The Act of ThinkingA new theory proposes that thinking is a learned action. In this remarkable monograph, Derek Melser argues that the core assumption of both folk psychology and cognitive science—that thinking goes on in the head—is mistaken. Melser argues that thinking is not an intracranial process of any kind, mental or neural, but is rather a learned action of the person. After an introduction in which he makes a prima facie case that thinking is an action, Melser reviews action-based theories of thinking advanced by Ryle, Vygotsky, Hampshire and others. He then presents his own theory of "token concerting," according to which thinking is a special kind of token performance, by the individual, of certain social, concerted activity. He examines the developmental role of concerted activity, the token performance of concerted activity, the functions of speech, the mechanics and uses of covert tokening, empathy, the origins of solo action, the actional nature of perception, and various kinds and aspects of mature thinking. In addition, he analyzes the role of metaphors in the folk notion of mind. While intending his theory as a contribution to the philosophy of mind, Melser aims also at a larger goal: to establish actions as a legitimate philosophical given, self-explanatory and sui generis. To this end, he argues in the final chapter against the possibility of scientific explanation of actions. The Act of Thinking opens up a large new area for philosophical research. |
Contents
1 ActionBased Theories of Thinking 1 | 17 |
BehaviorAbbreviation Theories | 21 |
Ryles Adverbial Theory | 28 |
Ryles Refraining Theory | 35 |
Internalization of SpeechMediated Social Activity | 42 |
Hampshires Inhibited Display Theory of Emotion | 47 |
Other Internalized Social Activity Theories | 51 |
3 Concerted Activity | 55 |
SecondOrder Tokening | 140 |
Other Varieties of Thinking | 144 |
Ways in Which Thinking Is Public | 148 |
Is Thinking Observable? | 149 |
8 Where Our Notion of the Mind Comes From 1 | 157 |
Theory Theory | 158 |
The Colloquial Vocabulary for Talking about Thinking | 164 |
Using Metaphor to Refer to Features of Things | 166 |
Defining Concerting | 57 |
Infants Innate Abilities | 58 |
First Concertings | 61 |
Educative Concerting | 64 |
Vocalizing and Speech in Educative Concerting | 68 |
The Matrix | 72 |
4 The Tokening of Concerted Activity | 75 |
Tokening Done to Initiate Concerted Activity | 76 |
Speech Replaces Other Types of Tokening | 78 |
Covert Tokening | 81 |
The Mechanics of Covert Tokening | 82 |
The Uses of Covert Tokening | 85 |
How Covert Tokening Is Taught | 87 |
The Notion of Expressing Thoughts and Feelings | 93 |
5 Derivation of Solo Action from Concerting | 95 |
Early Solitary Action | 98 |
Empathy | 100 |
Hortation | 102 |
Cooperation | 104 |
Autonomous Solitary Action | 106 |
What Is Learned before What | 107 |
6 Concerted Perceiving and the Tokening of It | 109 |
Learning New Perceptual Behavior | 112 |
Things in the World | 118 |
Referring | 122 |
AbsentReferent Referring | 125 |
Solo Perceiving Solo Imagining and Consciousness | 131 |
7 Thinking | 137 |
Dead Metaphors | 171 |
Galvanic Stirrings | 173 |
The Conventional Wisdom about Metaphors and Mind | 179 |
The MetaphoricalOrigin Theory | 181 |
Exclusive Use | 182 |
Precedents in Metaphors | 184 |
No Concept | 187 |
Nominalization | 188 |
10 Literal Paraphrases of the Mind Metaphors | 199 |
Internality Privacy and Introspectability | 200 |
Agency | 205 |
Intentionality | 208 |
NonPhysicality | 211 |
Other Metaphors in the Colloquial Thinking Vocabulary | 212 |
Why We Depend on Metaphors for Talking about Thinking | 215 |
Mistaking Empathizing for Imagined Perceiving | 217 |
11 Our Knowledge of Actions | 221 |
The Empathy Argument | 222 |
Action Metaphors in Science | 228 |
The Rhetoric of Action Physicalism | 233 |
Cultural Determinants of Actions | 238 |
Verbs and Actions and Things | 242 |
Is Knowledge of Actions Epistemologically Primary? | 247 |
A Sample of Mind Metaphors | 251 |
Bibliography | 273 |
283 | |
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References to this book
Consciousness Transitions: Phylogenetic, Ontogenetic, and Physiological Aspects Hans Liljenström,Peter Århem No preview available - 2008 |