of imposing Oaths, which, as we have said, is exercised by all States (781). By the imposition of Oaths, the citizen's Obligations are identified with his religious Duties; and the State relies upon this identity, as necessary to give it a real hold upon men, and to make them do its business in a sincere, serious, and solemn spirit. If the State cannot obtain this result, it will necessarily tend to dissolution. But religious Duties can have no force for men who have no Religion. The State therefore, in order to provide for its own preservation, must maintain the Religion of the citizens in such modes as it can; for instance, by the religious education of the young, and by arrangements for keeping up the religious convictions and religious sympathies of all. If the State do not, by such means, or by some means, keep alive the religious convictions to which it appeals in the Oaths which it imposes, the Oaths will be rejected, or regarded as unmeaning. In such a Case, men, thinking lightly of Oaths, will think lightly also of Duties and Obligations; and the State will be dissolved by the destruction of all the ties which bind its members to it. Or else, such Oaths will be looked upon as a sinful profanation of true Religion; religious men will refuse to take them, and will give all their efforts to the support of their own Religious Association, which is opposed to the Religion of the State; and thus the actions of such men will tend to destroy the Religion of the State, and perhaps the State itself. It may, indeed, happen, as we have just said, that there are several rival Religions in the State; and in this case, there are especial difficulties in employing Oaths for the purposes of the State, and in keeping up the religious convictions which give Oaths their force. In this case, if all the Religions allow that obedience to the Civil Authorities is a religious Duty, Oaths may still be employed, to promote the lower aim of the State, its own preservation; but the higher aim of the State, the moral and intellectual culture of its members, will necessarily be pursued under great disadvantages; for the moral and intellectual culture of men cannot be prosecuted without employing Religion; and Religion can be employed for such purposes, only by accepting it as true. The State therefore cannot employ, for its higher purposes, Religions which contradict each other; and in such a case as we have spoken of, the State may be prevented from pursuing its higher purposes at all; or may be much impeded in doing so. But even in such cases, the State has those Duties which all the rival Religions agree in recognizing; and has, be the Duty of promoting moral and intellectual culture, in conjunction with the true Religion, as far as circumstances permit. 937 Thus, in all cases, States have Duties. The Duties of States may be arranged under the same heads which we have already had before us. Besides the Duties of Order, by which, especially, the State is the State, there are Duties of Justice, Truth, Humanity, Purity; and there is also the higher and more comprehensive Duty of moral and intellectual Self-culture. The State obtains moral and intellectual Culture for itself, by obtaining it for its members. And thus, the highest and most comprehensive Duty of the State is the moral and intellectual Education of its members. This Duty, as belonging to the State, modifies, in an especial manner, its other Duties; and must be considered in conjunction with all of them, as we shall have occasion to see. CHAPTER XI. DUTIES OF THE STATE-JUSTICE AND TRUTH. 938 THE Duties of Justice and Truth, as belonging to States, point out the same course of action which they point out for individuals they direct the State to abstain from infringing the Property or Rights of other States; to pay its Debts; to observe its Treaties; and the like. In these instances, the Duties have analogy with the Legal Obligations, rather than with the Moral Duties of individuals; and accordingly, these Duties are the subject of an especial branch of Law or Jus; which we may term International Law, or International Jus, and which we shall treat of afterwards. 939 But the Duties of Justice and Truth, as belonging to the State, have also their Sphere of Action within the State; they require, for instance, that both the Laws, and the Administration of the Laws, be conformable to Justice and Truth. We have already stated (397) a general Maxim of Justice, which applies especially to Legislation: namely, that Justice requires us to aim constantly to remedy the inequalities which History produces. And this maxim applies to all the matters with which Law deals; to personal Rights, to Property, to Education. In these matters, Justice does not require Equality. Any attempt to establish Equality would tend to destroy all Property, all Law, and all Right; for if Rights be permanent, their permanent subsistence will produce Inequality. But Justice aims constantly to remedy Inequality. Hence Laws should aim continually to enrich the poor, to strengthen the weak, to elevate the low, to instruct the ignorant. But they should do this in such a manner as not to shake at all the permanence of Rights. They should enable the poor to enrich themselves, the low to rise, the ignorant to learn, by the use of their own Rights, and without trespassing upon the Rights of any other Class. Just Laws will not transfer Property from one Class to another, merely in order to restore equality. Just Laws will not direct the poorest to be educated in the same degree as the richest. But Just Laws will not allow a condition of the community, in which any Class is condemned to a degradation, or poverty, or ignorance, from which they cannot escape. Just Laws will provide openings for the rise of the lower ranks into the place of the higher, as soon as they become fit for such a rise; and will assist such an event, by promoting, among the higher ranks also, such views as will make them regard this event, not as an evil, but as a good. 940 The regard of the State for the Duty of Truth will be shown both by the simplicity and sincerity of its own proceedings, and by its encouraging and promoting this Duty in individuals. For instances of the former kind, we may take the abolition of legal fictions and the removal of forced constructions of old laws by means of improved laws. Such steps make the language spoken by the State more true. Yet in the case of States, much more than in the case of individuals, we must take account of the Conventions (297) by which words, phrases, and processes, acquire a meaning different from their obvious meaning. This is more necessary in the case of States, because it is impossible for States to accommodate their language to each case, as individuals may do. States must act by stated forms of procedure and language, in which forms a complex multitude of interests are implied; and any alteration of the forms, since it will require a consideration of all these interests, and an agreement upon the alteration by the legislating bodies, cannot take place frequently and lightly, nor ought it to do so. Legal fictions, and forced constructions of the language of old laws, cannot be altogether avoided. They have existed in all countries in which laws have long subsisted; and to attempt to avoid them entirely, would be to make the legislator instantly conform to all changes, however capricious, of language practice. Law Language, and Law Forms, must have an antiquated cast, for this reason: that they must have in them a principle of steadiness and permanence beyond our daily speech and common manners. 941 The State promotes and inculcates the Duty of Truth in individuals, by requiring from them a punctual and faithful performance of Contracts and other Engagements. Yet here also, the consideration of other Duties comes in; and limits, in some degree, the extent to which the State insists upon the performance of Engagements. We have seen that the Roman Law did not compel the performance of a nudum pactum (703), a mere promise made for no reasonable consideration; and that the English Law takes the same course. The Law will not, for instance, in general, sanction or enforce an engagement to win and lose money according to the events of a game of chance. To insist upon the performance of such engagements, would be to encourage a reckless spirit, which loves to depend upon casual superiority, or upon mere accident, rather than on rational foresight and self-guidance. The State, in such cases, teaches its citizens that Property is a Trust of more value than the Veracity of such rash and reckless promises. The State, in doing this, does not slight the Duty of Truth; on the contrary, it sometimes condemns the whole proceeding, by making such Gambling a crime. Besides; such engagements are so frequently and so naturally connected with Fraud, as well as Folly, that Honesty, as well as the rational use of Property, would be damaged by the legal recognition of such Engagements. 942 In another kind of Engagements, Promises of Marriage, the Law teaches the Duty of Truth, by punishing the violation of the Promise; and sometimes, even when it has not been made in express words, but only implied in the general course of the language used between the parties. And though, here also, there may be room for Mistake or Delusion; to punish the Levity or Duplicity which can trifle with so serious a matter, is a moral lesson which it becomes the State to give. CHAPTER XII. DUTIES OF THE STATE-HUMANITY. 943 THE Duty of Justice on the part of the State is universally allowed that the State has a Duty of Humanity, is perhaps the state of the community had continued unchanged, would have been labourers, are elevated into something more. There is a constant current upwards, in a thriving society; and the multiplication of intermediate classes provides for the increasing distance between the highest and the lowest. The agricultural classes produce food for an increased number of persons in addition to themselves; and the multiplied occupations bring forward persons who receive their share with advantage to all. 955 We have evidence that in England the advance of which we here speak has gone very far, in comparison with most countries. In all other countries, the agricultural classes are the largest share of the population. In France, for instance, they are two-thirds of the whole. Two agriculturists support one nonagriculturist, besides themselves. But in England, the non-agricultural is twice the agricultural population. Two agriculturists support four non-agriculturists*. And these four receive their support, as members of some or other of the various trades and occupations which have gradually grown up, amid the increased activity and multiplied bearings of our industry. 956 I have spoken of the increase of the productive powers in agricultural labour, because that labour belongs to the earliest condition of mankind, and is always the most indispensable. But improvements may be made in other kinds of labour also, by which its powers may be increased, and at least for a time, a number of persons may be thrown out of work. And this is more likely to happen in manufactures than in agriculture; because improvements are always slowly and gradually introduced in agriculture, but in manufactures often suddenly and rapidly. But on the other hand, the desire for manufactured goods may be extended much further than the desire for food, which is confined within moderate limits; and therefore, it may often happen, that when a body of labourers have been at first thrown out of work, by some improvement in manufactures, which dispensed with their labour, they may have been again absorbed by the manufactories, in order to provide for the increased sale of manufactures to which the diminished prices had given occasion. 957 But we can hardly venture to assert that the multiplication of trades, and the extended use of manufactures, taken together, will always provide an adequate employment and subsistence for the numbers thrown out of work by the improvements in agriculture and manufactures. And even if agriculture be * Jones, On Rent, p. 230. |