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47 Am. Rep. 381-387; White v. Conly, 52 Am. Rep. 157-166. In determining what is a proximate cause, the true rule is, to consider whether the injury is the natural and probable consequence of the negligence: West Mahanoy Tp. v. Watson, 116 Pa. St. 344; 2 Am. St. Rep. 604. This results from the principle that one who is guilty of negligence is deemed to have foreseen, and is liable for all consequences which may naturally ensue therefrom, without the intervention of some other independent agency, although, in advance, the actual result might have been improbable: Bunting v. Hogsett, 139 Pa. St. 363; 23 Am. St. Rep. 192, and note; Quigley v. Delaware etc. Canal Co., 142 Pa. St. 388; 24 Am. St. Rep. 501. Another way of expressing the rule is, that if the facts constitute a continuous succession of events, so linked together that they become a natural whole, liability will attach; while if the chain of events is so broken that they become independent, and the final result cannot be said to be the natural and probable consequence of the neg. ligence, liability will not attach: Haverly v. State Line etc. R. R. Co., 135 Pa. St. 50; 20 Am. St. Rep. 848. In other words, there must, between the injury and the negligence, be a causal connection, uninterrupted by the interposition of any independent human agency: Curtin v. Somerset, 140 Pa. St. 70; 23 Am. St. Rep. 220.

MEASURE OF DAMAGES, when personal property is lost or destroyed by the negligent act of another, is the full market value of the property at the time of the loss, and interest thereon: Atlanta etc. Mills v. Coffey, 80 Ga. 145; 12 Am. St. Rep. 244.

RICHARDS V. STATE.

[91 TENNESSEE, 723.]

WITNESSES — Co-defendants — Right to Place UNDER THE RULE. — If, during the trial of two persons charged with crime, they announce their purpose to testify as witnesses, each for himself, neither can be placed under the rule, and excluded from the room during the examination of the other.

S. G. Heiskell, for the plaintiff in error.

Attorney-General Pickle, for the state.

LURTON, J. John and James Richards were jointly indicted for murder, and tried together. Both were convicted,-James of an assault and battery, and John of voluntary manslaughter. The latter only has appealed. After the conclusion of the state's evidence, the defendants announced their purpose to testify as witnesses, each for himself. James was first offered for examination, whereupon the court, on motion of the district attorney, ordered that John should be placed under the rule, and excluded from the court-room during the examination of his co-defendant. To this ruling, and against his conse

quent exclusion from the court-room while his co-defendant was being examined, John Richards excepted. The ruling of the court was erroneous.

The constitution guarantees to every defendant in a crimi nal prosecution "the right to be heard by himself and his counsel ": Const., art. 1, sec. 9.

This guaranty includes the right to be present at every stage of the trial: Andrews v. State, 2 Sneed, 550; Witt v. State, 5 Cold. 11; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 390.

It has been suggested that the right of a defendant to testify in a criminal prosecution is, by the statute conferring the right, limited to the delivery of evidence "for himself," and that he may not testify either for or against a co-defendant. If this were conceded, it would nevertheless be error to prevent a co-defendant from being present during such evidence. How else could he see and know that the evidence was limited as indicated by the suggestion, or that the jury were properly guarded against giving effect to it as against the absent co-defendant? But we do not assent to the limitation put upon the testimony of such a co-defendant. When one of several defendants on trial together voluntarily becomes & witness, he is a witness for all purposes. If he knows facts injurious to a co-defendant, they may be brought out either by his own counsel or by the state. The witness's best line of defense for himself may lie in evidence involving the guilt of his co-defendant. On what principle shall it be said that such testimony would be inadmissible? If admissible in his own interest, how is its effect upon his co-defendant to be prevented? Practically, it could not fail to be injurious and prejudicial, even if the jury were instructed to disregard it as to the co-defendant affected. We know of no principle which would exclude any competent evidence, simply because it came from a co-defendant testifying for himself under the statute. In view of the possible prejudice of such evidence, or of its possible advantage, the right to be present, and to hear and examine such a witness when testifying for himself, is an important right to every other defendant jointly on trial with the testifying defendant. The violation of this right is clearly reversible error.

For this error, as well as for another occurring in the charge, and which we state orally, this case must be reversed, and remanded for a new trial.

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RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO BE PRESENT DURING HIS TRIAL. Prisoner, where the felony is capital, has a right to be, and must be, personally present at all times in the course of his trial, when anything is said or done affecting him as to the charge against him in any material respect; where the felony is less than capital, he has the same right to be present, but it is not essential to conviction that he must be so, at all events: State v. Kelly, 97 N. C. 404; 2 Am. St. Rep. 299. Cases sustaining the rule that a defendant testifying in his own behalf has a right to remain in the court-room while other witnesses are giving their testimony are Garman v. State, 66 Miss. 196; Bell v. State, 66 Miss. 192.

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INDEX TO THE NOTES.

Appellate ProCEDURE, errors, immaterial, will be disregarded. 27.

BANKS AND BANKING, cashier, powers and duties of, 247.

trustee, deposit made by, may be paid out on his check without consult.
ing the beneficiary, 163.

BENEFIT SOCIETIES, change in beneficiary, how may be made, 421.
BOUNDARIES, monuments control distances, 453.

of lands fronting upon the sea, 333.
survey as actually made controls, 453.

CARRIERS, power of, to limit their liability, 874.

termination of liability of, 906.

CHATTEL MORTGAGE, removal to another state of property subject to, 824.
CONFLICT OF LAWS, contracts, by what laws controlled, 828.

sale, place where deemed to have been completed, 348.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, damaging private property, provisions prohibiting,
837-839.

taking of private property, injury to property by grading streets, when
is a, 836, 837.

CONTRACTORS, liability of municipal corporations for acts or negligence of,

411-413.

CONTRACTS for building, architect, certificate of, may be made prerequisite
to action upon, 617.

for building, architect, unreasonable act or refusal of, 616.

for building, intentional departure from, by contractor, 616.
for building, substantial performance of, is sufficient, 616.

mistake in, due to carelessness, will not support a claim for reformation,
621.

reformation of, when will be decreed, 621.

unilateral, are enforceable, 50.

CONVEYANCES, acknowledgment, certificate of, attesting by deputy, 126.
acknowledgment, certificate of, official capacity of officer, when suffi.
ciently appears in, 125.

acknowledgment, certificate of, presumption in favor of, 126.

acknowledgment, certificate of, what should state, 125.

constitutionality of statutes validating void acknowledgments of, 125,
CORPORATIONS, residence of, 892.

Costs in mandamus proceedings, 556.

CRIMINAL LAW, false pretenses, crime of, where consummated, 184.
false pretenses, indictment for, sufficiency of, 134.

trial, prisoner's right to be present during, 909.

DAMAGES, exemplary, ground for allowance of, 22.

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