102 Man, recognizing Moral Rules as the necessary conditions of his being (67), and recognizing Punishment as a necessary means of giving reality to such Rules (83), recognizes himself as liable to Punishment for transgression of Moral Rules. Even before he learns what the consequences to himself of transgression will be, he knows that he is exposed to those consequences, whatever they may be. He must answer for his actions, when the demand is made by real authority; he is responsible. If his actions are condemned, the results of the condemnation fall upon him. On the other hand, if his actions are approved, the results of the approval belong to him. He deserves these results, whatever they may be. And thus he has a Sense of Responsibility and a Sentiment of the Merit and Demerit of Actions. 103 When man has distinguished actions in general, according to their Moral Character, as good or bad; and has assigned to them Merit or Demerit; he must, in order to apply these distinctions, judge of particular actions, and determine to which moral class they belong. His judgments, both in the adoption of Moral Rules, and in the application of them to particular actions, must be formed by the use of his Reason. By the use of his Reason, dealing with all the elements of the human constitution within him, and the world without him, he is led to Convictions, both as to Rules and as to Facts; both as to what has been done, and by whom, and what is its Merit or Demerit. 104 The Moral Sentiments are further unfolded and expanded by action, habit and thought. And this process is the Moral Cultivation or Moral Education of Man. This Cultivation and Education depend upon various conditions, and are promoted or extended by various causes. Among these, we may notice the influence of one man upon another, in affecting his Moral Sentiments, or the application of them to actions. We have already spoken of the influence exercised by the parents upon the child, in educing his moral nature (47). But in many other ways, as well as in this, men exercise an influence in modifying each other's Moral Sentiments and Convictions. Men may, by speaking, by writing, by all the modes of the intercourse of life, direct the course of other men's thoughts; and thus affect their judgment of what is right and what is wrong, and their feelings with regard to actions and persons. And the exercise of such influence, by one man upon another, is an important kind of Action; and one for which the Agent is responsible, as well as for any actions which directly affect his primary Rights. 105 Virtues are, as we have said (91), the Habits of the Soul, or the Dispositions of the Soul (92) by which men perform Duties and it is their being thus Habits and Dispositions of the Soul which gives them their peculiar moral character: the Soul being, as we have said (65), that central unity of man's being in which all the elements of human action, affection, desire, thought, will, purpose, operate upon each other and are operated upon by external causes; for instance, by such Moral Cultivation and Moral Education as have just been mentioned. Moral Cultivation and Moral Education, whether produced by internal activity or by external influence, tend to produce in the Soul a conformity, actual and habitual, to the Supreme Rule of Human Action: they tend to make men do and feel on each occasion, what is right, and direct them to an internal Rightness. But what it is on each occasion right to do and to feel-what is the description of habitual and internal Rightness, are points which require to be further explained: and this is the object of the following Books. NOTE. We have already seen (79) that the expression of the Supreme Rule of Human Action must involve, among other terms, Rights. We have also seen (80) that there are five primary kinds of Rights-the Rights of the Person, of Property, of Contract, of Marriage, and of Government. Further, we have seen (96) that though these Rights, as general Conceptions, are necessary and universal conditions of Human Action; the Definitions of each Right in each particular Community is given by the Law of that Community; which Law is determined by historical events as well as by moral con siderations. In the first edition of this work, examples of such Definitions of Rights were given, by collecting from the Roman and from the English Law, the Rules which have been established by Legislators, by Custom, and by Jurists, concerning each of the five kinds of Rights, -those of the Person, of Property, of Contract, of Marriage, and of Government. This summary of positive Law is however not necessary for the moral dis cussions to which we have now to proceed: and may be reserved till, having established our moral doctrines, we are ready to examine what Laws ought to be. BOOK II. MORALITY. OF VIRTUES AND DUTIES. CHAPTER I. OF MORAL PRECEPTS. 106 By the constitution of our human nature, we are necessarily led to assume and refer to a Supreme Rule of human action; and to conceive human actions, our own and those of other men, to be absolutely right, when they are conformable to this Rule. In order that such a Rule may have a definite form in human Society, men must have Rights; and must also have their Obligations, corresponding, in each man, to the Rights of others. The real existence of Rights and Obligations is a condition requisite for the definite application of the Supreme Rule of Human Action: for, by the existence of Rights and Obligations, the objects of human desire and affection assume such a general and abstract form, that they may be made the subjects of Rules of Action. These points have been discussed and established in the First Book. The Rights and Obligations which really exist among men are regulated by Laws, or Customs equivalent to Laws. Such Laws, the definitions of Rights and Obligations in each community, are determined in each community by its history (97); and may be, and are different in different communities. But in every community such Laws or Customs must subsist, and must define men's Rights and Obligations. Especially they must define the F |