PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

THOUGH the following work has been received in some quarters far more favourably than I had ventured to anticipate, other persons have urged against it objections which show that they have much misapprehended its object and plan. I will therefore make a few remarks which I hope may bring the scheme and purpose of the work clearly into view.

Morality has its root in the Common Nature of man; and no Scheme of Morality can be true, except a scheme which agrees with the Common Sense of mankind, so far as that Common Sense is consistent with itself: including in the term Common Sense, both men's convictions as to what is right, and their sentiments as to what is morally good.

Now the Common Sense of mankind has in every age led them to two seemingly opposite Schemes of Morality :-that which makes Virtue, and that which makes Pleasure, the rule and guide of human action;-the system of the Stoic and of the Epicurean, with their successors down to our own times. On the one side, men urge the claims of Rectitude or Rightness, of Duty, of Conscience, of the Moral Faculty; on the other side they declare Utility, Expediency, Interest, Enjoyment, and the like, to be the proper guides of men's actions.

Moreover the Common Sense of mankind suggests, against each of those opposite systems, a sweeping argument, which is, in controversy, repeated more and more vehemently on each side;

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each side having a triumphant persuasion that its own argument is irresistible; and the Common Sense of mankind alternately assents to each argument as convincing.

Against the latter system, that Pleasure is the proper guide of human action, it is urged that such a system does not express the nature and feelings of man;-that we admire and approve virtue when proposed as our guide, and condemn and reject pleasure as something degrading and brutish, when put in opposition to virtue :—that with regard to great transgressions of what is right, odious vices, atrocious crimes, we do not convey what men mean, if we only say that such actions are opposed to utility:-that there is a feeling of remorse for crime, altogether different from the feeling of regret for miscalculated consequences. This argument, presented in various forms, is so constantly and cordially assented to, that the rule of mere pleasure or utility has never been generally accepted as a measure of real Morality.

And against the opposite scheme, that virtue is our proper guide, it has been urged that the mere name or notion of Virtue cannot be a sure guide, since Virtue is a matter of opinion :—that Conscience cannot be a real means of determining what is right, because Conscience determines different things to be right, in different countries, ages, persons:-that actions which the Conscience of man in one century or nation determines to be odious vices or atrocious crimes, Conscience at another time and place has regarded as innocent or even laudable :—that to refer us to an internal Moral Faculty, is to refer us to mere caprice or prejudice. And this argument has been of efficacy enough to prevent the morality of conscience from being generally adopted as a System.

These two arguments are so convincing in their effect upon men's minds, that I do not conceive that any system can stand, against which either of them can be justly urged. In order to frame a scheme of morality which shall fall in with the Common Sense of mankind, we must, I conceive, conform it to both the considerations thus urged. On the one hand, the distinction of right and wrong, of moral good and evil, of virtue and vice, must be a peculiar distinction, different from the mere distinction of pleasure and pain, gain and loss;-on the other hand, this distinc

tion must be one not immediately apprehended by any peculiar sense or faculty, which belongs to each individual, and which may vary in its results in each; but must be a distinction discerned by some use of the faculty of Reason which is common to all mankind, so that men may have the means of coming to an agreement on such subjects. The sentiment of approbation with which we regard what is right and good may be different from any result of reasoning; but there must be reasons why actions are right and good.

When I attempt to proceed further in the direction thus pointed out by the Common Sense of mankind; I am led to ask whether there are any actions or qualities of actions which are universally regarded by mankind with approbation, as right and good; and again, whether there are any moral rules or moral truths which are accepted by the Common Sense of mankind as universally valid and true, and from which we can reason concerning right and wrong.

To this we may reply, that there are such universally approved qualities of actions, namely, those which are commonly called virtues; for instance, Veracity, Justice, Benevolence;—that there are also such rules universally accepted as valid; for instance, Speak the truth: Give to each his own: Be kind to friends:may add that these latter precepts may be expressed as propositions; for we can say, It is right to be truthful, honest, kind; and thus there are moral truths which are generally assented to.

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I remark also that, at this point, the sentiment of approval, and the conviction of truth, which are, both, contained (as I have said) in the Common Sense of mankind on moral subjects, point to one common result. We admire and approve Veracity, Justice, Benevolence; we also assent to the truths that it is right to be truthful, just, kind. Here, therefore, we appear to have certain principles of Reason, which may be also accepted as the dictates of a Moral Faculty; and thus, we have a basis for a Moral System on grounds undisturbed by either of the opposing arguments which have been mentioned. Here are moral principles on which the agreement among men is universal, and from which we can reason to other moral truths.

To this it may be objected, first, that there is not such an agreement and next, that the principles cannot be made the ground of reasoning. These two objections I have to explain, and then, to remove.

It may be said, in urging the former objection, that the excellence of such virtues as Veracity, Justice, and Benevolence is by no means universally assented to:-men treat other men, when they regard them as their enemies, with the extreme of unkindness and violence, rob them, and deceive them by falsehood and fraud; and admire and applaud themselves and each other for such acts. Thus the general authority of the precepts which require men to be truthful, just, and kind, is practically rejected ; and with regard to enemies, is not even speculatively admitted. And even without going to cases in which men are thus under the influence of hostile feelings, there are exhibited in the laws and manners of different nations, the widest differences of opinion as to what conduct Truth, Justice, and Humanity require: and the same might be said of the other virtues. So that there is not among men that agreement respecting fundamental moral principles which we have asserted.

To this I reply, that the difficulty of determining what actions Truth, or Justice, or Humanity requires in a given case, does not make an exception to the principle, that we are to do what Truth, Justice, and Humanity require. The principle may be universally assented to, however difficult be its interpretation or application in a given case. And this is in fact so: all mankind agree that we must be truthful, just, humane, even when they differ about what we ought to do. The excellence of these virtues, the authority of these precepts, is universally acknowledged, though the results of them may be different in the minds of different persons. And as to that part of the objection, which states that we do not apply these precepts to our enemies, and do not treat them with Truthfulness, Justice, and Humanity; I reply, that when the moral faculties of mankind are fully unfolded, they do universally allow that enemies are to be treated with Truthfulness, Justice, and Humanity, no less than friends; though the rules of action in detail may be very different towards enemies,

(if we must necessarily have enemies,) and towards friends. And if, at an earlier period of men's moral progress, they look upon enemies as having no claims to be treated with Truth, Justice, and Humanity, this is because they have only turned their thoughts to the virtues which affect their friends. They approve, it may be, of Fraud or Violence used towards enemies; but this is because they look upon such a course as showing Fidelity and Kindness to friends: and thus, the qualities which they admire, are still the virtues of Fidelity and Kindness, though they limit the sphere of their virtues. The Romans at first had stranger and enemy as synonymous; but afterwards, they learnt to admire the poet when he said Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto. And it is evident that the latter was truly the voice of man's moral nature. For that which we look for, as principles universally assented to by men, must be principles which we assent to when we think and speak in the name of the human species, not of any fraction or segment of it, separated by hostility from the other parts. And thus, the authority of such virtues as Truth, Justice, Humanity, and the like, over the human species, is assented to by all men, when they are in a condition to judge on such matters. Truthful, just, humane, are words which are universally used and accepted as terms of praise. Even if in certain cases, men think that there are allowable exceptions to the rules which enjoin Truth, Justice, Humanity, still they do not deny that it is universally right to be truthful, just, and humane. And thus we have an agreement among men with regard to certain fundamental principles of morality.

But, in reply to this, may be urged that which we noticed in the second objection to our proposed basis of Morality :—namely, that such principles as these are too vague and loose to reason from. It may be said that a verbal agreement in employing the terms truthful, just, humane, and the like, as terms of praise, does not prove that men really agree in approving any definite qualities in human actions: that Veracity, Justice, Humanity, are indefinite. and variable notions, changing with each changing mood and condition of man, and having only a mere nominal permanency and coherence :-that to say that Veracity, Justice, Humanity, are