to say further, that the consideration of the improvement of existing Laws is not neglected nor treated slightly in our system. With those who think that Loyalty to the Laws, the Constitution, and the Sovereign, ought never to be mentioned by the Moralist, except to be repudiated and condemned, we do not aspire to agree.

10 In the same way, it is made an objection, that I teach (Art. 844) that "whatever be its origin, the Constitution of our Country is a worthy object of our fidelity, reverence, and affection."

That a reverence for the Constitution is no new doctrine, nor one confined to servile minds, I have shown by quotations from English and American writers, in Articles 835, 853, and other places. That it is difficult to express, in general terms, the mode in which such reverence for the existing Constitution is to be combined with a desire to improve it, I have also said. That there may be cases in which a great change, amounting to what is called a Revolution, is necessary, I have also stated: but I have abstained, and give reasons why the Moralist must abstain, from attempting to define such cases beforehand. Perhaps, too, an Englishman who reverences the Constitution of his own country may too readily presume that something of the same reverence is due to the Constitution of every country.

11

What is evidently intended to be stated, in thus speaking of the Constitution of every Country, as being a worthy object of reverence and affection, is that the Constitution of every Country has in it something which is suited to the national character and the result of the national history; and is therefore the best basis for political improvements. Perhaps it would

have been more exact to say that "The Constitution of the Country has claims upon our fidelity, reverence, and affection." It is a fit object of such sentiments, as being the National Constitution; but its claims may be neutralized by its defects as a Constitution, and by the impossibility of producing a Reform by constitutional means.

§ 6. Marriage by Parental Authority.

1 Objector. "Even in a matter so personal as Marriage, the usage and practice of the country is to be a permanent law, according to Dr W. He says, (232), 'In some countries the marriage of the child is a matter usually managed by the parents.

In such cases, it is the child's duty to bring the affections as far as possible into harmony with the custom.'"

2 To this objection I can only reply, as in other cases, Is there any Moralist who holds that it is not so? Observe, we do not say that it is the duty of the child to marry at the command of the parent, even in such countries, without suitable affections; but that, supposing that matter settled, and the child (daughter, for instance,) must and does marry at the parent's command, we say that it is her duty to bring her affections into harmony with the conjugal relation. I am at a loss to understand what other advice the Moralist can give. Is he to say that, if the marriage be the result of external command, it is a virtue and a duty in the parties to keep up sentiments of indifference or aversion?

3 In truth, may we not go further, and say that such an accommodation of the affections to our condition is not only right, but peculiarly virtuous? Is it not true that, in times and places where such a custom is established, (and we know that there have been and are such,) the most amiable dispositions and tempers, the best regulated minds, the persons of the most kindly, pure, and sincere characters, do especially take this course, of conforming their affections to their conjugal circumstances, as regulated for them by their natural guardians? Such conformity is regarded as an eminent virtue, in the countries where such usages prevail. We ought to be very sure that the opposite teaching is an improvement, before we venture to introduce it into our Morality.

§ 7. Slavery Laws.

1 Objector. "According to Dr W., The Laws of the State are to be observed, even when they enact Slavery." (Art. 434).

2 In the Second Edition Dr Whewell has changed "observed," into "submitted to." The best explanation of the limitations under which Dr W. says this, are to be found in the Chapter itself.

3 I do not know whether any Moralist holds a different opinion from that here objected to;—whether there are moralists who hold that we have a moral right to go into countries where Slavery exists, authorized and upheld by the laws, and to disregard these laws. For instance: Abraham had slaves; servants who were born in his house and bought with his money (Gen. xvii. 23). Would it have been right in any of his contemporaries to hire or deal with these slaves, as if they had not been slaves? The Apostle

Paul exhorts slaves to submit to their masters cheerfully. Would it have been more truly moral in him to tell them that the Laws which established slavery were not to be submitted to? He sends back a fugitive slave to Philemon: would it have been more laudable to have kept the slave, and taught him that he could not justly be held as a slave? There may be many persons who would answer in the affirmative to these questions: but the other side, that it was right in these cases to submit to the Law of Slavery, is not so manifestly immoral as to be disposed of merely by mentioning it. The maxim that such a Law is not to be submitted to, leads to great difficulties and doubtful advantages, as I have shown.

4 And let it be observed, that when we say that such Laws are to be submitted to, while they exist; we say this in conjunction with the strongest expressions which we can use, asserting the duty of all States to abolish Slavery; and of all persons to do all in their power to promote such a result. "Wherever Slavery exists," it had just been said, (433) “its Abolition must be one of the great objects of every good man."

5 Moreover we hold a belief that such a submission to the Laws, while they exist, combined with such a constant effort to produce a reform in the laws, is the most hopeful mode of promoting the abolition of slavery, and the course most beneficial for the slaves themselves. This may be a mistake; but at any rate it is an opinion not arising from any love of slavery or toleration for it. Besides this Art. 434 &c., see 855.

6 But it may be rejoined, "This submission to Slavery Laws is a matter of prudence, not a matter of right." I am not very solicitous to stand upon the distinction, if it be granted that to submit to the Law is the course which we ought to take. That in a certain loose sense, Slavery is contrary to the Natural Rights of Man, I am quite willing to allow; and to express the doctrine with any amount of emphasis which is likely to be of efficacy in promoting the abolition of slavery. Why I do not commonly use such language, I have given reasons, when I have spoken of the difficulty, (indeed the impossibility) of establishing any list of such Natural Rights (Art. 421). I have stated in what sense Rights may be said to be indefeasible and inalienable. I have stated that such assertions cannot be understood, as if the Laws limiting or taking away such Rights were ipso facto null and void. I have given a whole Chapter on Slavery, the object of which is to show that Slavery is inconsistent with any above the lowest degree of

Morality in a State. I have stated that though we cannot point. out or define any Law of Nature, different from the existing customary Laws of Nations, yet that we must hold fast to the truth which is intended to be expressed by those who speak of this Law of Nature; namely, that the existing Laws ought to be improved, so as to make them more completely correspond to the Moral Nature of Man.

§ 8. Rights of Animals.

1 In speaking of the objection, that in our System, we really draw our conclusions from the effect of Rules in increasing Human Happiness, I have said that such an effect does prove Rules to be moral, provided we lay due stress upon the attribute Human, and consider what it implies. But those who have been wont to deduce all Rules of action from their effect in increasing human happiness, have of late shown a disposition to reject the limitation which this adjective implies, and to take into account the increase of the happiness, or pleasures, of animals, as a ground of Rules of action. This appears to me to be a reductio ad absurdum of the "greatesthappiness principle." That the pleasures of pigs and geese are to be weighed against the pleasures of men, in order to obtain Moral Rules, is so wide a deviation from the general sentiments of mankind, that such a doctrine appears to be a sufficient refutation of the principles from which it flows. At any rate we may ask for some proof of the principle, that we are to take into account the pleasures of animals, as well as the pleasures of men, in framing our moral system. For that we are to regulate our actions so as to give the greatest pleasure to the whole animal creation, is certainly not a self-evident principle. It is not only not an obvious, but to most persons, not a tolerable doctrine, that we may sacrifice the happiness of men, provided we can in that way produce an overplus of pleasure to cats, dogs and hogs, not to say lice and fleas.

2 To this it is objected, that kindness to animals is a duty (as we also have said, Art. 967); that it is generally allowed to be immoral to give animals unnecessary pain, or to treat them with cruelty; that thus their pleasures are recognized as a ground of Moral Rules.

It is further added, that Laws have been made by the English Legislature, making cruelty to animals a crime, and assigning to it a punishment; and this, it is held, invests animals with Rights.

3 In reply to this, we say that animals may doubtless be the objects of Moral Rule. Cruelty to animals is a vicious and odious

disposition, as cruelty to men is. It involves something of the same want of kindly affections; and arises in the same way from not repressing fierce and savage emotions, and from regarding pain with indifference, or even with gratification. Cruelty to animals is the natural associate of cruel dispositions towards man. It was a cruel tyrant who took pleasure in killing flies. The Hebrew Proverb (Prov. xii. 10) appears to imply this, when it says, "The righteous man regardeth the life of his beast: (much more of men:) but the tender mercies (the kindest thoughts) of the wicked are cruel." And the consideration of the way in which the Creator has provided for the pleasures of animals, naturally leads a religious man to shrink from needlessly giving them pain.

4 But this is a very different matter from regarding the pleasures of animals as deserving the same kind of regard with those of men. Man alone is the Moral Creature, for he alone can conceive Rules of Action;-can judge of actions as right and wrong, and cannot help perpetually forming such judgments. And hence, the purpose and aim of Moral Rules is the relation of man with man; and every other bearing of such Rules is subordinate to this. Cruelty to animals is odious and wrong, mainly as manifesting a want of the kindliness which human intercourse demands.

5 And for the same reason-the peculiar moral character of man-man alone can properly be said to have Rights. Rights are expressions of the relations of man to man. Rights are attributes of Persons. Animals are not Persons; they are, so far as the question of Rights is concerned, Things; Things, no doubt, on which may be exercised actions right and wrong, dispositions good and bad; as there may on other things also. But we cannot speak of the Rights of Animals, without forfeiting all the exactness of expression which the Doctrine of Rights requires.

6 No doubt, in a certain loose and popular sense, we may say that animals have a Right to be treated with kindness; meaning that it is right so to treat them: just as we may say that savage nations have a Right to receive from us the benefits of civilization. But to speak in this manner would be to renounce all pretension to distinct and definite meaning in discussing International Rights. Just so to speak of the Right of a hackneycoach horse not to be overworked or galled, would confuse all classification of human Rights, which are the especial matter of Laws.

7 "But have not the English Laws, by condemning and punishing the overworking and tormenting of horses, given these

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