to which it belongs, and as such, not to be violated by the belligerent: but it is plain that this analogy is too loose to be of any force. If the doctrine were true, it would be a violation of neutral Rights to seize contraband of war in the ship, or to resist breach of blockade. And it is plain that the analogy does not hold in other cases; for when a ship comes into a foreign port, she and all on board are subject to the jurisdiction of the foreign state. 1090 There is another kind of limitation of the maxim, "free vessels make free goods," which has also excited much discussion in modern times. This limitation has been termed the "Rule of 1756*," and is thus stated: "Neutrals are not allowed to engage in a trade with the colonies of belligerents during war, which trade is not allowed them during peace." In virtue of this Rule, the Stronger Naval belligerent Power enforces, during war, in order to distress its enemy, the same restrictions on commerce with the Colonies of the Weaker, which the Weaker itself had during peace enforced, in order to its own advantage. For, in all cases, European governments have, during peace, excluded other countries from the carrying trade between them and their colonies†. But in the Seven-years' War, begun in 1756, the French were prevented, by the maritime superiority of the British, from carrying on their colonial trade themselves. Upon this, they threw open the trade to neutrals; but Great Britain denied that neutrals had a Right to such a trade, and therefore acted upon the Rule of 1756 just stated. The consistency of the Rule with the common Rights of war is evident. Such an interposition of neutrals as was here attempted was a manifest assistance to France. It enabled colonies to hold out, which must otherwise have surrendered; supplied the mother-country with colonial produce and revenue; and enabled her to withdraw sailors from her merchant-service to man her fleet. It was a trade which the neutral had not possessed before the war; which he possessed, during the war, only in virtue of the British naval superiority; and which he would lose again on the restoration of peace. The neutrals exercise such a trade under the protection of the stronger naval power, and entirely to his damage. The prohibition of such a trade is no doubt a limitation of the Rights of Commerce; but, in this respect, the prohibition of a neutral from supplying the suppressed colonial trade of the weaker naval belligerent, does not differ from the prohibition of a neutral from supplying a blockaded town with food, or a defeated belligerent with arms. In such cases, the Rights of Manning, B. III. ch. v. * + Ibid. 1107 But again*, every sovereign State has the exclusive right of regulating the proceedings in its own courts of justice. This Rule is Lex fori. And the Lex loci contractus of another country cannot apply to such cases as are properly determined by the Lex fori of that State where the contract is brought in question. Thus if a Contract made in one Country is attempted to be enforced, or comes incidentally in question in the judicial tribunals of another, every thing relating to the forms of proceeding, the rules of evidence, and of limitation or prescription, is to be determined by the law of the State where the suit is pending, and not of that where the Contract was made. 1108 The municipal laws of most countries prohibit foreigners from holding Land within the territory of the State, because in most countries the Rights of Government are connected with the tenure of land, as was the case in Europe under the feudal system. In that case, the acquisition of land involved the notion of allegiance to the Sovereign within whose dominions it lay, which might be inconsistent with the allegiance which the proprietor owed to his native sovereign. 1109 The right of Succession, like the right of real property, was conceived to depend on the State, and to be a creature of the State. Hence, this right was denied to foreigners dying in the Country; and the Sovereign of the Country took their property. This Right of the Sovereign, as it existed in France, was termed jus albinatus (alibi-natus), and in French, droit d'aubaine. In such cases, the property was also said to escheat or fall (escheoir) to the King. 1110 Thus Laws which concern Property are, in their international application, mainly governed by the place. On the other hand, the laws which determine the Character and Condition of a person do, for the most part, accompany him with their effects into all places, wherever he may travel or reside. In general‡ the Laws of the State, applicable to the civil condition and personal capacity (status) of its citizens, operate upon them, even when resident in a foreign country. Such are the universal personal qualities which take effect, either from birth, as citizenship, legitimacy, illegitimacy; or at a fixed time after birth, as idiocy and lunacy, bankruptcy, marriage, and divorce, as ascertained by the judgment of a competent tribunal. The laws of the State affecting these personal qualities of its subjects, travel with them + Ibid. p. 138. Wheaton, P. II. c. ii. § 9. Ibid. I 141. wherever they go, and attach to them in whatever country they are resident. 1111 With regard to Marriage, indeed, it has two aspects, since it may be considered either as a contract, or as a personal status; and will be governed by the Lex loci contractus, or by the original country of the parties, as the one view or the other is taken. The Law of England adopts the former course: a clandestine marriage in Scotland, of parties originally domiciled in England, who resort to Scotland for the sole purpose of evading the English marriage act, (which requires the consent of parents or guardians), is considered valid in the English ecclesiastical courts. The same principle has been recognized between the different States of the American Union. By the French Law, on the other hand, the age of consent which is required by the Code is considered as a personal quality of French subjects, following them wherever they remove; and consequently, a marriage by a Frenchman under the required age, will not be regarded as valid by the French tribunals, though the parties may have been above the age required by the law of the place where the marriage was contracted. 1112 With regard to penal Laws, it is a principle generally acknowledged among jurists*, that the penal Laws of one State have no operation in another State. Hence a person convicted as a criminal in one country is not, on that account, to be treated as a criminal by the Government of another country. Nor does it appear to be a Right generally acknowledged, or a part of the Law and Usage of Nations, that offenders, charged with a high crime, who have fled from the country where the crime has been committed, should be delivered up and sent back for trial, by the Sovereign of the Country where they are found. But though this Extradition of Criminals may not be a matter of general International Law, it is often a matter of compact between States. It is voluntarily practised by certain States, as a matter of general convenience and comity. And it is held by moralists that it is the duty of the Government where the criminal is, to deliver him up; and that if it refuses to do so, it becomes, in some measure, an accomplice in the crime. 1113 There are some offenses which alter their character, according as they are committed by a subject or an alien. Thus an alien who bears arms against the Sovereign of the Country is dealt with by the laws of war; but the subject who does so is guilty of treason. He violates his Allegiance. Hence it becomes important to determine from whom Allegiance is due to each Sovereign, and how far this tie may be cast aside or transferred. 1114 There are two extreme opinions on this latter point. According to one, the tie which connects a man with his country, like the tie which connects him with his family, can never be abolished. His original country is his Mother, in spite of all that he can do. According to the other view, a man's connexion with any Community is of a voluntary kind. At a mature age, and with due formalities, he may choose a country for himself. But this latter view, though it has been asserted by theoretical writers, has never been recognized in the practical legislation of States. The ancient Jurists had a maxim that no one can divest himself of his country: Nemo potest exuere patriam. The Common Law of England was to the same effect, that all the King's natural born subjects owed him an allegiance which they could not cast off. It is held that it is not in the power of any private subject to shake off his allegiance, and to transfer it to a foreign prince: nor is it in the power of any foreign prince, by naturalizing or employing a subject of Great Britain, to dissolve the bond of Allegiance. Entering into a foreign service without consent, is a misdemeanour: taking a commission from a foreign prince, and acting against the King, is treason. The United States of America, and other new States, have made various provisions for admitting new citizens into their community. But they have not, in general, left their citizens at liberty arbitrarily to cast off the tie which connects them with their country. The Federal Courts of the United States have had the subject before them†; and the Opinion which there prevails is, that a citizen cannot renounce his allegiance to the United States, without the permission of government, to be declared by law. Also the Law of France does not allow a Frenchman so far to expatriate himself as to bear arms against his country. 1115 It may be inquired, From whom is this Allegiance due? Who are the subjects of a State? According to the old Law of England, all persons born within the King's dominions are his natural born subjects, and all persons born abroad are aliens. But more recent laws have given the rights of natural born subjects to all children, born out of the King's liegeance, whose fathers, or grandfathers by the father's side, were natural Kent's Commentaries, II. 42. Kent, II. 48. born subjects. Rules more or less resembling this prevail in other States. 1116 Besides this natural allegiance, jurists+ recognize a Local Allegiance, which is due from an alien or stranger, so long as he continues within the dominions, and therefore under the protection, of the State. And as this Allegiance, by which they are required to abstain from injuring the State in which they reside, is demanded of strangers; so are they allowed, in a temporary manner, some of the Rights of citizens. Thus a subject of one country may, for commercial purposes, acquire the Rights of the citizen of another. He has a Commercial Domicile, and this domicile determines the character of the party as to trade‡. CHAPTER V. INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS OF INTERCOURSE. 1117 ACCORDING to International Jus, nations are regarded as distinct moral agents, capable of acting for or against each other, of contracting with each other, and the like. Hence they must have certain National Modes of Intercourse with each other; not merely such as consist in the citizens of one State communicating with the citizens of another; but in the States themselves communicating with each other, by persons who speak and act on their part. Such Intercourse is naturally under the direction of the Executive branch of the Government, as being that branch which acts for the State. But, for the most part, the communications with foreign States are not made directly by the Sovereign, as a part of his general administrative office, but by Ambassadors or other Ministers of the State, deputed for that express purpose. 1118 Every State, considered as an Independent State, has the power of negotiating and contracting Public Treaties with other Independent States. For this purpose, every Independent State has a right to send Public Ministers, and to receive Ministers from any other Sovereign State. No State is, strictly speaking, Kent, II. 49. Blackst. I. 373. + Ibid. I. 370. |