; that is, supposing the Irish annual charge arising from debt to be £1,400,000, and the medium proportion of their contributions to be as 7 to 1, a portion of the debt of Great Britain subject to an annual charge of £9,800,000 may be consolidated with it. The common debt of the United Kingdom would then bear a charge of £11,800,000, of which Ireland would pay an eighth part, and England would be subject to a separate annual charge of £7,200,000 in addition to her seven-eighths of the |