Supreme Rule. We may therefore state it as a Moral Principle, that We must obey positive Laws as the necessary Conditions of Morality; and this is the Principle of Order.

163 These five Express Moral Principles may be further unfolded; and the Conceptions by which we designate them, Humanity, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order, may be further defined hereafter. But we do not fully express the import of the Cardinal Virtues of Benevolence, Justice, and the like, without adding some further Principles to those which we have mentioned. Benevolence must be strong, as well as general: vivid in its degree, as well as universal in its application. And the same is true of the other Affections rightly directed. The Supreme Law must not only direct the Affections and Intentions to their proper objects, but must require steadiness and energy in them thus directed. The recognition of this condition of the Supreme Rule is shown in the place which Zeal, Energy, Earnestness, hold among the Virtues (143). In order to express this, we may therefore state, as a Moral Principle, that The Affections and Intentions must not only be rightly directed, but energetic; and this we may call the Principle of Earnestness.

164 Again, it is not enough to give the character of virtue to our desires, that they are directed only to those objects which Justice assigns to us. Our desires are not virtuous (though they are not necessarily vicious,) if they terminate in the objects themselves. The Supreme Law of Human Action requires us (117) to consider Moral Good as the object to which all other objects are subordinate, and from which they derive their only moral value. We naturally desire external things, as wealth, power, honour, pleasures of the sense and of the imagination, the society of those we love, and the like, and we originally desire these things for their own sake. But a more advanced Morality directs us to desire these things also as means to moral ends: for all these things, as means of moral action, moral restraint, and moral culture, may be made means to moral ends. And we may state this as a Moral Principle, that Things are to be sought universally, not only in subservience to moral rules, but as means to moral ends; and this we may term the Principle of Moral Purpose.

165 To the Express Principles which we have thus stated, correspond Operative Principles of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order, Earnestness, and Moral Purpose: these exist in each man's character, in so far as the Express Principles above stated become his habitual guides and springs of action,-in so far

as these express the usual tendencies of his affections and purposes. In this sense, as Operative Principles, a man is also said to have a Spirit of Benevolence, of Justice, and the like.

It may be proper hereafter to state other moral Principles, in addition to these seven: but these seven will enable us to lay down many Rules of Duty, which is the purpose for which we put them forwards. We must now speak of Duty; and in the first place, of the distinction between Duty and Virtue.

CHAPTER V.

DUTIES.

166 WE have already stated (91), that Virtue and Duty differ, as the Habit and the Act; as the internal Disposition, and the outward Manifestation. Acts do not necessarily prove the existence of the Dispositions to which they generally correspond. A man may frequently give relief to a person in distress, without being really compassionate; he may habitually perform what he has promised, without real integrity. Such is the case, for instance, when a man gives alms to avoid importunity; or pays his debts to escape disgrace. Acts do not even prove Habits; for an act may be solitary; like that of her

Who paid a tradesman once to make him stare.

But notwithstanding this, Acts of Duty are both the most natural operation of virtuous Dispositions, and the most effectual mode of forming virtuous Habits. Hence, Acts of Duty are requisite, both as the manifestations of Virtue, and as the means of becoming virtuous. The Virtues belong to a deeper part of our nature than the Duties, being the sources out of which our acts of Duty spring. But Duties are more capable of definite description and determination than Virtue not exhibited in act; and hence Duties are the more especial subject of the Moralist's discussions. The Virtues are what we are; the Duties are what we do. It is more important what we are, than what we do; but it is more easy to speak of what we do, than of what we are; and moreover, what

H

we are, gives rise to what we do; and what we do, shows what

we are.

167 Duties, in their general form, coincide with Virtues. Justice is a Virtue; Justice is also a Duty. But they are generally conceived with this difference; that Virtue is more of an unconscious Disposition; Duty implies more of conscious thought. Our Virtues exist and operate without our thinking about them; we perform an act of Duty, thinking that we ought to do it. To think an act a Duty, is to think we ought to do it; it is to think it right; to think it conformable to the Supreme Rule of Human Action.

To think an act right, is to think that there is a Reason for it, by which it is shown to be conformable to the Supreme Rule. Such Reasons are given, when we show that Acts are conformable to the Moral Principles which have just been laid down (162); for these Principles express parts of the Supreme Rule. Hence, Rules of Duty are to be established by a reference to those Principles, as their Reasons.

168 Virtue is a Habit of the Desires, Affections, and Will; Duty involves an operation of the Reason, by which the Desires, Affections, and Will, are directed and governed. By the frequent performance of such acts of direction and government, they become habitual, easy, familiar, and finally cease to be objects of consciousness; and thus Duty becomes Virtue.

169 We may make a further distinction between Duty and Virtue; indicating that we carry the notion of Virtue further than that of Duty. We speak of Heroic Virtues, as we have seen (157), but never of Heroic Duties. Heroic Virtues are Virtues beyond the range of Duty. Duty implies Rules of Duty, but Heroic Virtue soars above Rules.

170 The act of conscious thought by which we recognize our Duties, turns our attention upon ourselves as the objects of the Moral Sentiments of Approbation and Condemnation (155). The habit of regarding ourselves as worthy of Condemnation when we do wrong, and as consequently liable to Punishment, the consequence of deserved Condemnation, in a world in which the Supreme Law is really administered, is the Sense of Responsibility. This Habit of Thought is not explicitly recognized in our notion of Virtue, but it forms part of our conception of Duty; and is often termed the Sense of Duty.

171 A further feature in our Conception of Duty is, that it includes the notion of Actions determined by external Relations

and Circumstances, as well as by internal Dispositions. Duties depend upon the social position of men, and other like conditions. There are Duties of Parents and Children, of Husbands and Wives, of Friends, of Neighbours, of Magistrates, of Members of various Bodies and Professions. Men's Virtues manifest themselves in various Acts of Duty, according to these conditions. The descriptions of Duties must include a reference to those varieties of circumstance and condition. There belong to each man the Duties of his Station. Our Duties, so far as they regard our special Relations to particular persons, may be termed Relative Duties.

172 Men have legal Obligations, as well as Duties, belonging to their Station. Some of these Obligations, though defined by different Rules and Limits in different ages and countries, are acknowledged and established in some form in all communities. Thus Children are everywhere under an Obligation to obey their Parents; Parents to support and educate their Children; Husband and Wife are under mutual Obligations to community of life and fortune; Master and Servant have Obligations of support and service; and the like. And positive Obligations of this kind, in some form, are necessary conditions of man's domestic and social life: and the actions proceeding from such Obligations and from the correlative Rights, make up a large portion of the series of actions of which human activity consists. These actions, and the relations from which they proceed, like all parts of human life and being, belong to the sphere of Morality, and are subject to Moral Rule. The several relations of domestic and social life, the Obligations and Rights of station, must have a moral character, as well as a mere legal existence. Hence these actions and relations must proceed from those internal springs of action by which alone they can have a moral significance. They must be the result of Affections and habitual Dispositions; of Affections and Dispositions belonging to the special relations, domestic and social. And thus the Relative Duties recognize a moral significance in the established Obligations of each Station; and Relative Duties are necessary parts of the Moral Laws, because established Obligations relative to domestic and social connexions are necessary conditions of man's existence.

This Maxim, that there is a Moral Significance in our Social Relations, will often serve to point out our Duties. All acts relative to other men, in order to be moral, must proceed from an internal Spring of Affection; our Obligations, being what we ought to do, if the law be a reasonable law, are also Duties. But

in order that they may be Duties, there must exist an Affection which is the natural Source of such acts; and this Affection is itself a Duty.

173 The Affections from which Duties thus proceed, will be, for the most part, those Affections which naturally grow up in the bosoms of men, so far as they are influenced by the common moral judgments of mankind; they will be Virtuous Affections, the Affections which belong to a good man (158).

Our Duties are determined by the General Notions of the Virtues on the one hand, and on the other, by the Social Relations, special Circumstances, Conditions, Rights and Obligations of men.

So far as Duties depend on the Notions of the Virtues, they will admit of a Classification corresponding to that of the Virtues, already given. We shall have Duties of the Affections; Duties respecting Property and other Objects of Desire; Duties connected with Truth; Duties connected with the Bodily Desires; Duties connected with Order. Each of these Classes contains Duties which may be distinguished according to the Social Relations with which they are concerned.

CHAPTER VI.

DUTIES OF THE AFFECTIONS.

174 THE Supreme Law of Human Action adopts and authorizes the Benevolent Affections, as a part of human nature which binds men together, and depends upon their common humanity. This we have expressed, by laying down the Principle of Benevolence as one of our fundamental Moral Principles (162). But further; the Supreme Law requires that the Affections thus authorized be vivid, strong and permanent. This we have expressed, by stating the Principle of Earnestness as one of our fundamental Moral Principles (163). Now the more general Benevolent Affections which bind men together cannot be vivid and strong, except the special Benevolent Affections, determined by family relations, and other external circumstances, be also vivid and strong. For the Affection of Universal Benevolence is only the expansion of the Love belonging to narrower circles of relation.