unprogressive, and manufactures of small amount, the numbers of the people may multiply so that it is difficult for them to procure subsistence. If this happen, under a Government in which the sense of Duty is not unfolded, or in one in which it is rejected, the people will be left to struggle with their needs for themselves; and the hard discipline of want or famine, will limit their increase, or dispose of the superfluous numbers.

958 It has been sometimes said, that when the number of the labouring population is too great, it is the consequence of their own improvidence; that they ought not to marry and produce children except they have a reasonable prospect of being able to support them; that they have the remedy in their own hands; since, by abstinence from marriage, they may limit their numbers, and reduce them to that amount for which the condition of society has need, and which it will willingly support.

959 But this, though sometimes said by very humane persons, appears to be contrary to all consistent humanity. To expect that the labouring classes shall, by general consent, take the course thus recommended, is to expect that they, the most ignorant and helpless class, shall act for the State; and shall act with more foresight, combination, and self-denial, than any State has even yet acted. And if it be merely meant that each poor man should, for himself, act thus; it may be true, that such Forecast is a Duty; but to this may be opposed in many or most cases, other Duties; the Duty of chastity and the Duty of promoting the happiness of those we love. For it can hardly be meant that a poor man shall never love. We may add, too, that when a man looks to little more than a subsistence for himself and his family, he may, under the influence of love and hope, frequently reckon upon so much when he does not find it; and often his destitution may come by some change which no forecast could have divined. But supposing there be a great number of unemployed poor who have neglected such duties as these; still the question recurs, What is the State to do respecting them? To say that they have neglected their Duty, besides being of no use in pointing out the remedy for the evil, has the fault of being a one-sided censure. For it is equally probable that their richer neighbours also have neglected their Duty; in not employing them for humanity's sake, as well as for the sake of gain; in not warning and superintending the poor; in not helping them at an earlier period; and the like. And both parties being thus to

are still poorer than themselves, and all ranks will be bound together by ties of kindness.

964 Whether the State provision for the poor shall or shall not freeze the spontaneous charity of individuals, as here asserted, will depend much upon whether those who are taxed, on this account, look upon the State as acting towards the poor for them, or for the poor against them. If the former be the case, which is what we have supposed; if the State be looked upon as executing the benevolent intentions of the citizens, and thus, as supplying the inevitable deficiencies which must occur in the practical working of the charity of private persons, however benevolent and however vigilant, there appears to be no reason to fear that the public stream will stop the private sources. We do not find that the State's taking into its hand the enforcement of Ownership or of Contracts weakens men's habits of Justice and Truth; except that in cases where the Government is hated, men are willing to defeat the administration of the Law. Where men look upon the Laws as conformable to Justice, they readily help to enforce them; and in cases which the Law does not reach, they are the more likely to act justly, on account of their having promoted the administration of justice by the Law. In like manner, if men look upon a Poorlaw as humane, and approve it on that account; they are likely both to make the law effective for the purposes of humanity; and when the law falls short of the measure of their humanity, to supply its defects by their own voluntary acts. They are the Nation; the law is their law; it is one part of their dealings towards their poorer friends and fellow-citizens, but necessarily one part only.

965 The example of England appears to show that a legal provision for the poor does not extinguish the disposition to spontaneous charity. In this country, all lands and houses are taxed for the relief of the poor; and this tax may be considered as a condition of the tenure of property. And yet there is, perhaps, no country in which there is more spontaneous charity; especially if we include, in this expression, the relief of the poor in the various forms in which it is undertaken by Charitable Societies. These Associations are something intermediate, in their nature, between the State and an individual; and they show, that the humanity of Englishmen does, as we have intimated, look upon the relief given to the poor by the State, as insufficient; and seeks to supply the deficiency, by the aid of supplementary bodies. These Associations, again, do not supersede the Duty and the

necessity of individual charity. The charity of each person to his immediate neighbours is especially a Duty; for of their distresses, he sees something, and gives to them because he feels for them. Not only no act of the State, but no participation in Associations, can supersede this Duty, as a necessary part of our Moral Culture. We may add also, that it does not seem likely that individual charity, in addition to the operation of Societies, will ever cease to be needed, or will ever be less needed, in order to relieve the distress which prevails in various forms. The forms of misery multiply so fast, and the number of the distressed is so great, that charity is never entirely victorious in her struggle with them. Or rather, all the exertions which we make are quite insufficient to bring the distressed part of the people into a condition which our humanity can contemplate with any satisfaction. All that we do, serves to show us, among other things, this; that both the State and individuals must cultivate the Principle of Humanity within them to a far higher degree than they have yet done, in order that their moral condition may correspond to the actual condition of things, and in order that the continued moral and intellectual progress of the nation may be possible.

966 If we can see, even by the light of rational morality alone, the necessity of thus cultivating our Humanity by acts of kindness and bounty to the poor, this is still more strongly brought to our conviction when we take into our account Christian Morality. The teaching of Christ and his Apostles accepts all the precepts of this kind which prevailed among the Jews, and carries them further. Yet in the Jewish Law, bounty to the poor was largely enjoined. The Jews were forbidden to glean their vineyards, and commanded to leave something for the poor and the stranger (Lev. xix. 10). They were directed to lend to their poorer neighbours, even when likely to lose what they lent (Deut. xv. 9). And almsgiving was among them one of the most necessary practices of a good man. Christ exhorted his disciples. to carry this practice still further (Matth. v. 42): Give to him that asketh thee. He himself was in the habit of giving money to the poor (John xiii. 29). The early Christian congregations made frequent contributions for the poor (Rom. xv. 26; Gal. ii. 10, &c.). And this was often urged as a duty in Apostolic injunctions. The Christians were recommended to lay aside something for this purpose on the first day of the week, according as God had prospered them (1 Cor. xvi. 2). And such a collection on the Lord's day has continued to be a very general practice of Christian congre

gations, up to our own time. In England, indeed, it has been generally discontinued; perhaps in a great measure in consequence of the absolute right to relief which the laws gave to the poor. But there appears to be no reason why the Humanity of the State should supersede the Christian Charity of the Congregation. There is, as we have said, abundant room for the exercise of both. We have already seen (496, 508) how strongly benevolence to the poor is urged upon us as a part of Christian Morality.

967 There is another way in which the Laws of some States, and of England among the number, express the humanity of the humane citizens, and teach a lesson of that virtue to those that need it: namely, by forbidding cruelty to animals, and making it penal. This is a remarkable kind of Law, as being a very distinct instance of Laws dealing with manners, as evidence of vicious dispositions, where no Rights are violated. For animals can have no Rights. And if it be said that humane men have a Right not to be shocked by the sight of wanton cruelty, it may be said on the same ground that truth-loving men have a Right not to be shocked by wanton lying; and the like; which probably no one would assert as a ground of legislation.

CHAPTER XIII.

DUTIES OF THE STATE-PURITY.

968 THE Duties of the State connected with Purity are principally those which concern the Institution of Marriage, which is the foundation of the notion of Purity, so far as regards the Intercourse of the Sexes. The State takes the course which the Duty of Purity prescribes for it, when it establishes and sanctions the Marriage Union, punishes Offenses against it, makes it a source of Rights to the married Persons and to their children. But a regard for Purity imposes still other Duties on the State with respect to this Institution. It is the business of the State, aiming at moral purposes, not only to sanction Marriages such as belong to the manners of any stage of Society, but also to purify and elevate the conception of the Marriage Union itself. Marriage must be, for instance, a union of the married persons upon equal terms, so far as the conditions of the two sexes allow; with an identification of their interests, and an engagement of permanent and obligatory

community of life. The Law teaches this, by prohibiting Polygamy; and by denying the Rights of children to the offspring of mere Concubines.

969 The closeness of the jural and moral union between two married persons may still further be taught by the Law, in its provisions concerning Divorce, the release of married persons from the marriage tie. The entire union of interests, affections, and life, which forms the highest conception of marriage, is expressed in Law, by making marriages indissoluble, and prohibiting Divorce altogether. It may perhaps be said, that this is legislating upon a standard of Morality too high for any existing state of society. It may be said, that the man and the woman may, after marriage, find themselves mistaken with regard to the union of hearts, and harmony of dispositions, which they supposed. They may come to hate each other, as much as they ought to love. Can it answer the purposes of Marriage to prohibit such persons from separating?

970 It may perhaps be further urged, that to shape Laws by this scheme of teaching a pure morality, is visionary and mischievous visionary, because it will not succeed; mischievous, because the law deprives some persons of Rights, or makes them miserable, in its attempts to teach others. It may be added, that the true way to legislate concerning Marriage, is to treat it as a Contract, which it is; to make such provisions as shall most promote the benefit of the Contracting Parties: and among others, what more obvious than this: that when both the Contracting Parties, who must know best, find the engagement a source of unhappiness, they shall be at liberty to dissolve it?

971 To this we reply, that if we take this Principle simply, that the union of the Sexes is a matter of Contract, and that the Contract may at any time be dissolved by the joint agreement of the parties, we must abolish the Laws against Polygamy, and place illegitimate and legitimate children upon the same footing. For this Principle leaves no distinction possible between Marriage and Concubinage. If any voluntary engagement of cohabitation, for any time, be Marriage, there is no need for any Law respecting Marriage. The Law, which requires an engagement of permanency, in order that the Marriage may have legal consequences, limits the freedom of such Contracts; and does so, in order that the Marriage Contract may be more nearly what it ought to be. Concubinage and Marriage are distinguished, in order that an entire union of two persons, for social and moral,