before us, and act with purpose (propositum): we design it, or mark it out beforehand (designo).

15 Will, or Volition, is the last step of intention, the first step of action. It is the internal act which leads to external acts.

An action that proceeds from my will or volition is my act. But if it do not proceed from my will, it is not my act, though my limbs may be employed in it; as for instance, if my hand, moved by another man whose strength overmasters mine, strikes a blow. In such a case, I am not a Free Agent. Human Actions suppose the Freedom of the Agent. In order to act, a man must be so circumstanced that his volitions take effect on his limbs and organs, according to the usual constitution of man.

The Will is stimulated to action by certain Springs of Action, of which we shall afterwards speak.

16 Among the Springs of Action, are Rules or Laws. There are Laws of Human Action, as well as Laws of Nature (8). But while the Laws of Nature are assertions only, as; Mars revolves in an ellipse; a solar eclipse will take place at the new moon; the Laws of human action are commands: as, Steal not; or, Thou shalt not steal: We must be temperate. These imperative Laws of Human Action, we shall call Rules. Such Rules, when adjusted with due regard to the Springs of Action, direct the Will.

17 Actions may lead to events, as causes to effects: they may have consequences, immediate or remote. To steal, is an action which may have the gain of a shilling for its immediate, and a whipping for its remote consequence.

An End is a consequence intended, aimed at, purposed, designed (14). When we act with purpose, we have an end, to which the action is a Means. To possess the fruit being my end, I purposely cultivate the plant as the means.

18 The Rules of Action (16) may command actions as means to an end: thus: Steal not, that thou be not whipt. Be temperate, in order to be healthy.

19 We have often a Series of Actions each of which is a means, towards the next, as an end. We dig the ground, that we may make the plant to grow; we make a spade, that we may dig the ground; we take a branch of a tree, to make a handle for the spade.

20 To discern the consequences of actions; to act with purpose; and to consider our actions as means to an end; are pro

cesses which are ascribed to the Reason, as well as the mental operations which have already been spoken of (10).

As possessing Reason, man is called rational or reasonable. But the latter term is often used in a more special sense; meaning, agreeable to such rules and measures as man, by the use of his reason, may discover.

21 The Reason, when employed in such processes as have been noticed already (10), is the Speculative Reason: we oppose to this the Practical Reason, which guides us in applying Rules to our actions, and discerning the consequences of actions (20). The Speculative Reason tends to speculative Truth; in which kind of truth ideas, conceptions, and abstract propositions are contemplated: the Practical Reason guides us to truth, so far as truth concerns our actions. By the Practical Reason, we apprehend objects and facts in a manner conformable to their true relations; and hence, we discern the true consequences of our actions, though the relations and the actions are not explicitly contemplated. This true apprehension of the relations of things may be only implied, not explicitly contemplated, in the Act of the Will, by which we take such means as lead to our ends.

22 The ideas, relations, rules, conceptions of ends and means, and the like, which are implicitly involved in the exercise of the Practical Reason, may be unfolded, so as to be matter of contemplation. In this manner, the Practical Reason is developed into the Speculative Reason. Such a developement of the human mind is produced by the exercise of Thought.

23 Animals, as well as man, conform their actions to the true relations of objects (21), and perform actions which look like means to ends (17). Thus, bees build cells in hexagonal forms, so as to fill space; and birds build nests, so as to shelter themselves and their young. But in the case of animals, the tendency to action cannot be unfolded into ideas, and conceptions of ends. Bees have no conceptions of hexagons, separate from their cells. Birds do not contemplate an end, when they build a nest: for they build nests in a state of captivity, where there is no end to be answered. The tendencies to such actions are implanted in the constitution of the animal, but are not capable of being unfolded into ideas, as in a rational nature they are (22). Hence such tendencies are called Instincts, and are distinguished from Practical Reason.

24 Instinct, as well as Reason, operates through the Will, to direct the actions. In both cases, the Will is stimulated into

action by certain Appetites and Desires, which we shall term Springs of Action.

We use the term Springs of action, rather than Principles of action, because the term Principles is used equivocally, not only for Operative Principles, which produce action, but for Express Principles, which assert Propositions.

The Springs of Action of which we have to speak, are the Motive Powers of man's conscious nature, and might hence be called Motives. They first put man in motion; that is, in the state of internal motion which leads to intention and will. But in common language, the term Motive is rather used to designate the special object of the intention, than the general desire which impels us to intend. When a man labours hard for gain, his spring of action being the desire of having, his Motive is to get money. But he may do the same thing, his Motive being to support his family, and then his spring of action is his family

affections.

CHAPTER II.

THE SPRINGS OF HUMAN ACTION.

25 THE Springs of Action in man may be enumerated as follows: The Appetites or Bodily Desires; the Affections; the Mental Desires; the Moral Sentiments; and the Reflex Sentiments. We shall consider them in order.

1 The Appetites.

26 The Appetites or Bodily Desires are common to man and brutes. The strongest and most obvious of them are the Appetites for Food (Hunger and Thirst), by which the individual is sustained; and that by which the species is continued. These appetites are tendencies towards certain bodily things, and cravings for these things when they are withheld.

But besides these, there are many other bodily Desires which may be classed with the Appetites, and which are powerful springs of action. Such are the desire of rest after labour, the desire of sleep after long waking, the desire of warmth and shelter, the desire of air and exercise.

These Desires are Natural Wants; they are Needs of man's nature. Man cannot exist at all, except they are satisfied in some degree; and cannot exist in a healthy and stable condition, except they are satisfied in an adequate degree.

27 Moreover, by the constitution of man, certain Pleasures are conjoined with the satisfying of these wants; and the Springs of Action, of which we now speak, include the Desire of these Pleasures. Thus, man has not only an appetite for food, but a desire of delicious food, and a Sense of Taste, by which he relishes such food. He has, in like manner, a pleasure in sweet odours, and a desire of this pleasure; and similarly for the other

senses.

Man uses various Arts, to satisfy his natural wants, and to gratify his desires for the pleasures of sense, of which we have spoken. As such gratifications, through means of art, become habitual, they also become Wants, and are termed Artificial Wants. These Artificial Wants, no less than Natural Wants, are powerful Springs of Action among men.

2 The Affections.

28 The Affections are tendencies or cravings directed towards conscious individuals; not, like the Desires, tendencies and cravings for bodily objects. The Bodily Desires tend to things, Affections to Persons.

But the Affections are not mere tendencies or cravings, they are internal Emotions or Feelings: being directed to persons, not to things, they mould the thoughts in a way quite different from what the Appetites do.

29 The two principal affections are Love, and Anger. The term Love, is sometimes used to describe the Bodily Desires, as when we talk of a Love of wine, or a Love of the pleasures of the table. But the more direct and proper sense of the word, is that in which it denotes an affection towards a person. A man's love of his wife and children is more properly Love, than his love of wine or of music.

30 The most important of the Affections which thus come under the name of Love are;-the Love of the mother and of the father towards the children, Maternal and Paternal Love;-the Love of children towards their parents, Filial Love;-the Love of brothers and sisters towards each other, Fraternal Love; the special and distinguishing affection of man towards woman, and woman towards man, which tends to the conjugal union; this is

often expressed by the word Love, without any epithet; its natural sequel is Conjugal Love. Also, among the kinds of Love we must enumerate Friendship, and our Love of our Companions; likewise the Affection, so far as it partakes of the nature of Love, with which we regard our fellow-citizens, our fellow-countrymen, our fellow-men.

31 The Affection of Anger also appears in various forms. Anger comes into play against any one who assaults or threatens us, in man as in other animals; and this Affection, giving vehemence and rapidity to our actions, aids us in self-defence. Anger in this form, is the natural repulsion and return to any harm which falls upon us or approaches us, and is called Resentment, as being the sentiment which is a natural re-action to the hostile sentiment of another person.

32 The Affections conspire with the Desires. We are angry with those who take from us, or prevent our obtaining, what we desire. We love those who aid us in gratifying our desires. These affections are modified according to the circumstances under which they thus arise, and they hence receive special names. Men feel Gratitude towards those who have conferred benefits upon them. As they feel sudden Resentment against a sudden attack, they feel Permanent Anger against those who have inflicted or endeavour to inflict pain or harm upon them, or whose desires come in conflict with theirs. When this feeling is no longer a burst of emotion, but a settled and steady feeling, it is Hatred, Malice, or Ill-will. When malice prompts men to return pain and harm to those from whom they have received pain or harm, it is Revenge.

All these Affections belong to the irascible part of man's nature. 33 The Affections, as has been said, are directed towards persons. In speaking of the affections, we suppose him who feels them to live as a man among men. He is in Society; and his desires and affections are excited, determined, and modified by the circumstances of his social condition. These circumstances may be various, both for the individual, and for the general body of the society. There are various Forms and Stages of Society. We may conceive, as the original form, a society in which there are no Affections except the Family Affection, and no Appetites except the Natural Wants. But as the society becomes more numerous, and Artificial Wants increase, many other kinds of relation and dependence grow up among the individuals who compose the society, and the Affections are modified by these new conditions.