EDWIN R. SEELEY US, HENRY HOWARD.

and the English law no Judge was allowed to sit in his own home or county at all to try criminal or civil cases. It is only during the present century that the restriction has been removed. As a matter of construction it was therefore concluded that the Constitution does not require residence.

It was further held that the Constitution does not permit the regularity of elections to the more important public offices to be tried by the courts. It is provided that in all cases where by the Constitution or by statute, the result is to be determined by the Board of State Canvassers, there shall be no judicial inquiry be yond their decision. It declares that "when the determination of the Board of State Canvassers is contested, the Legislature in joint convention, shall decide which person is elected." This provision was doubtless suggested by the difficulty of conducting an inquiry of this kind before the courts, and probably to discourage litigation in matters of election.

The result of these conclusions is that all the replications, except that relating to the residence, tender issues which are immaterial, because their determination cannot in any event change the Canvassers' certificate, which is in this controversy conclusive proof of the respondent's title to office. As the replications take no issue upon the existence of their determination, but distinctly admit it, and as there is no material issue of any kind tendered, the respondent is entitled to final judgment on the demurrer. He was also awarded costs against the relator.

EDWIN R. SEELY US. HENRY HOWARD.

Description of lands in declaration in ejectment.

Error to St. Clair Circuit.

Opinion by GRAVES, J.--Seely brought ejectment, and in his declaration describes the premises as "the following real estate or premises situated in the city of Port Huron, county of St. Clair, and being known and described as the undivided eighth

WILLIAM II. BOOTHROYD vs. JOSEPH ENGLES

part of the lower West Brook farm, (so called), in section 15, town 6 north, range 17 east, lately conveyed by Frederick H. Vandenburgh, trustee, to said Howard by deed dated April 15 1870, and recorded in liber 30, page 201, of deeds, in the office Howard demurred

of the Register of Deeds for said county." to the declaration, and the Court awarded judgment in his fa▾ vor. Seely now asks a review of this judgment. The main grounds of the demurrer are those which raise the question whether the premises are described with sufficient certainty.

Held, That the description was sufficiently precise without reference to the Vandenburgh deed. The county and city are given, with the name of the tract of land, and it is clearly dis tinguished from all other pieces of land. Writers and the authorities hold this description sufficient. Inasmuch as the de

scription was held sufficient, the reference to the Vandenburgh deed

was deemed immaterial in this relation.

Judgment reversed and a new trial ordered.

WILLIAM H. BOOTHROYD vs. Jozɛpu Engles.

Error to St. Clair Circuit.

Opinion by CAMPBELL, Ch. J.-The only question was whether the record of a deed purporting to be signed by Harrison Sherman. and certified to have been acknowledged by Hiram Sherman, (the latter name having been inserted in the beginning of the deed as that of the grantor,) could be received in evidence as the conveyance of Hiram Sherman, the original deed not being shown.

Our statutes now require every deed to be signed and sealed by the person from whom the estate or interest is intended to pass, as well as acknowledged by the person executing it. The signing can not be dispensed with, and no one but the signer can be regarded as the grantor. The presumption of law always is that a person uses his real name, and, in the absence of proof, a deed signed by Harriand acknowledged by Iliram is signed and acknowledged by different persons. A person using an alias might, under some cirBut no such case cumstances be estopped from denying the alias. is shown to exist here.

The judgment was correct and is affirmed with costs.

SUPPLEMENT.

Abstracts of Decisions of the Supreme Court, rendered at the April Term, 1871.

DEXTER A. BALLOU US. WILBUR H. HILL et. al.

Suit was brought against two persons upon an award against them, the declaration showing the submission and award to have been joint. The suit as against one of them was dis continued, without any amendment being made to the declaration, though it was ordered that "the pleadings and proceedings be amended in accordance with such discontinuance.' Held, That in such case the discontinuance as to one defendant worked a discontinuance as to both.

When an amendment is ordered or permitted, and is of such a nature that the record furnishes upon its face all the data for applying it, it may be considered as made, though no verbal changes are made in the pleadings, which are then to be read as if they had been actually amended.

Error to Bay Circuit.

Opinion by CAMPBELL, Ch. J.-Suit was brought upon an award against Dexter A. Ballou and Oren A. Ballou, alleged in the declaration to have been made on their joint submission.In conseqence of certain questions raised on the trial, a discontinuance was allowed to be, and was entered before the judg ment as to Oren A. Ballou, and judgment was rendered against Dexter A. Ballou alone, without any further action than the recital in the order, "that the proceedings and pleadings in this ca bese and the same are hereby amended in conformity with such discontinuance, and that said suit proceed against Dexter A. Ballou, as though it had originally been commenced against

him alone.

SPICER VS. SMITH,

Held, That when an amendment is ordered or permitted, and is of such a nature that the record furnishes upon its face all the data for applying it, it may be considered as made, though no verbal changes are made in the pleadings, which are then to be read as if they had been actually amended.

If, however, Dexter A. Ballou had been sued alone upon such a cause of action as is set forth in the declaration, the suit could not be maintained against him. The award is stated in the declaration to have been a joint one, made upon a joint submission. No sole action could be maintained upon such award, and a discontinuance against one defendant, leaving this joint award as the alleged cause of action, would be as fatal to the case as a discontinuance against both. There is nothing in the record from which any one can legally infer in what way the declaration should be amended, and this being so, the amendment cannot be inferred. Until made, the suit appears of record as a joint suit incapable of severance, and the discontinuance not being followed up by any amendment in fact, practically ended the case and rendered any judgment erroneous. The judgment cannot be upheld upon the declaration.

Judgment below reversed with costs of both courts.

FREDERICK SPICER vs. JARED A. SMITH.

Where suit is brought by the endorsee of a note which had been endorsed by an agent of the payee, in behalf of the payee, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove the authority of the agent, the endorsement and the ownership of the note.

Error to Eaton Circuit.

Opinion by GRAVES, J.-This was assumpsit, in which Smith declared against Spicer on the common counts, and set forth the copy of a note which was to be given in evidence. The following is a copy of the note:

"Post-office address, Eaton Rapids, county of Eaton, State of Michigan, Town of Hamlin, May 12, 1869.

$150.

SPICER US. SMITH.

Five months after date I promise to pay to the order of Perkins & Chilson, one hundred and fifty dollars for value received with use. (Stamp.) Signed, FREDERICK SPICER.”

On the back of the note was the following endorsement: "Pay to the order of Jared A. Smith. Perkins & Chilson, by H. H. Blair, agent."

The general issue having been pleaded, the parties proceeded to trial before a jury, when Smith gave evidence tending to show that the note was purchased before its maturity by him through his agent, for value, in the belief that there was no defence to it, and without notice of any objection to its validity. No affidavit having been made denying the execution of the note, it was then offered in evidence, when Spicer's counsel opposed its admission on the ground, first, that the endorsement by the payees had not been proved, and, second, because the authority of the agent by whom the endorsement purported to have been made had not been shown. The Court overruled the objection and admitted the note.

It was claimed for defendant in error that no proof of the endorsement was required, because neither the execution of such endorsement or the authority of Blair had been denied upon plea or upon oath, and reference was made to sections 3,714 and 3,767 Com piled Laws, and also to Rule 79 of the Circuit Court.

Held, That the statutes cited have no application to cases originating in the Circuit Court, and if they had, they would furnish no support to the position taken. In this case the endorsee was not a party, nor was the endorsement as a ground of liability in any way involved. If the plaintiff had set forth his cause of action specially, he must have alleged the making of the note and its transfer to himself and must have proved each in the absence of any rule excusing it. By allowing the note to be given in evidence under the money counts the statute has not made the proof of these facts unnecessary. The rule, however, has provided that as against the alleged maker in a suit by the endorsee, payee or holder, the plaintiff shall not be put to proof of the execution of the instrument unless it is denied on oath, but the necessity for proving the title of the plaintiff through an alleged endorsement is neither removed or lessened. In this case the defendant did not deny the making of the note. But the plaintiff's title was likewise in issue and, as the rule had no relation to