LABAR US. NICHOLS.

Also that the Court erred in not giving judgment in their favor for costs upon the issues found in their favor. It was deemed sufficien as an answer to these arguments to say that the record did not show that any motion in arrest of judgment was made on this ground.— The Court further held that the three counts in the declaration were not, as a legal proposition, for the same cause of action.

The course taken to double the damages was correct, and the judgment was affirmed with costs.

LABAR VS. NICHOLS.

To entitle a person to appeal from the allowance of an administrator's acconut, he must show that he has been aggrieved by such allowance.

Error to Kalamazoo Circuit.

Opinion by CAMPBELL, C. J.-The Circuit Court dismissed. an appeal from the allowance of an administration account. on the ground that the appellant was not a personage aggrieved by the order appealed from. The appellant was the son of decedent, who died testate, and had bequeathed him $10 out of a considerable estate, all of which was willed to specific and residuary legatees and devisees. The will was probated and established in 1859. The account in question was settled in 1689, and the order of settlement directed this legacy to appellant to be paid, and a large surplus was shown and ordered to be distributed

The appellant had no interest in the case save as to his legacy of $10 and as to the question whether he might be held liable so far as his legacy went for some contingent and unaccrued claims which might be discovered. The statute requires that the person appealing must be "aggrieved," and his interest must be present and existing. No claim has yet occurred after the lapse of many years, nor does there seem any likelihood that appellant's interest will be interfered with in any way.

The order of the Circuit Court dismissing the appeal is affirmed.

THE PEOPLE US. SCHWEITZER,-MOORE et. al. vs. CHEESEMAN et. al.

THE PEOPLE vs. SCHWEITZER.

Evidence as to the commission of other offences than the one with which respondent is accused, held inadmissible.

The weight of legitimate evidence is to be left entirely to the jury.

Error to the Recorder's Court of the City of Detroit.

Opinion by CHRISTIANCY, J.-There was no legal ground upon which the witness, Dumphy, could have been allowed to testify to the commission by the defendant of another larceny from that for which he was on trial. The general rule is unquestionable. The admission of such evidence, upon whatever ground it might have been let in, would tend directly to prejudice the defendant. He could not anticipate such evidence, and would probably be unprepared to meet it, though he might have a perfect defence to the charge.The intimacy between Schweitzer and Stewart might probably have been shown in another way; if it could not, it does not make this sort of evidence admissible. The evidence was, therefore, improperly admitted.

There was no error in the refusal of the Court to charge that it is not safe to convict a defendant on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, or any number of accomplices. This was exclusively a question for the jury.

Judgment reversed and a new trial ordered.

MOORE et. al. vs. CHEESEMAN et. al,

Appeal in Chancery from Van Buren Circuit.

The bill in this case was demurred to because it was not sworn to. This, apparently, upon the ground that from some averments in the bill it was to be subjected to the rule requiring creditors' bills to be sworn to. The Court below sustained the demurrer.

We think this was wrong. The bill does not belong to the class

DIBBLE VS. THE PEOPLE.

of statutory creditors' bills which are named in the statute to be verified. There is no rule requiring bills in cases of general equity cognizance to be sworn to. Bills that attempt to remove into a court of equity matters cognizable in a court of law, and bills in cases requi ring the preliminary act of the Court upon facts stated in the bill if the facts are not otherwise established, should be verified. But the absence of a verification to a bill not requiring it is not the ground of a demurrer.

DIBBLE US. THE PEOPLE.

Error to Hillsdale Circuit.

Opinion by CHRISTIANCY, J.-The question in the ease was whether upon proceedings in the nature of forcible entry and detainer when had before a Justice of the Peace the costs are limited to $10, as provided by section 127, of the general Justicc's act, as amended. After showing that the general Justice's act gives no jurisdiction to Justices in special cases, Judge Christiancy says that it is clear that section 127, limiting costs, has no reference to costs in these special proceedings. This limitation applies only to cases of which Justices had jurisdiction under that act, or of which they might have jurisdiction by way of amendment to that act.

By the act of 1861, authority to try these forcible entry and detainer cases was given to Justices, giving Justices special powers in certain cases. From this act and its amendments he derives his ers, and by its provisions he is controlled.

pow

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Hillsdale County, awarding a mandamus against the Justice, plaintiff in error, was reversed, and it was held that he might recover his costs against the relator.

SUPPLEMENT.

Abstracts of Decisions of the Supreme Court rendered at the

July Term, 1871.

CLARK US. BABCOCK.

Construction of contract. Question of damages.

Error to Bay Circuit.

Opinion by CAMPBELL, Ch. J.-Babcock sued Clark, his lessee for rent. The defense set up by way of recoupment was under a claim for damages, partly for delay in getting the property in condition for profitable use and partly for expenses in repairs. The lease running for one year from February 1, 1869, demised a steam saw-mill and salt works and its lands, with a reservation of certain houses and premises not used for business. On notice to be given before October 1, 1869, (which was given,) the lease was to be extended two years more, but subject to be defeated by the lessor upon notice and payment of certain sums named. The lease was renewed without countermand, the rent being $10,000 a year. The sum of $1,000 was to be paid to the lessor for repairs to be made by him, $1,000 for insurance, and the balance as specifically provided. The lessor agreed to put the salt works in complete running order by March 15, and to put the mill in complete and good running order by April 15. In case the mill and salt works were not put in order, as provided for, then the lessee was to have the right to complete the necessary repairs and deduct the sums expended from the first payments. If Mr. Bennett was employed as the engineer, the consequences of any negligence on his part were to be borne by the lessor, and if through his carelessness the mill con

tinued idle for a time, make the lessee good. season of six months.

CLARK US. BABCOCK.

a deduction was to be made from the rent to The year was to be considered the sawing The destruction of the mill by fire was to terminate the lease, and pro rata allowance was to be made in case of partial destruction by fire.

The lessor did not make the necessary repairs, and the lessec took possession and made them himself. The salt works were put in order by April 10, but the supply of brine being unsatisfactory. some work was done on the well afterwards, and the mill was got in order by May 11.

The Court below excluded all evidence of damages dependent on the preliminary delay in getting the property in runninng condition, and confined them (beyond the expenditure for repairs) to such as might arise out of the deficiency in the well. The ground was that the lease did not contemplate any redress for such prelimi. nary failure beyond the right of the lessee to step in after March 15 and April 15 respectively and complete the work at the lessor's expense, to be applied as rent.

Held, That this ruling was correct. The parties must have had this very question before them, and yet fixed no rule of damages.— They probably would, had they contemplated that any special damage would be allowed. The mill was the principal thing and the salt works the accessory, and the provisions relating to the mill were especially regarded.

The other question related to the "condition of the sait works and the losses supposed to have occurred through its defects. The claim was two-fold: one, that the lessor was bound to furnish a well capable of supplying sufficient water in quantity and quality for the profitable use of the works; second, that he was liable for having actually rendered the well less productive than it would have been without his work.

Held, That there was no foundation for the point, as the well was known to both parties at the time of the lease and it was leased with an equal understanding of the facts. No covenant scems to have entered into the matter. The Court examined the facts developed by the record concerning the second point, and concluded that they would not sustain the position taken

The judgment was therefore affirmed with costs.