cannot have, of themselves, a moral character (115). They are to be controlled by moral Rules, and made subservient to moral Affections, and thus, are the materials of Virtues. The Habits of thus controlling the bodily Desires, constitute the Virtues of Temperance and Chastity. The Demeanour produced by a chaste mind, especially in women, is Modesty.

By the establishment of Family and Social Relations, the gratification of the bodily wants is connected with the impulses of Affection and the Love of Society. The shelter of the common family roof, and the social meal, as well as the marriage-bed, are the objects of far other feelings than mere bodily desires. The Appetites are thus made subservient to the Affections. They are absorbed by the Affections, and are thus purified. All gratifications of the Appetites, sought as gratifications merely, are impure and vicious. Among such vices is the Love of the Pleasures of the Table. When the Desire of Food is gratified to excess, there is Gluttony, Gulosity. When there is an excessive solicitude about the gratification of the Taste, the man is an Epicure. The Love of Drink involves, not only a bodily Appetite, but a complacency in the mental condition to which certain liquors lead; namely, the condition of Intoxication or Ebriety; a condition in which the Reason loses the power of directing our actions. The Vice of falling into such a condition is Intemperance, Drunkenness.

The other leading bodily Desire, when not morally controlled, is Lust. The control of this within moral limits, is Continence. The vicious indulgence is Lewdness, Lechery. Persons whose guiding springs of action are these bodily desires, are sensual, carnal. A chaste and modest person does not allow his eyes or his imagination to dwell on things which may excite Lust. Such images are obscene, indecent. To suggest such images in speech is Obscenity. All such filthy conversation pollutes the mind. A man who makes pleasure the object of his actions is a Voluptuary. Such men generally cast off moral restraint, and are hence dissolute, profligate. A woman who thinks lightly of chastity is a Wanton.

When the arts of life are employed to gratify artificial wants and desires, those who give their attention and solicitude to obtain such gratifications are luxurious. Luxury is often employed to describe the aggregate of such gratifications; but the Solicitude employed on the means of gratification, rather than any special Class of such means, appears to be essential to our conception of Luxury. Things which are luxuries in one stage of society, become universal wants, and consequently necessaries, in another

stage. Linen garments, glass windows, tea, were luxuries a few centuries ago in this country. They are now necessaries of life.

5 Intellectual Virtues.

150 The Disposition by which we accept Law and Rule as the necessary guides of human action, is that which we have termed Order. This Virtue is also, as we have said (127), termed Orderliness, Obedience, and the like.

But it is a Virtue to govern carefully, as well as to obey cordially, according to the position we hold in the community. A virtuous governor must be guided by Justice; but Justice itself must be defined by Specific Rules. Laws and Rules must be apprehended by the Intellect, and must be expressed in terms of general conceptions constructed by the Reason. Hence, the Virtues connected with Order especially include operations of the Intellect, and may be termed Intellectual Virtues.

151 The abstract Conceptions of the objects of our mental Desires, as Property, Power, Society, require operations of the Reason for their formation in the mind. By the further operation of the like faculties, we form still more abstract and general Conceptions of objects of action, as Good, Wellbeing, Happiness, Expediency, Interest, and the like. We may construct and express Rules of Action, dependent upon such Conceptions. Various moralists have stated various Rules, thus expressed. Different individuals govern their conduct by one or other of such Rules, more or less clearly apprehended. One man looks to Interest as his object, another to Happiness, another to Wellbeing, another to the Happiness of Mankind, and so on.

One or other of such objects being assumed as the end of human action, Prudence is the Intellectual Virtue by which we select the right means to this end. A man is prudent, who acts so as to promote his own Interest, if his Interest be assumed to be the proper Object of action: but if we conceive Happiness to be a higher object than Interest, he is prudent, if he disregard mere Interest, and attend only to his Happiness. Prudence supposes the value of the end to be assumed, and refers only to the adaptation of the means: It is the selection of right means for given ends.

152 In the notion of Wisdom, we include, not only, as in Prudence, a right selection of means for an assumed end, but also a right selection of the end. However prudent a man may be in seeking his Interest, he is not wise, if, in doing this, he neglect

a truer end of human action. Wisdom is the habit by which we select right means for right ends. We approve and admire Prudence relatively to its end: we approve and admire Wisdom absolutely. We commend the prudent man, as taking the best course for his purpose; but we do not necessarily agree with him in his estimate of his object. We venerate the wise man, as one knowing, better than we do, the true object of action, as well as the means of approaching it. Wisdom is a Cardinal Virtue, like Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity; and with reference to the first, as well as the other four, human Dispositions are good, as they partake of the Cardinal Virtue. Wisdom is the complete Idea of Intellectual Excellence; as Benevolence, Justice, Truth, and Purity, are of Moral Excellence.

153 Prudence is, etymologically speaking, the same word as Providence, that is Foresight. But we do not call a man prudent, except he not only see the bearing of actions on a distant end, but act upon his foresight. A man who gambles, with a clear foresight that gambling will ruin him, is not prudent. Prudence is a Virtue, not of the Speculative Reason, which contemplates Conceptions, but of the Practical Reason, which guides our Actions.

The guidance of our Actions by Reason, requires us to attend both to the present and to probable future circumstances; it requires Attention, and Forethought, or Forecast. It requires, too, the employment of Thought upon the Circumstances of the case. A virtuous man must be thoughtful, considerate. The want of thoughtfulness is a part of that Levity which we have already noticed as involving a Vice of the Affections (144).

In order to act prudently, we must not only have Prudent thought, but have it at the right time for action; this is Presence of Mind. Cunning is a lower kind of Prudence, that seeks its ends by means, of which the end is not intended to be seen by others, when they are used.

By our Intellectual Faculties we are able to apprehend and know Truth, that is, Objective Truth (126); and especially, Truths which bear upon our actions, and which must be taken into account in framing Rules of Action. Truth is the proper object of Reason; that is, of the universal Reason of mankind: and the Supreme Rule of human action which belongs to mankind, in virtue of their universal Faculties, must depend upon the Truths which Reason makes known to us. The Love of Knowledge impels men to aim at the Knowledge of such Truths: and the Love

of Truth, which thus contributes to a Knowledge of the Supreme Law, is a Virtue.

The progress which each man makes in the Knowledge of Truth, depends in a great measure upon himself; upon his Observation; his Diligence, Attention, Patience, in seeking the Truth. His progress depends also upon external circumstances; upon the Intellectual and moral Development of the Society in which he lives; and upon his own Education, in the largest sense of the term. But there are also differences of the Mental Faculties, between one person and another. One man excels another in Acuteness and Clearness of the mind, when employed in observation or in reasoning; one man has a quicker or a more tenacious Memory than another. There are various degrees of Sagacity; various kinds of Imagination. Some men have Genius. These Faculties are not properly termed Virtues, but Gifts, Endowments, Ability. They may be used as means to right ends, and hence they are termed Talents; by a metaphor taken from the Parable in the New Testament, which teaches us that a man is blameable, when he does not use the means of right action assigned to him.

6 Reflex Virtues and Vices.

154 We may place, among the Intellectual Virtues and Vices, those which depend upon our apprehension of other men's sentiments concerning us. For such Virtues and Vices imply reflex thought. We have already enumerated (57) among the springs of human action, the Reflex Sentiments, in which we form a conception of other men's sentiments, by the image of our own; and of ourselves, as the object of those sentiments. Such are the Desire of Esteem, the Desire of Admiration, the Love of Fame, and the like.

There is a difference to be made between the Desire of Esteem and the Desire of Admiration. Esteem is given to what is deemed right and good. Admiration and Applause are often bestowed upon qualities which have no moral character; as strength, skill, beauty, wit, and the like. The want of such qualities is a ground, among many men, of Contempt; and if the deficiency appears suddenly and glaringly, of Ridicule. Ridicule implies that the object which excites it is so palpably below the standard which we apply to it, that the comparison is extravagant and absurd. The Desire of Admiration produces a Fear and Dread of this Contempt and Ridicule. But the Desire of being admired, for

other than moral excellences, has in it nothing of Virtue. He who desires the Esteem of others, desires them to regard him as good; and will, for the most part, be disposed to sympathize with them in their admiration for what is good. The Desire of Esteem therefore is easily consistent with Virtue.

The Desire of Admiration produces a ready belief that we are admired, and a Joy and Elation of Mind accompanying such belief. This Disposition is Vanity. One who is treated with marks of general esteem among men, is brought to Honour. One who is pointed at as an object of general disesteem, is brought to Disgrace; and, if he feel the Disgrace, is put to Shame. But Honour and Shame likewise indicate, subjectively, the Sensibility of the man to those indications of general Esteem and Disesteem. We speak also of False Honour, and False Shame; meaning Dispositions to be influenced by Applause on the one side, and Blame or Ridicule on the other, even when they are not rightly bestowed. True Honour is a Regard for what is right and good, considered especially as the object of sympathy and esteem among A man of Honour, an honourable man, has an especial abhorrence of the Vices of Fraud and Falsehood. The Desire of Admiration in another form is the Love of Glory. In Civil Society are established marks of Public Honour, as Rank, Titles, Decorations, and the like. Dispositions, for the most part, allied to Vanity, fasten upon these objects; and thus we have the Love of Rank, or the like. But such marks of honour are often accompanied with Political Power; as when, in England, a man is made a Peer. In this case, the Desire of Rank may be Ambition, rather than Vanity.

men.

155 When I have formed a conception of myself, I am led to regard myself as the object of my own moral sentiments. If I approve my own character, I feel Self-esteem. If I am the object of my own Admiration, without requiring the sympathy of others, this feeling is Pride; a Vice which estranges me from other men. The Satisfaction which is felt in my own Admiration, is Self-complacency; a feeling which blinds men to their true character.

I ought to render my Character such as to deserve esteem, and therefore, such as to deserve my own esteem, if I contemplate my own character. If I do this, I may reject wrong acts and emotions, as unsuited to the character which I thus ascribe to myself. The Disposition to do this, appears to be what is meant by a Proper Pride: but this way of regarding one's own cha