2 I reply, that any one, looking at the book itself, will see that the Morality does not depend on the Law. The enumeration of the Primary kinds of Rights (80) is a step towards the determination of what is right and what is wrong: for it is wrong, among other things, to violate men's Rights. But the general determination of what is right and what is wrong, is carried on by means of the Principle that the rightness and wrongness of actions goes far beyond their legal character;-depends upon the Springs of Action from which they proceed; (108)-and includes in its domain the whole being of man. This Principle at once makes Morality far higher and wider and deeper than Law. Law is not the foundation of Morality, but an indication of its place and form;-not the groundwork, but the guide-post.

3 In one sense indeed Morality depends upon Law, in our System; and just as much, according to every scheme of Morals that ever was recognized among men. Law supplies the Definitions of some of the terms which morality employs; and without these definitions, Moral Rules would be indefinite, unmeaning and inapplicable. Morality says, You shall not seek or covet another man's property: Law defines what is another man's property. Morality says, You shall not desire her who is another's wife: Law determines whether she be his wife. Morality says, Willingly obey and wisely rule, according to your station in society: Law determines what your station is. In this way, certainly, our Moral Precepts depend for their actual import on Law. But it does not appear how we can have any moral precepts which do not depend upon Law in this sense. To what purpose does Morality say to me, Do not desire the house, or the field, or the authority which is another's, if I am allowed to take out of the hands of the Law the decision of the matter, what or who is another's, and to decide it myself some other way? We, certainly, do not think it a degradation to listen to the voice of Law, when Law pronounces about matters which especially belong to her;-matters which no other voice can decide, and which must be decided. So far as this, we accept from Law the determination of certain fixed points in the external world of things, in order that in the internal world of thought and will there may be something to determine the direction which thought and will must take.

4 That there is no ground for the objection that we make Law the basis of Morality in any other sense than this, the necessary and universally allowed sense, must appear abundantly to any one who reads the book. See Articles 364, 365, and again 396, &c.

In no instance, in this work, are the special maxims of Law referred to as in any other manner determining our Duties; except in a few cases to suggest the limitations of Duty: as Art. 312, the Law which does not permit us to kill the diurnal burglar, or the flying robber, is referred to for the purpose of showing that moderate danger does not justify acts of violence and blood: and the inference is, not that Morality is to be judged by Law, but that if Law require so much moderation and humanity, morality must require much more. And this is the very principle by which we establish our Moral Rule: namely that Morality must be something far beyond Law;-something deeper, higher, wider, purer, brighter; the precious metal of which Law is a fragment of the rude ore;-the living tree of which Law is the dried fruit.

St. Why five Fundamental Rights?

1 We enumerate (Art. 35, &c.) five Desires or Needs, as the leading Springs of human action: and (Art. 80) five Primary kinds of Rights. But why, it is asked, do these Rights so exactly correspond to the five Desires? Why, as it has been put in a lively way, are they so exactly face to face with the Springs of Action;so many Policemen, watching so many Thieves? To this it has been replied, by those who urge the question as an objection, that it is so because the Rights are merely the Desires over again, only appearing in other people instead of ourselves. Each man's "Rights of the Person" are only the legitimate part of his Desire of Personal Safety; and so of the rest.

2 I do not know why this correspondence of the two parts of our system should be alleged as an objection. It appears to be rather an evidence of coherence. The constitution of Society, as a system of instituted Rights, corresponds to the constitution of Man, as a system of Desires that need regulation and control. If the enumeration of Fundamental Rights be correct, there must be so many impulses in man which require and produce them. If the enumeration of Leading Desires be true, there must be so many Rights which mark the sphere of their legitimate gratification. These Leading Desires must be capable of being gratified in a tranquil and legitimate manner, in order that man may aim at higher objects. The Policemen control the Thieves, that men may be able to do something better than merely look to their pockets, or avoid being knocked down.

3 But it is not exact to say that the Rights are merely the Desires in other persons. They are more than this; they are the

results of Rules directing and controlling the Desires ;—making their gratification legitimate by being Rules. And these Rules, though they have for their origin the same Desires in other persons, have also other elements in their origin, and other purposes than merely to control the Desires. They have, as a part of their origin, man's faculty of conceiving and applying Rules, and of conforming his Desires and Actions to them.

4 Even this would not make them Rights, but only Laws; but they have further, as a part of their origin, that they are right; that is that they are conformable to the Supreme Rule of man's nature. Right Rules controlling each man's Desires so that they may be in harmony, and in equilibrium with the Desires of others, do establish Rights: the conflict of Desires without such Rules does not.

§ 5. Is Respect for Authority a Duty?

1 An objector says, "We find Dr W. everywhere inculcating, as one of the most sacred duties, reverence for superiors, even when personally undeserving."

2 In the first place, I must remark that I have said nothing about "sacred duties," still less about "the most sacred duties." I do not make a scale of duties, or of the sacredness of duties.

I say (Art. 176), “"Reverence for Superiors is a Duty:"—simply, " is a Duty." And I would ask the objector, Is it not? At least it has commonly been so reckoned by all moralists, sacred and profane. Are we not to acknowledge an order of society in which there are superiors and inferiors? We, at least, acknowledge such an order. And how do we acknowledge it really and morally, if we have no affections corresponding to it? We say that obedience to Law and Authority are Obligations binding upon us in general.Are they not? And that these Obligations ought in general to have a moral signification, a moral value.-Ought they not? In general, we say; or marking the conditions more precisely, when the Law is just; when the Authority is rightful.

3 Is not this the common voice both of mankind in general, and of the loftiest moralists? Is not Socrates admired for his obedience to Law? Is he not admired for it, even by those who think the Law unjust and cruel? And St Paul allows himself to be rebuked for lack of reverence to the Judge in his seat; and himself quotes the text, "Thou shalt not speak evil of the Ruler of thy people." And, regarding him merely as a human moralist, do not other moralists agree with him? Are not persons disapproved

of and condemned for want of loyalty, for sedition, treason, rebellion? Does not this disapprobation, this moral condemnation, assume that loyalty to the sovereign, reverence for the laws and the constitution, are qualities approved, admired, loved: in short, are regarded as Virtues?

4 But it is objected, that we reckon reverence for superiors a duty, even when the superior is personally undeserving.-We have nowhere said so. We have said (Art. 176), that we readily believe that the superior has that goodness, which combined with authority, is the natural object of reverence. Is it not a good habit of mind, to have this readiness of belief, and to suppose such goodness, till we have grounds for believing that it does not exist? Is not this habit of mind characteristic of a good man?

5 But it may be said, "It is right to admire those only who are personally deserving." We reply, that Reverence for Superiors is a different sentiment from approbation and admiration of virtue and merit. However the two sentiments may be related to each other, they are not identical. As we have said, the recognition of the position of our superiors, joined with the habit of giving a moral meaning to everything, makes us willing to suppose that they are good, and therefore deserving of reverence. But if there come before us evidence that this is not so, we have not said that the sentiment of reverence should remain unchanged. If this be so,—if we find that persons to whom, on account of their station and relation to us, our love and reverence are due, are still such personally as we cannot love and reverence, there is necessarily a struggle between opposing feelings; between the sentiments due to their position and the sentiments due to their personal character. And this may be the case, not only with regard to political superiors, but also to persons who stand in other relations to us; as father, mother, brother, sister, husband, wife, child, any near relative, guardian, governor, master, tutor. Most persons will allow, with regard to some of these relatives at least, that when we cannot love, and reverence, and respect them, there must be a struggle, a painful struggle, of feeling. And that there is such a struggle, is evidence of the existence of a sentiment of reverence and respect founded upon the relation, which has to contend with another sentiment, a moral disapproval founded upon the personal character.

6 Moreover such a struggle, in such a case, is, by almost every one, regarded as evidence of a right state of feeling. A person whose heart is painfully wrung by such a struggle is ap

proved and admired, far more than if he could condemn, dislike and despise a blameable father or mother, without any struggle at all. And with regard to civil governors,-to Kings and Queens, -the same views have generally prevailed. The most ardent lovers of liberty in the English civil wars of the seventeenth century had, at first at least, a reverence for the king on the ground of his station. Those who had not, Vane for instance, who said that he would shoot him as soon as another man in battle, were looked upon with horrour. This was Loyalty; and the general admiration for this virtue (even if it have its limits, or may cease to be a virtue under certain circumstances,) cannot be assumed to be absurd, without some proof that it is so.

7 But it may be objected, "such a sentiment-Loyalty irrespective of personal desert-is servile."-Granted that it is a different sentiment from the Love of Liberty; granted that it may be in certain cases antagonistic to the Love of Liberty; still the two antagonistic sentiments may both be right, both be virtuous; just as love to a person, and indignation at a wrong, are sentiments which may be in many cases antagonistic, and yet may both be right. All depends upon the circumstances of the case, and the balance of sentiments adjusted thereto, according to moral

considerations.

8 I say that Loyalty and Love of Liberty may be, in certain cases, antagonistic: but they are not necessarily so. Even when the personal qualities of the Ruler are not the ground of their coincidence, they may coincide in their general conception, as the word Loyalty shows. Loyalty originally meant Love of Law, and of the Ruler as the Upholder of Law, in opposition to the insolence and instability arising from uncontrolled self-will.

9 I am aware that it is natural for some persons, and especially for those who most aspire to improve the existing morality of society, to look to writers on morality for principles, by the application of which existing laws may be improved, and made conformable to a higher moral standard than regulates them at present. And this is a just and reasonable expectation. But the expectation often leads them to expect that moral writers should occupy themselves mainly with the suggestion of such changes. Now I conceive that a general Body of Morality could not be framed on the scheme thus demanded: for such a work must be employed mainly in treating of private duties, and of the duty of self-improvement; not of the duty of changing the Laws. At most, this last is only one duty among many. And I venture