23 The natural operation of man's mind, elevating material objects into abstractions, thus puts mental in the place of bodily desires. But man not only abstracts and generalizes from external objects, he also turns his mental eye inward, and reflects upon his own internal world, his feelings, motives and purposes. And then again he reflects upon the result of these first reflections; and thus his thoughts work forwards and backwards, again and again, like the light in a globe of glass, so that it is difficult to say how many reflections of the light there are, and which is the last. In this way his pleasures and interests, his motives and designs, are transformed and complicated, so that it becomes very difficult to analyze and classify them. Yet those who have attempted to enumerate the Springs of Human Action have naturally not omitted those thus arising from reflection. Thus we have Mr Bentham's class of "Self-regarding Pleasures and Pains," with the corresponding "Selfregarding Interest." And we have, among Mr Stewart's Active Powers, two, besides those which we have hitherto noticed; namely, "Self-love" and "the Moral Faculty." The assumption of these two principles of Mr Stewart may lead to considerable debate. The first may lead to the question whether Self-regard, Self-love, and the like, be proper objects of the blame which is generally bestowed upon selfishness. And this question, in consequence of the habit of multiplied reflection of human thought, as I have said, is difficult to treat. Still, I think we may with advantage, enumerate, among the springs which move men's thoughts, and consequently their actions, those Reflex Sentiments which arise when they turn their thoughts upon themselves; as the Desire of Esteem from others, and the Desire of our own Approval.

24 But esteem and approval imply a moral judgment already formed: they imply a practice of regarding actions and dispositions as good or bad, right or wrong. Is such a judgment an original and elementary endowment of man? Has he a Moral Faculty? Mr Stewart, as I have said, holds that we have such a Faculty, and makes it one of his Active Powers, dwelling upon it and its consequences at considerable length. I do not think that this assumption of a special Moral Faculty is a convenient mode of treating Morality: for we must, in the determining what actions and dispositions the Moral Faculty selects for approbation and disapprobation, give reasons: and thus the Reason comes to be the Faculty which we really employ in forming such judgments. But the sentiments of approbation and disapprobation which result from our judgment of things as right and wrong, however formed,

become in themselves powerful Springs of Action, combining with and modifying all the others. These Moral Sentiments, therefore, as we may especially term them, Approbation and Disapprobation, must be introduced as forming a necessary sequence to the Desires which merely aim at pleasure or shun pain, and to the affections, which seek a good or repel an evil, without consulting the Reason.

I have thus offered my reasons for the arrangement which in the Elements of Morality I have given of the Springs of Human Action; and for preferring this arrangement and analysis to that of other writers.

CHAPTER II.

OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED.

§ 1. Reasoning in a Circle.

1 I HAVE said that the adjective right, used absolutely, means conformable to a supreme Rule; and that for what is thus absolutely right, no higher reason can be given. Why must I do what is right? Because it is right (Art. 76).

And the same is true of the other ways of expressing the Supreme rule. Why should I do what I ought? Because I ought. No higher reason can be given.

It is plain that if any one, instead of accepting this account, as a notice of what we mean by right, ought, and the like, should take one of these related terms, as giving a reason for the other, he might produce "reasonings in a circle" of the most palpable kind. As thus: Why must I do what is right? Because I ought. Why ought I? Because it is my Duty. Why is it my Duty? Because it is right. And so on.

2 On such reasonings, I have to remark, that the Because, thus used, is none of mine. I have not only given no such reasons, but have said expressly that they are not to be given.

Nevertheless an objector has pretended to educe from what I have said, such reasonings as these; and has numbered these reasonings in an elaborate manner, with the notice; "This is vicious circle the first:" "This is vicious circle the second:" "This is vicious circle the third."

3 But the objection will perhaps be followed out thus: To

construct a System of Morality, is to determine what is right: and how are you to do this, without giving some reasons for what you prohibit and what you enjoin: that is, some reasons why what is right, is right?

4 To this I reply, that I do give reasons for the precepts of Morality; but these reasons are given, not by extracting them out of the meaning or definition of right, ought, or the like: but by considering what the Supreme Rule of Human Action must be, according to the constitution and conditions of human nature.

As an intermediate step in the determination of this Supreme Rule, comes the establishment of certain Rights among men; as Personal Security, Property, Family, and the like. These are necessary conditions of men living in human society, and living under the sway of a Supreme Rule. A respect for such Rights is a part of what is right; it is the beginning of the right course of action and being. But Rights the substantive is a much narrower term than right the adjective, as I have shown B. 1. ch. iv.

The Objector has not attended to this distinction. He says, "While the meaning of ought is that we ought to respect Rights, it is a previous condition that Rights must be such as ought to be respected. Morality must conform to Law, but Law must first conform to Morality. This is vicious circle the second."

6 Neither the expressions nor the purport of these assertions are mine. I do not anywhere say that the meaning of ought is, that we ought to respect Rights. On the contrary, I say that the meaning of ought is much wider than this. The meaning of ought is that we ought to do what is right, whether or not the Rights of other persons require it.

Nor do I say that Rights must be such as ought to be respected: -though I might very truly say, that there must exist among men such Rights as those of the Person, of Property, of Family, and that these ought to be respected, as the necessary conditions of human actions. Such Rights ought to exist. But this is not my explanation of the meaning of ought; nor is such an explanation consistent with my views.

Nor do I say that "Morality must conform to Law, but Law must first conform to Morality." I say that Morality must conform to Law in general, and herein I believe all Moralists agree with me. What Moralist says that we may make our own definitions of property, marriage, and the like, disregarding the definitions of the Law? I say also that Law must be brought constantly more and more into conformity with Morality; that is, the Laws ought to be

constantly made more Moral; and again, What Moralist denies

this?

But though Morality and Law are thus connected, according to our Scheme, Morality and Law do not depend upon each other mutually, but rather, alternately; Morality improving Law, and Law defining Morality. See B. II. c. xix.

7 Again, the Objector says, "We wanted to know what Morality is, and Dr W. said it was conforming to Rights. We ask now how he knows that there are Rights, and he says that otherwise there could be no Morality. This is vicious circle the third.”

Dr Whewell has no where said that Morality is conforming to Rights; nor could say so, without entirely disregarding his own system. Morality is "doing what is right," which, as I have just said, is a much wider expression than "conforming to Rights.”

8 Dr Whewell does say that if there were no Rights there could be no Morality; and that this truth shows the necessity of Rights; and this he conceives may be and is proved very clearly. If there were no Personal Security, no Property, no Marriage, no Contract, no Government, there could be no Morality. This is a definite and fundamental proposition in his system of Morality, and is in no way liable to the charge of reasoning in a circle.

§ 2. Reasoning from Human Happiness.

1 Pursuing the objection just stated, it has been said that the mode in which the necessary existence of the Fundamental Rights of man is established in this system, is not, as is pretended, by showing that without them there could be no Morality, but by showing that they are necessary to the peace and comfort of society. And thus, it is asserted that we have recourse to the principle of increasing human happiness; which, in other places, we profess to repudiate.

2 That the existence and prevalence of Moral Rules promotes human happiness, we are quite ready and willing to assert. And even more than this;-that if there be any Rule which, by its prevalence, increases human happiness, rightly estimated, then this Rule is consistent with Morality, and is a part of Morality.

But this a very different thing from accepting a system which deduces all its Moral Rules from the Principle of increasing human happiness, and from that alone. Such a mode of deduction we reject, because we do not think that we can determine in all cases what does increase human happiness. The calculation is too vast, vague and complex.

Moreover we find that that there are other methods in which we can determine, much more easily and clearly, as we think, what is right. And we conceive that men in general do determine what is right by other methods, and that it was intended by their Maker that they should do so.

3 That the existence of Property, Marriage, Government, promote human happiness, we do not at all doubt. That their doing so is a reason why these institutions must exist, as attributes of human society, we readily join in asserting. That they are necessary in order that man may live in tolerable peace and comfort, is what we have said. That they are also necessary in order that man may live under the sway of moral rules, is in no way inconsistent with this. Nor is it inconsistent to put forwards both these necessities, as grounds for the existence of Property, Marriage and Government, among men. These Institutions are necessary, that man's life may be tolerable: they are necessary, that his condition may be social; they are necessary, that his course of action may be moral. Their ground is, that they are necessary to human happiness; their ground is also, that they are necessary to human morality.

4 Not only are these two grounds consistent, but they are closely connected. Human happiness cannot be conceived without introducing moral elements. The happiness, that is, the pleasures, of pigs and cows may be understood to consist of elements in which esteem, approbation, and the like sentiments, have no share: but the happiness of man cannot be understood without including such sentiments as these: and these are moral sentiments. That Property, Marriage, and other Human Institutions, increase human happiness is true: but we must lay a due stress on the adjective human. And if we do this, we shall have to recollect that man is, by his nature, a moral creature; and that no happiness is human which does not involve moral relations. And thus, the account of the ground of Property, Marriage, and the like, that they promote human happiness, is incomplete, unless we add, or understand as included in the account, that these Institutions are the necessary conditions of Morality.

§ 3. Founding Morality upon Law.

1 An objection has been made, that since we establish Rights, meaning legal Rights, as a step towards our System of Morals, our Morality is founded upon Law, and must be limited by Law.