at their own expense, and after a careful review of some of the authorities above cited, the court of appeals reached the conclusion that the ordinance was valid as a reasonable exercise of the police power of the state.

The principles which rule the cases above cited cannot, in our opinion, be distinguished from the principles which rule the case at bar. Of course, it is not claimed that in the exercise of the police power such assessments could be made and collected from the abutting property owner unless he had a special interest and derived a special benefit therefrom not enjoyed by the public in general, but if he has a special interest in the improvement of the street and sidewalk, and in keeping them free from snow and ice, so he has a special interest in keeping them free from accumulating filth. It is matter of common observation, of which we must take notice, that property located upon well-improved streets kept clean is more desirable than property on unimproved streets, where mud and filth are permitted to accumulate and obstruct their

It is safe to assert, we think, that keeping a street clean adds to the rental if not to the permanent value of property located thereon; and for this reason, among others, the abutting property owner has a special interest in such cleaning not enjoyed by the general community. For the reason that the public in general has an interest in keeping the streets free from filth, the city may, in exercising the police power conferred upon it by the state, order them swept; and for the further reason that the abutting property owner derives a benefit from such sweeping not enjoyed by the general public, he may be required, by assessments, to pay the expenses incident to such sweeping.

It follows from what we have said that the assessments provided for by the act under consideration do not amount to a taking of private property without compensation and without due process of law.

Assessments of the kind we are now considering are made upon the principle that the person assessed is benefited in the increased value of his property, either rental or permanent, over and above the benefits received by the public, in a sum equal to the amount he is required to pay. It is upon this theory alone that they can be sustained.

If the property owner is fully compensated for his outlay in the enhanced value of his property, we see no reason why he may not be taxed generally, also, with the balance of the pub

lic for cleaning other streets in which the public alone have an interest, and which are not, and indeed cannot be, swept as the streets upon which his property abuts. We are not able to perceive how such a tax would be unjust or inequitable, inasmuch as he receives as much benefit therefrom, in contemplation of law, as any other member of the community. As he has been fully compensated for his outlay in sweeping the street upon which his property is situated, he should not be heard to complain of such payment when called upon to bear his portion of other public burdens.

Nor do we think the fact that the statute contemplates the sweeping of the crossings renders it invalid. It cannot be said that the property owners do not receive a special benefit from keeping them clean. Sweeping the street in front of the property would be of little benefit if filth and rubbish were permitted to accumulate upon the crossings, so as to render them unfit for use. If the property does in fact receive a special benefit from sweeping the crossings, there is no reason why those who are thus benefited should not pay the expense.

Having carefully examined all the objections urged against the validity of so much of the statute as is here called in question, we have reached the conclusion that it is not unconstitutional, and that the court did not therefore err in overruling a demurrer to the complaint before us. Judgment affirmed.

TAXES AND Assessments DISTINCTION BETWEEN. Taxation and assessment are regarded as distinct modes of raising money for different purposes, and founded upon different principles. Taxation is a general burden imposed for supporting the government, and the revenue raised is expended for the equal benefit of the public at large. Assessment rests upon the taxing power, but is a distinct and well-known mode of laying a local burden upon particular property with reference to a special benefit to be derived by such property: Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio St. 243; 67 Am. Dec. 289, and note; note to People v. Mayor, 55 Am. Dec. 289; see Bridgeport v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 36 Conn. 255; 4 Am. Rep. 63. As to what is a tax, see extended note to New Orleans v. Great Southern Tel. Co., 8 Am. St. Rep. 506; also note to McCord v. Pike, 2 Am. St. Rep. 94, in which the purposes of taxation are discussed. As to what are assessments, and the purposes for which levied, see note to Zigler v. Menges, 16 Am. St. Rep. 371. An ordinance requiring every person on a certain street to lay a pavement in front of his lot, or in default, requiring the constable to do so and bring an action against the owner for costs, is not a tax: Mayor v. Maberry, 6 Humph. 368; 44 Am. Dec. 315. To the same effect, see Goddard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504; 28 Am. Dec. 259, and note. A constitutional provision requiring taxation to be equal and uni form and ad valorem relates to taxation for revenue, and not to assessments by municipalities for local improvements: Davis v. Lynchburg, 84 Va. 861;

Spokane Falls. Browne, Wash. 84. See also State v. Brown, 53 N. J. L. 162.

TAXES.-POWER TO LEVY INCLUDES POWER TO ASSESS FOR LOCAL IM. PROVEMENT: See Elmore ▼. Drainage Comm'rs, 135 Ill. 269; 25 Am. St. Rep. 363. An act authorizing the assessment of the cost of grading and paving streets against the abutting property is not in conflict with, nor though a special act is it repealed by, an article of the constitution providing for uniformity of taxation: Beaumont v. Wilkesbarre, 142 Pa. St. 198. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS POLICE POWER.- A municipal ordinance requiring the owners or occupants of property to remove ice, snow, and other obstructions falling or collecting thereon, and imposing a penalty for sailing to do so, is a valid exercise of the police power: Village of Carthage v. Frederick, 122 N. Y. 268; 19 Am. St. Rep. 490; see Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 378; 34 Am. Rep. 451, and note; also McCormack v. Patchin, 53 Mo. 33; 14 Am. Rep. 440, and note.

PARVIN V. WIMBERG.

[130 INDIANA, 561.]

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE ACCEPTED BY ELECTION OFFICERS NOT IGNORED BY COURTS, UNLESS PALPABLY WRONG. - A construction of an election law that has been accepted and acted upon by the officers whose duty it is to administer the law will not be ignored by the courts, unless it is palpably wrong.

ELECTIONS, POWER OF LEGISLATURE TO PRESCRIBE MANNER OF HOLDING. —

It is within the power of the legislature to prescribe the manner of holding elections and the mode in which electors shall express their choice. ELECTOR MUST VOTE IN MANNER PRESCRIBED BY LAW.-Where the law requires an elector, in voting, to express his choice by stamping certain designated squares on the ballot, if he does not choose to indicate his choice in the manner prescribed, he cannot complain if his ballot is not counted.

AUSTRALIAN BALLOT, MODE IN WHICH IT MUST BE STAMPED. — An elector voting under the Australian system must indicate his choice by stamping one of the squares of his ballot; he cannot stamp his ballot elsewhere, and leave the election board to guess at his intention. MERE IRREGULARITIES OF ELECTION OFFICERS DO NOT VITIATE ELECTION. —

Mere irregularities on the part of election officers, or their omission to observe some merely directory provision of the law, do not vitiate the election.

STATUTE, WHETHER MANDATORY OR DIRECTORY, HOW DEtermined. —If a statute expressly declares any particular act to be essential to the validity of an election, or that its omission shall render the election void, the courts must hold the statute to be mandatory, whether the particular act in question goes to the merits or affects the result of the election or not. But if a statute simply provides that certain things shall be done within a particular time or in a particular manner, and does not declare that their performance shall be essential to the validity of an election, it will be regarded as mandatory if they affect the merits of the election, and as directory only if they do not affect its merits.

For the

CONSTRUCTION OF Statute, MatTERS CONSIDERED BY COURT IN. purpose of construing a statute and ascertaining the intention of the legislature, the courts will look to the whole statute and all its parts, and when such intention is ascertained, it will prevail over the literal import and strict letter of the statute; and where the meaning is doubtful and uncertain, the courts will look into the situation and circumstances under which it was enacted, to other statutes, if there are any upon the same subject, whether passed before or after the statute under consideration, and whether in force or not, as well as to the history of the country, and will carefully consider, in this connection, the purpose sought to be accomplished.

BALLOT NOT TO BE REJECTED BECAUSE INDORSED BY CLERK IN WRONG PLACE. - The statute requiring the clerks of election to indorse their initials upon the ballots is mandatory, but the requirement that the initials shall be indorsed in a particular place on the back of the ballot is directory merely. A ballot indorsed at an improper place cannot therefore, for that reason only, be rejected.

BALLOTS PLACED BY MISTAKE OF ELECTION OFFICER IN WRONG BOX MUST BE COUNTED.-A ballot cannot be rejected in making the count because the election officers, by mistake, have placed it in the wrong box.

A. Gilchrist, C. A. De Bruler, and D. B. Kumler, for the appellant.

J. M. Butler, A. H. Snow, J. M. Butler, Jr., J. E. Williamson, P. W. Frey, and J. I. Walker, for the appellees.

COFFEY, J. At the November election for the year 1890 the appellant and Henry Stock fleth were opposing candidates for the office of county auditor of Vanderburgh County, in this state.

The board of canvassers having declared the appellant duly elected, this proceeding was commenced by the appellee Henry Wimberg before the board of commissioners of that county, to contest the election upon the alleged ground that Stockfleth had received more votes for the office than had been cast for the appellant.

The cause was appealed to the Vanderburgh circuit court, from which a change of venue was granted to the Gibson circuit court.

In the latter court, issues were formed, upon which the cause was tried by the court, resulting in a judgment against the appellant.

At the request of the appellant, the court made a special finding of the facts in the case, from which it appears, among other things, that returns of the election were made by the judges of election and canvassed by the board of canvassers, and that it was determined by the canvass that the appel

lant had received 4,745 votes, and that Henry Stockfleth had received 4,735 votes, and thereupon the board declared the appellant duly elected.

It further appears that the appellant received twenty-seven votes at the election which were not counted for him, and that Stock fleth received sixty-one votes which were also rejected by the judges of election, and that the number so received by these parties, and not counted, were not included in the votes canvassed by the board of canvassers, and that the total number of votes cast at the election for the appellant was 4,772, and for Stock fleth, 4,796.

The only question discussed by counsel on this appeal are questions arising on the ruling of the court below in overruling the appellant's motion for a new trial.

It is insisted by the appellant that the finding of facts above set out is not sustained by the evidence. It is also urged that the circuit court erred in admitting in evidence certain ballots offered by the appellee to sustain the issue tendered by him.. It appears by the record before us that the appellee offered in evidence, on the trial of the cause, certain ballots, none of the squares upon which had been touched by the stamp, which ballots were admitted and read in evidence over the objection of the appellant.

As it is perfectly apparent that the court could not have made the finding set out above without counting some of these ballots, the question, therefore, as to whether they were admissible in evidence, and the question as to whether the finding is sustained by the evidence, may very properly be considered together.

The solution of these questions depends upon the construction of the act of the general assembly, approved March 6, 1889, known as the "Election Law."

Section 26 of this act prescribes the following form of ballot to be used at all subsequent general elections, viz.: —

Section 45 of the act provides that "when a voter shall

have been passed by the challengers, or shall have been sworn

Alvin P.
Hovey.

Prohi.