ing precise and consistent moral conceptions. Those especially need such Truth, such Precision, and such Consistency, whose office it is to make Rules for others, or to teach them the Rules which they are to follow ;-those, that is, who have to legislate for mankind, or to educate them. The Duty of Wisdom is especially incumbent on Legislators and on Educators.

Since the offices of Legislation and of Education especially require the possession of Moral Truth, we shall defer the consideration of those offices in detail, till we have, under our notice, those further elements of Moral Truth, which we still have to consider.

We will only observe, before we quit this part of the subject, that Legislation implies, not merely combinations of Conceptions, and mental results of Ideas, but also the external Facts, by which Law is realized. Laws are Moral Rules, clothed in an actual historical form. The Legislator must also be a Governor; or at least his ideas must be adopted and enforced by the Governor, in order to make them be Laws.

247 In like manner, Education, so far as it teaches Rules of action, implies external facts, which give reality to the precepts inculcated. The Educator teaches the learner the Laws of the Land, for instance, in order that he may guide himself by them; but in order that his teaching may have its effect, he must be able to speak of these Laws, as Laws actually in force; not as merely possible conceivable Rules. And when the Educator has to teach, not merely human Laws, but moral Rules, he must still be able to present these moral Rules, not merely as imaginable, but as possessing a real Authority. Moral Rules derive their substance from the Supreme Rule of Human Action, of which they are partial expressions. Hence, this Supreme Rule must have a real authority, and an actual force. The Educator teaches his pupil to do what is absolutely right; and because it is right; but this teaching supposes that its being right includes a sufficient reason for doing it; estimating reasons according to the real condition and destination of man.

The Supreme Rule of Human Action derives its Real Authority, and its actual force, from its being the Law of God, the Creator of Man. The Reason for doing what is absolutely right, is, that it is the Will of God, through which the condition and destination of man are what they are.

We are thus led to Religion, as a necessary part of the Moral Education of men. But in order to complete the train of thought by which Morality leads us to Religion, we must pursue somewhat

further the subject of Moral Transgression, of which we have already spoken (206).

CHAPTER XIII.

OF TRANSGRESSION.

248 IN our survey of the several classes of Duties (174—247) we have seen that, beside the direct Duties of action, and of affection towards others, there are reflex Duties which regard ourselves : the Duties, namely, of unfolding within us, or establishing in our minds, the Operative Moral Principles from which external Duties most proceed; the Duty of aiming at our own Moral Progress; the Duty of cultivating in our own minds the principles of Benevolence, Justice, Truth, Purity, and Order. We have it for our business and proper aim, to make our Lives a Moral Progress, in which these Principles constantly become more and more identified with our habits of action, thought, and feeling. We have to form our character, so that these principles are its predominant features. We have to seek not only to do, but to be; not only to perform acts of Duty, but to become virtuous (195, &c.).

Further there is an Intellectual, as well as a moral progress, at which we must aim; an Intellectual Progress, which is a means to a Moral Progress. We are to endeavour constantly to improve our powers of apprehending Truth, in order that we may be able the more readily and firmly to lay hold on that Moral Truth, which is the proper guide of our Lives (245).

249 We have to aim at this moral and intellectual progress as the Greatest Good which we can desire for ourselves (209). But further, the complete Benevolence which is part of the character at which we thus aim, and which seeks the good of others, must seek for them that good which for ourselves we esteem the greatest. Our benevolence, therefore, will seek the moral progress of others as well as our own; and intellectual progress for them, no less than for ourselves, as a means of moral progress. And thus, the complex Object, at which we shall constantly have to aim, is, the Moral and Intellectual Progress of ourselves and of the rest of Mankind.

We may consider this as the highest object of action and thought which we can propose to ourselves; and in proportion as we make

this our object, and direct our thoughts and purposes to it, we elevate our minds.

250 We have already seen (196, &c.) that we have the power, in some measure at least, of carrying on this moral and intellectual progress within ourselves. That this progress must be altogether incomplete and imperfect without the aid of Religion, we shall hereafter see; but it is at least so far possible for men to promote or neglect their own moral progress, that one man shall differ very much from another in the advance he has thus made. Two men may be, at least by comparison, one virtuous and another vicious; and by a like difference, they may be at very different stages of their moral progress; if, indeed, we may not say of some, that the course of their lives is a constant moral degradation rather than a progress.

251 This moral progress, as we have said (203), can never terminate while we remain on earth. So long as we live, we shall have room to make ourselves better and wiser: to increase the warmth of our benevolence, to purify our hearts, to elevate our thoughts, to make ourselves more and more virtuous. To do this, is a moral growth and nurture; a moral life, which can never end, while our natural life goes on. Or if the moral progress end, the moral life is turned to moral disorder. In the moral faculties, if there be not a healthy growth, there must be a morbid decay and foul disease.

252 The moral life is nourished by the perpetual aliment of moral actions, moral habits, moral thoughts, moral affections. All acts of Duty, and all affections which lead to acts of Duty, tend to promote our Moral Culture. On the other hand, all Transgressions of Duty interrupt our Moral Culture, arrest our Moral Progress, and are steps in a retrograde moral course. Unkind affections, unlawful desires, fraudulent intentions, impure imaginations, are inconsistent with our moral advancement, while they occupy us; and are proofs that we have much still to do, in giving a moral character to our being. If these things form frequent and common parts of our lives, they are proofs that we have made little moral progress; or rather, that we have made none, and are making none. If these things are acquiesced in by us, and allowed to grow into habits, we are not going forwards, but backwards, in moral character. So far as this is our case, we tend to become more and more degraded, depraved, vicious (206).

253 Thus, if wrong affections, desires, intentions, and imaginations, occur in our lives at all, they are interruptions of our

moral progress; and evidences that, in our moral culture, we have still much to do. Yet such things may occur, so long as our moral culture is incomplete; and since, during our lives, it ever must be incomplete, they may occur so long as life remains. The Springs of Action, not fully converted into Moral Principles, may, under special circumstances, tend to deviate from the Law of Duty. Desires may be inflamed, Affections perverted, Reason misled, Consideration omitted, Rules neglected, lower aims put in the place of the highest; and man may fall below the line which morality draws. The circumstances which tend to produce such an effect are Temptations. By the impulses of the Springs of Action, not fully controlled by Rules of Duty, man is tempted to transgress such Rules.

254 It is the moral business of man to resist Temptation. The powers by which we guide ourselves, the Reason, and the Moral Sentiments, must be employed in controlling the Desires and Affections which impel us in an immoral direction. All the results of our Moral Culture must be called to our aid for this purpose. The express Moral Principles which we have learnt; the Operative Moral Principles which we have acquired; Consideration, Rational Action, and Rules of Duty; we must call all these into operation, that they may overcome the immoral impulses by which we are urged. This we must do as moral agents; although to these resources, Religion alone can give their full force.

If a man does not effectually resist Temptation; if he is overcome and yields, he transgresses the Rules of Duty; he offends against Morality; he commits a vicious act. The contemplation of man under this aspect, as liable to Transgressions and Offenses, introduces us to very important and serious views of his condition and destination.

255 Transgressions or Offenses are described by various terms, implying various degrees of condemnation. As defects from the standard of Morality they are Faults; and when we would ascribe them to weakness of Will, rather than to wrong intention, they are called Failings. As transgression becomes graver, more grievous, we have no term which directly expresses an enormous violation of morality (as do the Latin scelus, flagitium, facinus). Vice implies the disposition to transgress; Guilt and Crime properly express the violation of human laws; and Sin, an offense against God. But Guilt and Crime are terms also used of the violation of moral laws; and all Transgressions are sins. Those

who commit Sins are wicked, (which is said to have meant, originally, under the influence of evil spirits). Sins are described, according to their character, as acts of cruelty, of injustice, of falsehood, of uncleanness, and the like. As they excite our moral abhorrence, they are termed hateful, heinous, atrocious, shocking, abominable, detestable, execrable. Crimes are said, figuratively, in proportion as they are greater, to be higher, deeper, heavier, darker. As their criminal nature is more manifest, they are flagrant.

256 It may be asked, according to what Measure and Standard do moral transgressions become greater and graver. Is there a definite gradation from slight Failings to atrocious Crimes; and if so, what circumstances fix the place of each Offense in this Scale? To this we reply, that the universal voice of mankind declares some offenses to be greater, some to be less; some heavier, some lighter. But yet, since the moral transgression consists in the perversion of internal affections, desires, and will; and since this internal condition cannot be fully known and compared in any two cases, at least in any two classes of cases; it must be almost impossible to declare one class of transgressions to be necessarily better or worse than another. This at least we may say; that to pronounce one kind of offenses better and slighter than another, would tend to convey a false opinion respecting the offenses thus in some degree preferred and palliated. For no transgression can be said to be so much better than another, as not to be utterly bad. No offense can rightly be deemed slight, since the slightest utterly interrupts our moral progress.

257 But in this aspect of offenses, that they interrupt or undo our moral progress, we have a kind of Measure of their magnitude. Those offenses are most grievous, which are most pernicious in their effect upon our moral culture. Some may interrupt our moral culture for a time, and it may nevertheless be resumed. Others may show that moral culture has no place in our thoughts; that we have no wish to be better than we are. Other transgressions may imply a recklessness or despair of moral progress; a state of mind which points to moral ruin as its natural sequel. The gravity of the offense will therefore be increased by all circumstances which indicate it to be the result of an habitually. immoral state of the Affections and Desires, of settled and deliberate purpose, of a want or a rejection of moral aims. The hope that an offense may be only a transient interruption of the offender's moral progress, is favoured by its being the result of great and sudden Temptation, plainly at variance with the habi

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