accessible series of hills, some of them rising abruptly over a hundred feet; every advantage had been taken of the character of the ground; the country was densely wooded, but the timber had been felled far out in advance of the breastworks, the smaller trees chopped till they stood about breast-high, and the limbs left attached to the stumps, forming an unusually difficult abatis. Two streams set back from the Cumberland, whose waters were now high, and these streams formed the right and left defences of the rebel line, which extended nearly three miles, and was strongly intrenched. At intervals inside, were secondary lines and detached works, commanding the outer intrenchments, which were more than two miles from the river, and covered the town of Dover. The slashing was continued between the rifle-pits and the main fortification; streamlets, gullies, and ravines. added to the strength of the place, and light batteries were posted on commanding heights, as well as along the advanced line. The main fort itself was built on a precipitous height, or rather range, cloven by a deep gorge opening to the south; it was about three-quarters of a mile from the breastworks, and overlooked both the river and the interior. It covered a hundred acres of ground, and was defended by fifteen heavy guns and two carronades. Water batteries, admirably located to control the river navigation, were sunken on the hillsides towards the Cumberland, and the entire amount of rebel artillery, including the light batteries, was sixty-five pieces. The garrison numbered, as nearly as can be ascertained, twenty-one thousand men a great part of whom had been recently thrown * See note to page 51 for my authority for this estimate. into the works, from Bowling Green and Cumberland City; for the rebels appreciated the importance of the position as fully as the national commander, and strained every nerve to retain it.* As soon as Fort Henry fell, they began to enlarge and strengthen the fortifications at Donelson, working day and night to be ready for the attack which they foresaw was at hand; reënforcements were poured in, and Buckner, Pillow, and Floyd were successively sent to command, each ranking his predecessor, who remained to serve under the new superior. About noon of the 12th, the rebel pickets were met by Grant's advance, and rapidly driven in; and the fortifications were from this time gradually ap proached and surrounded, with occasional skirmishing. The first line was formed in open fields opposite the enemy's centre. Grant threw up no intrenchments, for at this period of the war the science of eathworks had not been brought to such a degree of perfection as was afterwards attained. "As yet," he said, "I have had no batteries thrown up, hoping with the aid of the gunboats to obviate the neces sity." His left that night rested at a point on Hickman creek, and the line ran around well towards Dover on the right; on account of the overflow, it did not, however, quite extend to the river on either side, but Donelson was practically invested. The advance to the right had to be made with extreme caution, for the ground was very much broken, without roads, and covered with an almost impenetrable growth of small oak. On the left, however, Grant *Pollard, a rebel historian, says, the rebel generals held a conference, and decided to fight for Nashville, at Donelson, and accordingly sent thither every thing they could spare from Bowling Green. was able to communicate by the creek, with his transports and gunboats, while the enemy was completely cut off from escape in that direction. When the siege began, General C. F. Smith had the left, and McClernand the right, of the national line. Grant's headquarters were in the rear of Smith's division, on the Fort Henry road. There were but three professional soldiers in the entire command-Grant himself, Smith, and Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson, of Grant's staff.* The 13th was occupied in selecting and still further reconnoitring the ground, and getting into position; owing to the non-arrival of the gunboats and of the reënforcements sent by water, no attack was made, but the investment was extended on both flanks of the enemy, and drawn closer to his works. Skirmishers were thrown out actively in front, and several smart fights occurred, but with no result of importance. They were in no case intended for Leal assaults, but simply as attempts to discover the force and position of the enemy, and to establish the national line. An attempt was made by McClernand to capture a battery commanding the ridge road on which Grant moved, but this was without orders, and unsuccessful, though gallantly made; three regi ments were engaged in the affair. On the first two days, Grant lost about three hundred men, in killed and wounded. The enemy, notwithstanding his great superiority in numbers, made no effort to molest Grant, allowing him to continue the investment at his leisure, a blunder almost equal to that of opposing no obstacle to the march from Fort Henry. By the night of the 13th, Grant was established * McPherson was at this time really on Halleck's staff, but detailed as chief engineer for Grant during this campaign. |