cipline, lose its hold upon men, from being too rigorous, it may regain its hold by being relaxed: but it is to be recollected that the hold thus gained consists in the suffering, alarm, and indignation which crime produces.

:

1000 Many attempts have been made to render punishment a moral Discipline, not only for society in general, but also for the criminal himself; to reform him, while we punish. And so far as this is compatible with the reality of punishment it is a Duty to aim at such an object; not only as a matter of humanity towards the individual, but also as a step in the moral improvement of the community for the persons who are punished by imprisonment, or otherwise, are, after a longer or shorter time, liberated; and these form a part, and in populous States, not a small or unimportant part, of those whose collective moral character is the moral character of the community. How the reformation of criminals is to be aimed at, whether by solitary confinement, by making the prisoner's subsistence or comfort depend upon his industry, or in what other way, is a question, rather of Prison Discipline than of Morality.

1001 The punishments besides death and bodily suffering, as Fine, Imprisonment, Exile, Deportation to a convict colony, and the like, differ much in the severity with which they fall upon different persons, according to their previous circumstances, and the circumstances of the community. Through the feeling of the repugnance which the infliction of death excites in bystanders, many persons have been led to think that capital punishments ought to be abolished altogether. If other punishments could come to assume such a character as to give to men's Rights their reality, capital punishments might cease. But such an increase in the efficacy of lower punishments, exile, imprisonment, and the like, must depend, in a great measure, upon the value of those benefits of social life from which the exile and the prisoner are excluded. If the general lot of man in society could be made so delightful, that it would be comparative misery to lose it, Banishment or Imprisonment for offenders might suffice to keep up such a condition. But then, it is to be recollected, that one requisite for our advancing towards a state of society so generally satisfactory, is the establishment of Moral Rules as realities; and to this, at present, there appears to be no way, except by making Ignominious Death the climax of our scale of Punishments.

1002 We have said that there are two kinds of Laws, Laws against Wrongs and Laws against Vice. What we have hitherto

said respecting Punishments, applies mainly to the former kind. The general Principle which we have laid down respecting Punishment in such cases, namely, that it is to be regarded as an Instrument of Moral Education, is still more evident with regard to Punishments appointed for acts, which, though vicious, violate no man's Right. Such are Laws against Cruelty to animals; as we have said (967); Laws against Indecency and Profligacy; against Profaneness and Blasphemy; and the like. Punishments assigned to such Offenses, evidently have it for their purpose to mark the judgment of the State as to what is right, and what is wrong; and to call upon the citizens to agree in this judgment. Such laws are intended, not to protect the Rights, but to mould the Manners of the citizens: not so much to prevent the acts which the Laws forbid, as to foster in the community a disposition the opposite of that which such acts betray. The State forbids cruelty to animals, because it approves, and would cherish, the feeling of humanity. It puts down indecency and profligacy, as far as a regard for freedom will allow it to do so, because it respects, and would diffuse, chastity and purity. It condemns profaneness and blasphemy, because it reverences God, and would lead all its members to share in this reverence. Such Laws are manifestly Moral Lessons. The State, in promulgating such ordinances, plainly comes forward in the character of a Teacher of the Citizens.

1003 But yet, this office of teaching must needs be very imperfectly discharged, if the means which the State can employ for this purpose are only those which we have mentioned. Punishments, when viewed as Instruments of the Moral Education of the citizens, may have a significance which they cannot have under any other point of view; but still, they are Instruments which can carry the work but a little way. We must have something different from the Axe, the Scourge, the Chain, the Branding Iron, in order to raise the minds of men to any elevated standard of morals. The use that is made of them, may show that Moral Education is a Duty which the State acknowledges, and must needs acknowledge; but we must look in another quarter for the only effectual means by which this Duty can be performed.

CHAPTER XV.

DUTIES OF THE STATE-EDUCATION.

1004 Two main questions may be proposed on the subject now brought before us: Is it the Right of the State to educate the People? and, Is it the Duty of the State to educate the People?

We reply to the first question, that the State has certainly a Right to educate the People, at least so far as is requisite to one of the objects at which every State must aim, its own preservation. Such a Right is involved in the State Obligation of Self-Preservation, of which we have spoken. The State cannot continue to subsist as a State, except there be in the minds of the People, a certain degree of reverence for Law in general, and for the existing Laws in particular. The infliction of punishment requires in some cases (as in the case of ignominious punishments) the sympathy of the people in all cases, their acquiescence. The State cannot give to its punishments that force which the maintenance of the existing order requires, except it can diffuse among the People a moral education in some degree corresponding with the Laws. For this end, therefore, the State must have a Right to control, in some degree, the education of the People; at least so far as to suppress all education which teaches them disobedience of the laws, and produces a hatred of the institutions under which they live. Again; the State must necessarily have a Right (781) of requiring, from its citizens, Oaths of Testimony, Oaths of Office, and the like, as means of securing a general coincidence between men's legal Obligations and their Duties. But oaths cannot produce their effect, if men's minds be not religiously educated: the State must therefore desire the religious education of its citizens: and must have a Right to require that they be religiously educated, at least so far as to feel the force of an Oath. Again, the State, in prohibiting offenses against Person and Property, aims, and has a Right to aim (791), at producing not only quiet, but security. It seeks not only to prevent battery and robbery, which prevention may, in particular cases, be effected by mere force: but also, to make men feel secure that they shall not be beaten or robbed : which can only be done by making the citizens in general peaceable and honest, instead of being pugnacious and rapacious. The State must therefore have a Right of educating the People, or of control

ling their education, so that the general Principles of Morality (160), which inculcate such virtues as peacefulness, honesty, and the like, shall be diffused among them. And thus it is the Right of the State-a Right arising out of the Duty of Self-preservation, and of the protection of Person and Property,-to direct or control the education of its citizens, at least so far as is requisite to diffuse among the people a respect for the property and personal Rights of their neighbours, a reverence for the obligation of an oath, and a general deference for Law and for the actual Laws.

1005 But the State has not only a Right to direct and control education so far as this, and on this ground of its Lower Duties, of Self-preservation, and of the Protection of Person and Property. The State has also Higher Duties, as we have already shown in general (933, &c.), and as we have found to be universally recognized by nations in their Laws. For instance, the character of the Laws concerning Marriage in all nations implies that the State must not only aim at the continuance and bodily comfort of its population, but also at the encouragement of chastity and domestic virtue (968, &c.). The care for the destitute and wretched shown in the Laws of many States (943, &c.), shows that the State acknowledges in itself the Duty of Humanity, and naturally implies that the State desires to promote this virtue among its citizens. And thus the actual Laws of nations in general show that the State universally aims at something higher than the protection of Person and Property; and this higher object may fitly be described as the Moral Education of the People.

1006 There are obvious reasons why states should thus recognize as a Duty the general moral and intellectual culture. of their citizens. The moral and intellectual culture of men, (including in this, as we cannot avoid doing, their religious culture also,) is the highest object at which men can aim; and one which they cannot be content to neglect, or to have neglected. They require to have their moral, intellectual and religious sympathies gratified, as well as to have their persons and properties protected. And many modes of conducting this culture, and gratifying these sympathies, are such as naturally draw men into associations which exercise a great sway over their actions. In some respects, the convictions and feelings which bind together such associations, may be said to exercise the supreme sway over men's actions: for, as far as men do act, their actions are, in the long run, determined by their conviction of what is right on moral and religious grounds: and a government which they hold to be wrong

on such grounds, must tend to be destroyed, so far as its subjects are free to act. And though men may for a long time be subjugated by a government which they think contrary to morality and religion, a society, in which this is the general condition of the subjects, cannot be considered as one in which the State attains its objects. The State, the supreme authority, must, in a sound polity, have on its side the convictions and feelings which exercise the supreme sway. It must therefore have, on its side, the convictions and feelings which tend to bind men into associations for moral, intellectual, and religious purposes. If this be not so, the State has objects in which it fails, and which are higher than those in which it succeeds: and a portion of the sovereignty passes, from it, into the hands of those who wield the authority of Moral, Intellectual, and Religious Associations. It must, then, be an object of the State, so to direct the education of its subjects that men's moral, intellectual, and religious convictions may be on its side; and that Moral, Intellectual, and Religious Associations may be duly subordinate to its sovereignty. See (798).

1007 But further, the State has a moral character, which is represented by the moral character of the governors of the state (806), with certain limitations and conditions (807). The Governors of the State will aim at the Moral and Intellectual Progress of the People. It is their Duty to do this, as acting for the State; and thus to promote the moral and intellectual progress of the people is a Duty of the State, inasmuch as the State is represented by the Governors.

1008 The Moral and Intellectual Education of men is closely connected with their Religious Education; and it does not appear that any Education from which Religion is excluded, will answer either the lower or the higher ends of Education as we have described them. For the convictions of men as to right and wrong, duty and virtue, almost universally derive their support and their efficacy from their convictions respecting the Will of God and the Rewards and Punishments inflicted by Him. And even matters which may be regarded as having an interest for the intellect only, inevitably lead men to higher questions which have a religious interest. Thus the study of the material world leads to questions respecting the way in which the world was created and is directed; which are to most minds more interesting than any questions of physical detail. The study of human history leads to questions respecting the providential history of the world,