the Soul in which it exists. Spite implies a vigilant desire to depress and mortify its object. All these malevolent Feelings are vicious.

138 Moderate Anger, arising from pain inflicted on us is Offense; which term is also used for the offensive Act. A person commits an offense, or offends, in the latter sense; and takes offense, or is offended, in the former. If the Act be one which violently transgress common rules, it is an Outrage. Anger at pain received, impelling a man to inflict pain in return, is Revenge. This term also implies the object or aim of the feeling, as well as the feeling itself. A man is stimulated by Revenge, and seeks his Revenge. The same may be said of the word Vengeance, another form of the word, but of the same origin. The man who admits into his heart this Affection, and retains it, is revengeful, vengeful, vindictive.

139 The Malevolent Feelings, as manifested in the external behaviour, have various names. As they affect our disposition to a person, without necessarily leading to action, they are Ill-will. When they disturb the usual current of cheerful thoughts, they are Ill-Humour. When malevolent feelings lead us to speak or act with a view of giving pain to others, they are Ill-nature. When they make us rejoice in another person's pain, they are Malignity. If the pleasure, which a malignant man takes in another man's pain, be uncheckt by compassion, when the pain is evident, he is cruel; and as such a disposition shows a deficiency in the common feelings which bind men together, he is inhuman. If this character be strongly marked, the man is savage; he approaches to the character and temper of wild beasts; he is brutal.

The Malevolent Affections are also modified by a regard to the circumstances of the object of them, as compared with our own circumstances. Malevolent Pain at the Good which happens to another, and at our own Want of this Good, is Envy.

140 Contempt can hardly be called a malevolent feeling; for we may despise persons without hating them. Contempt consists rather in an estimate of a man as below a certain Standard of Character, to which our Esteem is given. We despise a man for Cowardice, because we admire Courage. The verb despise, (despicio, to look down upon,) shows that such a view is implied. The word Scorn implies a condemnation of this kind, so strong that it approaches to Indignation. The expression of contempt, in a marked manner, is an Insult. If the discrepance of the con

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templated character with the assumed standard be extravagant, so as to excite a sudden and poignant feeling of Incongruity, our Contempt expresses itself in Laughter. The character is regarded as ridiculous.

141 There are various modifications of character and conduct which arise from the greater or less Energy of the affections, and appear as Virtues or as Vices. The feelings of Love of Right, and Anger at Wrong, in a permanent and energetic form, are virtuous Zeal. Courage, the habit of mind which rejects Fear, is allied to this virtue; as is Fortitude, the habit of not yielding to Pain. From such dispositions of mind, arise Energy and Activity in action; which are important virtues when the action is virtuous.

142 Though Hope and Fear are not simple Affections (37), they operate in increasing or diminishing our energy and activity, as the Affections do. The Disposition in which the emotion of Hope predominates is also termed Hope, or Hopefulness. Joy and Joyfulness describe rather Delight produced by some special event, than any permanent Disposition; but Cheerfulness, like Hopefulness, is rather an habitual Disposition; and when governed by Rules of Duty, is an auxiliary Virtue. A tranquil yet cheerful flow of the spirits keeps the thoughts and feelings in a condition suitable to virtuous action. The want of activity and energy is Sluggishness, Sloth, Idleness, Laziness, Indolence; which are habits alien to virtue, and connected with the Vice of Apathy, the absence of lively affections and desires. As the influence of Fear predominates, the character becomes timid, and tends to Cowardice, the opposite of Courage. Such habits are at variance with the Rules of Duty; for these Rules often direct us in a course which leads through Danger, either to the Person or Fortune of the Actor, or to the Good-will which others feel for him. In order that a man may act rightly, he must act freely, independently. Men wanting in Independence of Character, and seeking the favour of others, without regard to moral Rules, are slavish, servile, obsequious, cringing, fawning; they are Flatterers and Sycophants. Such dispositions make men abject and base. The want of cheerfulness and hopefulness is Despondency, Dejection, Sullenness, Melancholy, Gloom; which are habits of mind adverse to active virtue. The theological moralists have made Acedia (akndia), Apathy with regard to Good, one of their seven deadly sins.

143 We have placed here the Virtues and Vices which are

connected with Energy or Zeal, because these qualities depend very much upon the strength of the Affections. They depend also, however, upon the Habits of Mind by which the intention is directed. The energetic man decides soon and conclusively what course to take. This is Decision. Energy also manifests itself in Fixity of Purpose. When the purpose is once formed, the energetic man's course is determined; his doubts are resolved; and he goes on in spite of difficulty and danger. This is Determination, Resolution. A man who adheres to his purpose, in spite of strong motives to draw him away, is firm; but if the motives which he resists are reasonable, he is obstinate. Firmness implies a good cause; Obstinacy a bad one. Energy and Zeal may also become extreme, so as to trespass upon Benevolence. In this case they are Overzeal, Vehemence, Harshness, Impatience.

Zeal, operating through the Reason, is Earnestness, which leads to Seriousness. With this quality, Cheerfulness is not inconsistent, but Levity is. Care sometimes implies only so much attention as Earnestness requires; at other times, it implies more than is consistent with Cheerfulness. It is right to take Care, but it is not necessary to be full of Care. It is wrong to be careless, reckless. A disposition to attend to trifles only is Frivolity.

144 Connected with the pleasures of Cheerfulness, there are pleasures which show themselves externally in good-humoured Laughter; as the pleasures of Jesting and the like. These arise from intellectual acts, and may be spoken of hereafter; but we may here remark, that under the influence of Levity, they lead to mere Merriment, Buffoonery, Folly.

2 Virtues of the Mental Desires.

145 Property is the Conception about which the Cardinal virtue of Justice is especially concerned; and hence the dispositions and habits of mind which regard Property, have Justice for their leading virtue. Yet Wealth, and Property of all kinds, may be used as a means of Benevolence; and from this use, arise Virtues; as Charity, already mentioned, Liberality (a willingness to give), and the like. Wealth may be desired as a means either to such ends, or to different ones. Hence the Disposition which aims at acquisition, may be virtuous or vicious, according to the ulterior object. A man may desire Wealth as a means of Luxury and Sensuality; and in such a case, the Desire of Wealth is opposed to Temperance, rather than to Justice.

The Desire of the means of Subsistence is an universal and necessary Desire. A Wish for a Competence,-for so much property as may free a man from solicitude respecting common needs and common enjoyments,-is not opposed either to Justice or to Temperance. The prospect of Poverty and Penury; the pressure of Privation and Want; the sense of Dependence upon others;greatly tend to disturb the influence of virtue in the mind. The Fear of these evils is not a vice. Also wealth may be desired as a means of benevolent action, or of right action, in many other ways. A person's power of doing good, of many kinds, depends much upon the Station and Influence which wealth bestows.

146 But though wealth may be desired for ends which make the Desire virtuous; the progress of men's habits is such that, when sought at first as a means, it is afterwards desired as an end. The Desire to acquire money is then unlimited; and is Covetousness, Avarice. The man's greediness in desiring is Cupidity: his eagerness in taking, is Rapacity. He scrapes and hoards. He spares carefully and spends unwillingly: he is parsimonious, niggardly, penurious. His solicitude and privations make him miserable. He is a Miser.

On the other hand, such habits of care, with regard to sparing and spending, as may tend to avoid Poverty and Privation, are reckoned as Virtues; such virtues are Economy, Frugality. By these, a man thrives or grows in his possessions: he is thrifty. A person who is destitute of these qualities is an Unthrift. A willingness to give is Liberality, Generosity, Bountifulness; which are reckoned Virtues. But this disposition may be excessive: the man is then lavish, extravagant.

147 Property conveys Power to the Possessor: but there are also many other Sources of Power. Whoever aims at a larger share of Power than his neighbours possess, is, so far, regardless of Justice. The Desire of Power is Ambition. But the Desire of Power for good ends, and the Desire of the Power which moral excellence gives, may be termed laudable Ambition.

The Disposition which represses our own desires, whether of money, power, victory, or any other object, and contemplates the desires and claims of other persons with equal favour, is Fairness. This is a kind of personal application of Justice, to questions between ourselves and others. Impartiality is more commonly used for the Fairness which decides justly between two other persons.

3 Virtues connected with Truth.

148 We have mentioned (127) some of the names of the Virtues connected with Truth; as Truthfulness, Veracity. These express a conformity of our words to the reality. The conformity of our actions to our Engagements, whether express or implied, is Fidelity, Good Faith. Thus a subject is faithful to the engagement which binds him to the Sovereign of the State. If, in such a case, Love is added to Fidelity, it becomes Loyalty.

A man who says what he knows to be untrue, is a Liar. He is guilty of Falsehood. A man who says what he thinks, is sincere. Such a man shows himself what he is. A man who conceals some important part of his feelings or thoughts, dissembles. When he assumes the appearance of virtues which he really does not possess, he is a Hypocrite. By such means men impose upon others, and deceive them.

Lies and Deceit are often used as means of Fraud; which is an offense against Property, and therefore contrary to Justice as well as Truth. A person who defrauds, circumvents, cheats any one, must be destitute both of Justice and of Truth. Property and Language may both be considered as Universal Contracts, to which the whole human race are parties; Fraud by means of Falsehood violates both these Contracts.

A man free from all fraudulent dispositions is honest; he is a man of Probity. He is not drawn aside, by the desire of gain, to act obliquely, tortuously, in a crooked manner. He is straightforward, and upright. His intentions, words, and actions, form a whole in which there is no inconsistent part. This is Integrity. A deceitful man may have two purposes; one, apparent, simulated, declared; the other secretly held, but dissembled, till it can be acted on. To have two purposes in this way is Duplicity. The truthful person, on the contrary, has Simplicity for a part of his character: he has Singleness of Purpose, Singleness of Heart. He is frank and open, showing himself as he really is.

4 Virtues relating to the Bodily Desires.

149 The gratification of the Appetites or Bodily Desires, to a certain extent, and under certain conditions, is requisite for the continuance of the individual and of the species, and therefore is not vicious. These Desires being mere attributes of the Body,