racter appears to involve a share of Self-complacency. Men reckon among virtues, the Magnanimity which disregards small dangers and small injuries or offenses. The opposite term, Pusillanimity, denotes cowardice; a quick sensibility to offenses is Captiousness.

Pride is, in its tendency, at variance with the Benevolent Virtues, Meekness, Reverence, Courtesy. But the virtue which is especially opposed to Pride, is Humility. He who is humble in his estimate of himself, is also modest in comparing himself with others; but, as we have said (149), Female Modesty has a more especial meaning. When Pride is manifested so as to imply Contempt of others, it is Haughtiness, Disdain; if Unkindness be added, it is Insolence. The insolent man is overbearing, domineering, arrogant. Self-esteem, so far as it regards the Operation of the Intellect, is Self-opinion. When this excludes all mistrust of one's self, it is Self-sufficiency: and, as taking much for granted, it is Presumption. When Pride fastens upon special points, it is Conceit.

156 The Habits of mind by which we resist the impulses of desire and affection, so as to conform to rules of virtue or prudence, are Self-control, Self-command, Self-watchfulness; Selfmistrust; when the desires which we control are so lively that we cannot suppress them, though we resist them, it is Selfdenial. When we seek our own gratification, in disregard of more virtuous objects, it is Self-seeking. When we let our Will take its course, in spite of manifest warnings of prudence, it is Self-will.

The Habit of making ourselves the principal object of our attention and solicitude, is the Vice of Selfishness. A man is selfish, if the Desires which tend to himself (the Desires of the Body, the Desire of Property, and the like), rather than the Affections, are his leading Springs of Action. These may be termed Selfish Desires. The term implies an Excess in the attention which we give to ourselves, a Defect in that which we give to others; and is always used in an unfavourable sense. Hence the term is not applied to the predominance of those Desires which do not interfere with the claims of others. We call a man selfish, in whom the Love of Money or of Bodily Ease prevails, because such Dispositions make him disregard the claims of others; but we do not call a man selfish, in whom the Love of Knowledge or of Society is strong; for my pursuit of knowledge takes nothing from other persons; and my love of society implies an acknowledgment of some kind of merit or value in other men. Pride and

Vanity are selfish dispositions; for the proud man is too much occupied with his own admiration of himself, and the vain man with admiration of himself proceeding from other men, to regard, with due attention, the claims of his neighbours.

The Selfish Man thinks only of himself: hence he has no Consideration for others: no due care for their feelings, condition, and claims. This Virtue is required in all; there is a higher degree of it, Unselfishness; the disposition of a person who pays no regard to his own gratification when that of another person comes in competition with it. A still higher degree of such virtue is Self-devotion; the virtue of him who willingly incurs pain, danger, or death, to procure benefits for another.

157 There are some dispositions regarded as Virtues, which are conceived to go beyond the standard of common characters. Such virtues are called noble; and when elevated still higher in our thoughts, they are heroic, or heroical. Heroism generally implies great Fortitude or Courage, combined with Self-devotion. History is full of heroic acts; as that of Regulus, who refused to counsel his countrymen to peace, and returned to Carthage to die in tortures; that of Virginius, who stabbed his daughter to preserve her from dishonour; that of the elder Brutus, who, as judge, condemned his own sons to death; that of Lucilius, who saved the younger Brutus by offering himself to the pursuers as Brutus; that of Socrates, who preferred to receive death in obedience to the Laws of his country, though escape was offered him by his friends. The acts of Martyrs, who died for the Truth, when they might have saved their lives by denying it, are heroical.

158 The Moral Vocabulary of which we have taken a survey, the Collection of Terms describing Virtues and Vices, is used to express the judgments of mankind in general, respecting the Dispositions and Characters of men. The approval or disapproval implied in each Term is, for the most part, so well understood, that the mere use of the term pronounces a moral sentence on the subject to which it is applied. And the moral judgment of mankind, thus expressed in a recognized form, is very efficacious in forming the moral sentiments of each person; and hence, in modifying the characters and affections of men. The Vocabulary of Virtues and Vices is a constant moral Lesson; perpetually operating to bring each man's moral sentiments into agreement with the general judgment of men. Every man is taught, by the use of moral language, to admire Gratitude and Filial Love, to condemn Revenge and Cruelty; and the like.

For the most part, this Lesson agrees with the Lesson of true Morality, and points rightly to the Supreme Law of Human Action. This may be readily understood. For the Supreme Law of Human Action must be a Law in which all men, as men, sympathize (98). Hence the common moral judgment, of which we have been speaking, which is expressed and communicated by the moral language commonly in use among men, will, in general at least, conform to the Supreme Law. What are universally held as Virtues, must be dispositions in conformity with this Law. What are universally reckoned Vices, must be wrong.

And a man, in so far as he is taught and formed by the general judgment of men, thus conveyed in the language of the Morality universally recognized, will be rightly taught. A man whose character contains what all men reckon Virtues, and is free from what are universally reckoned Vices, will be a good man. His affections and desires being thus regulated, he will tend to the possession of the Operative Moral Principles of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, Order; which we have stated as the Elements of the Supreme Law.

159 To the doctrine, that the common judgment of mankind respecting Virtues and Vices agrees, generally, with true Morality; it may be objected, that there are dispositions which we reckon vicious; and which yet, in many ages and countries, have been esteemed laudable, as Revenge. To this we reply, that men do not conceive themselves pronouncing the moral judgment of mankind when, under the influence of strong emotion, they speak of the satisfaction arising from Revenge, or appeal to the sympathy of other men alike moved. No Moralist, speaking calmly, and in the Name of Mankind, would say that boundless Revenge is good and virtuous. So far as he could praise or defend the Disposition, it would be by identifying it with the Punishment of Wrong, that is, with Justice. Men speak of Revenge as a kind of wild Justice;" and approve it only so far as it partakes of the nature of Justice. And in like manner, all other dispositions are reckoned Virtues, even in the common judgment of mankind, only so far as they agree with, and partake of, the Cardinal Virtues, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order.

CHAPTER IV.

MORAL PRINCIPLES.

160 By the help of our Reason, we frame Rules of Moral Action which are more or less partial expressions of the Supreme Rule (151). These Rules may be variously connected, so as to give, by comparison and reasoning, rise to other Rules, according to the varieties of the occasions and relations to which the Supreme Rule is to be applied. But such connexion and such reasoning must rest ultimately upon certain fundamental general Maxims or Rules which we may term Principles: just as in Geometry, the reasoning rests ultimately upon the Axioms and Definitions. In order, therefore, to establish and apply Moral Rules, we must state the Moral Principles which are the foundation of such Rules.

These Moral Principles, being the expression, or parts of the expression, of the Supreme Rule of Human Action, must coincide in effect with the Idea of Virtue or Goodness; and therefore with the Elements of this Idea, which, as we have seen (125), are the Five Cardinal Virtues, Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order. Our Moral Principles must express these Cardinal Points of the Supreme Rule.

161 The term Principles is variously used. Springs of Action, as Affections, Desires, Dispositions, are often termed Principles of Action; especially when they operate in a steady and consistent manner. We put such steady Principles in opposition to transient and casual Feelings, which may be inconsistent with themselves. Our Feelings may prompt us to be kind to one person, and harsh to another; but Benevolence, operating as a Principle, would make us kind to all. We have hitherto avoided speaking of "Principles of Action in this sense;" and have called the Affections and Desires Springs of Action (24). Custom allows us to term Benevolence, and the other Cardinal Virtues, Moral Principles, when they operate in any man steadily and consistently, even though they be not expressed in words. But we must distinguish the term Principles, used in this sense, from the fundamental Maxims or Rules, the basis of other Rules, which we have also more especially called Moral Principles. We may call the former Operative

Principles, the latter Express Principles. The former are Principles of Action, the latter are Principles of Reason.

In order that a man's Character should conform to the Supreme Rule, it is requisite that Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity and Order, should be in him Operative Principles. In order that he should express his Rules of Action so that they may be contemplated by the Reason, and communicated from one person to another, it is requisite that he should arrive at Express Principles.

162 Express Moral Principles must, as we have already said, be the expression of those Ideas which are the elements of the Supreme Rule. We have already been led to attempt to obtain such expressions, in speaking of these Moral Ideas.

We have seen (118) that the Idea of Benevolence is, that of an Affection, which makes man, as man, an object of love to us: and that we may state it as a Moral Principal, that Man is to be loved as Man. We may term this the Principle of Humanity.

We have seen (119) that the Idea of Justice is, that of a Desire that, of external things, each person should have his own, without any preference of ourselves to others, or of one person to another. We may state this also as a Moral Principle, that Each Man is to have his own; and this we may term the Principle of Justice.

We have seen (120) that the Idea of Truth (as a Cardinal Virtue) is, the Idea of a Conformity to a Universal Understanding among men, which is involved in the use of language, and according to which understanding, each may depend upon the representations of the others. Hence we may state it as a moral Principle, that We must conform to the Universal Understanding among men which the use of Language implies: and this we may call the Principle of Truth.

Again, we have seen (121) that the Idea of Purity implies the contemplation of mere Appetite and Desire, as the Lower Parts of our nature, which are to be governed by, and made subservient to, the Moral Sentiments and Reason, the Higher Parts. We may state this as a moral Principle, that The Lower parts of our Nature are to be governed by, and subservient to, the Higher. This is the Principle of Purity.

Again, we have seen (122) that the Idea of Order implies a conformity, both to Positive Human Laws, as the necessary conditions of morality, and to special Moral Rules, as the expression of the