the general authority was given him expressly to supersede the necessity of submitting points of this nature for consideration, the decision on which, generally speaking, admitted of no delay. In truth, it was impossible for him to make Ministers feel the necessities under which he acted, even had the delay been consistent with the nature of the struggle. His Grace will easily conceive how embarrassing and discouraging to him it must have been, in the progress of such a contest, to have been subject to perpetual remonstrances and objections, and how fatal it must have been to the measure, if the disinclination of Ministers to the arrangements had transpired. In that case, Government would have had all the odium and none of the advantages of its favours: while waiting for the sanction of the Cabinet, they must have given hopes which it would have been afterwards difficult to disappoint. Any doubt or delay would have produced all the evils of a refusal, and the suspense in itself caused an uneasiness productive of disclosures and naturally of new claims growing out of each other. I am satisfied the Union could not have been carried without the most unqualified authority in the person charged with its execution; the most entire support from the English Government, which perhaps a variance of opinion on points viewed under dissimilar situations hardly admits; and, lastly, a power to act without delay and with the utmost secrecy. The system which the Irish Government acted upon was one of greater responsibility and risk to itself, but for the accomplishment of the object it was indispensable. I am persuaded Lord C.'s own wish would have been to carry the Duke of Portland's judgment and concurrence with him on every point, could he have done it without disadvantage to the measure; and the zeal his Grace uniformly showed, in all his communications to the Lord-Lieutenant and in all his conversations with me, to call forth the utmost powers of Government in both countries to accomplish the measure, would have made it peculiarly satisfactory to his Excellency to have carried his Grace's conviction along with him; but he

VOL. III.

Ꮓ

felt, while the point was at issue, that he had no alternative but to act, and to trust his conduct to the future approbation of his Majesty's Ministers. As this is a point on which an explanation is not likely to take place between the parties, I have troubled you with this detail, in hopes that it may not be misunderstood.

Now, as to myself and the wish expressed by Mr. Pitt to see me in England, I do not see how I can leave Ireland till after the Session closes and the election of Peers is made. We shall yet have a fortnight's business in the Commons. The Bills, in passing the Lords and returning from England, will delay us in all from three weeks to a month before the doors of Parliament can be fairly shut. What I should therefore propose for Mr. Pitt's consideration is that I should go over for a short time immediately after the prorogation. I should naturally settle our official arrangements with my LordLieutenant before my departure, and carry them over for the sanction of Ministers: if approved, they could be returned and carried into execution in my absence. After staying such time as might be necessary for receiving my instructions, I should wish to return home, with a view of looking after the Canal and Compensation proceedings, which are both delicate subjects, and of preparing for the new order of things. If Mr. Pitt approves of this suggestion, it will equally suit me to attend him in the country or in town, and of course it need not, in any degree, interfere with his arrangements.

When I ask you whether you propose being in Ireland about that time, I trust you will understand distinctly that I do not see the necessity of it, or I would say so. I wish you entirely to consider the object you went to accomplish, and I only inquire that I may make my arrangements accordingly.

Ever, my dear Cooke, &c.,

CASTLEREAGH.

Secret.

Lord Castlereagh to Lord Camden.

Dublin Castle, June 25, 1800.

your two letters, Although it must

My dear Lord-I am very thankful for which reached me this morning by express. still be a subject of much painful reflection that any part of the arrangements suggested from hence should be unpleasant either to his Majesty or his Ministers, yet it certainly is comparatively a great relief to my mind, to find that the good faith of a Government to which I am associated, and the honour of a person under whom I act, are to be supported, at all events; and although I cannot hope that time will ever recommend a particular part of the arrangements to the approbation of Ministers, I do not despair, when the whole of the transaction is understood in detail, that they will be of opinion that the measure has been accomplished on terms as little injurious either to the character or permanent interests of Government as could have been reasonably hoped for.

Assured that there is every disposition in Ministers to uphold his engagements, Lord Cornwallis is not less anxious, as far as he can in good faith, to accommodate to their sentiments.

It may naturally occur to Ministers that embarrassment could not have arisen, had there been an unreserved communication between the two Governments on the subject of engagements at the time of making them, or rather previous to it; but then it is equally reasonable to consider how much difficulty and positive injury to the measure might have arisen from the Irish Government not feeling itself enabled to act on the spur of the moment. The Ministers, I am sure, will feel how impossible it would have been to enable them to estimate the necessities under which we acted, and how difficult it would have been, in the progress of the struggle, to reconcile those who formed their opinions at a distance to measures which were felt to be indispensable by those on the spot. The delay and remonstrances to which such a course of proceeding must

have led would, I fear, have disabled us from acting with effect, and destroyed the confidence between the two Governments so essential to our cause. It certainly would have been the safest course for the Irish Government to have taken, had its first object been to avoid responsibility; but, looking only to the accomplishment of the object, and trusting to the liberal support of those under whom they were serving, they preferred acting upon the exigency as it arose; and, I am satisfied, my dear Lord, your own mind will easily suggest to you how fatal any opposition from your side of the water might have been, while the point was at issue, to measures of patronage suggested from hence; how injurious the delay of communication must have proved, and how unpleasant it would have been to the Cabinet to have been called on, day after day, to sanction what they must feel a reluctance to concede under any circumstance but indispensable necessity, and yet, from the very nature of the case, precluded from forming any correct estimate of that necessity. You probably would have thought we were going too far; we should have thought you were not permitting us to go far enough. Under your representations, we should perhaps have been insensibly led to act with caution at moments when vigour was required; and, after a fruitless expenditure of patronage, the measure might have been lost.

The Irish Government is certainly now liable to the charge of having gone too far in complying with the demands of individuals; but, had the Union miscarried, and the failure been traceable to a reluctance on the part of Government to interest a sufficient number of supporters in its success, I am inclined to think we should have met with, and, in fact, deserved less mercy.

Several of our supporters were speculating on which side the strength would ultimately lie, and things were so balanced as to enable single individuals, conversant with cabal, to have produced a very serious impression. The point is now secured;

and, though it is much to be wished that nothing had arisen out of the struggle to be regretted, yet I trust you will feel that it is more natural to wish than to expect such an issue; and, if reluctance is felt on your side of the water to the accomplishment of the proposed favours, be assured they were not entertained and promised without much pain by Lord Cornwallis. Ever, my dear Lord, &c.

CASTLEREAGH.

Private.

Mr. Cooke to Lord Castlereagh.

Ealing, June 26, 1800. My dear Lord-I hope the Duke of Portland's last letters to my Lord-Lieutenant have proved satisfactory. King assured me that his Grace's note to his Majesty, on communicating Lord Cornwallis's despatch, was expressed in the hand

somest terms.

The last news from Italy has, I believe, greatly disconcerted Administration; and, if events of a different kind do not speedily ensue, matters will be unpleasant. I conceive a peace will be demanded by the nation upon every account.

1. All our projects of keeping our Allies together have ever failed at the most critical periods.

2. The Allies have, on feeling the pressure of disaster, made a separate peace.

3. Whatever be the changes of things in France, it appears that every new change produces new energy and exertion, and disappoints the hope that revolution of internal Government will extinguish the spirit of the nation, or disorganize its armies.

4. It appears we could not effect our purpose when Prussia and Austria were united with the empire, and Holland in our favour;

The disastrous battle of Marengo had been fought on the 14th of June.