leck replied: "Although the reënforcements from your army for General Rosecrans did not move as soon or as rapidly as was expected, no blame whatever attaches to you. I know your promptness too well to think for a moment that this delay was any fault of yours." The delay was occasioned by the confusion occurring in the transmission of Halleck's orders, as already explained.

In consequence of this confusion, Grant now sent a staff officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, to Cairo, to communicate direct with the government, and, on the 3d of October, the following dispatch was received: "Convey, as soon as possible, to General Grant the following: 'It is the wish of the Secretary of War that, as soon as General Grant is able to take the field, he will come to Cairo, and report by telegraph.'" Grant replied from Columbus, Kentucky: "Your dispatch from Cairo of the 3d, directing me to report from Cairo, was received at eleven thirty, on the 10th. Left the same day with staff and headquarters, and am here, en route for Cairo." On the 16th, he telegraphed from Cairo: "I have just arrived, and report in pursuance with your instructions of the 3d instant. My staff and headquarters are with me." Halleck answered: "You will immediately proceed to the Galt House, Louisville, Kentucky, where you will meet an officer of the War Department with your orders and instructions. You will take with you your staff, etc., for immediate operations in the field." This was received on the 17th, and Grant started im mediately for Louisville, by rail.

At Indianapolis, he was met by the Secretary of War, Honorable Edwin M. Stanton, who brought with him from Washington an order creating for

Grant a new command-the Military Division of the Mississippi; this was to include all the territory between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi river, excepting such as might be occupied by Banks: the three departments of the Tennessee, the Cumberland, and the Ohio were all to be subordinate to Grant. At this time, Rosecrans was in command of the Department of the Cumberland, and Burnside of that of the Ohio. The imperative necessity for coöperation between these various commands had been made painfully manifest to the government. Hitherto, each army had seemed to have a separate object, and apparently, in each department, a campaign was carried on without reference to the operations of the others. Within the last few months, indeed, Halleck had striven hard to compel Rosecrans to coöperate with Grant, but found himself utterly unable to accomplish the task; and it was now determined to cut the knot of Rosecrans's obstinacy and insubordination, by giving to Grant almost absolute control of the forces and oper ations west of the Alleghanies. The disaster which Rosecrans had suffered at Chickamauga hastened this decision, and the course suggested by Grant, nearly a year before, was at last forced upon the gov. ernment-the concentration and combination of all the western armies under a single head, and for a single aim. Grant was to be allowed to make his own campaigns, to use the troops to accomplish his own purposes. It was a great responsibility to put upon him, but there was nothing better to do; no other general had accomplished as much as he; his past successes were the best guaranty for future ones; the danger at Chattanooga was imminent, and increasing daily; it was necessary to act at once; and trem

blingly, doubtless, but still almost hopefully, the great trust was committed to his hands.

The Secretary of War brought also two other orders which he showed to Grant. One of these left Rosecrans in his previous command, of the Army and Department of the Cumberland; the other relieved him, and substituted Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, the next in rank in that army. Grant was offered his choice of the orders, and did not hesitate a moment; his past experience with Rosecrans made him certain that he could get no complete coöperation from that officer, and he asked at once for his removal. The government, indeed, preferred this. The defeat of Rosecrans had been so disastrous, and its results were so alarming, that the confidence felt in his talent and military character was shaken, perhaps, even more than was deserved. Intense anxiety was entertained lest he should abandon Chattanooga, or even surrender his army, now in the closest straits; and Grant's action was fully approved. He was directed to proceed at once to his new command.

The Secretary of War accompanied him as far as Louisville; there both remained a day, discussing the situation of affairs, and Grant gathering the views of the government. During this day, the minister received a dispatch from Mr. C. A. Dana, his subordi nate,* at Chattanooga, intimating that the danger of an abandonment of Chattanooga was instant; that Rosecrans was absolutely preparing for such a movement. The secretary at once directed Grant to im mediately assume his new command, and to relieve Rosecrans before it was possible for the apprehended mischief to be consummated. Grant accordingly telegraphed to Rosecrans and Thomas, from Louis* Afterwards Assistant Secretary of War.

ville, assuming command of the military division. He sent also, at the same time, an order assigning Thomas to the Department of the Cumberland. On the 19th of October, he started, by rail, for Chattanooga.

CHAPTER XI.

Natural features of Chattanooga-Strategical importance-Relations to East Tennessee Chickamauga campaign-Defeat of Rosecrans-Retreat into Chattanooga-Abandonment of Lookout mountain-Investment of Chattanooga-Sufferings of Army of the Cumberland-Hooker sent west to support Rosecrans-Burnside's movement into East Tennessee-Difficulties of supply-Grant starts for Chattanooga-Directions to his three armies-Arrival at Chattanooga-Thomas's magnanimity-Lookout valley-Brown's ferry— Plan of operations to recover Lookout valley-Seizure of Brown's ferryMarch of Hooker from Bridgeport-Battle of Wauhatchie—Repulse of rebels-Lookout valley secured-Communication reopened-Elation of soldiers -Further difficulties in supply-Sherman's march from Memphis-Long lines of communication-Sherman's magnanimity-Grant hurries ShermanAlarming situation of Burnside-Anxiety of government--Grant's calmness -Longstreet moves against Burnside-Grant's counter-plan-Dispatches of Grant to Halleck and Burnside-Thomas ordered to attack Bragg-Thomas not ready-Movement postponed till Sherman's arrival-Great anxiety about Burnside-Road from Nashville to Decatur opened-Supplies ordered to Burnside by Cumberland river-Difficulties of Sherman's route--Critical condition of Grant's armies-Extent of his operations--Halleck still anxious about Burnside-Grant impresses on Burnside necessity of holding outConfidence of Burnside--Arrival of Sherman at Bridgeport-Reconnoissance by Grant, Sherman, and Thomas-Orders issued for battle of Chattanooga.

THE Cumberland mountains constitute the natural boundary between what are called the cotton states -the semi-tropical region of the American Unionand the vast grain-growing plains of Kentucky and Tennessee. Several important ranges cluster just where the three great states of Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama approach nearest to each other; the