from behind Walden's ridge, at the appointed crossing of the Tennessee; bridges were built like magic, and the army passed on to its position. Meanwhile, Hooker's veterans scaled the lofty peak that dominated over all the landscape, and, all day, they held in their front the six brigades so much needed else where. Sherman's assault began, and was so deter mined and at so critical a point, that Bragg threw battalion after battalion to resist the Army of the Tennessee. That army was indeed resisted, was unable to make its way; but this was accomplished only by the sacrifice of all that Bragg was fighting for. The rebel centre, as Grant had foreseen, was weakened to save the right; and then, the whole mass of the Army of the Cumberland was precipita ted on the weakened point; the centre was pierced, the heights carried, and the battle of Chattanooga won. Hooker threw his soldiers, flushed with success, on the left of Bragg, and rolled in that flank, and nothing but rout remained.

In all these operations, the enemy had been compelled to do his part almost as if under Grant's control. Bragg had no choice of movements left him: he was forced to weaken his left; he was forced afterwards to defend himself on the right; he was forced to make the very opportunity at his centre which Grant desired. And, although this battle had not been planned according to any immutable design, nor the commanders directed by any orders that were irreversible, yet each event proceeded regularly according to the calculation; each subordi nate carried out his part exactly as he had been ordered; each army, brought from a distance, came upon the spot intended, crossed a river, or climbed a

mountain, at the precise moment; and even the unexpected emergencies of the fight contributed to the result, as if anticipated and arranged. In this respect, Chattanooga was one of the most notable battles ever fought.

There were, however, other considerations which rendered it extraordinary. Not only was it one of the grandest spectacles in modern war; not only was it so peculiar in plan and development, and so impor tant in results, but it had a remarkably fortunate effect upon the armies engaged. Three hosts combined: one, coming from the valley of the Mississip pi, loaded with laurels; another, fresh from the famous fields of the Potomac; and the third was the great Army of the Cumberland, whose foot was on its native hills, but which, through two long years that it had been struggling for this very advantage, had met with only incomplete success. Once or twice, after bloody battle, it had indeed remained master of the field, but the full advantages of victory it had never reaped; for, although it had really won Chattanooga, the possession of the prize had remained insecure; the fruits of its labor had been turned into ashes before they could be enjoyed. But, now, Fortune's bandage seemed to have fallen from her eyes, and she distributed rewards with an impartial hand. The Eastern troops had carried the most conspicuous position on the field, and won a strange and picturesque renown, forever associating their names with the mighty mountain that stands at the gate of the South; the Western army had fought harder and longer, and with less brilliant results than either of the others, but, by its persistent gallantry, had rendered possible the great success of the day; while

it was fitly reserved for the Army of the Cumber land to win the crowning victory over its old enemy, to carry the heights that had confronted it so long, and, in sight of Chickamauga, to accomplish that which Chickamauga had disastrously delayed.

For, the way was now thrown open to Atlanta, and all the rich country in its rear; the very heart of the rebellion was laid bare; the great bulwark of the would-be Confederacy was broken down, was become, instead, a sally-port for the national armies; the rebel hosts, that had stood in the way, were thrust aside, and Chattanooga, thenceforth, was as terrible a menace to rebellion, as in times past it had been defiant to loyalty.

CHAPTER XIII.

Knoxville still in danger-Granger sent to Burnside-Granger moves reluctantly -Sherman sent to Burnside-Sherman moves with vigor-Burnside falls back before Longstreet-Battle at Campbell's station-Retreat to Knoxville --Defences of Knoxville-Siege of Knoxville-Aid from loyal TennesseansLongstreet determines to assault-Strength and position of Fort Sanders— Assault of Fort Sanders-Repulse of Longstreet-Approach of Sherman-Raising of siege-Retreat of Longstreet-Burnside sends Sherman back to Hiawassee-Parke's pursuit of Longstreet-Burnside relieved by FosterResults of entire campaign-Congratulations of President--Thanks of Congress-Miscalculation of Burnside-Battle of Bean's station--Success of Longstreet-Longstreet winters in Tennessee--Disappointment of Grant---Grant proposes movement against Mobile-Bragg relieved by Hardee-Furloughing of veterans--Grant's visit to Knoxville-Impossibility of winter campaign-Germ of Meridian raid--Distribution of forces for winter-Sherman sent to Vicksburg-Grant's plan for ensuing year-Mobile and Atlanta objective and intermediate points--Sooy Smith's orders--Sherman's march from Vicksburg-Seizure of Meridian-Destruction of railroad-Failure of Smith to coöperate-Sherman returns to Vicksburg-Smith retreats to Memphis-Results of Meridian raid-Coöperation of Thomas-Johnston in command of rebel army-Movements in East Tennessee-Grant ordered to Washington.

BUT the task that had been set for Grant was even yet not fully performed. Bragg had indeed been driven back, and Chattanooga made secure, but Burnside was still threatened by a redoubtable force, and the capture of Knoxville was imminent. On the 28th of November, Grant returned from the front, to Chattanooga, and found that Granger's corps had not yet started for the relief of Burnside. A whole day

had thus been lost, when every hour was invaluable, and Grant at once hurried off to Knoxville the reënforcements so much needed there.

Meanwhile, Major-General John G. Foster had been sent from Washington, to supersede Burnside, and went direct to Cumberland gap, where there were about three thousand national soldiers. He could not, however, approach nearer to Knoxville, now so closely besieged. On the 28th, Grant telegraphed to Foster: "The Fourth corps, Major-General Granger commanding, left here to-day, with orders to push with all possible speed through to Knoxville. Sherman is already in motion for Hiawassee, and will go all the way, if necessary.... Communicate this information to Burnside, as soon as possible, and at any cost; with directions to hold to the very last moment, and we shall not only relieve him, but destroy Longstreet." The next day, he wrote to Granger, at length: ".... On the 23d instant, General Burnside telegraphed that his rations would hold out ten or twelve days; at the end of this time, unless relieved from the outside, he must surrender or retreat. The latter will be an impossibility. You are now going for the purpose of relieving this garrison. You see the short time in which relief must be afforded or be too late, and hence the necessity for forced marches. I want to urge upon you, in the strongest possible manner, the necessity of reaching Burnside in the shortest possible time. . . . .”

But Granger moved with reluctance and complaint, and, on the 29th, Grant said to Sherman : 'Granger is on the way to Burnside's relief, but I have lost all faith in his energy and capacity to

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