and the local constitutions of his native soil, under the very eminent professors that abound in their several universities. And in the northern parts of our own island, where also the municipal laws are frequently connected with the civil, it is difficult to meet with a person of liberal education, who is destitute of a competent knowledge in that science which is to be the guardian of the natural rights and the rule of his civil conduct.

*Nor have the imperial laws been totally neglected even in the English [* 5] nation. A general acquaintance with their decisions has ever been deservedly considered as no small accomplishment of a gentleman; and a fashion has prevailed, especially of late, to transport the growing hopes of this island to foreign universities, in Switzerland, Germany and Holland; which, though infi-, nitely inferior to our own in every other consideration, have been looked upon as better nurseries of the civil, or (which is nearly the same) of their own municipal law. In the mean time, it has been the peculiar lot of our admirable system of laws to be neglected, and even unknown, by all but one practical profession; though built upon the soundest foundations, and approved by the experience of ages.

No man

Far be it from me to derogate from the study of the civil law, considered (apart from any abiding authority) as a collection of written reason. is more thoroughly persuaded of the general excellence of its rules and the usual equity of its decisions, nor is better convinced of its use as well as ornament to the scholar, the divine, the statesman, and even the common lawyer. But we must not carry our veneration so far as to sacrifice our Alfred and Edward to the names of Theodosius and Justinian; we must not prefer the edict of the prætor, or the rescript of the Roman emperor, to our own immemorial customs, or the sanctions of an English parliament; unless we can also prefer the despotic monarchy of Rome and Byzantium, for whose meridians the former were calculated, to the free constitution of Britain, which the latter are adapted to perpetuate.

Without detracting, therefore, from the real merits which abound in the imperial law, I hope I may have leave to assert, that if an Englishman must be ignorant of either the one or the other, he had better be a stranger to the Roman than the English institutions. For I think it an undeniable position, that a competent knowledge of the laws of that society in which [*6] we live, is the proper accomplishment of every gentleman and scholar; a highly useful, I had almost said essential, part of liberal and polite education. And in this I am warranted by the example of ancient Rome; where, as Cicero informs us, (a) the very boys were obliged to learn the twelve tables by heart, as a carmen necessarium or indispensable lesson, to imprint on their tender minds an early knowledge of the laws and constitution of their country.

But, as the long and universal neglect of this study with us in England seems in some degree to call in question the truth of this evident position, it shall therefore be the business of this introductory discourse, in the first place to demonstrate the utility of some general acquaintance with the municipal law of the land, by pointing out its particular uses in all considerable situations of life. Some conjectures will then be offered with regard to the causes of neglecting this useful study, to which will be subjoined a few reflections on the peculiar propriety of reviving it in our own universities.

And, first, to demonstrate the utility of some acquaintance with the laws of the land, let us only reflect a moment on the singular frame and polity of that land which is governed by this system of laws; a land, perhaps the only one in the universe, in which political or civil liberty is the very end and scope of the constitution. (b) This liberty, rightly understood, consists in the power (1) of doing whatever the laws permit; (c) which is only to be effected by a general

(a) De Legg. 2, 23. (b) Montesq. Esp. L. 1. 11 c. 5.

(c) Facultas ejus, quod cuique facere libet nisi quid vi, aut jure prohibetur. Inst. 1. 3. 1.

(1) For Mr. Christian's view of this definition of liberty, see note, post, 126.

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conformity of all orders and degrees to those equitable rules of action by which the meanest individual is protected from the insults and oppression of the greatest. As, therefore, every subject is interested in the preservation of the laws, it is incumbent upon every man to be acquainted with those at least with which he is immediately concerned; lest he incur the censure, as well as inconvenience, of living in society without knowing the obligations which it lays him under. And thus much may suffice for persons of inferior condition, who have neither time nor capacity to enlarge their views beyond that contracted sphere in which they are appointed to move. those, on whom nature and fortune have bestowed more abilities and greater leisure, cannot be so easily excused. These advantages are given them, not for the benefit of themselves only, but also of the public: and yet they cannot, in any scene of life, discharge properly their duty either to the public or themselves, without some degree of knowledge in the laws. To evince this the more clearly, it may not be amiss to descend to a few particulars.

But

Let us therefore begin with our gentlemen of independent estates and fortune, the most useful as well as considerable body of men in the nation; whom even to suppose ignorant in this branch of learning is treated by Mr. Locke (d) as a strange absurdity. It is their landed property, with its long and voluminous train of descents and conveyances, settlements, entails, and incumbrances, that forms the most intricate and most extensive object of legal knowlege. The thorough comprehension of these, in all their minute distinctions, is perhaps too laborious a task for any but a lawyer by profession; yet still the understanding of a few leading principles, relating to estates and conveyancing, may form some check and guard upon a gentleman's inferior agents, and preserve him at least from very gross and notorious imposition.

Again, the policy of all laws has made some forms necessary in the wording of last wills and testaments, and more with regard to their attestation. An ignorance in these must always be of dangerous consequence to such as, by choice or necessity, compile their own testaments without any technical assistance. Those who have attended the courts of justice are the best witnesses of the confusion and distresses that are hereby occasioned in families, and of the difficulties that arise in discerning the true meaning of the testator, or, sometimes, in discovering any meaning at all; so that in the end, his estate *may often be vested quite contrary to these his enigmatical intentions, [*8] because, perhaps, he has omitted one or two formal words, which are necessary to ascertain the sense with indisputable legal precision, or has executed his will in the presence of fewer witnesses than the law requires.

But, to proceed from private concerns to those of a more public consideration. All gentlemen of fortune are, in consequence of their property, liable to be called upon to establish the rights, to estimate the injuries, to weigh the accusations, and sometimes to dispose of the lives, of their fellow-subjects, by serving upon juries. In this situation they have frequently a right to decide, and that upon their oaths, questions of nice importance, in the solution of which some legal kill is requisite; especially where the law and the fact, as it often happens, are intimately blended together. And the general incapacity, even of our best juries, to do this with any tolerable propriety, has greatly debased their authority; and has unavoidably thrown more power into the hands of the judges, to direct, control, and even reverse their verdicts, than perhaps the constitution intended.

But it is not as a juror, only, that the English gentleman is called upon to determine questions of right, and distribute justice to his fellow-subjects: it is principally with this order of men that the commission of the peace is filled. And here a very ample field is opened for a gentleman to exert his talents, by maintaining good order in his neighborhood; by punishing the dissolute and idle; by protecting the peaceable and industrious; and, above all, by healing petty differences, and preventing vexatious prosecutions. But, in order to attain

(d) Education, Sec. 187.

these desirable ends, it is necessary that the magistrate should understand his business, and have not only the will, but the power also (under which must be included the knowledge), of administering legal and effectual justice. Else, when he has mistaken his authority, through passion, through ignorance, or ab[*9] surdity, he will be the object of *contempt from his inferiors, and of censure from those to whom he is accountable for his conduct. Yet farther: most gentlemen of considerable property, at some period or other in their lives, are ambitious of representing their country in parliament; and those, who are ambitious of receiving so high a trust, would also do well to remember its nature and importance. They are not thus honorably distinguished from the rest of their fellow-subjects, merely that they may privilege their persons, their estates, or their domestics; that they may list under party banners; may grant or withhold supplies; may vote with or vote against a popular or unpopular administration; but upon considerations far more interesting and important. They are the guardians of the English constitution; the makers, repealers, and interpreters of the English law; delegated to watch, to check, and to avert every dangerous innovation, to propose, to adopt, and to cherish any solid and well-weighed improvement; bound by every tie of nature, of honor, and of religion, to transmit that constitution and those laws to their posterity, amended if possible, at least without any derogation. And how unbecoming must it appear in a member of the legislature to vote for a new law, who is utterly ignorant of the old! what kind of interpretation can he be enabled to give, who is a stranger to the text upon which he comments!

Indeed, it is perfectly amazing that there should be no other state of life, no other occupation, art, or science, in which some method of instruction is not looked upon as requisite, except only the science of legislation, the noblest and most difficult of any. Apprenticeships are held necessary to almost every art, commercial or mechanical: a long course of reading and study must form the divine, the physician, and the practical professor of the laws: but every man of superior fortune thinks himself born a legislator. Yet Tully was of a different opinion. "It is necessary," says he, (e) "for a senator to be thor[*10] oughly acquainted with the constitution; and this," he declares, "is a knowledge of the most extensive nature; a matter of science, of diligence, of reflection; without which no senator can possibly be fit for his office."

The michiefs that have arisen to the public from inconsiderate alterations in our laws, are too obvious to be called in question; and how far they have been owing to the defective education of our senators, is a point well worthy the public attention. The common law of England has fared like other venerable edifices of antiquity, which rash and inexperienced workmen have ventured to new-dress and refine, with all the rage of modern improvement. Hence, frequently its symmetry has been destroyed, its proportions distorted, and its majestic simplicity exchanged for specious embellishments and fantastic novelties. For, to say the truth, almost all the perplexed questions, almost all the niceties, intricacies, and delays (which have sometimes disgraced the English as well as other courts of justice), owe their original not to the common law itself, but to innovations that have been made in it by acts of parliament, "overladen (as Sir Edward Coke expresses it) (f) with provisoes and additions, and many times on a sudden penned or corrected by men of none or very little judgment in law." This great and well experienced judge declares, that in all his time he never knew two questions made upon rights merely depending upon the common law; and warmly laments the confusion introduced by ill-judging and unlearned legislators. "But if," he subjoins "acts of parliament were after the old fashion penned, by such only as perfectly knew what the common law was before the making of any act of parliament concerning that matter, as also how far forth former statutes had provided remedy for former mischiefs and defects, discovered by experience; then should very few questions in law

(e) De Legg. 3. 18. Est senatori necessarium nosse rempublican ; idque late patet genus hoc omne scientia, diligentiæ, memoriæ est ; sine quo paratus esse senator nullo pacto potest. f) 2 Rep. Pref.

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arise, and the learned should not so often and so much perplex their heads to make atonement and peace, by construction of law, between insensible and disagreeing words, sentences, and provisoes, as they now do." And if this inconvenience was so heavily felt in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, you may judge how the evil is increased in later times, when the statute book is swelled to ten times a larger bulk, unless it should be found that the penners of our modern statutes have proportionably better informed themselves in the knowledge of the common law.

said of our gentlemen in general, and the propriety of their application to the study of the laws of their country, will hold equally strong or still stronger with regard to the nobility of this realm, except only in the article of serving upon juries. But, instead of this, they have several peculiar provinces of far greater consequence and concern; being not only by birth hereditary counselors of the crown, and judges upon their honour of the lives of their brother peers, but also arbiters of the property of all their fellow-subjects, and that in the last resort. In this, their judicial capacity, they are bound to decide the nicest and most critical points of the law; to examine and correct such errors as have escaped the most experienced sages of the profession, the lord-keeper, and the judges of the courts of Westminster. Their sentence is final, decisive, irrevocable; no appeal, no correction, not even a review can be had; and to their determination, whatever it be, the inferior courts of justice must conform ; otherwise the rule of property would no longer be uniform and steady.

Should a judge in the most subordinate jurisdiction be deficient in the knowledge of the law, it would reflect infinite contempt upon himself, and disgrace upon those who employ him. And yet the consequence of his ignorance is comparatively very trifling and small; his judgment may be examined, and his errors rectified by other courts. But how much more serious and affecting is the case of a superior judge, *if, without any skill in the laws, he will boldly venture to decide a question upon which the welfare and [*12] subsistence of whole families may depend; where the chance of his judging right or wrong, is barely equal; and where, if he chances to judge wrong, he does an injury of the most alarming nature, an injury without possibility of redress.

Yet, vast as this trust is, it can nowhere be so properly reposed, as in the noble hands where our excellent constitution has placed it; and therefore placed it, because, from the independence of their fortune and the dignity of their station, they are presumed to employ that leisure, which is the consequence of both, in attaining a more extensive knowledge of the laws than persons of inferior rank, and because the founders of our polity relied upon that delicacy of sentiment so peculiar to noble birth; which, as on the one hand it will prevent either interest or affection from interfering in questions of right, so, on the other, it will bind a peer in honor, an obligation which the law esteems equal to another's oath, to be master of those points upon which it is his birthright to decide. (2)

The Roman pandects will furnish us with a piece of history not inapplicable to our present purpose. Servius Sulpicius, a gentleman of the patrician order, and a celebrated orator, had occasion to take the opinion of Quintus Mutius Scævola, the then oracle of the Roman law; but, for want of some knowledge in that science, could not so much as understand even the technical terms which his friend was obliged to make use of. Upon which, Mutius Scævola could not forbear to upbraid him with this memorable reproof: (g) "that it was a shame for a patrician, a nobleman, and an orator of causes to be ignorant of (g) Ff. 1. 2. 2. 43. Turpe esse patricio, et nobili, et causas oranti, jus in quo versaretur ignorare.

(2) [As a peer of parliament, when that body is sitting judicially, a nobleman's pledge of honour is considered equal to another's oath. The ordinary courts of common law know no distinction of this kind; there, wherever an ordinary subject must swear to speak the truth, a peer must equally be sworn. In courts of equity, peers, peeresses, and lords of parliament answer on their honour only; though persons of inferior degree are required, in like case, to answer on oath. 1 Jacob and Walker's Reports, 524.]

that law in which he was so peculiarly concerned." This reproach made so deep an impression on Sulpicius, that he immediately applied himself to the study of the law, wherein he arrived to that proficiency, that he left [*13] behind him about an hundred and four-score volumes of his own compiling upon the subject, and became in the opinion of Cicero, (h) a much more complete lawyer than even Mutius Scævola himself.

I would not be thought to recommend to our English nobility and gentry to become as great lawyers as Sulpicius, though he, together with this character, sustained likewise that of an excellent orator, a firm patriot, and a wise, indefatigable senator; but the inference which arises from the story is this: that ignorance of the laws of the land hath ever been esteemed dishonourable in those who are intrusted by their country to maintain, to administer, and to amend them. (3)

But, surely, there is little occasion to enforce this argument any further to persons of rank and distinction, if we, of this place may be allowed to form a general judgment from those who are under our inspection: happy that while we lay down the rule, we can also produce the example. You will therefore permit your professor to indulge both a public and private satisfaction, by bearing this open testimony, that, in the infancy of these studies among us, they were favoured with the most diligent attendance, and pursued with the most unwearied application, by those of the noblest birth and most ample patrimony, some of whom are still the ornaments of this seat of learning, and others, at a greater distance, continue doing honor to its institutions by comparing our polity and laws with those of other kingdoms abroad, or exerting their senatorial abilities in the councils of the nation at home.

Nor will some degree of legal knowledge be found in the least superfluous to persons of inferior rank, especially those of the learned professions. The clergy, in particular, besides the common obligations they are under in proportion to their rank and fortune, have also abundant reason, considered *merely [*14] as clergymen, to be acquainted with many branches of the law, which are almost peculiar and appropriated to themselves alone. Such are the laws relating to advowsons, institutions, and inductions; to simony, and simoniacal contracts; to uniformity, residence, and pluralities; to tithes and other ecclesiastical dues; to marriages, (more especially of late,) and to a variety of other subjects, which are consigned to the care of their order by the provisions of particular statutes. To understand these aright, to discern what is warranted or enjoined, and what is forbidden by law, demands a sort of legal apprehension, which is no otherwise to be acquired than by use and a familiar acquaintance with legal writers.

For the gentlemen of the faculty of physic, I must frankly own that I see no special reason why they, in particular, should apply themselves to the study of

(h) Brut. 41.

(3) "One of the constitutions of our own King Alfred expressly required that his nobility should be instructed in the laws. Without this knowledge, indeed, a man will advance but vain and frivolous pretences to exercise the functions of a statesman or a legislator. It is true he may be eager enough to meddle with such matters; he may indeed be "given to change" he may become, perhaps, a showy declaimer, fluent in the use of common-placesthat is, if either house of parliament will tolerate his puerile inanities; he may possibly acquire credit on occasions of minor, of mere temporary or local interest and importance; but on the stirring, grand national, CONSTITUTIONAL questions, which are often so suddenly started, he will be, he needs must be, an inglorious mute; his "vote and influence" may be solicited by the contending parties, but nothing further will be expected or, indeed, permitted. Such information as is required on these occasions, however great may be his zeal or talents, or intense his desire of distinction, he neither has nor can get. No cram will suffice; nothing but the careful, leisurely acquisition of early years, assiduously kept up at once generating and justifying confidence and self-reliance-will enable a man to acquit himself on such occasions even creditably. And how often in these pregnant times do such occasions arise; what melancholy exhibitions are sometimes the consequence!" Warren's Law dics, 85.