there be a surplus, it is considered real estate, to descend and to be disposed of as if it were actually so.

The general rule is, that it is only when it appears that it was the intention of the testator to convert real estate into personal, and definitely to affix to it the latter character, that the law will treat the estate as personal for all purposes to which the intention of the testator extends.

Where there is a compulsory conversion of the real estate of an infant the proceeds during the minority of the owner retain the character of real estate for the purposes of devolution and transmission.

It may be for the benefit of the infant, in many cases, that money should be laid out in land if he should live to become an adult, but if not, it is a great prejudice to him, taking away his dominion by the power of disposition he has over personal property so long before he has it over real estate. The court, therefore, with reference to his situation, even during infancy, as to his powers over property, works the change, not to all intents and purposes, but with this qualification, that if he lives he may take it as real estate, but without prejudice to his right over it during infancy as personal property.

When realty is no longer treated as if it were personalty, or personalty as if it were realty, there is said to be a reconversion.

The doctrine of reconversion will not be applied to land unless the parties in interest are agreed that it should be treated as land. But it is not necessary that the parties be agreed in order to apply the doctrine of reconversion to personalty.

[Multifariousness.]

The courts recognize two kinds of multifariousness, one, in which there is a misjoinder of causes of action against the same defendant or defendants, and the other, where there are several causes of action to some of which some of the defendants have no relation.

Demurrers alleging multifariousness among other things

assert that by reason of the improper joinder of distinct matters and causes, the proceedings in the progress of the suit will be intricate and prolix and the defendants will be put to unnecessary charges and expense in matters which ought not to be joined in one petition or which in any way relate to or concern them or any of them.

To support the objection of multifariousness, because a bill contains different causes of suit against the same person, two things must concur: first, the grounds of suit must be different; second, each ground must be sufficient as stated to sustain a bill.

The objection of multifariousness cannot prevail when the case against one defendant may be so entire as to be incapable of being prosecuted in several suits; and yet some other defendant may be a necessary party to some portion of the case stated.

It is not indispensable that all the parties should have an interest in all the matters contained in the suit; it will be sufficient if each party has an interest in some material matters in the suit, and they are connected with the others.

[Pleading and Practice.]

A suit in equity is instituted by a writ of summons or petition, commonly described as a bill of complaint, which can be amended or followed by a supplemented bill. The defendant when served with a copy of the complaint and summons to answer may file a cross-bill in order that both matters may be heard at the same time.

The defence is made by demurrer, plea, or answer, and the proceedings are such as to bring all parties interested in the controversy before the court, either as plaintiffs or defendants.

If made on oath, the answer is evidence for the defendant so far as it is responsive to the bill for discovery and as such it prevails, unless it is overcome by something more than what is equivalent to the testimony of one witness. Without oath, it is a mere pleading and the allegations stand for proof. If the plaintiff elects, the case may be heard on bill

and answer, but if the latter is considered incomplete the plaintiff may except and secure its correction. To controvert statements in the answer the plaintiff files a replication in which he asserts that he is prepared to prove the accuracy of the averments in the petition and then testimony is taken before a special master.

The rules of evidence, except as to the effect of the answer and the manner of taking testimony, are, in the main, similar to the rules of evidence in actions at law. The hearing of the suit is before the equity judge, who may make interlocutory orders or decrees, and who pronounces the final decree or judgment. If sufficient cause is shown, he may grant a re-hearing. There may be a bill to execute or impeach a decree and also a bill of review. If the suit fails by the death of a party there is a bill of revivor.

APPENDIX

PART II (SECOND SECTION)—Continued

ALL ANTI-TRUST SUITS AND INDICTMENTS

PRESIDENT TAFT'S ADMINISTRATION

37.-United States v. Winfield A. Huppuch, and seven other wall paper manufacturers and jobbers (continued from page 544.)

The defendants were placed on trial before Judge Day sitting in the Criminal Branch of the United States District Court at Cleveland on May 13, 1912. They were W. A. Huppuch of the Standard Wall Paper Co., Hudson Falls, N. Y.; J. B. Pearce of the J. B. Pearce Wall Paper Co., Cleveland; Robert E. Hobbs of the firm of Hobbs, Benton & Haith, Hoboken, N. J.; John McCoy of the York Card and Paper Co., York, Penn.; George Tait of the Campbell Wall Paper Co., Glens Falls, N. Y.; C. C. Aler of the Aler Wall Paper Co., Columbus, Ohio; Norton Newcomb of Newcomb Brothers Wall Paper Co., St. Louis, Mo., and Charles E. Maxwell of the S. A. Maxwell Wall Paper Co., Chicago, Ill.

A jury being secured within an hour after the calling of the case, District Attorney U. G. Denman stated that the eight defendants comprising committees of National associations of the two branches of the trade had entered into an agreement not to sell wall paper to the keepers of five and ten-cent stores located in various cities and States. T. H. Garry, counsel for the defense, answering the Government's conspiracy charge, asserted that his clients were justified in not selling to the owner of a string of five and ten-cent stores in Pittsburgh and other cities, upon whose complaint the prosecution was based. Garry asserted that half a dozen wall paper manufacturers and jobbers had lost money in dealing with the Pittsburgh storekeeper, and that the latter's indebtedness to a Cleveland concern, totalling $20,000, had forced it into bankruptcy.

During the trial the Government put in correspondence and other documentary evidence in support of the charge that there was a conspiracy among the defendants to shut off the supply of wall paper from five and ten-cent stores in Pittsburgh, Wheeling, Cleveland, New York and other cities.

T. J. Roache of the Barey Brothers Wall Paper Company of Philadelphia, a Government witness, was assailed by counsel for the defense in the closing argument, their view being that he had turned against his